





DAVRSSTHANA INTERNATIONAL  
Vol. 30 1990

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# INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY

Philosophy, Psychology,  
Psychical Research, Religion,  
Mysticism & Sociology

117

**MORADABAD**  
(India)

30  
VOL. XXX

JANUARY 1990

NUMBER 1



## DEDICATION

*This 117th issue of the Darshana International  
is most respectfully dedicated to  
PROF. AWTAR SINGH  
Professor of Philosophy, Dean Faculty of Arts  
who had devoted his life for the Cause of  
Indian Philosophy and Sikhism.  
May God rest his soul in peace.*

ANURAG ATREYA  
Managing Editor





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### OF

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## Research, Religion, Mysticism

## & Sociology

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An International Quarterly

OF

Philosophy, Psychology, Psychical  
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## The Thirty Years of the DARSHANA INTERNATIONAL

*Darshana International* has completed Twenty nine years. of its existence with this number and enterich in its 30th year. Darshana International served the cause of Philosophy and its allied disciplines for a long period of 29 years. It is all due to sincere and untiring efforts of the distinguished scholars on the Editorial Board, Contri butors, Subscribers who are taking been interest in bringing Darshana International to the lime light, who deserve our appreciation. This Journal has achieved rare distinction in the realm of the philosophical journals of the world.

The General Editor Dr. J. P. Atreya deserves much more appreciation for his efforts to continue this Journal which is run by him single handedly for the last 29 years.

Mr. B. V. S. S. Mani, the Hony. Managing Director of the Swadharma Swaarajya Sangha, Madras in enabling us to send *Darshana International* to several institutions. Mr. Mani has been a great source and solace of inspiration and motivation for us to promote philosophical undertaking to continue this venture of ours. His continuance of financial assistance to promote the publication of the *Darshana International* for so many years without any other help from other sources.

We are really sorry on account of financial difficulties the Journal is behind schedule. We hope by the end of the next year the journal will be upto date. By June 1992 all the issues of 1991 will be released.

**Darshana Printers** and its staff under the able leadership of Mr. S. K. Agarwal is doing work with sincerity and devotion. They deserve our heartfelt thanks for bringing out this Journal. Without their active interest and efforts it was not possible to continue this journal so long.



We are conscious of the shortcomings of our journal. It is all due to financial difficulties. The cost has gone enormously high and the regular publication is being delayed. We have published large number of articles of high standard to attract more and more scholarly readers.

We wish our Readers to introduce this Journal and recommend *Darshana International* to their friends and libraries in their vicinity to subscribe.

We wish all our Readers, Subscribers, Members of the Editorial Board, and Contributors a *VERY HAPPY AND PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR.*

ANURAG ATREYA  
Managing Editor



## I

*Advaita in Paramartha and Vyavahara**A. G. Javadekar***Absolute And God**

I will try to summarise my views and constructive contributions, I think, I have made in my books and hundreds of articles in English, Hindi, Gujarati, Marathi though I can not do justice to all of them.

In Metaphysics, I have been a constructive exponent of the Advaita Vedanta. I look upon the Ultimate reality as surpassing the best of human thought. In this sense, It is Nirguna or Acintya. It transcends all categories of Being, Nothing, Both and Neither. The root of such ideology is in the Nasadya Sukta. The Brahman however is described by the acceptance of these categories as well as by rejection of them. While the Sunya of the Buddhists of the Madhyamika School is described by rejecting these categories only. This negative description is comparable to maya of the Advaitins. Thus the concept of Nirguan Brahman is superior to that of Sunya. In a sense it is neither Saguna nor Nirguna neither dual nor non-dual.

The highest anthropomorphic description of Brahman is that it is Sat-Cit-Ananda. This is the God or Saguna Brahman; The Ultimate Reality is amenable to such description. It is the foundational reality for all anthropomorphic approaches, and therefore these approaches cannot be altogether false, though they can not be altogether or absolutely true. Theism in this sense is the next best possible truth after Absolutism But I am inclined to accept the attitude of the saints of Maharashtra and of other also who consider God as both saguna and nirguna. While God presents to us in the saguna and sakara aspects of infinite auspicious qualities and varied forms, His nature is not totally exhausted in this presentation. What transcends that presentation is for greater than the manifested. The absolutist has the loftiest conception of God, [incomparable with that of any theist or dualist. Moreover the Absolute could be interpreted



by the theist according to his own liking. God may be father, Mother (as Goddess), lover or beloved or child (as Balakrishna) and so on. Through this intense love to personal god, the impersonal Absolute could be realized. These variety of forms are not open to be the non-Absolutistic faiths. Again this kind of attitude to God is very liberal allowing freedom to others to have their own lovable forms of God. Religious attitude ceases to be exclusivist claiming the whole truth for one's own faith. The principle, very well expressed in Rigveda, is that Reality is one but sages describe it variously (*Ekam sat vipra bahudha vadanti*). There is no greater principle than this either for metaphysics or for theology, The many is manifestation of the one. The one runs through the many. This could be applied to all the prevalent human cultures, as varied expressions of human existence.

God or the Reality as *sat-cit-ananda* does not mean that these are the three exclusive alternatives, in terms of which the absolute could be understood. The same reality could be approached in three ways. Ontologically it is 'Being'. Epistemologically it is 'Knowledge', and axiologically it is value, *ananda* being the criterion of the realization of value, There is a distinction in the connotation, without there being a difference in the reality that is denoted.

### Truth in the Doctrine of Maya

There is a considerable amount of truth in the doctrine of *maya*, *avidya* or *ajnana* as taught in the Advaita Vedanta. Every thinking human individual admits that he suffers from ignorance with which he is inherently endowed. This is the universal presence of ignorance, or absence of knowledge of the reality as it is. All the Indian systems accept that we are born in ignorance which constitutes bondage knowledge (though differently conceived in each system) leads to liberation. This universal, beginningless ignorance is named *maya* which covers, at it were, reality from us. The other importance of the *maya* concept is that it make a Valuational discrimination between the worldly, empirical, pragmatic reality of the common routine daily experience and the transcendental intuitive experience of the Ultimate Reality, The world is declared as false (*mithya*) only in comparison with the eternal reality as against the perishable reality. It is illogical to declare the changing evanescent world and the unchanging timeless Brahman as equally real in the same sense. That will also go against the non-dualistic position.

The question is whether the Absolutist can compromise with any other realities and yet retain the absolutist standpoint. For the non-Advaitic Vedantins the world is material and real with the plurality



of its objects, as well as the plurality of the individual souls. Yet they want to call themselves Advaitins, though this is qualified with some epithet as Visistadvaita, or Suddhadvaita, or Svatantradvaita (or merely Dvaita) or Dvaitadvaita. None of these positions is that of Absolute Non-dualism as that of Sankaracarya. Brahman is the only unqualified reality, and nothing else is real whether like it or unlike it, nor are there any parts within it.

While pragmatically there is all the reality for the material world of the multiplicity of objects and the plurality of the individual souls, this is not the highest metaphysical truth. From the highest (paramartha) point of view just as the jiva is Brahman, the world too is Brahman. There is a certain inconsistency in saying that while the world is unreal, the jiva or the soul is identical with and not other than, Brahman. Both jiva and jagat are empirically real and transcendently ideal, that is, identical with Brahman.

### Reality of the World in Advaita Vedanta

I have, in an article, given an elaborate explanation as to how even in Sankara's philosophy the world is regarded as real from the various points of view. One of the expressions familiarly used in his philosophy is '*lokavat*' meaning as in the world, thus this world becomes a set example for him to explain the philosophical problems. The world according to him, is different from the dream, It is not an illusory experience (*prati-bhasika*). In the rope-serpent illusion in the world of the waking state, it is in terms of the reality, of the worldly rope that the serpent is regarded as illusory. Sankara's epistemology is realistic, since the mental modification has to take the shape of the real external object in order to be true. His refutation of the Vijnanavada or subjective idealism of the Buddhists establishes the objective external reality of the world. That is there is an experience of the world object as external (*bahirvat*). The pragmatic knowledge of the world requires dualism of the subject and object, subject and predicate, substance and attribute. He accepts six methods (*Pramanas*) for the knowledge of this real world, where the knower (*Pramata*), the known (*prameya*), the instrument of knowledge (*pramana*) and the resulting knowledge (*prama*) are realistically distinguished and differentiated. The entire philosophical investigation becomes meaningful only after regarding the world as objective reality, and exemplifying duality and plurality. Though the philosophical investigation has to terminate in the transcendental unitary experience. Thus a distinction is significantly made between the primary or expressed meaning (*vacyartha*) and the secondary or intended meaning (*lakshyartha*) of the words. Thus the goal of rational



philosophical knowledge is determined in the context of the worldly experience, but its actual realization is in a different kind of experience which is intuitive and direct (*aparokranubhuti*). For the realization of such experience certain ethical conditions are laid down. They are known as four fold ethical preparation (*sadhana-catustaya-sampannata*) or equipment. This depends upon the acceptance of the world as real. This equipment as well as the various yogas like the Rajayoga, Karmayoga and the Bhaktiyoga lead the aspirant to purify his mind of various blemishes. All this practice is possible in this life and in this real world. This entire Dharmasastra is devotedly adhered to before the perfection of salvation or realization of Selfhood is reached. Neither the individual's physical death, nor the actual realization of selfhood as distinguished from the physical body during life time lead to the dissolution of the physical world. The very distinction between the *jivanmukti* and *videhamukti* is with reference to the reality of the physical body along with the reality of the physical world. While the individual soul is liberated through the realization of the self or Brahman, the world continues to exist.

But the most important truth about the world is that whatever reality the world has is due to its ontological oneness (*tadatmya*) with Brahman. The five fold analysis of the world phenomena as it is", 'it appears', 'it is liked', 'it has a name', 'it has a form' (*asti, bhati, priya, nama, rupa*) indicates that the first three constitute *sat-cit-ananda* or Brahman, and the other two are only charging appearances. Jagat, thus is founded in Brahman. No other Vedantin has given such highest ontological status to the world. And yet they find fault with Sankara as a *mayavadin* and as a concealed Buddhist (*pracchanna-banddha*). They have failed to understand the highest import of Sankara Advaitism.

### Prakrti or Jagat is Caitanyasvarupa

According to Advaita the only reality is *Cit* or *Caitanyamatra*. There is no other reality as *acit* or *jada*. The experience of the so called *acit* or insentient world or *prakrti* is owing to fundamental ignorance called *avidya* in the subjective sense, or *maya* in the objective sense.

The Advaitic position is consistent to the Upanisadic teaching that all this is verily 'Brahman' (*Sarvam khalu idam Brahman*). From the theistic point of view the same truth, is expressed as all this is God (*Vasudevah Sarvam*) as Gita puts it, Also, *Purusa eva idam sarvam*). The self is all this.

I have given above the indication that the world is founded in Brahman. Its reality is indeed because of its being nothing else than



*cid rupatva*. What we call jagat or prakrti is in essence *caitanyaśvarupa* and not *jadaśvarupa*. What is amenable to sensuous perception and conceptual construction is only a superficial understanding of reality. To experience it as *caitanya* is the essence.

All our sciences are based upon the study of the actual working or behaviour of nature. Our physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy etc., reveal the uniform laws of the behaviour of nature. To put in other words, prakrti reveals various talents. It has a mathematical or geometrical talent physical and chemical talent, biological and psychological talent, an artistic and ethical talent. This means that it is wrong to consider that nature is an unintelligent principle. In my two addresses I have dealt with philosophical ecology, The first as the Chairman of Indian Philosophical Congress, when the International Philosophical Conference was invited at Delhi in 1975. The second was my presidential Address at Bhuvaneshwar in the I. P. Congress Session in 1981. The ecological problem is to become aware of the very intimate relation that man has with his environment, which is nothing else than nature in all its aspects. Man and nature interact and they together form one reality. When man forgets this owing to his egoism and selfish interests, either of the individuals or of the species, alienation takes place. This quite often results in the exploitation of natural resources, causing imbalances. According to Sankhya philosophy, prakrti or nature is originally in a state of equilibrium. But it is because of the external intrusion of puruṣa or man that the equilibrium is disturbed. According to the Advaitic point of view, however, the two principles of prakrti and puruṣa being basically the manifestations of one and the same reality, the loss of equilibrium in prakrti has its counter reactions on puruṣa. It is not possible to disturb prakrti without inviting trouble for puruṣa. They stand or fall together. Prakrti or jagat, therefore can not be looked upon as an inert insentient principle. Man maintains himself through nature. The environmental science supports the Hindu concept of dharma as *dharana*. Man cannot preserve himself at the cost of nature. The survival of human species very much depends upon the survival of the balance of nature.

In a sense the nature inclusive of everything including man is the omniscient and omnipotent principle, not other than God or Brahma-man. This is the ecological argument for the existence of God. Nature is such an inherently harmonious system of various systems which are the basis of the formulation of various sciences. Man is self-conscious, yet ignorant. He derives his Knowledge from the study of nature. It is possible for man to increase his knowledge by reading the open book of nature. But all the knowledge gathered by all the



scientists and philosophers throughout the centuries can not equal the infinite storehouse of knowledge inherent in nature. But there is one more fundamental distinction between human knowledge and that of nature. The human knowledge is only theoretical and of the nature of information only. It does not reach the level of practical wisdom. Knowledge, as nature has it is not theoretical but operative. It is knowledge put in action. It is wisdom rather than knowledge. But man prides in his consciousness and yet remains fool. He is so foolish that he calls nature as unconscious and undervalues it. But if man's consciousness is consistent with his ignorance, nature's apparent unconsciousness could be consistent with wisdom in the form of operational knowledge. Nature has her own ways of recouping losses and if man continues to conquer nature she very well knows to vanquish him. The point is that we must not commit the mistake of regarding nature, prakrti or jagat as an insentient principle.

### Body is also Caitanya Svarupa

Just as the spiritual or 'conscious' or omniscient nature of the world is in consistency with the omnipresent principle of Brahman or Caitanya, I maintain that the so called physical body as constituting the part and parcel of the physical nature also is replete with Caitanya. Philosophers are familiar with maintaining the distinction and opposition between the self and not self, between Atman and anatman, the latter being the body composed of the five elements. Even to understand this it to go a long way in accepting the presence of Caitanya at the most along with that of unconscious matter. It is better than the position that all is matter as the staunch materialist would hold. But if the philosophical position of the omnipresence of the spiritual principle is acceptable as the Advaitins do, then in consistency with this position the so-called physical body can not be excluded from being caitanya. I know that even the Advaitins would be slow in accepting and understanding this position of equating body with spirit or even supplanting bodily existence by the spiritual existence. If this position, is not accepted, then it goes against the spirit of spiritualism or of Advaitism of Brahmanavada.

It may be initially necessary for Advaitism to follow the negative method of *vyatireka* to appreciate the essential nature of *atman* as opposed to *anatman*, that the *atman* is *sat-cit-ananda* and not *asat-jada-duhkha* as the body and the world appear to be. But, the final position is that of the positive synthesis or *samanvaya*. According to this the conclusion is that *sat-cit-ananda* Brahman is the only existence, and nothing else exists. This, we have seen above that the world is essentially Brahman. And in the same way this body too is Brahman,



that is, body is not *acetana* but *cetana*. Thus, either accept the position that there is non-dualism of *Caitanya* being along everywhere without exception and therefore the body is too *Caitanyamatra*, or if you so choose make the exception of body and retain its *acetana* character, and consequently reject the Advaitic position of *Caitanyavada* being altogether impossible and false. The Absolute advaitin is completed to accept the *cetana* nature of the body. This, as a matter of the truth of *Caitanyamatra*, the Advaitin must with all willingness accept.

One need not be shocked at this position. Let us see how true it is. If my body were merely a physical non-sentient existence and if I am the sentient soul with which I identify myself, I should have a complete control over my body as my possession. But the fact is that I do not have any convincing knowledge of myself as to what truly I am, much less indeed have I any real knowledge of my bodily existence. I try to learn of the truth of what is called the self by reading books on philosophy. And I am dismayed by the variety of views held from denying the self altogether to maintaining that self is all that is. In between there are views identifying the self with the body, with the senses, with the life principle, with the mind, with the reason, with a continuous stream of consciousness, as a name given to the totality of the various constituents, as a momentary existence, as a substance, as a subject, as having an attribute of consciousness and so on and so forth, I have only a 'notion' (as Berkeley would put it) *that* I am, but I do not really know *what* I am.

If this is my ignorance about myself, inspite of being the most intimately nearest and most familiar thing, what knowledge can I possess of my body which though very familiar is so remotely known to me?

If I ask this question to myself as to whether I maintain my body, or my body maintains me. I find that my body is in full control of my existence. I learn from the physiological and anatomical sciences, from the sciences of health and hygiene as to how my body is most wonderfully constructed and how wisely it functions in full Cooperation and harmony of its various systems. Each sense organ and motor organ has its system. Besides, there are several such systems as of respiration, blood circulation, digestion, excretion, cerebration, nervous systems, muscular system, glandular system, cellular system, and various internal organs, which all together maintain my existence as a living conscious being. What control do I have over all these? I have learnt of their ways of functioning and of their structure from the books and the teachers and the scientists who have spent their life times to study and understand them. By my self I am completely



ignorant of all this. I eat, I drink, I talk, I hear, I walk, I sleep and wake up as per the requirements and dictates of my body: Actually I do not always consciously initiate these activities and operations, For instance, I do not breathe, but breathing goes on spontaneously inspite of me. My becoming conscious of it may actually cause disturbance in this natural process. My heart, the vigilant jumping station goes on with out my orders in order that I may continue to live. The food is asked for by the body, it orders the various limbs to work and get the food in the stomach. The food gets digested, not at all because of my efforts. In short, all the bodily functions go on systematically which result in my being alive. I do not preserve myself of my own, but the body preserves me. If anything goes wrong anywhere in the normal functioning of the body. I cannot mend it, nor do I understand as to what is wrong. An expert needs to be consulted. No single expert knows all about the body. There are specialists regarding the specific systems in the body. They alone may (or may not) know the fault. The point is that the entire organic system of the body is very complex and complicated. The expert doctors etc., derive their knowledge from the study of the body. While we want to consider the body to be insentient physical existence, and the doctors and experts as intelligent beings. This is to pry-turvyng the whole scale of truth and values., The correct view is that the body is the store house of knowledge and wisdom in actual operation. What is true of the world as a whole is also true of the individual body. Both pinda and brahmada are such that they can not be looked upon as insentient material existences. They are throughly replete with imponderable intelligence, and are not at all other than Brahman., This is the right interpretation of Advaita. There should be no doubt about the body being spiritual in its essence.

#### **Prarabadha too does not Affect the Jivanmukta**

Of course, to establish this position as theoretically consistent with the omnipresent, omniscient and omnipotent principle is not to have immediate experience of the caitanyatva of the bodily existence. But as and when the advaitic experience of *aparoksama* bhuti downs, along with the would outside, the body too casds to exist as a physical existence, This is the State of liberation while yet living (*Jivanmukti*) This state could be described from the two points of view. For he exiernal obsever the liberated soul has a body and he is subject to the influence of the *Prarabdha karma* so long as the actual death of the body does not take place, with the Physical death there is the complete cessation of the lingering of the Physical existence of the body (*Videhamuktt*). But looked at from the point of view of the liberated soul, that is the internal experience as enjoyed by him, the body ceases to



affect him. This is known as *Videhavastha*. All Karmas came to an end with spiritual knowledge as the Gita declares. All karmas include the *prarabdha* karmas too along with the *Sancita* and *Kriyamana*. Thus these are two deaths for the liberated soul, one at the time of liberating knowledge itself, while practically overtly alive, and the other is at the time of the physical death. This is the experience of all the saints whose devotion is rooted in Advaita. Santa Tukaram, for instance, says, 'I have seen my death by my own eyes, and that became an incomparable festival'. He also says that while absorbed in the *Kirtana bhakti* his body takes the form of Brahman. Santa Bahenabai, Tukaram's only woman disciple, while describing the enlightened state says that just as the burnt garment can not cover the body, nor the fire in the picture can burn anything, so the body of the liberated ceases to affect him. There is no *prarabdha* for the one who disassociates with the body (*videhavastha*).

The general understanding even of the great Advaitins is that even for the enlightened soul the effect of the *prarabdha* continues till its exhaustion, (*prarabdha-Karmanam bhogadeva Ksayah*). But that is only an external view, not the internal view of the liberated soul who enjoys his blissful state.

The above Advaitic view that the body or *deha* itself constitutes *caitanya* must be distinguished from the *carvaka* view that body itself is the self (*dehaimavada*). The former is the spiritualist or idealist view as completely opposed to the later materialist view. For the materialist body is a material existence and there is no soul over and above or other than the body. While the Advaita view is that Brahman, *Caitanya* or God is the only reality, nothing else is. The material existence either of the world or of the body is only apparent owing to ignorance. It does not constitute knowledge to look upon anything as a material existence. But while the *carvaka* materialism is not accepted by any orthodox or heterodox school of Indian philosophy, the reality of matter is accepted by all of them, excepting the Mahayana Buddhism. Therefore, all of them insist upon the basic dualism of the self and the not self, and the non-Advaitic Vedāntins too subscribe to this view. The Advaitin alone accepts this position only initially for the correct understanding of the nature of the self. But his final conclusion is *Atmaikatvavada*, which is the same as *Brahmavada*. This is the Absolutistic non-dualistic position of one universal self unique in the philosophical literature of the whole world. It does not remain merely an intellectual hypothesis, but is the basis of the world religion practised by most of the Hindus.



### Reformulation of the Arguments for God's Existence

I have attempted to reformulate the traditional arguments for the existence of God. By God, I understand the existence of the spiritual principle, caitanya, or jnana as a pervasive reality. The question is not of Proving God as the Creator of the world, but of proving the world as an intelligent, sentient existence of the form of knowledge. Kant regards various arguments for God's existence as essentially ontological. By that he means that they attempt to prove the existence of God from the idea of God. But the gap between the idea of God and the actual existence cannot be filled. Because existence is a matter of experience. He has, however, some sympathy for the argument from design, or which is also known as teleological argument. In my opinion, all arguments are reducible to the argument from design of a sort. And there too, we need not think in terms of arguing from design to the designer. It is enough to see design in nature or existence itself. And the simple conclusion is that where so ever there is design there is presence of intelligence. This intelligence is God or spiritual principle or presence of knowledge.

### The Cosmological Argument

The causal or the cosmological argument tries to prove God as the First cause, or The causeless cause of the world as a whole. As I think about it, it is not necessary to go beyond the world to posit God as its cause. It is sufficient for us to see the causal order in nature. Everything that happens in the world could be accounted for in terms of causation. If there were not sufficient causal order in nature, no science would ever be possible. It is an attempt the Part of every scientific discipline to reveal the prevalent orderly character or uniformities in nature. Unless there were law and order in nature there could be no scientific knowledge possible. Or to put it otherwise unless there were knowledge in nature, it could not reveal uniformities or laws of causal design. Human knowledge is only a revelation of knowledge in nature. The difference however is that while the human scientific—knowledge is theoretical and descriptive of what happens in nature, knowledge in nature is operational and demonstrative. Knowledge is contemplative. Nature's knowledge is operative, producing regular effects. Human knowledge is expressible in language and formulas. Nature expresses its knowledge in happenings, processes, activities. In brief, nature's intelligence is revealed in its behaviour, science discovers causal laws. These are revealed by nature, nature is open to discovery. In fact nature does not cover anything. It appears to be covered so long as the scientist remains covered by his own ignorance. Nature invites him and makes him



know what it possesses already. Thus God exists as the intelligent causal order in nature, not as the first cause, beyond the causal order.

### The Teleological Argument

The teleological argument rests upon to purposeful design in nature as distinguished from the mechanical causal operations as seen earlier in the causal argument. What is regarded as cause and effect relation can also be looked at as relation between means and ends. The entire world is a grand design of adjustments, bringing about internal harmony. It is not enough to say, causes operate and effects follow. Rather, in order to bring about certain results, certain helpful means appear to be employed. This kind of adaptation is particularly found in organisms. How wonderful it is that thousands of millions of cells forming different system performing specific functions cooperate to constitute one body. This is true of the whole universe. The designs in the universe are of different sorts. One of them is aesthetic. These designs whether causal, purposive, evolutionary, moral, aesthetic etc. cross one another. Usually the argument posits the existence of the designer God as distinguished from the design in the world. But we need not accept this dualism between the designer and the design, wheresoever there is design there is intelligence within it, and not outside it.

Actually, as it appears to me, it is assumed that the world is material and insentient. And whatever kind of order, organization, system, harmony or design is evident in it, it has to be explained by intelligence or consciousness or spirituality external to it, and which is termed God. Difficulties are found in such position. The correct view is that the design in the world is because of intelligence within the world. If insentient matter can not be self sufficient explanation of its design, then there is nothing like insentient matter at all. Whatever exists is inherently intelligent and express itself in grand design or designs.

### The Traditional And The Neo-Ontological Argument:

Even the so called ontological argument banks upon perfection which constitutes the maximum of all values which are not at all conceivable without consciousness or knowledge. Only in the traditional argument perfection is fulfilled by its existence. It is considered weakest of all arguments though it makes an appeal to the innocent believer in God. The objection is, how can we jump from the mere idea of perfection to its existence which is not matter of our idea only, but of experience. Existence is not an attribute, like other attributes. The argument could however be expressed the other way round meaningfully. If whatever exists is found wanting in perfec-



tion, because of its unconsciousness then we can say that existence is perfected by granting consciousness to it. Consciousness is the main principle and source of all values.

Let us reformulate the ontological argument. The question usually is formulated as: Does God exist? This initially only we assume the difference between God and existence. We can as well ask, 'Can that which exists be called God?' The question is not of existence, but of its being God. We need not search God outside existence, but in existence only which is already experienced.

Logically only there was a possibility of 'nothing'. why should there be any being at all? Thus in actuality 'nothing' is impossible. being alone is. Being has the power inherent in it against nothing, and therefore being is. But if being were not of the nature of consciousness or knowledge, being could not have asserted itself as being. There could not have been any distinction between the absolute nothingness and being without consciousness. To be meaningful being must be endowed with consciousness. One could argue that originally there could have been being without consciousness, as the materialist conceive of matter, consciousness may have been a later evolution out of unconscious being or matter. There are two things of value granted in this. Consciousness, if product of evolution, is of greater value than unconsciousness. But consciousness could not have come out of unconsciousness. Just as nothing can come out of nothing, if consciousness were not there, it could not have evolved at all. Therefore being has consciousness along with it in order to be. It is along with consciousness that assertion of being is conceivable. Mere material insentient existence is not distinguishable from nothing.

We have asserted two things that being has inevitable value over nothing, and consciousness is inherently valuable as opposed to unconsciousness. The valuableness of being and consciousness goes along with them. To be is to have value, to be conscious is to have value. Value is the very nature of being and consciousness. This position is of the Vedantic *sat-cit-ananda*, *ananda* being the criterion of the realization of value. These three are triune in one. They are one and the same, This indeed is the nature of God. In my opinion, arguing from *existence to God* is the real ontological argument. Thus, I call neo-ontological argument to distinguish it from the traditional ontological argument which goes from *the idea* of God as perfection to its existence.

### **The Moral Argument: Moral order intrinsic in Nature**

There is a moral argument according to which for meeting moral justice God is necessary. Justice consists in rewarding good with



happiness, and evil with unhappiness. Since this is not guaranteed in the present life, immortality of self, freedom of will and God's existence to fulfil the requirements of justice are regarded, as postulates. This is the formulation in brief of Kant's argument. In the Indian Philosophy also a similar argument is given, God being necessary to preside over (*Karmadhyaksha*) the insentient law of Karma. But, as we have seen, Kant reduces the arguments to the ontological form, making them of no avail. It is difficult to see why Kant considers the moral argument as of a different kind, not reducible to the ontological form; This Kant's argument too, in my view, is ontological. For here too we attempt to argue from the *ideal* nature of moral life to the existence of God, without there being any guaranty. Just as there may not be existence of perfection, there may not be fulfilment of our idea of moral ideal.

But apart from this possible defect in the moral argument, it can be conceived that the requirements of moral life to become meaningful should have a basis in the very nature of existence as whole. Just as there are mechanical, teleological, aesthetic, valuational designs in nature, there is a moral design too of the conservation of values. Wheresoever, whatsoever there is design an arrangement, an order, there of necessity is the presence of intelligence. No external agency must be thought of as providing this orderly Character. Orderliness itself is an expression of the intrinsic nature of existence. It is the very essence of nature to be in order. It is inherently a cosmos, not a chaos. Man's moral order is a part and parcel of nature's order, because man's existence cannot be conceived as apart from nature, world or reality as such.

#### Argument from the Epistemological Status of Authority

I will now give one aspect of epistemological argument in support of God's existence. It is constructed on the basis of the authoritarian method of knowledge. The argument is not from authority, testimony or sabda-pramana. To say that God exists because Vedas or sastras say so would be such argument from testimony. Such argument does have its importance depending upon the authenticity of such authority. But my contention depends upon the *nature* of the authoritarian method, and its *status* in epistemology.

Usually the order in which the pramanas are placed are pratyaksha, anumana and sabda. The perceptual method, as it were is the first or the basic one. The inferential method follows the perceptual, as also is suggested in the name *anu t mana*, *anu* meaning coming after, *mana* is the method. Most of the philosophers, and especially the scientific thinkers are content with these two methods only, which



are also termed or classified as primary. There are of course some others who classify sabda along with the first two, But even then it is put third in order. Even then there is an important sense that, after all, sabda plays a *secondary* part in the acquisition of knowledge and can not stand on her with pratyaksa and anumana. It is not considered by many to have an *independent* status as a method of knowledge.

If we honestly put this question to ourselves as to what are the various independent sources from which I get my knowledge. I will have to agree that just as some of my knowledge is derived from my perception, and my inference, so too my listening to some other's spoken or written words is equally my important source independent of that is other than, perception and inference. Actually I get most of my knowledge from my parents elderly persons, neighbours teachers, newspapers and a host of books, W. P. Montague in his "ways of knowing" has given a good account of the authoritarian method of knowledge saying that nine tenths of one's knowledge is derived from authority. Yet, while evaluating its status as a method of knowledge, he calls it secondary, while perception and inference or the empiricist and the rationalist methods are regarded as primary in importance.

My contention is that while the authoritarian method of knowledge is the one most pervasive method of the acquisition of knowledge, it is also important as the *first* among the primary method too. Let us see how.

Imagine that a newly born child is left alone to get his knowledge all by himself, forbidding even the mother to keep any contact with the child excepting feeding or looking after child's physical needs. The child, even though has been naturally endowed with the senses and the mind, will not have any knowledge worth the name. He would continue to be affected by the big buzzing mass of sensations, without their development into meaningful perceptions. It is only because of the mother's *verbally teaching* him to associate his sensations with meanings that the child begins to *perceive*. She has to say; this is your Father, 'This your brother,' This sister, 'This horse, 'This cow.' and so forth. Along with the Physical feeding, the mother has also to give mental feeding. Thus his natural endowments begin to function as perception and inference only *after the authoritarian method*. *Therefore, I am inclined to put sabda as the first*, followed by pratyaksa and anumana, since in the psychological, evolutionary history of human individual's knowledge, sabda is the determinant of the very use of pratyaksa and anumana, I would consider, in this sense, sabda to be



all-pervasive. Only if this conditioning role of sabda is granted to begin with, then only pratyaksa and inference are left free to develop independently. But in no case can they function independently of the foundational function of sabda.

### God exists as the first Guru of source of knowledge

But if this analysis is true, then it follows that every human individual gets his knowledge initiated from his mother, the first teacher, the 'guru.' If knowledge inevitably gets initiated from the guru for every human being, who could have been the *first guru in the chain of gurus?* There is a very significant yoga sutra which states that, God is the first teacher of the most ancient ones, not being conditioned by time, (*Esa Purvesamapi guruh kalena anavacchedat*). There is also other sutra meaning, 'in Him is the source or seed of unexcelled omniscience, (*tatra niratisayam sarvajnatvabjam*).

In this way, I consider this very nature of the authoritarian method as constituting the 'Proof' or argument for the existence of God. God's word is the first source of all knowledge, God's word also constitutes our source of the knowledge that He exists. It is in both these senses that the Vedanta-sutra "sastrayonitvat" could be interpreted in both the ways. God is the source of vedas. Vedas are the source of the knowledge of God's existence. But that the nature of the authoritarian method necessitates God's existence is different from these two above meanings.

### God or nature as the source of Instinctive Knowledge

But besides this significance of sabda as the first method of knowledge, there is one aspect of epistemology not taken into account. Even before any epistemological method could function including that of 'word', the child is born with instinctive knowledge with inherent capacities to know. This instinctive knowledge is the primary source of knowledge. Where from does this instinctive knowledge come to the child? Nature is its source. It is in this sense that nature is the very treasure house of all knowledge. This nature which is of the very nature of knowledge is called God. To put it differently, since knowledge is, God is. Knowledge is the essence of God.

### God and the Pramanas

From the point of epistemological methods, God's existence is based upon at least three kinds of methods. (1) Pratyaksa : where yogaja-pratyaksa gives God's direct experience. It is *aparoksanubhuti* of God, called *samradhana* by Vyasa. This is no argument, but the very experience of God, requiring no external argumentative proof.



This is the most important of all the prananas. (2) Anumana under it come all the various forms of inferential arguments, which are of more or of the less value. For the theists they do constitute significant rational arguments, though they really cannot convincingly prove God. God is no God if He is amenable to rational proofs given by the finite man with his limited rational powers. God requires no proof, since He is the source of all proofs. None the less, a philosophical investigation must be made and the rational arguments at their best could be presented. So that God does not remain simply an object of faith, but at least of rational faith. So long as direct experience is not within the reach of the common man, he very much needs rational arguments to preserve and strengthen his faith in God. (3) Sabda: A common man's belief in God has a source in the word of the experienced mystic, saint or devotee. In actual development of the individual man's knowledge of God, sabda comes first, then anumana and it culminates in the experience of God. Sravana, Manana, Nididhyasa and Saksatkara constitute the ladder of knowledge.

### The Nature of Advaita Bhakti

I am primarily interested in God's existence as sat-cit-ananda. Whether this satisfies every devotee of God is another matter. There are problems connected with the nature of God, his relationship with the world and with the individual selves. In the Advaita, God alone exists, and is all the reality, and therefore neither the world nor the selves are other than God. Devotion to God requires dualism only initially, between Him and the devotee, but it culminates in non-dualism. For the avowed dualists such Advaita-bhakti is blasphemous, but not at all so, for the Advaitin, since to consider oneself as other than God's reality, is to give rise to one's egoism, as well as to challenge the omnipresence and omnipotence of God. For the sake of devotion the devotee may give rise to feigned duality (Krtaka-dvaita). There is no problem of my freedom against that of God. My freedom consists in complete merger in God and His will. I have no independent will, and bondage of responsibility. Therefore, there is no problem of evil for the devotee, who accepts God as all in all. There is evil in his separation only. In devotion it is the sentiment (bhava) that has value. God is all that my sentiment and devotion want Him to be. This only means that it is in the nature of reality or God to respond to the sincere and heart felt demands or prayers of the devotee.

### The Problem of sin and its solution in the Gita

In this light of Advaitic devotionism I have interpreted the teaching of the Gita. In my opinion, Arjuna's initial and most im-



portant problem was that of the involvement in the ghastly sin of war, and consequently to be a party in bringing about the most undesirable, far-reaching and irreparable results of war (aho bata mahatpapatnam kartin vyavasita vayam). Bhagavan Srikrasna has elaborated his reply keeping in view this problem of sin. He has repeatedly drawn attention to this, throughout his teaching, taking the form of rajayoga, karama-yoga, bhaktiyoga, Jnanayoga which help the devotee in overcoming the sin. The ideals of sthitaprajna, gunatita, daivi sampat, perfect jnana and Bhakti are so described as to make the devotee free from the biting conscience of sinfulness. The visvarupadarsana completely absolves Arjuna of any agency of the happenings in this world, they being ordained by God himself. The last consoling assurance of God ends with the same note, "Leave all considerations of right and wrong. surrender yourself unto Me alone. I will free you from all sins. Don't worry". I would recommend the interested to read the Gita again from the above suggested point of view. The principle problem is that of sin, and the teaching of the Gita in all of the chapters consists of the reply to this problem.

### Sri Krishna avoids the Problem of war

But there is another part of Arjuna above problem regarding the evil consequences of war. Over half a crore of lives of selected men of merit were lost in this war. So many women were widowed. Only children and old men survived. War itself gives birth to evil designs, and its effects are greater evils of criminality, poverty, scarcity, disease, famine. Unrighteousness prevails all around unobstructed. Arjuna himself draws this picture of the evil effects of war. As compared to the Mahabharat war, the modern wars are much more ghastly in their operations and their consequences, for the entire mankind, and possibly for all life on earth. The ecological awareness has brought out this fearful truth.

Sri Krishna while dealing with the problem of evil has, in my opinion, completely overlooked the problem of the evil consequences of war. He could neither avoid war, nor the evil consequences of war. The only lesson of his teaching is that we must not avoid our Righteous duty, however difficult and apparently evil it may superficially appear to be. This duty ought one ought to do without the sense of egoism, and attachment to the fruits of the action or to the consequences of our liking or otherwise. At the background of our activity should be the reverential awareness of God and this world, and our modest place in it. Thus the various yogas of Karma, bhakti, and jnana are not exclusive of each other nor alternatives, but they are the aspects of one and the same integral yoga.



**Holism superior to Humanism**

From such a broad cosmocentric point of view of human life and the world, I have advocated 'holism' as the greatest attitude that one can have to oneself and the entire nature, variously called as world, God or Brahman. I consider as any form of humanism, whether materialistic or spiritualistic, as narrow, since it places the human species at the centre of all activities and values. It smells of the unjustified egoism of the human species, looking down upon nature, whether of vegetation or of animal life as also of the so-called world of matter, as if they are the means provided for man's exploitation of them for his own ends. On the other hand, we ought to take a cosmic or Brahmic or Divine view of the whole, inclusive of man as a member of this whole. As we have seen above man and nature stand or fall together. Man cannot prosper, or maintain his well being at the cost of nature. The wholeness point of view of man's individual being in all his aspects, and of the whole reality in all its aspects is what constitutes 'holism'. The Advaita view looks upon all existence as forming one family and not only the brotherhood of man forming the exclusively self-sufficient unit. This is ideal of "vasudhaiva Kutumbakam", all the variety of beings in the whole world are members of one another. This is the teaching of the philosophical study of ecology. Thus this view is at once scientific, philosophical, religious and spiritual. Such a holistic view is capable of reducing evil to the minimum level.

In order to develop this holistic attitude in its fullness we must study all human achievements in their concreteness in terms of the integration of all values through them. We have pointed out above that value is an inherent aspect of being and knowledge. The traditional theory of knowledge and of being study epistemological and ontological problems independently of the valuational point of view. But value constitutes the very structure of existence and the actually acquired knowledge in the different fields of existence. It is in terms of the values which we intuitively recognize that we must reorganize our knowledge, and put it in practice to realize wisdom. Through such wisdom only man can preserve his species along with the total being. This is what the term 'dharma' technically means. This indeed is the Advaitic view of universal dharma or dharana as distinguished from sectarian religions, which often are practised at the cost of dharma. Dharma as Advaita conceives it helps to maintain the entire universe inclusive of man.



## Dialogue : A Plea for Alternative Epistemology

S. S. Barlingay

It is a known thing to history that Hume's philosophical investigations and the logical implications that he drew from the British empirical philosophy of Locke and Berkley led Kant to his critical philosophy. Kant observed that he was attempting what he called Copernican revolution in Philosophy. Tolemny had thought that the earth was the centre of universe and that the Sun and the Moon and the planets were all moving around the earth. This hypothesis of course could not explain the movements of the planets. So Copernicus today-termed the hypothesis and proposed that it was the Sun which was the centre (or the solar system) and that the earth was moving around it. This hypothesis could satisfactorily solve many of the problems in astronomy. When empiricist's investigations led to the problem whether knowlege was possible, Kant assumed that knowledge was possible and worked out the conditions for the possibility of knowledge. He did not doubt knowledge, he did not ask the question, 'Is knowledge, possible? He asked the question, how is knowledge possible? I want to ask a similar question : How is a dialogue possible? I believe, 'How is knowledge possible'? Its an incomplete question. For, as I shall explain later, knowledge situation is a rudimentary dialogue situation. I believe that an explicit dialogue situation must be contrasted both with the knowledge situation (and the belief situation . I have tried to analyse belief situation in my paper 'A Critique of Pure Belief'. In this paper I try to analyse a dialogue situation. I ask the question : How is a dialogue possible? In doing this I compare it with knowledge, acquaintance, communication and belief and arrive at the conclusion that all such epistemic activities are rudimentary form of dialogue with this difference that in belief and knowledge situation there is no explicit recognition of 'you' or a



second person. But there is merely an awareness that 'I' play two or more roles, the first I play some role and the second I another. This awareness of the first I and the second I, in fact, leads us to the distinction between I and you.

In short I propose to discuss the behaviour of four words: knowing, acquaintance, communication and dialogue. I thereby intend to find out the field or situation in which these words are operative. I feel that by this search, the implications of these words could be made explicit and that in return would throw light on certain philosophical problems.

First, let me take the case of how "know" behaves. The paradigm that is taken by philosophers is that the word, know (or what we call knowledge) requires a knower and an object of knowledge and it is some kind of interaction between the two, that is imprinted on the knower's mind which is called knowledge. I would try to give analysis of this situation when I elaborate the point. The only thing that I would point out at this stage is that such knowledge situation requires only one knower as one of the sufficient conditions in order for it to be knowledge situation. With this I should contrast what I call 'acquaintance'. I am aware that Bertrand Russell talks of two kinds of knowing ('Problems of Philosophy') knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. I do not want to raise a point whether both the kinds are knowledges in the straight forward sense of the term. For, both of them do presuppose a knower or some kind of consciousness, both of them do require an epistemic situation. But like several other words, the word acquaintance can be used in primary as well as in secondary sense. I claim that when we say that we are acquainted with a person we are using the word in its primary sense, and when say that we are acquainted with sense datum we are not using it in its primary sense. Knowing is, of course, basic to both. But being acquainted requires not merely my being aware of 'the other' but also "the other's" being aware of me. This second point is not covered by the case which is concerned with sense-datum. This point again will be elaborated in the course of time. The third word which I want to discuss here is the word dialogue. It is, indeed concerned with communication between two individuals. It also requires an epistemic situation; but it is not a situation which requires only one knower and a known but one which requires *two knowers* without which there would not be a dialogue. Dialogue, of course, is a case of communication, but all communications are not dialogues. First, the other to whom something is communicated need not be acquainted with the communicator. The communicator need not know who the others are and whether they actually are consider situations like a



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speaker and an actual meeting, a radio-talker and his listeners, television speaker and his audience-spectators. Secondly, the others need not be present simultaneously with the communicator, as for example a poet and his poetry which is communicable through ages to others. I shall discuss these models and point out that on the selecting of these models, we get a certain picture of the world and develop certain attitudes towards the world. For example, one of the frequently discussed problems in philosophy is the problem of solipsism. It arises on account of the belief or the make belief that there is only one individual in the world, the knower and every other person is non-existent or has only existence in a dream. This has its implication in all kinds of knowledge. For example, this situation has a tendency to make perception, of the nature of representative perception or of the nature of sense-datum. For, one cannot "perceive" through the castle-walls of the object that is perceived. Let me elaborate my points in greater detail.

First, about knowing or what is sometime called the knowing process. Recognised Philosophers and psychologists have talked of three such "mental processes", as knowing feeling and willing. All the three verbs knowing, willing and feeling, which describe these 'processes' are transitive, i.e. they take an object; but the nature of the object in each case seems to be different. In the case of feeling, the object need not be anything outside me or my body. When I say "I reel pain, the pain is about my physical, body, when I say "I feel miserable" it has a reference to my mental behaviour though it may have some relation to happenings in the outside world. But my feeling has a direct reference to the present, to the present time. What I feel is immediate, it is not a memory of the past nor an intention about the future. When I will, the object of my will need not be present in a concrete form at the time of my willing. At the most it may be in the form of concept. It is something to be 'achieved' in future; it is a part of my dream; my desire to modify the world with my will. The world is always so modified and what we call the human world is actually the modification of the natural world through such human will. But when something is of the nature of will, it is not concrete or material, it is, so to say, mental or conceptual. So neither the willing situation nor the feeling situation requires an actual object of feeling or willing.

Knowledge situation proper, however, can be contrasted, in this respect, with the feeling or willing situation. Unless the knowledge is about something "internal" it requires an object of knowledge and we take it for granted that knowledge or knowing situation has capacity to show the external world, the world that is concrete and



material and having the properties of space (and time). In fact, but for this showing ability, no one would have known the external world. But when we talk of the knowledge situation we usually take for granted the object of knowledge which is inanimate, though, we need not so take it. Knowing, like feeling and willing, taken to be a capacity of the knower, not of the object of knowledge. It belongs to the knower, possessed by the knower and cannot be separated from the knower. Therefore, it is thought that all that we know or perceive is of the nature of knowledge and is not of the nature of the object of knowledge. Thus if some one asks the question, how do you know the object of knowledge or how do you know the external world, there is, in fact, no theoretical answer; we are led to cul-de-sac of subjectivism. The result is either solipsism or representative theory of perception; both these mutually imply each other. Right from the days of Plato when he presented the view of *Protagoras in Theatetus* through Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Russell, Ayer etc., this subjectivism which is brought about by knowledge situation has possessed us; we are not able to get over it. This is also the case with almost all branches of Indian philosophies which some how or the other presuppose *Dristisrstivada*, *Sautrantikavada*, *Vijnanavada* and the like. In fact, if we carefully look at the nature of the analysis of a knowledge situation we will always find that it has tyrannized us. In 'Alice in Wonderland' there is a beautiful incident narrated. Some queen of cards (probably of heart) which has no real existence is sleeping. Alice goes to wake her up. But before she is able to do so some elderly person comes there and stops her from waking her up. He says to her: "Do not wake her up. If she wakes up where will you be Alice? So long as the queen (of heart) is sleeping and is having her dreams you are able to move about, but if she wakes up you will be no more, you will wither away". The story tells up quite a lot about the present status of the knowledge situation. Understood in the way in which we presently understand the knowledge situation we do not allow it to behave in anyway different from willing and feeling situations. Ultimately, all these three situation understood in the above way require nothing else but the knower and this knower also does not have a third person singularity of grammar. It is only in the first person singular, the I.

Let us now come to the story of the word, *acquaintance*. In English language as pointed out earlier, the word is used sometimes in the sense of knowledge, 'I am acquainted with the situations'. It is also used sometimes for recognition and sometimes for knowledge which is a little more than recognition but a little less than intimacy. That I am acquainted with somebody means I am familiar with some-



body and when I am familiar I can also be familiar with certain circumstances. The verb acquaint is also used in the sense of inform, make oneself aware of. Acquaint is a transitive verb and it primarily relates two persons, two conscious objects. When I am acquainted it is myself that is acquainted; I am also acquainted with somebody. My being acquainted with *somebody* is, I think, the basic notion behind acquaintance. One could, of course, legitimately ask: if someone is acquainted with somebody he must also be acquainted (with.....) about something, about some situation. This must have given rise to the use that somebody is acquainted with the situation. But it is possible to think that I am acquainted with somebody without there being any marked recognition of something. Thus of acquaintance there could be several varieties—from vague acquaintance to deeper and deeper acquaintance. But if we distinguish acquaintance from information and knowledge, the basic element in acquaintance would be that acquaintance is of a person. It means a recognition that there is another person like you. Thus it can lead to a situation for dialogue and communication. But is acquaintance a necessary condition for a dialogue? In the early days of human civilization this must certainly have been the case. But today when someone phones to me from Australia I can have communication or dialogue with him without being acquainted with him. So is also the case when one talks with someone on a local telephone. Presence of a second person and acquaintance with second person are two different things. So can one now say that a communication or a dialogue situation requires acquaintance? Again, if one did not talk to the other would there not be an acquaintance with the other? This is certainly the case in regard to personal acquaintance. But is not a teacher acquainted with students, although the teacher may not know each student personally? It is possible that the teacher may not be acquainted with the students (a speaker may not be acquainted with the audience but the students (and the audience) may be acquainted with the teacher (or the speaker). But are the students really acquainted? Or, do they know him by description? Russell is likely to say that the students are not acquainted with the teacher but are acquainted with certain sense-data. I am not interested here in discussing Russell's theory of knowledge by acquaintance. I think, basically acquaintance does require two persons whether they interact at shorter distance or at longer distance. 'To be acquainted' behaves like *embracing* (though in a different sense), it is like shaking hands. If two persons are at long distance they may not shake hands but just say 'Bye Bye'. Acquaintance requires two persons and only when we treat something as a



person or individual we can talk of acquaintance of a thing or situation.

Of course, if acquaintance requires two persons, it creates a further difficulty. When is one acquainted with the other persons? What elements of knowledge of information of the other person are required for this? Will not the other person require some information about me? If the other person sees my face, my gait and I see other's face and gait, will we be acquainted with each other? Is my acquaintance with the other person equivalent to my (some) knowledge of the other person and other's (some) knowledge of myself? In such a case acquaintance will imply two knowing situations. But acquaintance seems to be more complicated than even this: Firstly, one does not know how much knowledge is required for one to be acquainted with the other, i.e. whether in the absence of any knowledge also there could be acquaintance... Secondly, what is required is much more complex than the two knowing processes put together. A complex process i.e. acquaintance may not be dissolved or explained in two simple 'knowing' processes. A complex does not seem to be a compound of two or more simples. A complex process has to be taken as something unique in itself. If we take the first alternative and say that in acquaintance mutual knowledge of each other is not required, the situation becomes complicated. If there is no knowledge background how are the two persons to be acquainted with each other? Can there be unconscious acquaintance? In that case acquaintance would be a case of mutual hypnotism as in the case of love at first sight. But even in such a case there would be a tendency of acquaintance becoming conscious, i.e., creating a condition for knowledge. But if acquaintance requires knowledge of each other it would require both knowledge of the other and also the knowledge that one has knowledge of the other. This second type of knowledge will mean storing and recalling the memory of the first knowledge and it must arise rather simultaneously in both the processes. This means that when there is a case of acquaintance it is not only with regard to the present but also with regard to past. This is how when the two acquainted person meet at second or successive times, they have recognition of the past acquaintance. But if acquaintance is such a complicated process when is one acquainted for the first time? At that first moment how can there be the presence of earlier non-existing moment? Merely by saying that every perception is an apperception the problem will not be solved. An acquaintance is not a-acquaintance (coining a word from acquaintance in the fashion apperception is coined from perception). One may then even come to the conclusion, through a



wrong conclusion according to me, that the concept of acquaintance is self-contradictory and illusive in nature. One may feel that there is acquaintance but it would be logically impossible to have it. This would create a paradox as in the case of change, motion etc.

I have a feeling that the first acquaintance and the second acquaintance are not similar types of experiences. The first type of acquaintance is not just a case of knowledge and memory as having two separate parts of the process. Perhaps what we call memory is far too complicated to understand and should not be understood in sense of some part of information perceiving and storing in the past with potentiality to be re-called. Perhaps, even the first perception is in spacious present, has a length in time and so in the very first act what is later on discussed as memory, is present. But what is further present and not generally recognized as present is an element of rudimentary future represented in terms of desire, hope, expectation etc. This element is present in so elemental form that it is not recognized at the first sight. But it is this element which gives an incentive to invoking the memory on the second and successive occasions.

I have discussed above the cases of knowledge and acquaintance situation. It appears to me that there are some inadequacies, in the above analysis of knowledge situation, where we talk of a knower, an object of knowledge (which is passive) and the interaction of the two, called knowledge. Let me compare this kind of situation with a dialogue situation. Suppose A and B are talking to each other. Can this situation be regarded as knowledge situation? Yes, in a way it is. But it is not a knowledge situation of the type when, for example, A looks at a table. It is knowledge situation because knowing is involved in this situation also. But here, just as A knows B, similarly B also knows A. When A knows (perceives) a table, the table does not know (perceive) A. A dialogue situation is more like an acquaintance situation than like a knowledge situation. Can we say that one dialogue situation is equal to two knowledge situations, A knowing B and B knowing A? This does not seem to be the case. The two knowledge situations above do not make a dialogue situation. Each knower in a dialogue situation behaves both as a knower and as an object of knowledge. But this also is an over simplification. Perhaps it would be better to say that a dialogue necessarily requires two knowers. Dialogue is something that 'goes in between knowers, and it is not just a relationship between a knower and an object of knowledge. It means that each knower in a dialogue is aware of the presence of the other knower and that he is also aware that the other knower is aware, that the first knower is aware that the other knower is aware



of him. But this means that a dialogue situation presupposes that there are other beings and that our thoughts can be communicated to them and vice versa. However, this dialogue model is not simply a combination of two knowledge models.

Let me return to the knowledge situation. We have seen that the necessary conditions of the knowledge situation are two : (1) the knower and (2) the object of knowledge. Of course, I am taking it for granted that the knower has the will to know, he has ability to know, and that neither is he suffering from any mental or physical defect nor are the objective conditions unsuitable for knowledge. If there is no object of knowledge then the suitability for helpful objective conditions will also not be necessary. But then perceptive knowledge will not be produced. If recognition of past knowledge is regarded as knowledge then a simple knower is sufficient for producing that knowledge. But if there is only a knower, then just as he can produce memories similarly he can also produce imaginations and although the imaginations are also based on past memories they will not be regarded as knowledge because they cannot have any truth-claim. But now suppose that instead of one knower, there are many knowers, will it make any difference to the knowledge situation? Will it, e.g., be regarded as a communication-situation? Will it be a dialogue-situation? If a set of knowledge-situation is repeated, it will merely lead to more knowledge sets and nothing else. In some sense, of course, knowledge situation has rudiments of a communication-situations. (But it is not communicating to others). But communication-situation is more complex in two ways: (1) It requires at least two knowers such that each knower plays two roles, one as a knower and other as the object of knowledge. If there are A and B then B is an object of knowledge for A and A is an object of knowledge for B. But suppose A knows B and B knows A. Are these two knowledges equivalent to a dialogue or communication between A and B? The answer is definitely no. B must not only be an object of A's knowledge but he must also be a recipient of A's expression whether it is in the form of knowledge, memories or imaginations. Of course, for this, it is not sufficient that B knows what A knows, A must also express what he knows in a manner which will be understandable to B. But that also is not sufficient. A must further know that B has known what A has expressed. Thus in a full-fledged communication situation what I have expressed in regard to A must also be true in regard to B and vice versa. Of course, sometimes there could be misunderstanding and A and B may not know what others know. But there must be at least a possibility of understanding or not misunderstanding. In communication-situation the *objects of know-*



ledge that should be necessarily present are the two knowers and nothing else. The knowers have to play three roles: the role of a knower, the role of one who expresses and the role of a receiver. Knowing, expressing and receiving both ways seems to be the basic condition for communication, of course, we sometimes use the expression communication in a loose way. E.G., I am hearing a commentary of a test match on the radio- I say, it (the commentary) communicates (something) to me. But the commentator does not know whether I am listening, or if listening, understanding his commentary. But we take it for granted, other conditions remaining the same, that I shall understand the commentary if the radio is switched on to the proper wave-length. We take it for granted that if the radio set is adjusted to the proper wave-length, I shall be able to hear and understand his commentary. But it is one sided communication. Not only that the commentator does not know that I am hearing his commentary I am also not able to communicate to him what I feel about his commentary. That is, the communication apparatus is one sided and incomplete. But now think of a telephone. I am not only hearing what is spoken from the other side, I am also speaking and the other is hearing. The one-sided communication is like a faulty telephone talk where someone is able to hear but not speak back.

The word communication is also used in various other senses. In one such sense one can talk of communication between an artist and his appreciator. There can be such communication even in the absence of simultaneous presence of the artist and his appreciator. What Kalidas has written can be communicated to his readers now, after hundreds of years.\*

Is there anything common to knowing and communicating? I think it is 'being aware of'. In fact, being aware of also seems to be

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\* Could there be such situation in acquaintance? I, of course, can say that I am acquainted with the art of Tajmahal. But here, too, I am acquainted with the art as it is present today. I am not acquainted with the artist who built the Tajmahal. But the same is the case with communication. I am directly concerned with the medium of communication. I am not concerned with who communicated (from the other end). It is also possible that there might not be any other person at the other end. If I send a message to the moon and get it back, there may not be any other person like myself at the other end. And in this process of communication both the sender and receiver could be myself. I would have two roles, one as the sender of the message and the other as the receiver of the message. Such a reflexive use of the word acquaintance is certainly possible. I can ask the question : am I acquainted with myself? and answer the question by saying that I am acquainted (or not acquainted) with myself. Such a question is asked by Upanisads when they say, 'who am I'. But this is a limiting case.



common to feeling and willing. 'Being aware of' is certainly subjective in character but it has its domain outside the subject; What am I aware of? I am not aware of myself alone. "Being aware of myself" rather comes of a later stage, only when I become self-conscious. But in the primitive mode 'being aware of' is certainly being aware of something or some other person. Not recognising this leads to problems like: Is there an external object? Are there other minds? The problems which have been discussed age long in philosophy. In practice, however we do recognise that there are other beings and there are external things. All our communication is based on this. But we feel that a communication situation is reducible to, knowledge situation. This happens because 'being aware of' is common to both the situations. Unless I know or take for granted that there is another being, I cannot talk to anybody; but I reduce this other being to my object of knowledge and I explain this situation as an instance of a knowledge situation.

Can this be done? In a knowledge situation there is a knower and the object of the knowledge. But when I talk to somebody, then can that other person be regarded as just an object of knowledge? When A and B are talking can we say that from A's point of view B is an object of knowledge and A is the knower, and from B's point of view B is the knower and A is the object of B's knowledge? Can a dialogue between A and B be reduced to two knowledge situations (1) A knowing B and (2) B knowing A? It does not appear to me that such a reduction is possible. A dialogue situation is only one unique situation. Neither A nor B is in some sense, the object of knowledge. When A sees B, B could be regarded as an object of knowledge. But when A talks to B, B is not a mere object of knowledge. Dialogue is an intercourse between two knowers and if they also play a role of the object of knowledge, it is only subsidiary and as a part of the knower's role. A dialogue which is, of course, a communication situation and which requires an epistemic field in the background thus, cannot be simply regarded as a knowledge situation at least in the ordinary sense of the term. If we so reduce it then a dynamic situation would be reduced to a compound static situation consisting of two processes. The dialogue situation takes for granted that there are other beings. It cannot be reduced to a solipsistic position. Once you accept that there are other beings as one of your axioms, solipsism withers away. What you call the knowledge situation, i.e. where you talk of the knower and the object of knowledge, appears to me to be perhaps just a limiting case of this dialogue situation. Thus, though the dialogue situation is dependent on our being aware of...it is not a knowledge situation as posed by the phi-



losophers. Moreover, in the dialogue situation the awareness is of the type of *our being aware of* and is not of the type of *my being aware of*. It is acceptance of at least two knowers.

Although let me further explicate what I intend to say, knowledge situation appears to be different from a dialogue situation I should say that it is a covert dialogue situation only. Of course, in the knowledge situation there is no recognition of the being as a definite 'you' and, therefore, I have stated that in a dialogue situation the awareness is of the type of *our being aware of* and not of the type of *my being aware of*. But when one talks of awareness one does not merely cognise, one is aware that one is cognising. Thus there is a quick succession from consciousness to self-consciousness. Perhaps it is because of this that Stout had said long back that every perception is apperception. When I know a certain object I am the subject but when I know that I know... the second I have become a predicate to say the least. Is a matter of fact when such a situation arises where is a covert dialogue between the first I and the second, I. If we analyse the situation we will have to say that the second I is different from the first I, the recognition of the second I is beginning of the part of you. Thus even knowledge situation, as I have held earlier in limiting sense of a dialogue. I should further say that it is a rudimentary dialogue itself. It is interesting that Tukarama a great saint poet of Maharashtra has regarded this case as a case of dialogue (*Samveda*). The fact is that we do not go from a one man world to a many men world. A world where many men live is given to us already, we do not create it. Many of the so-called philosophical problems arise because we forget the real situation and create some kind of knowledge games. One must know that knowledge games are different from knowledge situations or knowledge. Even when we come across the knower, the known and the knowledge, the knower in this situation tends to play a role of more than one knower. There is never a pure monologue situation, a knowledge situation is always a covert dialogue situation.

Ordinarily we do distinguish between a belief situation, a knowledge situation and a dialogue situation. In a belief situation, we assume that only a believer (knower) is necessary, in a knowledge situation both the knower and the object of knowledge are necessary and in a dialogue situation two knowers, both playing the role of a knower and the object of knowledge, are necessary. But now on deeper thought we should say that these situations are more complex than what we had thought. None of them is a pure one knower situation. Although belief situations and knowledge situations may differ in res-



pect of the object of knowledge or belief, all of them behave alike in respect of the subject or the knower.

Many a time I feel that in India the dialogue has come to an end that we are governed by resonance and reverberation. Of course, this is only a metaphorical and emphatic way of saying that we are ignoring the 'dialogue' element in a dialogue which leads to the 'mutation' of dialogue.

Once we accept that dialogue is basic to all epistemic activities and that in a dialogue there are at least two knowers then we can further think of more developed situations of communication.

For example, when I see somebody, A shooting B and B falling in the pool of blood, the situation evokes sympathy from me. I am now aware of A and B besides me. B's pain and misery now become a part of my misery. His misery is communicated to me but is no more his misery, it is my misery evoked through the reaction to B's misery. It is second order misery. Buddha called this Karuna. Similarly, as my reaction to A, I may be angry with A. This would also be a second order feeling or emotion. It has the capacity to communicate but it is different from a dialogue. Such things are possible if and only if we accept communication (and dialogue) situations and accept that there are other beings. (In fact, even the acts of pretending and acting are dependent on the acceptance of other beings). Once you accept the existence of other beings it is also possible to accept other beings as our superior or equal or inferior to us. If one has to have a concept of equality in society one must really regard that there are other beings like oneself and their status is not a hierarchical one, of equality. The three models, the superior, the equal and the inferior will make all the difference to the society and man's relation to one another in the society. If I accept the other man as my equal then there would be no place for slavery. But if I surrender to the other as my superior then it will be acceptance of an inequality order, whether the superior being is a master, dictator or god. All such situations appear in the world because we have consciously or unconsciously taken for granted the existence of other being, and built our social order on this presupposition. In theistic philosophy when we accept god, we have accepted the other being. But we have accepted him as superior to us, As he is omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent, we have naturally to submit ourselves to him. If he is merely a hypothetical being it would not have much practical significance. But if the concept of a perfect being percolates in the social strata, it is bound to reflect in a social order based on inequality. Chaturvarnya conceived by 'Brahmanical' seers is an instance. Our



reflection on history will show that the inequality in our social order has a basis in our basic thinking. It is also necessary to recognise that there are other beings. It is necessary to have sympathy for others. But it is not necessary to think that there is a hierarchy or superior and inferior beings. The real mischief according to me, begins when we accept the mono-cognizer thesis (the only one-knower thesis), which takes for granted the existence of oneself without cognizing the existence of others.

Let me now summarise. I may say that as soon as a person begins to "know" (or rather have in dialogue) he is aware of the existence of other beings, some of whom are at least equal to him, and that he does not have any superior status as a monopolizer of mono-cognizing situation. I may also add that the knower-knowledge situation is merely a limiting case of a broader epistemic situation of communication and dialogue and that not knowing that this is only a limiting case creates problems for us like one of solipism, in Philosophy, dictatorship in politics, and monopoly in Economics and all rights to myself and license to exploit in all social spheres.



## A Plea for 'Transcendental Secularism'

G. C. Nayak

Some time back, while talking of *Jivanmukti*, I had characterised the typical philosophy of value developed in the Advaita frame-work as a form of 'transcendental secularism' which is associated with a 'transcendental variety of monism' subscribing to the view of non-duality of existence.<sup>1</sup> This view of mine has been subjected to a somewhat trenchant criticism in a recent article.<sup>2</sup> "Does not transcendental or beyond something", asks the learned author, "turn out to be obscure and vague?". Moreover, according to him, "if secularism is not here exactly in any of the available socio-ethical plane, but in a peculiar abstract trans-popular metaphysical sense of implying non-duality of existence, then that is surely vague and can not cater to the need of invigorating the cause of national integration". The author further points out that he would prefer to describe the Advaita conception of value as a form of 'humanitarian secularism' "which is never opposed to the idea of national integration, but does supply at least an indirect boosting for it".<sup>3</sup> In view of all this it has become a necessity to rethink on the whole issue and in this paper of mine I propose to do the same.

'Transcendental', it should be pointed out, has been used by me in a *specified* sense and is hence neither obscure nor vague, even if it has to be admitted that, when left to itself without explanation, it is liable to be obscure and vague. Freedom conceived in Vedanta is,

- 1 G. C. Nayak, *Philosophical Reflections* (ICPR, New Delhi, 1987), pp. 70-71.
- 2 Ct. Bijayananda Kar, "National Integration, Secularism and Advaita Philosophy of Value" in R. Balasubramanian and Sibajiban Bhattacharya (eds.), *Perspectives of Sankara* (Rashtriya Sankara Jayanti Mahotsava Commemoration Volume, Department of Culture, Govt. of India, 1989) pp. 400-402.
- 3 *Ibid.*, pp. 402-403.



according to me, unique of its kind and it is secular in the sense that it is not tied to any religious dogma or bias whatsoever. But at the same time, there is no popular secularistic fad involved here; in a sense, therefore, it is trans-secular. It is usually associated with or is based on a variety of monism which I have designated as 'transcendental monism' in the sense that it tends to transcend all 'isms' like pluralism, dualism and even monism of the popular variety. Strictly speaking, it is advaita or advaya (non-duality), not ekatva (oneless). There is transcendence in some form or the other involved here, transcendence of various 'isms', transcendence of duality and consequently of all injunctions and prohibitions of day-to-day moral and religious life, and even of secularism of the popular variety with which we are normally acquainted. The term 'transcendental secularism' is an indicator of these varied aspects of this unique philosophy of value. Why should the term 'transcendental' be necessarily obscure and vague is beyond my comprehension. The author points out that, being transcendently secular, "secularism is not here exactly in any of the available socio-ethical plane." What exactly does he mean by this? There seems to be an implication in this statement that if it is transcendental then it has to be transcendental in the sense of being totally cut off from our socio-ethical plane. But why should it be 'transcendental' in this sense? I do admit that it transcends secularism in its popular sense as we come across in our day to day discourse, but the *Jivanmukta's* life and work which highlight these transcendently secular values are very much available in the world of ours for all of us to see and judge in the way we can. True, if we judge the life and activities of *Jivanmukta* according to the available routine standards of ours, we are sure to go wrong and that is why in the Vedantic literature we find the mention of specific criteria by which a *Jivanmukta* or a *gunatita* could be recognised. In any case, what is important is to note that there are specific criteria mentioned within the Vedantic frame-work which are available to us in our socio-ethical plane for judging if the life of any one is an embodiment of what have been designated by me as transcendently secular values. That is how we come to recognise a Ramana Maharshi or a Ramakrishna Paramahansa. I think that there is no "abstract vagueness" here; this is what Vedanta is and that is all.

Regarding the charge of vagueness brought against metaphysics of non-duality, similar charges, I should say, can be brought against any genuine metaphysics for that matter; in the present case, however, the charge can be seen to be baseless in so far as non-duality becomes intelligible in the *specific* sense attributed to it in Advaita framework. If the term non-duality of existence (*Advaita*) itself is vague, as is



alleged by the learned author, then the whole of Advaita philosophy would stand condemned by the same logic. But there is no reason why the term *Advaita* or non-duality of existence which has its own specific significance as distinguished from *dvaita*, *ekatva* etc. in the Advaita frame work should be construed as vague. Here it might be useful to point out that 'popular' ideas are not necessarily precise and free from vagueness and what the learned author would designate as 'transpopular and metaphysical' are not always hopelessly vague, though some of these ideas may appear to be so at the outset on account of their novelty and freshness.

'Humanitarian Secularism' suggested in place of 'transcendental secularism' is, on the other hand, no less vague, and what is more, it does not take into account the typical characteristics of Advaita metaphysics, thus making it liable to be confused with a mere humanitarian philosophy in a vague and somewhat restricted sense where human welfare is emphasized at the cost of values like regard to life in any form whatsoever. The word 'humanitarian', according to its Dictionary meaning, stands for "holding the views of a person who works for the welfare of all human beings by reducing suffering".<sup>4</sup> Advaita Philosophy of non-duality along with its transcendently secular value system is of course 'humanitarian' in this sense, it is to be admitted, but it is so only in so far as it claims that human suffering can be eradicated only by eradication of *avidya* or ignorance in respect of the non-duality of existence. But in that case this type of 'humanitarianism' needs to be carefully distinguished from 'humanitarianism' of other types which take their stand on equality or fraternity of all men as envisaged in some of the world-religions; otherwise, 'humanitarianism' as applied in the context of Advaita would be inadequate, and even misleading, to say the least. 'Secularism' again, as applied in the context of Advaita, needs to be carefully distinguished from other forms of 'secularism' with which we are usually acquainted in our day to day parlance; secularism here is not irreligious or anti-religious; in a sense, so to say, it is trans-religious as well as trans-secular. The term 'transcendental secularism' can, when used in a specific sense, take care of all these varied aspects of Advaita value-philosophy, although it is to be admitted at the same time that this term is by no means sacrosanct in all its possible connotations.

So far as national integration' is concerned, I do not see how mere 'humanitarianism', left to itself with all its vague and varied associations connected with the 'welfare of all human beings' can be

4 A. S. Hornby, *Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English* (Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 416.



particularly conducive to 'national integration' and why it is that the Advaita metaphysics of non-duality, if properly understood, cannot contribute its share in its own way for promoting this noble cause. After all, it is a matter of bringing about an understanding, a comprehension (*avagati*), in the minds of millions who are usually in the habit of thinking in terms of differences and discord. It is, moreover, not merely a question of national integration but of world-integration, so to say, through realisation of non-duality in case of Advaita, for national integration can be meaningful here only in the context of world-integration. Advaita is meant not only for the Indian nation, or for any particular nation for that matter, but it is there for the world as a whole, and in its purest form it seem to be an ideology for which mankind can continue to aspire. If it appears to be a high-sounding ideology for mankind, so much the worse for us; it is neither meat to be nor is it a populist theory. A 'working integration' which is all that matters in the present context, can be achieved by means of a proper and adequate training in transcendently secular values to which Advaita is committed through its philosophy of non-duality of existence. That such a training is possible, that the teacher of Advaita can guide the suffering humanity to transcend duality and its consequent misery, is what the great Acarya himself announces in clear terms as follows: "*Santa mahanto nivasanti Santo Vasanta-allokahitam carantah. Tirnah svayam bhimabhavanaavam janana hetun- anyanapi tarayantah.*"<sup>5</sup> Ordinary minds need to be enlightened through training in Advaita under his guidance of a master-mind, the *Jivanmukta*, and the effortless practice of transcendently secular values by the adept in his day-to-day life can have an impact which no amount of persuasion in favour of concepts such as 'humanitarianism' or 'secularism' can be able to achieve. The entire world can benefit from a *jivanmukta*, provided it allows itself to be trained by him, of course. But if we continue to be opaque to Advaita, how can Advaita be of any help to us? There is no hocus-pocus, no magic or mesmerism involved here. Integration can come only to the extent to which Advaita is practised, and this can at best be a 'working integration. at any time since it is unlikely that at any particular time the entire mass-mind can be inspired by the ideology of Advaita, irrespective of the fact whether it is characterised as 'transcendental' or 'humanitarian' secularism. By merely designating it as 'humanitarian secularism' it can be no more conducive to national integration, for what is important here is not such attractive and popular label or designation as 'humanitarian' which by itself, according to me, is incapable of bringing about any integration whatsoever, but the life of a *jivanmukta*.

<sup>5</sup> Acarya Sankara, *Vivekacudamani*, 37.



who is ceaselessly putting in to practice in his own life what I have pointed out to be transcendently secular values and his impact on the society as a whole. One *jivanmukta* like Sankara can bring about a 'working integration' and in this sense liberate the country during his life time while slogans like 'humanitarian secularism' may not be of much help and sometimes may cause hindrance on the way to integration in so far as such slogans may bewilder the minds of the ignorant millions. Vedanta is 'humanitarian' in some of its significant aspects and is also no doubt 'secular' in some other aspects, but Vedanta, it should be borne in mind, is not exhausted by and can not be identified with mere 'humanitarian secularism'; this is the point to which I want to draw the attention of the learned author and all those who would like to subscribe to such a view. The *characteristic* features of Vedanta are highlighted by the term 'transcendental secularism' to an extent which cannot, I am afraid, be brought out by designating it as 'humanitarian secularism'.



## 4

*Who is Responsible for World Philosophy?**Archie J. Bahm*

Philosophy is the responsibility of philosophers. World philosophy is the responsibility of world philosophers. What is philosophy? What is world philosophy? Who are the world philosophers? What are their responsibilities?

Philosophy is much more than love of wisdom. It involves inquiry into the nature of things (self, society and the universe), including their origins, values, and futures. Philosophical inquiry tends to be limited to most general questions (pertaining to existence, knowledge, and values), although its purpose is improved (wise) living by particular individuals.

World philosophy is concerned not only with universal truths relevant to persons and peoples but also with claims established in differing cultural traditions to have acquired some true conclusions. When, and since, some culturally established conclusions differ from those in other cultures in ways that are contradictory, thereby providing evidence of some falsity, world philosophy, as a field of inquiry, is involved in problems of resolving any contradictions. As ideal, world philosophy seeks to achieve answers to philosophical questions that will be both true and acceptable to all persons and all peoples.

Who are the world philosophers? Although, in a sense, any philosopher who attempts to inquire into and to achieve a world philosophy is a world philosopher. But mankind needs something like our ideal philosophy if, it is to survive prospective conflicts. Thus an attempt is needed to achieve a philosophy that both incorporates the truths from every individual and culturally established world philosophy in an harmonious and integrated synthesis and to courageously neglect false parochial doctrines no matter how ancient and revered. Mankind has not authorized any body or society of philosophers to conduct its inquiry. FISP now exists officially as the society



of professional philosophers and teachers of philosophy trying to represent the interests of all philosophers and teachers of philosophy. Perhaps an independent society, or an other officially organized society, of responsible world philosophies could be organized. But at present, FISP seems to be the most able, and most appropriate, organization to assume responsibilities for pursuing mankind's needed world philosophy.

What are the responsibilities of today's world philosophers? They include dealing with the world's most urgent problems, at least to the extent that these involve philosophical issues requiring philosophical competence for understanding and solution. I limit consideration here to problems of three kinds which may be named "religious", "scientific" and "philosophical". Regarding each, achieving correct conceptions of each is itself part of the problems.

### RELIGIOUS

Misconception of religion is a basic problem in understanding religious obstacles to solving world problems. Religion is concern for the ultimate values of life as a whole. The popular view that religion is belief in God is false, demonstrably false. Jainism and Theravada Buddhism are explicitly atheistic. Since Jainism and Theravada Buddhism are religions, definition of religion as essentially theistic is obviously false. Furthermore, the prevalent view that "God exists" (God as conceived by orthodox Jews, Christians and Muslims) is also demonstrably false. The falsity of these views, combined with their embodiment in traditional cultures commanding believing loyalty of millions of people, effectively prevents intelligent (more truthful) efforts to deal with world problems.

For example, world wars are at least partly, when not primarily, caused by conflicting claims regarding what is true. Even though persons from many religions sometimes join in conducting "prayers for peace", dogmatic allegiance to basic doctrines continues to produce conditions conducive to war, even when war is not in process. Overpopulation and poverty are products partly of religious claims about the sacredness of foetuses, the divinity of souls emerging from fertilized ova, and the irresponsible helplessness of persons believing conscientiously that they are compelled by divine commands. Many religious institutions are unwittingly committed to policies and practices contributing to overpopulation, poverty and war. Demonstrations of the falsity of harmful views and providing true (or truer) views removing harmful obstacles are needed. In an age when science as become regarded as providing the best way to understanding the



## Who is Responsible for World Philosophy ?

nature of things, the task of demonstrating the falsity of false views and of replacing them with true views is a responsibility of scientists, at least partly. But when we examine science today, we find it grossly deficient in some kinds of achievement because also committed to some false conceptions of science.

### SCIENTIFIC

Misconceptions about science are basic problems in understanding scientific obstacles to solving world problems. Too many scientists are trapped in a false positivistic philosophy claiming that science is or ought to be completely free. In fact, science is based on value foundations, has valued aims, has valued methods, and valued results. Science is saturated not only with values but also with ethics. Oughtness consists in the power that an apparently greater good has over an apparently lesser good in compelling our choices. Scientists are constantly compelled to make choices and thus are involved in oughtness and obligation. A scientist ought to seek the best hypothesis, employ the best test of an experiment, obtain the best amount of evidence, at all times.

But also the nature of value and of oughtness can be investigated scientifically. There is nothing in the nature of scientific method preventing its application goodness and rightness, except prejudicial doctrinal exclusion due to false positivistic assumptions. Value-free conceptions of science relieve scientists of responsibilities for seeking to understand values. When persons seeking knowledge about values from scientists are turned away, where will they go for answers? Today many are going to traditional religions and getting false answers. Refusal of scientists to provide understanding regarding values (including ethics, religion and politics) is a part of the cause of world problems of overpopulation, poverty and war. To the extent that this is so, the false positivistic philosophy is a serious handicap in solving mankind's most urgent problems.

### PHILOSOPHICAL

Misconceptions about philosophy are basic problems in understanding philosophical obstacles to solving world problems. Although philosophies exist actually only in persons, persons exist in, constitute, and are constituted by their participation in encultured society, with responsibilities for their own social as well as personal welfare. Persons who are world philosophers have responsibilities not only for their own personal philosophies but also for world philosophy—philosophy needed by other people in the world.



Since some false religious and scientific conceptions about fundamental principles prevail, they constitute problems needing the attention by world philosophers. If world philosophers fail to attend to, resolve, and promote acceptance of needed revised (i. e., true) theories about foundational presuppositions of religion and science, are they not failing to bear their appropriate responsibilities ?

If world philosophers are to provide needed revised true foundational principles for religion and science, must they not first discover, if they have not already, and agree upon, if they do not already, principles that are, if not always self-evidently true, then at least demonstrable true, as much as possible ?

If world philosophers are to provide needed revised true foundational principles for religion and science, must they not first agree upon principles that are either self-evidently true or demonstrably true as much as possible. If they do not yet agree, then ought they not regard achieving such agreement as their unfulfilled responsibility ? To the extent that other urgent world problems cannot be solved adequately until world philosophers provide the foundations needed for true understanding, then is not absence of such provisions *the* most urgent world problem ?

Are philosophers "fiddling while the world burns"?



## *Buddhist Tantra : From Karmamudra to Mahamudra*

*Girija Vyas*

In the development of Buddhist thought through the ages, Tantrism was conceived to be a late product. Although as a public system of thought the Tantra gathered momentum after 500 or 600 A.D., the Tantra is not really a new creation but just an absorption with Buddhist Philosophy. The Tantric literature of Buddhism is very bulky, unexplored and very little has been translated. Buddhist Tantrism was prominent in the Vajrayana. About 630 A.D. a Tibetan prince, Sring Tsan Po, introduced Buddhism in Tibbet and for the Buddhist Tantra one scholar, Shantarakshita, is responsible. He excited the Tibetan by his yogic skills and sex symbolism, and through his influence Buddhism of Bengal became the religion of Tibbet. It was a form of devotion to Buddhist deities, male and female representing external and internal natural energies.

The scholarly investigation of the Tantric documents is still in its beginning, and the question, what does Tantra mean? has remained unanswered. The main charge levelled against Tantrism is that it makes use of sex, as the popular meaning of Tantrism is connected with sex.

Tantra is a samskrit word derived from the root 'tan' which means to expand. In this way Tantra is a knowledge of a systematic and scientific experimental method which offers the possibility of expanding man's consciousness and faculties. It is a process through which the individual's inherent spiritual powers can be realized.

It is difficult to determine the exact time when the Tantra started. Tantra literature took a long period to develop and no particular age

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Support for this research was provided by the Center for the Study of Values, University of Delaware, Newark, DE 19711.



can be assigned definitely. Tantrism in Hindu, Buddhist and Jain literature is very old and may be traced back to the beginning of the Christian era. Tantra developed largely outside the establishment, and in the course of a dialectical process acquired its own outlook. The Tantric approach to life is anti-ascetic, anti-speculative and without conventional perfectionist clichés. The main teaching of Tantra is that the Reality is unity. The individual has the potential to realize the Reality or cosmic consciousness. The individual is not isolated from the Reality. To realize this fact is the main aim of the individual, this way Tantrism is a system of the re-discovery.

The original Tantras may be grouped into two sections: The Hindu Tantrism: the Shaiva, the Vaishnava, the Shakta and the Buddhist or Vajrayana Tantrism. The two are not the same. Tantrikas are broadly divided into various sects according to the deities they worship their rituals. The Hindu Tantric meditates on Shakti as energy and on Shiva as quiescent wisdom—and he knows they are ontologically one. The Tibetan Buddhist Tantric meditates on Shakti (yum) as static and on Shiva (yeb) as dynamic;

Both Hindu and Buddhist Tantra assume that the really efficacious method of salvation and their proper use cannot be learned from books, but that they can be taught only by personal contact with a spiritual instructor. The Guru Naropa declares that through the Guru's grace highest realization can be won. The prospective Guru has to study his disciple for a considerable time in a close symbiosis. Both the teacher and the disciple have to test each other in order to effect a complete transference.

Tantra has adopted diverse methods to suit the needs of different followers according to their condition and abilities. Each individual has the freedom to follow the path of Tantra in his own way. The Tantras have evolved a framework of theory and practice, spiritual and physical, for achieving the values of life.

Because of the general ignorance regarding their real meaning, Tantric rituals such as sexo-yogic practices have been misunderstood and distorted. In fact, in Tantrism sex was not an end but one of the means to attain the Nirvana, or Void. Still another belief is entwined with this: in sexual union nonduality and the Void itself are momentarily experienced. So Tantrism doesn't mean only the sex act. What then does Tantra mean? The GUHYASAMAJATANTRA defines:

Tantra is continuity, and this is threefold Ground, Actuality and Inalienableness. "Actuality" is immanent causality, "Inalienableness" is the effect, "Ground" is the process.



# Buddhist Tantra : From Karmamudra to Makamudra

Naropa has explained this as: "actuality" is the experimenter, an individual likened to a precious jewel, an individual as such or continuity as immanent causality; "ground", is the four techniques communion and realization by means of the two stages—developing stage and fulfillment stage—or continuity as an operational process; and "inalienableness" is the unlocalized Nirvana, the pattern of identity, or continuity as effect.

Padma dkar Po links Tantra with men's existence or actuality, a proper knowledge of which will make all the difference to his actual status. According to Vajrasekhara, Mahaguyayogatantra Tantra is continuity:

Samsara (world) is considered as Tantra;  
Nirvana is the later Tantra.

In fact, Buddhist Tantra is the affirmation of the absolute unity of reality. According to John B. Noss, "As in Hindu Tantrism, the Buddhist rites were boldly taboo-breaking, but there was little concession to orginistic impulses as there was in Hindu rites, the hope still being to achieve a spiritual victory. The fundamental aim was to secure "illumination" through control of the body and its psychic powers. There was also the aim to come face to face with the elemental forces in the world and to transcend the desire aroused by them. These rites practiced by special groups, were secret and only carefully selected initiates were allowed by the Guru to engage in them".

Four rituals were allowed for the Tantra practice: (1) Mandala or frame, (2) Mantras or verses uttered, (3) Puja or offering something and (4) Mudras—position gesture. The approved practice in the sexual rites was to inhibit ejaculation at the moment of its occurrence by breath control, in order to cause semen to be withdrawn into the body of the male to heighten his spiritual energy. In the background of all the rituals there was a hope of union with deity and liberation from samsara. The human devotee was believed able to identify himself or herself with any of the celestial Buddhas or their consorts.

Buddhist Tantrism is a transition from sensuality to spirituality, Kamamudra to Mahamudra. Sex in this sense has a wider connotation than a purely genital response; it relates to the whole of phenomenon. As Guenther says in the teachings of Naropa, "...the relation a man has with a woman (Karmamudra) is not merely biological, a released tension, the easing of locally circumscribed urge; it is much more 'projective', outlining possible ways to a large whole". Padma dkar Po describes, "When enlightenment extends from the crown of the head to the throat, body-mind feel somewhat pleasant. The grad-



ual disappearance of the coarse subject—object dichotomy is a joyous excitement known as delight stable from above". Since this is operating in a variety of erotic activities, the situation is one of variety. After that, enlightenment extends to the heart. Body-mind on the whole feels pleasant. This disappearance of the coarse idea of self is "ecstatic delight". Thereafter, enlightenment extends to the navel. Pleasantness diffuses the whole of body-mind. The disappearance of the idea of the partner is "absence of excitement" or "a special delight". Enlightenment then extends to the extreme of the sex region. All that exists of appearance takes on the character of pleasantness and the idea of the three types of joyous excitement disappears—this is "co-emergence delight; the intuitive understanding of the non-duality of bliss and nothingness through an individual awareness which is the noetic act as such." In fact the Karmamudra or 'seal of acts' is first of all, a concrete person with whom a relationship can be established—it is an experience of transcendence.

The Karmamudra is not an end in itself according to Buddhist Tantra. Sex is doubtless involved, but only as a partial phase in something which includes much more besides, so in dealing with the Karmamudra we may also start with our own being. Now, the question arises, what is the ultimate end of Buddhist Tantra? Mahamudra is at the heart of, and the unifying principle in Buddhist Tantrism. The bliss that one feels in male-female relationships is not a real bliss. As the experience of the Karmamudra is not the Mahamudra experience proper. But it does not mean that the Karmamudra has no significance. For the attainment of fullness of life, the Karmamudra is of great significance. As according to prajñajñanaprakasa,

Without Karmamudra

No Mahamudra.

A few words about Mahamudra. Mahamudra, the literal word, means the great gesture or the ultimate gesture beyond which nothing is possible. It is the ultimate experience. According to Tilopa no words or symbols could describe or explain Mahamudra but he gave Naropa the instruction on the illumining Mahamudra transcending awareness. Be 'what you are' the gist of Mahamudra. Take the example of two lovers. When they are in the act of love they lose themselves into the act. Their identity is lost for that moment. The realization of Mahamudra is not a realization of something new, it is like recognizing a man one has known before or take the example of two lovers. When they are floating about loosely without making any effort, but remaining loose and natural, they achieve the orgasm. This orgasm between two lovers is called 'Mahamudra'. Similarly



without exerting but remaining loose and natural one can break the yoke.

Tilopa says that no words or symbols could describe or explain Mahamudra, yet for the sake of Naropa—his disciple—he makes an attempt. He gave him the instruction on the Mahamudra—transcending awareness. It is a brilliant sensation which is nothing in itself and beyond all words and thought.

Now the question arises, how can we achieve the state of Mahamudra? In Buddhist Tantrism there are several descriptions. The root problem of all our problems is our mind itself. Mind is never peaceful. Just as when a lamp is lighted in a dark room, the darkness disappears. In the same way when you reach the stage of 'no-selfness' or awareness, thoughts don't enter you at all. Our thoughts stray in mind just as the clouds float in the sky aimlessly without having any root. According to Tantrism one should not feel disappointed. Allow the thoughts to float effortlessly. The key word is 'effortlessly'. Soon one would understand the phenomenon of one's consciousness. In the sky we see the clouds forming different shapes and the color of sky is different at sunrise, sunset and mid-noon. But these different shapes of the clouds and the different colors do not effect the sky, it remains untinged. Similarly various thoughts come out of one's mind. But all these do not leave any mark on one's mind. Man should live in this world as if he is the sky—untainted. Buddhist Tantrics use the word mind in two senses. Mind with a small 'm' and mind with a capital 'M'. Mind with capital 'M' means the witness and consciousness and the mind with small 'm' means the witnessed. If one wants to find the truth one has to be natural and loose. If one practices one will not know beyond practice.

There are two types of mind—the ordinary and the extraordinary. The ordinary mind takes and the extraordinary mind gives. According to Buddhism there is a third type of mind—a 'no-mind' which neither takes nor gives but is indifferent. But Tantric Buddhism goes beyond all three—the mind neither asks for more nor gives more, nor even is indifferent to the world but it rests in itself. When you enter into yourself the world disappears; you are sitting inside doing nothing. This is the state of ultimate enlightenment—a Mahamudra.

Tantric Buddhists teach, do naught with the body but relax—relax both in mind and body. The energy is at home, not moving here and there. Then the whole surface of your consciousness becomes calm and *still* like silent water. Suddenly infinite energy will start pouring into you. You will find yourself filled with the Divine, the mysticism.



'Alaya' is a Buddhist term which means the 'abode', the inner abode, the inner emptiness. This is the basis of the ultimate awareness. If you remain in your inner abode everything, by and by, will dissolve into its own natural element (Dharmata). A natural man simply sits inside and allows things to happen. He does not 'do', and only then one attains Mahamudra.

Life is both good and bad. A man of real understanding, neither good nor bad, understands both and in that very understanding he transcends both. This is absolutely a new dimension which is neither optimism nor passivism but a self fulfilling in itself.

When one reaches for the stated enlightenment one's mind starts melting and one feels that the whole mind is falling like water into an abyss. One feels as if he is moving into the unknown. This first step is very difficult to pass through. After passing through this stage one attains another level of awareness. At this stage the sense of falling and trembling disappears. Mind flows like a river in the plains. This stage has the quality of absolute silence and calmness. The next stage is that of the flow of the river entering into the ocean ..delta. Here the mind has returned to the Universal Mind, which is the source of the origination, and hence the good of its journey back home. This is Mahamudra. Buddhists call this Nirvana. In fact, this state is indescribable and that is why the word 'shunyata' or void is used to express it in every type of Buddhistic yoga. Philosophically speaking Mahamudra teaches the absolute unity of reality, and if reality is one, we can only know it when we merge with it.

Guenther describes Gram-po-pa's view that Mahamudra has four characteristics: all encompassing, without color or shape, (it is the) actuality of transcending awareness, stretching across the whole of time, and neither coming nor going. When it is present in man he will not consider Samsara (world) to be something that has to be renounced and, therefore, he will not shun what is said not to be conducive to enlightenment. Neither will he hold Nirvana to be something restful and, therefore, he will not rely on what is said to counter worldiness and so has neither wishful dreams nor thoughts of despair as to the outcome.

This is the transcendent awareness, beyond the path of speech, the object of no thought, ...know this as pointing in itself to itself. Actually, when the clouds of ignorance disappear, this non-dual spirituality enjoys. This is Mahamudra, this is nothingness. Nothingness does not mean the absence of all the qualities but, in fact, it is a vacuity which is fullness, a silence, which is eloquence and inactivity, which is dynamic.



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## 6

*Life as I see it**Lakshmi Saxena*

As one traverses this long journey of life one gets increasingly convinced that there is considerable difference between knowing a thing from the outside and knowing it intimately. The subterranean notes, strains and rhythm combine to define a thing in its totality. So a deeper perception alone is able to do justice to it. But in most of the cases we just do not have the time nor the necessary art of entering deep into the innermost strains of their existence nor of their intimate relations with one another.

**Our ego-centred pragmatic approach : A deterrent**

The question that arises in the present context is why must it be so ? And why are we ordinarily satisfied with the odd tit-bits that we know about things around us ? Why do we not wish to establish a rapport with those things and take them in their contexts to do better justice to them individually and collectively ?

It is because the perspective with which normally life is lived is ego-centric and pragmatic. One likes to associate with those with whom life begins and can be conveniently lived. Our parents and members of the family give us the required start and the need perceptions. Those with whom we subsequently associate also likewise contribute to the enrichment of our lives and give us the required assurance with which life can be lived with a reasonable amount of security and success. Hence one thing is very clear that for most of us life is lived with a steady eye on one's advantages. We have hardly any time to come close to people, to be intimately in touch with them, to share their joys and sorrows and to express our intimate solidarity with them. It is a life of surface contacts, nor of deep communication with one another where a touch of a gesture speaks volumes of one's deep concern for one another and alleviates sorrow or enriches life instantly with the unspoken understanding and love.



## The Perceptive Ones : New vistas of human perception

Few are those and they are the gifted ones too, who have the required perceptions which take them beyond the routine cycle of understanding and activity of the ordinary individual. They are the sensitive ones whose contacts have a salutary effect on people around them : Their's is the spontaneous, live sharing which adds a new dimension to life. They may not be listed amongst the great thinkers or artists who find their places in history. But they live a life of silent communication with people and contribute immensely to their happiness. Their voice, their gestures, their touch, their silent services have a salutary effect on the mind and spirit of those around them and almost effortlessly the recipient is elevated to a realm ennobling beyond words.

The same is effected by the artists—who effect through their arts the needed Katharsis for a rejuvenation of life. Of these both Plato and Aristotle have drawn vivid pictures.

Plato spoke of the dialectician artist—the philosopher, whose gaze was constantly fixed on the transcendental realities of life—the good, the true and the beautiful. He spoke passionately of Ideal Forms and lifted people to a world of rare beauty open only to the wise and the dedicated few. Plato led us through his dialogue not to an imaginary world but to the divine perception of the frontal realities of life at the apex of which was the 'Good'.

Plato's thoughts had found their exemplification in the life of his master Socrates who lived and died for his convictions. For him philosophy was not something of which one could make fancy speeches to be later on forgotten. It was one for which one could live and die. The Socratic ideal was revived again in modern times by Soren Kierkegaard who spoke of the personal or subjective nature of truth. Truth for him was one with which one was deeply involved; for which one could live and also die. The question, therefore, of making compromises with it could never arise. In the "concluding Unscientific Postscript", he says, "madness and truth become in the last analysis indistinguishable", and also that Truth was something for which I—the individual could "existentially live and die". It was something for which one could mount the cross for it was something which ran in one's life-stream. Evidently, therefore, by 'subjectivity' in the present context is not meant the vagrantly personal. It is something which spell out the major thrust of one's being in its entirety—something for which one lives, suffers and eventually dies. It is something which cannot be defined in terms of



the human intellect, rather it is one which is seized by faith and exemplified in life.

Such commitment to Truth or to God in the case of the religious man, has been seen in the lives of many. But for Kierkegaard it was best expressed in the life of Abraham alone. He says it is difficult to comprehend him and much more difficult to follow him. He calls him the Knight of Faith and distinguishes himself from him as the knight of infinite resignation. The deep faith and love Abraham had for God, the consecration of his life for Him, the firmness with which he resolved to sacrifice his only son Isaac in response to His wishes, the long arduous journey to Mount morena without any doubt or faltering of steps... knows no parallel in human history. The life of Faith is lived in the inwardness of one's being and evidently no discourses or sermons can do justice to it.

### The Hallowed Ones :

New vistas of inner life, therefore, are opened up by these consecrated souls. They with their fervour and deep commitment enrich both their personal lives as well as the life of society around them. What would the world have been without a Gandhi or a Martin Luther King ? They stood like pillars of strength and inspired their people for concerted action and got freedom for them. What would India have been without the charged spirits of the people who stood firmly for the cause for which Gandhiji stood ? No country can be great without men and women who are disciplined and firm in their convictions for noble ends of life—whether it be in the sphere of art, morality, religion or political life. The Param-vir Chakras awarded to soldiers for gallantry in the battle field amply testify that spirit is mightier than the psycho-physical conditions in which it is placed the oddities of circumstances in which one has to work. It also proves that life is to be lived for ends nobler than the dictates of self-interest; that not 'Svartha' but 'dharma' should be the motivating force of our lives.

This the Mahabharata has placed at the centre of one's life and Lord Krishna assures us that for the restoration of dharma he incarnates :

यदा यदा हि धर्मस्य ग्लानिर्भवति भारत, अश्रुत्यन्तम धर्मस्य तदात्मानं सृजाम्यहम् ।  
परित्राणाय साधूनां विनाशाय च दुष्कृताम्, धर्मं संस्थापनार्थाय संभवामि युगे युगे ॥

॥ ८ ॥ अध्याय ४ ॥

### The Path of Yoga :

Even if one does not take the assurance of Lord Krishna literally to be true, the one fact that emerges from it is that the might of



Life as I see it

spirit and its power of resurrection cannot be questioned. Men can through their sustained efforts so purify their psycho-physical apparatus that they present themselves as live, glowing flames of the Inner Self; No bonds, no attachments, no illusions weaning them from their complete consecration to the best in them.

A Jnana-yogi remains perfectly detached and exists as the witness Light or the Sakshi of the happenings around him. He grows into the unruffled one, the "sthithaprajna" of the Bhagawad Gita. The Bhakta lives only for his "Istha". All other desires lose their significance for him. He has elevated himself pedestal high from the ordinary life of impulses and passions. The Karma-yogi works like the Lord himself not tied to the good or bad effects of his actions. Poised deep within, he ceaselessly works for whatever he considers to be his dharma. The Karma-yogi is also elevated to a point higher than the one on which the ordinary mortal is situated.

So the yogi-whatever be the form of his yoga-rises above the ordinary consciousness and works not for his personal ends but for that which is best for him and his society. He has surrendered his egoism-his sense of doership completely Nor does he consider himself the bhokta-the enjoyer of the fruits of his actions. He has opened himself completely to the Inner Light within him and works at Its behest. The feelings of "I and mine" which bound him earlier have given place to those of "Thou and thine"-The "Thou" symbolizing the transcendental principle within and outside him.

Evidently, therefore, the yogi is transported to a level beyond the mental consciousness. He is possessed of 'Samatva-buddhi' and is known as the 'Sthita Prajna'.

By a very sensitive portrayal the Gita describes the state of such a One seated beyond the pleasure-pain or the desire principle which is the sole motivating principle of the mental-man. Such a one is immovably calm in the face of excitingly favourable as well as the most oppressive situations of life. He does not welcome the one nor shun the other. He is neither hostile to his adversary nor feels drawn towards his beneficiary.

Like the tortoise he has withdrawn himself completely from the field in which the senses dwell. Like the mighty ocean in which waters keep on pouring from all sides, he remains unmoved by their noisy turbulence. His inner poise and serenity is beautifully presented in the following verse:

आर्यमाणाम् च ल प्रतिष्ठं, समुद्र मापः प्रविशन्ति यद्वत् ।  
तत्तत्काया यं प्रविशन्ति सर्वे सशान्ति माप्नोति न काम कायो ॥ द्वितीय अध्याय ७० ॥



To such a One there remains no mysteries of life for he has lost all sense of "Otherness". Everything is crystal clear to him. No reactions of any kind of refusal or acceptance vitiate his serenity. And so everything flows from him from the Great One for both ultimately are one with a spontaneity which silences the questioning spirit of the intellectual man.

And the corollary which flows from the above is that,

"the tiniest reaction is a proof that the discipline is imperfect and that some part of us accepts ignorance and bondage as its law and clings still to the old nature".<sup>1</sup>

The Yogi's is a state of absolute atonement with the Divine—and exclusive in the present context means not exclusive of the world in which one happens to be situated. It only means that nothing is to be excluded except "the falsehood of our way of seeing the world and our will's ignorance".<sup>2</sup>

**The leap beyond :**

The yogi state is one of beatific perception and inward peace. It is a state of perfect atonement with the Divine. Seated firmly in one's self the questioning spirit of man is silence for good. No doubt assail him, no uncertainties toss him. The subterranean dialectics of life stand crystal before him; For he sees it in its inner rhythm and magnificence,

It is just like a poem as it gradually unfolds itself in the heart of the poet in its unbroken unity. The same finds expression in a number of verses, having a number of lines which in turn are constituted by words having their own individual significance. The reader puts these together and reconstructs the vibrant unity of the whole. But the synthesis which he effects is an artificial one. So at best a shadow of the original.

But a more sensitive reader by a leap places himself at the point at which the creativity of the artist crystallized itself in the verses. His is a deeper comprehension made possible by an imaginative leap. It is almost coincident with the original. The yogi likewise transport himself to the point at which through empathy is revealed in all its transparency the movement divine. No oddities, no incongruities baffle him. The entire universe appears to him as a wonderful sport of the divine.

This is also the destiny of each one of us. Sooner or later when we are fed up and disillusioned by the sport of the intellect in which

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1 Sri Aurobindo, *The Synthesis of Yoga*, Sri Aurobindo Library, I.N.C., New York, 1950, p. 61.

2 Ibid., p. 40.



we are presently engaged, we return like the prodigal to one's own native land.

It not only is a return to the bosom of the Divine, It is a bigger perception and issues forth in a higher form of activity. One ceases henceforth to be the slave of one's passions and circumstances, one gets transformed into a channel for the free flow of the divine activity. This is what is symbolized in the term 'Yajna' or absolute consecration to the supreme. It is this which Arjuna exhibits in his attitude of absolute surrender to the Lord.

#### Concluding note :

And so as we come to a close of these reflections the question which comes most pressing to my mind for solution is : Which of the two is more glorious—life or death ? A life lived with a considerable degree of commitment to noble ends is certainly rewarding and inspiring. But the decision to give up one's life if it is not in keeping with one's aspirations is no less valuable.

Certainly to one who views such a decision from the outside it would appear that it speaks of one's weakness, of one's inability to face the situations of life. But if one were to see it from the inside—from the point of view of the person concerned and what it meant to him, one would certainly appreciate the courage with which it was taken and executed.

Giving up one's life for the defence of one's country is generally appreciated and quoted as an example for others to follow. But the passionate seeker of Truth who willingly opts for suicide because bogged by the situations of life he feels that it has led him into a blind alley—is equally worthy of our admiration. But only if the decision has not been taken in a state of momentary depression.

When the young Socrates decides to end his life because he feels it has cheated him and he will not be able to pursue the path of excellence for which his soul yearns, his decision is certainly not the result of a momentary state of depression. It is the corollary to his belief that a life of mediocrity is not worth living for; that if it is not consecrated to the highest excellence and if the chances of attaining that are not possible, it is better to do away with it rather than to live it at a low level,

This philosophy evidently sustains his option for voluntary death and compels us to give serious thought to it.

One may argue and it has been done, by many why can a person not be realistic enough to make the best use of the opportunities



which come his way? Why can he not be satisfied with whatever achievement is possible to him in the framework of the situational complex in which he has to live? But the young Socrates certainly refers to a category unique in itself—unique on account of the frenzy for excellence which possessed him till the end. No compromise was possible for him and hence the decision. Alok left us stunned. His death put an end to a very tender life—a promising one indeed. His yearning to be a research scientist of great excellence left him with no other option. Circumstances proved rather cruel to him—as well as to us.

There were intimations of what was going on in his mind. But we thought he would get over it if life gave him what he wanted. His sudden death has convinced me that it is very difficult to help one so deeply committed; that everyone is born with an inbuilt nature and exists for its fulfilment. This is what ordinarily is called one's destiny. Also that success or failure is not very important in life. What is valuable is the courage and determination with which life is lived. That alone makes it memorable. And added to it is the conviction that very often death is more glorious than life.

It was this which was demonstrated by Socrates in Athens long back when he chose death to escape from his imprisonment. It is this which is demonstrated time and again by the brave ones who willingly die for their convictions.



## *The Place of Hume in Modern Ethics*

*I. N. Sinha*

The history of the twentieth century ethical thought is vibrant with many divergent ideas about the fundamental problems of moral philosophy. These ideas, nodoubt, have led to the formulation of a wide variety of moral theories in the present century, but all of them do not indicate maturity of thought in equal measure. Contradiction and confusion regarding questions to be asked in moral philosophy are noticed frequently and every moral issue seems to bristle with difficulties.

The ethical thinkers of the present age are, however, seriously trying to find out what a moral judgment really unfolds. Does it unfold knowledge or mere feeling? If value judgments are nothing but expressions of mere feelings of individual minds then these are not really assertions or significant propositions. We express our emotions through them and emotions indeed, are what these ethical propositions embody. Ethical terms like right, good, duty, obligation, etc. are mere emotive signs to express the feelings of the speakers. These terms have only emotive meanings and no factual reference. These terms do not refer to empirical matters of fact like the words 'red', 'tree', 'horse' etc. Hence an ethical proposition does not make any assertion which may be verified by experience as true or false. Ethical concepts like 'good', 'wrong' etc. express nothing but our emotional attitude towards some facts. So an ethical term is emotive and not factual. Before deciding the question regarding the status of Ethics as a scientific study, we should, therefore, try to find out what the ethical predicates really express. We should not be misled by the conventional or arbitrary uses of the ethical terms. True empirical import of these terms should be found out by studying them analytically.



This attempt to find out the correct use or meaning of an ethical terms, thus, becomes an important task for the analytical branch of our ethical study. This School of ethical thinkers deserve credit because of the fact that this school has differentiated (for the first time) the analytical questions from the questions of normative ethics. The analytical branch, therefore, undertakes an enquiry into the meaning of such moral predicates as 'good', 'right', 'duty' etc. because unless a man knows what 'right' really means, he cannot ascertain correctly what makes an action right. So, if we want to know what a good life is, we must first of all know the correct meaning of the word 'good'. One can hardly apply a term correctly until he knows what the term really means. The problem of meaning of the moral predicates thus, becomes a basic problem in analytical ethics. The analytical thinkers have shown that the meaning of a term does not refer to the customary manner in which the term is used; rather it is to be understood as embodying "those characteristics or relations, if any, which moral experience in general intends to attribute to objects' actions or characters when it says that they are good or right or ought to be done or the opposite of any of those".<sup>1</sup>

Ethics has always looked upon the question "what is a good life" as its basic question. Normative Ethics too has sought to determine what is right, good or obligatory because only by knowing this a man can live up to his knowledge and can make his life a good one. The norm in normative ethics is the principle that controls human actions through reason and emotion. In this connection, therefore, a question naturally crops up regarding the primacy either of reason or of emotion in ethical judgment.

The result is the emergence of two opposite schools of ethical thought namely the rationalistic school and the sentimentalistic school emphasising two dominant aspects of human nature namely, reason and feeling respectively.

#### **Rationalistic School :**

The eighteenth century moral thinkers of Great Britain found the guiding principle of human conduct in the rational nature of man. R. Wudworth, has emphatically declared that Reason is the guiding principle in man's moral life and that moral decisions are always rational decisions. Reason alone helps one to distinguish 'right' from 'wrong'. S. Clarke, on the otherhand, has held that moral characteristics are eternal and unchangeable and that duty arises from reason. When a man does not follow the rational path, he goes

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1 T. E. Hills; *Contemporary Ethical Theories*.



against reason (which he possesses as a natural light) and acts under the spell of forceful desires and passions. His action, being irrational becomes immoral. His reason, no doubt apprehends what is right; even then he acts in a wrong way being compelled by desires and passions which are also the ingredients of human nature. His action contradicts reason and fails to become fitting to the situation. Fittingness can be apprehended by reason alone. In so far as men are conscious of fittingness and unfittingness of some actions to their situations, they are under an obligation to act accordingly.

### Sentimentalists :

The sentimentalists of the eighteenth century, however, were not in favour of granting supremacy to reason in the sphere of morality. According to Shaftesbury the moral distinctions have their foundation in the instinctive and altruistic impulses which constitute the basic nature of man. Man is, by nature inclined to benevolence. Therefore, he has a natural affective tendency to harmonise his own inclinations and desires of his own fellow beings. Virtue involves right affection. To be virtuous, a man should make efforts to produce harmony between what will satisfy him and what will bring satisfaction to his fellow beings, as otherwise, he will not be able to produce the greatest good for the mankind as a whole. Moral goodness emerges only when an action is done from such an altruistic affection.

Butler too has based Ethics on human nature. Human nature, as he finds, is composed of various elements. These elements form a harmony and create thereby, a balanced (and consequently morally good) character. Like Shaftesbury he also has regarded harmony as the indicator of virtue or goodness. An action is right when it originates from a balanced character in which all ingredients of human nature are related in a harmonious way. When harmony prevails in the nature of a man, then his actions also do not conflict with the interests and desires of his fellowmen.

It is true that man by nature seeks his own happiness but according to Butler this principle of self-love is not the only principle that works in man. The principle of benevolence which aims at general welfare of mankind is also a natural principle that guides and conducts human actions. These two principles are not contrary but complimentary. Excessive indulgence of those passions and desires which are opposed to the principle of benevolence will create unhappiness and will lead man astray. Similarly benevolence is to be practised in a manner consistent with self-love.

The supreme principle of human nature is, however, the principle of reflection or conscience. Whenever a situation arises when



self-love seeks to enter into a conflict with the principle of benevolence, the principle of conscience immediately assumes the role of the supreme authority and seeks to resolve the conflict in the best possible manner. Conscience, says Butler, is the final court of appeal. Butler, however, is not clear whether conscience is a principle of reason or of sense.

Hutcheson has given us a developed theory of moral sense. It is the moral sense that perceived the properties which arouse the response of moral feeling of approval or disapproval. We can never evaluate human conduct unless we possess a faculty to perceive the moral qualities of actions. Since moral sense determines what ends we approve of reason is not of any use to justify the ends. Reason, however, is serviceable in the sense that it discovers the means which will be effective to realise the desired ends. It has only a subordinate place in the moral life of a man.

Indeed, the movement launched by the sentimentalists has been forceful enough to prove that reason cannot be regarded as the sole guiding principle of morality in human life. Of course reason has a place in moral life but it is to be subordinate to passions.

This taking away of power and position from the rational aspect of human mind has found a very impressive and original expression in the writings of Hume. In his opinion, the primary function of moral judgment is to guide our actions in practical life and this guidance can never be given to us by reason which is not a dynamic principle. Reason can never move us to action. Whenever we act we are moved by the expectation of pleasure or pain. What reason can do is to inform the passions about the existence or non-existence of the object sought; reason can also suggest the most effective means of seeking the desired object". Morality is, therefore, more properly fact than judged of".<sup>2</sup>

It is true that Hume's philosophy is widely studied by contemporary ethicists but very few of them have accepted all his views. Nevertheless his views are studied and cited as if he is still a living force. Of course in the first quarter of the twentieth century it was believed that Hume was no longer a living figure in the world of ideas. But in the beginning of the third quarter of the present century the wind has started blowing in a different direction. Professor Hendel has aptly remarked that "Nowadays we all think very differently. Hume is no pale ghost of the past"<sup>3</sup> This revival of interest is due to

2 Hume; *Treatise of Human Nature*, II, 3, 3.

3 C. W. Hendel, *Studies in the Philosophy of David Hume*, Viewed. (Indianapolis, Ind., 1963), p. XXI.



the predominant growth of analytical philosophy in the Anglo-American philosophical world since 1930. The analytic temper is as strong in Hume's work as it is in the modern ethicists. He was the greatest moralist among British philosophers, the most subtle and most profound. Like Robsseaen Hume has represented Nature as operating through the heart, which has its own reasons and not through the intellect. Of course he has not denied the fact that the calm passions may sometimes prevail, and that a sensible, cool calculation of happiness within the social order may be both possible and desirable. His philosophy, his theory of knowledge, his ethics and his political theory are so designed as to persuade man to follow the dictates of passions without in anyway impairing the inner harmony that has been established by a balanced co-operation among the different ingredients of his nature.

It is not difficult to discover the basic ideas of modern ethical thought in a form of forceful suggestions in the writings of Hume. Perhaps we shall not be very far from the truth if we say that contemporary ethical thinkers have derived a good deal of their ethical thoughts from Hume. Hume's thoughts and ideas were not properly understood and adequately appreciated by the thinkers of his age perhaps because of the fact that he was far too ahead of his time. His ethical thoughts and ideas have the flavour and colour of the modern age. Almost all modern ethical writings remind us of Hume. Hume has attained a high position in the sphere of morality in the present age. He is rightly regarded as the precursor of modern ethical thought. Ethical thinkers belonging to cognitivist non-cognitivist, naturalistic and non-naturalistic schools have received inspiration and living suggestions from Hume's writings on moral philosophy. He has exerted a deep influence on the main trends of contemporary ethical thought. His influence is, however, markedly visible in the writings of non-cognitivist School.

He has greatly emphasised the role of feeling in the matters of moral decisions. Some of his thoughts and ideas especially his strong opposition against the role assigned traditionally to reason together with his strong inclination towards emotivism have contributed significantly towards the greatest development of different forms of non-cognitivism. R. David Broiles has rightly remarked that "It is with one of these problems, the place of reason in moral decisions on which Hume has been so influential in contemporary ethical discussions".<sup>4</sup> Hume is generally studied piece-meal. The reason is quite

<sup>4</sup> R. David Broiles, *The moral Philosophy of David Hume* (The Hague Martines Nijto FF), p. 2.



obvious. Different philosophers have tried to interpret Hume's ethical position from their own stand points and it is not rare that their interpretations do not tally in many cases with the real spirit of Hume's teachings. Infact, if we go through his teachings seriously we can find that his single maxim "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of passions and can never pretend to any office than to serve and obey them".<sup>5</sup>

In the scheme of the emotivists, the moral judgments are nothing but expressions of emotions, feelings, attitudes, commands, commendations and so on. According to A. J. Ayer, the Chief exponent of logical positivism. "ethical statements are simply expressions which can be neither true nor false".<sup>6</sup> He further says and says very emphatically that the exhortations to moral virtue are not propositions at all, but ejaculations or commands which are designed to provoke the reader to action of a certain sort in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind. I am merely expressing certain moral sentiments.<sup>7</sup>

Suggestions of this sort were being made as early as 1934 when W. H. F. Barnes had suggested that "Value judgments in their origin are not strictly judgments at all... They are exclamations expressive of approval".<sup>8</sup>

These passages clearly show that for Ayer, moral judgments are either ejaculations or commands, they are not factual statements; for Barnes again, these judgments are exclamations of approval or disapproval. Though moral judgments are sometimes phrased as declarative sentences still they cannot be regarded as actually conveying any factual information in the way that other declarative sentences do.

Bertrand Russell on the other hand said that moral judgments are expressions of wishes, rather than expressions of emotions or commands. He observed. "If, now, a philosopher says 'Beauty is good', I may interpret him as meaning either, 'would that everybody loved the beautiful'... or 'I wish that everybody loved the beautiful... The first these makes no assertion, but expresses a wish; since it affirms nothing, it is logically impossible that there should be evidence for or against it, or for it to possess either truth or falsehood. The

5 Hume, op. cit.,

6 A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic* (New York) Dover Publications, Inc., 1936), pp. 102-103

7 Ibid., pp. 103-107.

8 W. H. F. Barnes, *A suggestion about value*, Analysis, 1 (1934), 45.



second sentence, instead of being merely operative, does make a statement, but it is one about the philosopher's state of mind, and it could only be refuted by evidence that he does not have the wish that he says he has. This second sentence does not belong to ethics, but to psychology or biography. The first sentence, which does belong to ethics, expresses a desire for something, but asserts nothing".<sup>9</sup> Thus we find that in the scheme of Russell's Ethics value judgments do not have a truth-value.

Another suggestion for the analysis of moral judgment can be found in C. L. Stevenson's *Ethics and Language*, the first book-length treatment of a non-cognitivist meta ethical theory. According to him moral disputes involve, in an essential way, disagreement in attitude. In his opinion moral judgments are expressions of attitudes, and are designed to get others to share the attitudes. To acknowledge his indebtedness to Hume, Stevenson has aptly remarked "Apart from my emphasis on language my approach is not dissimilar to that of Hume".<sup>10</sup>

According to Stevenson, a moral judgment consists of two parts: a cognitive part, which is capable of being objectively true, and a noncognitive part, which is not capable of being objectively true. On this ground therefore, he holds that the judgment taken as a whole cannot be objectively true. A moral judgment, according to the non-cognitivist, is conjunction of two elements, and since conjunction is a truth-functional relation the whole cannot be assigned a truth value if one of the parts is denied of such a value. Recent noncognitivists have accepted some parts of Stevensons analysis while rejecting the others. More emphasis has been placed by them upon the imperative role of moral judgments rather than on their expressive uses. R. M. Hare suggests that the primary function of the word 'good' is to command, and that, "when we command... anything, it is always in order, at least indirectly, to guide choices of our own or other people's, now or in the future".<sup>11</sup> According to him words as 'right' and 'ought' are also used primarily for giving advice or instruction, or in general for guiding choices. Further he claims that the word 'ought' is used for "Prevailing".

<sup>9</sup> Bertrand Russell, *Religion and Science*, (New York : Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1935), p. 236.

<sup>10</sup> C. L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944), p. 3.

<sup>11</sup> R. M. Hare, *The Language of Morals* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 127.



P. H. Nowell-Smith, another contemporary English philosopher has suggested a theory sometimes called multifunctionalism, according to which value words :

..... "are used to express tastes and preferences; to express decisions and choices to criticize, grade and evaluate, to advise, admonish, warn, persuade and dissuade, to praise, encourage and reprove, to promulgate and draw attention to rules, and doubtless for other purposes also".<sup>13</sup>; still Novell-smith believes that these activities fall into a single family of cases. In his opinion, however "the central activities for which moral language is used are choosing and advising others to choose".<sup>14</sup>

The early non-cognitivists maintained that moral judgments were to be treated either as expressions of emotion or as disguised commands. Indeed Stevenson has brought much refinement in the domain of non-cognitivist metaethics and this refinement has been carried further by Hare and Nowell-Smith. All of them hold that moral judgments cannot be completely identified with statements and, therefore, are not capable of being objectively true.

It is not, thus, incorrect to assert that the non-cognitivists are very much indebted to Hume so far as the formulation of their ethical theories is concerned. It seems to us as if old thoughts have been resurrected through the writings of contemporary ethicists.

W. D. Ross has rightly remarked :

"Their original source of inspiration goes a good deal farther back than Wittgstein; in fact they may be regarded as having reverted to the views of Hume".<sup>15</sup>

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12 Ibid., p: 155.

13 P. H. Nowell-Smith, *Ethics* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1954), p. 98.

14 Ibid., p. 11.

15 Sir W. D. Ross, *Foundations of Ethics* (Oxford, 1939), p. 30.



## 8.

*The Berkeleian Test of Truth and Falsity*

L. P. N. Sinha

Berkeley does not discuss the test of truth and falsity in his *New Theory of Vision* (1709) or in his any other book. But the test of truth and falsity is rooted in 'The Sign-Significate Theory' or the theory that visual data suggest the physical or tangible objects, which have got celebrated place in the above book.

The basis of the Sign-Significate Theory is Berkeley's differentiation of data of vision with those of touch. In differentiating the visual data from the tactual data, he 'executes the classic manoeuvre' of distinguishing to unite these data.

Berkeley consistently works out the co-operation, co-relation, comparison and co-ordination between the visible objects and the tangible objects. He holds that genuine experience does not consist in the sensations of only one sense, such as in vision but it consists in the co-ordination or corroboration of sensations of vision and touch. The visual reports in abstraction from the tactual report is unintelligible and indeterminate. But the visual reports in coherence with the tactual reports is intelligible and determinate. The Berkeleian test of truth and falsity is rooted in this corroboration or non-corroboration of the objects of sight and the objects of touch.

<sup>1</sup> Molyneux's problem provides experimental evidence to Berkeley's theory. Molyneux's problem is: A man born blind was able to distinguish between a cube and a sphere through his sense of touch. Later on, he obtained sight. But he failed to distinguish between these two objects through sight. However in due course he learnt the co-relation of the experiences of sight and touch and was able to distinguish between a cube and a sphere only by seeing them.

Professor A. D. Ritchie thinks that part of Berkeley's solution of Molyneux's problem is correct. He says: "...the eyes see a visible object, the hands handle a tangible object, and the relations between them have to be learnt by experience..." (George Berkeley; *A Reappraisal*, M.U.P., 1967, p. 14).



I shall come to the test of truth and falsity later. For the present let me explain the objects of vision and the objects of touch, which form the basis of The Sign-Significate Theory.<sup>2</sup>

Vision has got two kinds of objects: 1. Primary objects; 2. and Secondary objects.

The primary objects of vision are in the eye or near the eye. These are visible signs or shapes of objects. They are distinct or indistinct, depending upon near or greater distance of objects in the ambient-space.<sup>3</sup> They are also known as visible objects. The secondary objects of vision are at a distance from the eye. They are in the ambient space. They are also known as physical objects and in Berkeley's words 'tangible objects'.

We immediately see the primary objects of vision, Through the primary objects of vision, we mediately know the secondary objects of vision. The primary objects of vision are the signs. The secondary objects of vision are the significate objects suggested by the signs. So the Sign-Significate Theory means that we immediately perceive through vision the primary objects and through its primary objects we know the secondary objects of vision. In short this theory means that we immediately see signs, which suggest the significate objects. A lines of Berkeley are mentioned below :

"What we immediately and properly perceive by sight is its primary object, light and colour. What is suggested or perceived by mediation there of, are tangible ideas, which may be considered as secondary or improper objects of sight".<sup>4</sup>

The signs and the suggested objects or referents are "complicated, twisted, knotted or concreated together".<sup>5</sup> This visual language of the relationship between signs and their referents or suggested tangible objects is learnt in our earliest infancy..." the connection between signs and things signified is sucked in with our milk so that we cannot remember having learnt the correlation;"<sup>6</sup>

To see is to foresee, so that we may take action. The signs should be sensible. To interpret a thing means to tell what it signi-

2 George Berkeley—*A New Theory of Vision*, Berkely's Works, Vol. I, Nelson Edition, Edinburgh, 1948, p. 50.

3 *Ibid.*, p. 94.

4 George Berkeley—*The Theory of Vision, Vindicated and Explained* (1733), Nelson Edition, Edinburgh, 1948. p. 42.

5 George Berkeley—*Works on Vision* by Colin Murray Turbayne, Bobbs Herrill Company, U.S.A., 1963, Editor's Introduction, p. xxxvi.

6 *Ibid.*, p. xxxvi.



## The Berkeleian Test of Truth and Falsity

fies. But to know which signs suggest or signify which tangible objects, one has to cultivate the habit of connection between the signs and the signified objects. A few lines of Berkeley are quoted below:

"We know a thing when we understand it, and we understand it when we can interpret or tell what it signifies. Strictly the sense knows nothing. We perceive indeed sounds by hearing and characters by sight; but we are not therefore said to understand them. After the same manner, the phenomena of nature are alike visible to all; but all have not alike learned the connection of natural things, or understand what they signify, or know how to vaticinate by them .. He who foreknoweth what will be in every kind is the wisest... you and the cook may judge of a dish on the table equally well, but while the dish is making, the chok can better foretell what will come from this or that manner of composing it..."<sup>7</sup>

Thus only if we have learnt well the habitual connection between visible signs and things signified by them, we can, by seeing the visible signs, think at once of the tangible objects signified by them. In this connection a few lines Berkeley are quoted below:

"Having of a long time experienced certain ideas, perceivable by touch, as distance tangible figure, and solidity, to have been connected with certain ideas of sight, I do upon perceiving these ideas of sight forthwith conclude what tangible ideas are, by the wonted ordinary course of Nature like to follow".<sup>8</sup>

The visible signs and significate objects are so interwoven and blended together that when we see signs, we *ignore* and take no notice of them and we attend to the suggested objects. The reason is that signs are harmless and are of no use but the significate objects are hurtful and useful. As Berkeley says:

"... when we look at an object... small heed taken of the visible figure and magnitude which though more immediately perceived do less concern us and are not fitted to produce any alternation in our bodies... and the hurt or advantage arising therefrom, depending altogether on the tangible".<sup>9</sup>

Further,

"Signs being little considered in themselves... the mind often overlooks them, so as to carry its attention immediately on to the things signified where nearly all our interest lies".<sup>10</sup>

7 George Berkeley—*Siris*, Berkeley's Works, Vol. V, Nelson Edition, Edinburgh, 1953, p. 253.

8 George Berkeley—*A New Theory of Vision*, Berkeley's Works, Vol. I, Nelson Edition, Edinburgh, 1948, p. 45.

9 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

10 George Berkeley's *Works on Vision*, Colin Murray Turbayne, Bobbs-Merrill Company, U.S.A., 1963, Editor's Introduction, p. xxxv.



The signs cannot break our bones. But the tangible objects like stones and sticks may break our bones. So our interest lies in the signified objects and not in the signs. A porter is more interested in the feel of the trunks rather than in their looks. Also the Pavlov's dog is more interested in its food rather than in the sound of the bell.

We now return to the Berkeleian test of truth and falsity. Truth lies in co-ordination, corroboration and coherence of signs with the things signified. We even say that it lies in the co-operation of signs and things signified. It lies in integrating visible experience with tangible experience of an object. Falsity lies in abstracting the visible experience from the tangible experience of an object. It lies in putting excessive reliance on the visible objects and signs, and in ignoring the significate or tangible objects.

I would now like to test three cases of visual-haptic relations on the Berkeleian criterion of truth and falsity. They are:

1. The straight stick appearing bent when partially immersed in water.
2. Geometrical figure.
3. Hallucinations.

#### 1. The appearance of straight stick as bent, when it is partially immersed in water

When I say 'This stick looks *bent now* as I hold it in the water' and later 'This stick looks *straight now* as I hold it out of water', there is no contradiction because two statements are about the same *stick* (straight) in two different situations. Both the statements are true also. Error or illusion comes in only if the first situation leads me to anticipate the second situation wrongly. There is no need also to judge the stick in air as straight and to judge the same straight stick as bent by putting it partially immersed in water, unless it is done to condemn sight as fallible sense.

The appearance of a straight stick in two different situations (in air and in water) can be explained on the Berkeleian test of truth and falsity.

The stick in air appears true. The visible stick or sign of the stick predicts the tangible stick. So there is corroboration of the sign and the signified object or the visible stick and the tangible stick.

The stick (partially immersed in water) appears bent. Here also the visible bent stick or sign of bent stick predicts the tangible stick



in water as bent. But this is false we can discover the falsity by handling it and dismiss the sign as false.

## 2. Geometrical figure :

In drawing a perfect geometrical figure the movements of eyes, hands and neck are necessary. So to think of geometrical figure as a pure visual one, is far from truth. In drawing or in measuring a geometrical figure both the senses of sight and touch are used. So geometrical figure involves visual—haptic relationship. A few lines of George E. Davie are quoted below:

“What is it we do when, with reference to a geometrical diagram visible before us, we attend to the shape and neglect the colour? ...this concentration on the visible shape cannot be carried through in terms of visual experience alone, but depends on a conscious comparison with the diagram as seen with the same diagram as felt, in, for example the tactual experience of drawing it. In attending to the shape and neglecting the colour we are concerned to note the respect in which the visible object before us has a certain peculiar (and very complicated) correspondance with the object as tangibly felt. Take away the comparison with touch and visible shape becomes un-seizeable”<sup>11</sup>

Thus the apprehension of a geometrical figure through the comparison of both sight and touch is true. But an apprehension of a geometrical figure only through sight is false, for in apprehending it with sight alone, there is no comparison with the sense of touch.

## 3. Hallucinations :

In hallucination a person says that he sees ‘something’, but his experience is not corroborated by a normal and sober observer. So it is condemned as false. But it is not insignificant experience. A few lines from Professor A. D. Ritchie’s books is quoted below;

“A says, pointing. ‘There are pink rats’. B, who hears him and sees him point, fails to corroborate him by seeing, touching, hearing or smelling anything ratty or pink in the region pointed to at the time of pointing. B also observes certain abnormalities of behaviour on the part of A, which lead him (B) to conclude that A is suffering from delusions or hallucinations. B however cannot demonstrate to A the falsity of A’s pink rats unless A himself is willing and able to cooperate, and to investigate for himself whether or not he (A) finds something tangible, audible, smellable and not just visible in an odd kind of way other than the way in which the walls and floors

<sup>11</sup> A D. Ritchie—George Berkeley: *A Reappraisal*, M.U.P., 1967, Editor’s Preface, p. xii.



of the room are visible to him, A, and also to others, such as B".<sup>12</sup>

A is suffering from hallucinations. He is under the influence of drugs, which may be the cause of his hallucinations. He may be under the influence of fear also. Even his pathological conditions may be the cause of his hallucinations or delusions. In short he is under certain unusual personal situation and because of which he cannot observe certain abnormalities in his own behaviour. So he is unfit to corroborate his senses to ascertain his experiences as true or false. Had A been a normal person and in normal situation he could have discovered his abnormalities and he should have collaborated with B to know truth or falsity of his experiences.

On the other hand 'B' is a normal and sober person. So all collaborating has to come from B and very little from drunken A. B can, therefore, tell A about his hallucinations or delusions with regard to 'pink rats'. This is how A can be free from his delusion or hallucinations about 'pink rats' and know truth that there is no pink rats. So for the discussion is on the Berkeleian standard. A, in the situation described above, cannot corroborate his senses and so he cannot know truth or falsity of his own hallucinations. B, on the other hand, is a sober and normal person. So he can corroborate his senses and even he can collaborate with the experiences of A and he is a fit person to know about truth or falsity of the experiences of A and he can acquaint A with truth or falsity of his experiences about 'pink rats'.

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12 A.D. Ritchie—*George Berkeley; A Reappraisal*, M.U.P., 1967, p. 35.



## *The Karma Yoga of Bhagavatgita as Distinguished from the Integral Yoga of Sri Aurobindo*

*K. R. Rajani*

In this paper an earnest attempt is made to understand the concept of Karma Yoga and the concept of Integral Yoga of Sri Aurobindo. From time to time great Acharyas like Sri Ramanujacharya, Madhvacharya and Nimbarkacharya have interpreted the Gita concept of Karma Yoga. Coming to the modern times, two great thinkers Sri Bala Gangadhara Tilak in his 'Gita Rahasya' and Sri Aurobindo in his Essays on Gita" and "Letters on Yoga" have reinterpreted the Gita concept of Karma Yoga. When a classical concept is reinterpreted by modern thinkers it is bound to take a new dimension. In certain aspects the thinker may agree with the classical concept, and in other aspects he may modify, twist, enlarge, amplify the essential meaning so as to meet both the philosophical and doctrinal requirements of the thinker. It is shown here how Sri Aurobindo reinterprets that the Gita concept of Karma Yoga can be rewarded as a Universal principle. And he has also shown how the Gita conception of Karma Yoga different from his Integral Yoga.

### **What is Karma Yoga ?**

Karma Yoga according to Ramanuja leads ultimately to self-realization. To sum up to important characteristics of Karma Yoga as propounded by Ramanuja are :

1. Karma Yoga is a means to Atmavalokana, which is inevitable for Bhaktiyoga.
2. Karma yoga includes the true knowledge of the soul and on account of this it is superior to Jnanayoga.



3. Karmayoga is easy to perform, and it results in Atmavalokana earlier than Jnanayoga.

4. It is Jnanakara and results in Sthitaprajna.

Thus the fundamental aim of Karmayoga is to the self-realization.

**What kind of self-realization is ordained here ?**

The Gita says that the Karma yogin attains Jnanavipaka which is of the form of Samadarsana. What does this Sarvatra Samadarsana mean ? Generally we find that the soul is associated with different and varied bodies. They all appear very different from one another. But Savants who know the true knowledge of the soul look upon them alike, and realise that the Atman is of the same nature in all those varied and different bodies. They will know that their Visamakara is due to the ever-changing Prakrti and not due to the soul.<sup>1</sup> For the attainment of Jnanavipaka of the form of Samadarsana one is obliged to practise giving up of delight and depression, developing detachment towards external objects of the world, subduing the forces of Karma and Krodha and delighting in achieving the good of all. The Karmayogin, who wishes only the good of all Atmans, just as he does for his own Atman, becomes a Sarvabuthahiterata, and alone is fit for self-experience.

**Sri Aurobindo's Interpretation of Karma Yoga :**

Gita admits the cessation of birth in the world as the ultimate aim or at least the ultimate culmination of yoga. It does not bring forward the idea of spiritual evolution or the idea of the higher planes and the supramental Truth—Consciousness and the bringing down of that consciousness as the means of the complete transformation of earthly life.

Gita seems sometimes contradictory because it admits two opposite truths and tries to reconcile them. The possibilities are<sup>2</sup>

1. It admits the ideal of departure from samsara into the Brahman.
2. It affirms the possibility of living free in the Divine (in Me, it says) and acting in the world as the Jivanmukta.

Sri Aurobindo considered the above second possibility affirmed by Gita and developed this idea on his own accord to reconcile the highest spiritual aim with life and action in the world.

**What is integral yoga ?**

Considering most of the types of yoga systems evolved and practised in India Sri Aurobindo developed his own yoga of self-perfection. He examines each yoga very carefully, considered its essential

1 *Ramanuja Gita Bhasya*, Chapter IV. 18.

2 Sri Aurobindo, *Letters on Yoga*, Vol. 22 (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1970), p. 69.



## The Karma Yoga of Bhagavatgita as Distinguished from the..... 71

features assimilates its core truth, and framed his system of yoga, only on the basis of his self-experience. In the past ages yoga is considered as only the transformation of inner consciousness or the quest to discover the 'self'. The soul consciousness is the only aim of old yogas. All the old yogas totally deny the body and its activities. Sri Aurobindo revolutionised his yoga system. Though he valued the old systems, he contributed a new yogic system. This yoga does not suggest the aim of being a yogi for only mukti or liberation, but seeks for a complete transformation of body, life and mind as well as soul.

Integral yoga aimed not at an ascent or passing beyond life but a descent of the divine consciousness into life. Its aim is double—two movements fusing themselves into one—an ascending into divine consciousness and a transformation of earth-life by the divine consciousness coming down here.<sup>3</sup>

### Integral Yoga : A double movement

Ascent of soul into divine consciousness		Integral yoga
Descent of divine consciousness into matter		

### A contra-distinction between Karma yoga and Integral Yoga

We find a clear distinction between Gita's Karma Yoga, and Integral Yoga.

The difference between Integral Yoga and Karma Yoga and other old yogas is not that they are incompetent and cannot do these things they can do them perfectly well. But they proceed from realisation of self to Nirvana or some Heaven and abandon life, While this (Integral yoga) does not abandon life. The supramental is necessary for the transformation of terrestrial life and being not for reaching the self.

Karma yoga leads to realisation of the self. Then how does this goal of Karma Yoga differ from the other schools of Indian Philosophy? While the schools of Vedanta and other systems of Philosophy like Samkhya of Kapila and the Yoga of Patanjali also aim at realisation of the self. But, the Integral Yoga of Sri Aurobindo aims at the realization of the soul or of its essential nature is of very great importance, but no less important—according to him is the realisation of Prakriti or nature of its oneness with the Supreme Reality. If the soul is one with the spirit or Brahman, matter also according to Sri Aurobindo is ultimately one with Brahman. It is due to this fact that Sri Aurobindo calls his yoga integral.

<sup>3</sup> Sri Aurobindo, A letter, reproduced as "Sri Aurobindo's Yoga and Old paths" in *Sri Aurobindo Circle* (annual) forty-fourth number, Sri Aurobindo Society, Pondicherry, 1988, p. 17.

<sup>4</sup> Sri Aurobindo, *Mother India*, June 1976, Sri Aurobindo Ashram Trust, Pondicherry, p. 481-482.



## IO

# The Philosopher, the Yogi, and Enlightenment: Plato's Symposium and Patanjali's Yoga Sutras

*Jonathan Shear*

I. Comparative philosophy is concerned with examination of the significance of the important differences and similarities found in the philosophical traditions developed in different cultures of the world. Historically, the comparative study of philosophy has had different phases and emphases. Early on, investigators brought forth what appeared to be important, fundamental commonalities underneath the surface differences. These investigations led, among other things, to support for the notion of a "perennial philosophy" locatable in the philosophical traditions of all the major cultures of the world and expressing what was taken to be the common core of all fully developed philosophical investigation. More recently, hermeneutical analysts, emphasizing uniqueness, have argued for the non-translatability of each culture's basic philosophical approaches and insights, and denied the very intelligibility of the notion of a universal common core to the philosophical enterprises of the world's diverse cultures.

Common sense suggests a middle ground between these two extremes. We are all human, we all live in the same objective universe. Thus our different philosophies presumably must reflect different emphases of attention to and interest in commonly accessible phenomena, as well as different, sometimes incommensurable patterns of conceptualization. The study of comparative philosophy should thus at least sometimes enable thinkers of different cultures to reflect on the perspectives, approaches, and insights of philosophers and philosophies of other cultures in a way that enables them to adjust and enrich their own perspectives—contemporary hermeneutical caveats notwithstanding. It is in this spirit that the present analysis is offered.



II. Consider, for example, the *Symposium* of Plato. This dialogue is one of the most widely read works in Western philosophy. But it is extremely difficult to interpret. It contains extended, explicitly metaphorical and mythical material; its high point is a description of an extraordinary transcendental vision; and it concludes with an extended description of Socrates as an extraordinary, even super-normal, individual. Moreover, it contains very little argument, and what argument there is appears to be embedded in poetry and metaphor. Thus, to modern Western analytical-oriented philosophers, the dialogue appears quite enigmatic, and it is generally read today more as a work of literature than philosophy.

The thesis of the present paper is that reading the *Symposium* in light of Patanjali's *Yoga Sūtras* renders it much less enigmatic, and makes its objective philosophical significance more readily apparent. In particular, it (1) clarifies central themes of the dialogue, (2) integrates major, otherwise apparently unconnected passages, (3) makes possible a straightforward empirical reading of some of its more remarkable, seemingly merely metaphorical contents, and (4) suggests that the dialogue has something objectively important to offer to modern Western philosophy.

III. Let us turn to the *Symposium* itself. Plato's Socrates is generally famous for his statement "I know that I do not know" and other denials of knowledge and wisdom. But the Socrates of the *Symposium* is a singular exception to this rule. For in this dialogue Plato has Socrates make repeated unequivocal self-referential claims to a specific kind of knowledge. The high point of Socrates' account of this knowledge, and of the dialogue as a whole, is his description, put in the words of Diotima, his teacher, of the experience of the Form of the Beautiful. As Socrates describes it, this experience unfolds in two distinct stages. First, after a long period of training the successful student learns to turn his (or her) attention away from all individual kinds of beauty and come to a preliminary experience of "the Beautiful" itself.<sup>1</sup> Here the student is said to become aware of an "open sea of beauty", the contemplation of which brings forth "the most fruitful discourse...loftiest thought...and a golden harvest of philosophy".<sup>2</sup> This first stage, as remarkable as it may appear to

<sup>1</sup> *Symposium*, 210b-211c, translated by Michael Joyce; reprinted in *The Collected Dialogues of Plato*, edited by Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973) pp. 562-63. All references to Plato will be from this edition of the *Collected Dialogues*, except (once) where indicated otherwise, and will give the dialogue, the Stephanus numbers, and the page numbers (in parenthesis) from this edition.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 211d (p. 562).



be, is however only preparatory to what Plato calls the "final revelation". Here one gains the full, direct, non-discursive vision of the Form of the Beautiful itself.

Whoever has been initiated so far into the mysteries of Love... is at last drawing near the final revelation. And now Socrates, there bursts upon him that wondrous vision which is the very soul of the beauty he has toiled so long for. It is an everlasting loveliness, which neither comes nor goes, which neither flowers nor fades, for such beauty is the same on every hand, the same then as now, here as there, this way as that way, the same to every worshiper as to every other.<sup>4</sup>

Now will his vision of the beautiful take the form of a face, or of hands, or of anything that is of the flesh. It will be neither words, nor knowledge, nor a something that exists in something else, such as a living creature, or the earth, or the heavens, or anything that is—but subsisting of itself and by itself in an eternal oneness, while every lovely thing partakes of it in such sort that, however much the parts may wax and wane, it will be neither more nor less, but still the same inviolable whole.<sup>5</sup>

The full experience of the Beautiful thus, according to Plato, unfolds in two distinct stages, first an experience of an "open sea" of pure beauty, and then a pure transcendental vision independent of all individuality, empirical objects, and distinctions of space, time, language, and discursive knowledge. Plato then goes on to make some major empirical psychological and ethical claims about the latter, full experience of the Beautiful. For, he asserts.

if... man's life is ever worth the living, it is when he has attained this vision of the very soul of beauty. And once you have seen it, you will never be seduced again by the charm of gold, of dress... (and) you will care nothing for the beauties that used to take your breath away and kindle such a longing in you.<sup>6</sup>

Indeed.

only when he discerns beauty itself...will a man be quickened with the true and not the seeming virtue.<sup>7</sup>

3 *Ibid.*, 210d (p. 562).

4 *Ibid.*, 210d-211e (p. 562).

5 *Ibid.*, 211a-b (p. 562). Compare also the opening sentence of the next paragraph of Plato's text, where he reemphasizes both the experiential nature of this vision of the Form of the Beautiful, and the fact that the experience unfolds in two stages.

6 *Ibid.*, 211d (p. 563).

7 *Ibid.*, 211e-212a (p. 563).



Thus according to Plato, the experience of the Beautiful unfolding in two stages, is supposed to produce a "golden harvest" of discourse and knowledge, give one's life true worth, render one autonomous and self-sufficient in the face of worldly temptations, and provide the essential precondition for developing true virtue. In short, the experiences described above are on Plato's account the necessary precondition for bringing about the truly knowledgeable, ethical life—the goal of philosophy as he understood it.

IV. All of this is likely to appear rather incomprehensible to the modern Western reader. The question thus naturally arises of how literally Plato intended us to understand these claims. The *Symposium* contains a number of explicitly mythical and metaphorical passages, and Plato's description of the vision of the Beautiful might simply appear to be another one of these. Yet Plato makes it quite clear that we are to understand the above passages contained in Socrates' speech in a literal rather than a metaphoric fashion. He has Socrates introduce this speech by contrasting it with the earlier ones of the dialogue in the strongest possible terms, insisting that while the earlier speeches filled with metaphor and rhetorical embellishment may all be "a pack of lies, for all it seems to matter", his own will be "an innocent statement of the truth", simply "stating the facts about the matter at hand". Plato further has Socrates add that he "knew the facts" here, "claim a special knowledge of the subject", and offer to tell "the truth" about it.<sup>8</sup> Moreover he has Socrates say at the conclusion of his speech that he believed what he had just said, and assert that "in that conviction I try to bring others to the same creed."<sup>9</sup> There thus can be little doubt that Plato intends us to take Socrates' statements here as being both literal and true.

This conclusion is reinforced by analysis of Alcibiades' speech, immediately following Socrates', in the *Symposium*. The two speeches are closely interrelated. Socrates' speech (1) is about a unique kind of inner experience, and (2) contains claims of psychological and behavioral effects supposed to follow such experience. Alcibiades enters just after Socrates finishes speaking, and he then, in his own speech, portrays Socrates as having both (1) note-worthy, extended periods (up to twenty-four hours) of inner contemplative absorption,<sup>10</sup> and (2) the internal psychological and external behavioral effects (inner virtue, unshakability, indifference to wealth and honors, etc.)<sup>11</sup>

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 198b-e (pp. 550-51).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 212b (p. 563).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 220e-d (p. 571).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 216e-219e (pp. 568-70). Alcibiades' speech also contains some more unusual components. We will return to these later.



predicted to follow the appropriate experience in Socrates' earlier speech. Thus Alcibiades' speech can be understood as Plato's way of offering within the dramatic context of the dialogue, objective corroboration of Socrates' empirical claim.

This understanding of Alcibiades' speech is in turn strongly reinforced by the fact that Plato took unusual measures to ensure that we take Alcibiades' speech as representing factual truth. In the first place, he portrays Alcibiades as being intoxicated, and thus speaking the truth because "Drunkards and children tell the truth"—drunkards anyway<sup>12</sup> (i.e., *in vino veritas*). He has Alcibiades assert that he is "simply going to tell the truth", and Socrates insist that he must,<sup>13</sup> and then refrain from contradicting anything Alcibiades said<sup>14</sup> either during Alcibiades' speech or in his own comments afterward...despite Alcibiades challenge to contradict him if he said anything false. Finally, Plato at a number of points had Alcibiades' statements about Socrates behavior corroborated not only by the reports of others in the dialogue, but also by instances of Socrates' behavior during the dialogue itself.<sup>15</sup> In short, Plato repeatedly took measures, unique in all of his dialogues, to insure that we take both the speech of Socrates and the corroborating speech of Alcibiades as representing factual truth.

Thus we find the Socrates of Plato's *Symposium* (1) claiming "special knowledge" of an experiential topic the highlight of which is a unique transcendental experience, (2) having remarkable, extended periods of inner absorption, (3) claiming that specific effects should follow from the experience described, and (4) being described by others (and with his own tacit approval) as having the inner psychological and outer behavioral effects claimed to follow from the experience. In sum, Plato's use of truth-claims and interlocking

12 *Ibid.*, 212d-213a (p. 564), 217e (p. 569).

13 *Ibid.*, 214e (p. 566).

14 *Ibid.*, 222c-e (p. 573).

15 It is worth noting that Alcibiades' description of Socrates' periods of deep inner absorption (*Ibid.*, 220c-d [p. 571]) is one of the portions of Alcibiades' speech that Plato gives several levels of corroboration for. Like the rest of Alcibiades' description it is corroborated by Socrates lack of interruption and correction. It is supported also by Aristodemus' earlier remark (made before either Socrates or Alcibiades joined the gathering) that these "fit[s] of abstraction" were "quite a habit of his [Socrates]" (175b' [p. 529]), and again by the description within the dialogue of Socrates' stopping and having one of these absorptive episodes while on the way to the party (174d-175b [pp. 529-30]).



levels of corroborative testimony makes it clear that he intended us to take this account as factually true, and that he believed (or wanted us to believe) both that "the Beautiful" could be experienced as described and that the experience would have the results predicted by Diotima, described by Alcibiades, and believed and assented to by Socrates.

V. To the modern Western reader this supposedly empirical account of the "true philosopher" is of course likely to appear more than a little problematic. The experiences described will seem remote, if not simply unattainable. It is not at all apparent that the psychological and behavioral effects postulated should follow from them, and even less clear that "true virtue", the overall goal of Plato's philosophy, could be produced by these or any other experiences. Plato's these however will not seem so remote to students of Indian philosophy. For the traditional systems of Indian philosophy both (1) contain frequent references to inner experience independent of all spatiotemporal content and distinctions and (2) often maintain that this sort of experience is essential to the growth of enlightenment. In particular, Patanjali's *Yoga Sutra*, the central text of the fourth of the "six systems" of Indian philosophy, provides a uniquely useful perspective for reevaluating the problematic texts of Plato we have been discussing.

A brief examination of Patanjali's text will quickly make this apparent. Its first three sutras (aphorisms) state

1. Now then Yoga is being explained.
2. Yoga is the suppression of the modifications of the mind.
3. Then the seer abides in Itself.<sup>16</sup>

Here, as is often the case with traditional "wisdom" texts, Patanjali has begun with a compact statement of his whole subject. Sutra I states the topic, Yoga, and Sutras 2 and 3 indicate its two major stages. Patanjali's aphorisms, of course, are extremely compact, and the text is generally read along with Vyasa's authoritative commentaries bringing out the meaning. Vyasa's commentary on Sutra 1 explains that "*Yoga means concentration (Samadhi)*,"<sup>17</sup> and his commentaries on Sutras 1 and 2 emphasize that this Yoga or samadhi "can be of two kinds", namely samadhi with an object (*Samprajnata*), and absolutely objectless samadhi (*Asamprajnata*).<sup>18</sup> Thus Yoga is

<sup>16</sup> *The Yoga Philosophy of Patanjali*, Swami Hariharananda Aranya, translated by P. N. Mukerji, (University of Calcutta Press, 1977) p. 474. Henceforth referred to as *Yoga Sutra*.

<sup>17</sup> *Yoga Sutra*, p. 1.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 1 and 8.



the state in which the mind is concentrated within itself (Sutra 1), and develops through two major stages in which the fluctuating modifications of the mind settle down completely (Sutra 2), and one gains stable experience of the unmanifest state of "pure consciousness", where "The Seer abides in Itself", beyond all individuality, objects of experience, and spatio-temporal distinctions (Sutra 3).

The first of these major stages of samadhi, according to Vyasa, has several substages, culminating in bliss (*ananda*) and unbounded inner awareness<sup>19</sup> characterized as "a waveless ocean, placid and limitless"<sup>20</sup> This experience of an unbounded ocean of bliss is then said to produce a uniquely refined intellect and insight into every field of knowledge.<sup>21</sup> But this samadhi is not final, and is to proceed to the second major kind, namely the samadhi of absolute, undifferentiated, objectless pure consciousness. And this samadhi then serves as the basis of

Dharmameghadhyana ("meditation of cloudpouring virtue")... the highest wisdom...unchangeable, untransmissible...pure and infinite.<sup>22</sup>

Thus it is this second, objectless samadhi which, according to Vyasa and Patanjali, is the basis of development of full, unshakable virtue.<sup>23</sup>

Major parallels between Plato and Patanjali can now be noted. Both (1) describe two major stages of transcending ordinary awareness to an unbounded inner ground. Both (2) hold that one comes to experience this inner ground first as an unbounded ocean of pure bliss or beauty, and then as unitary, unchangeable, objectless undifferentiated, and beyond the grasp of the discursive intellect. Finally, (3) both hold that while contemplation of the first stage produces deep intellectual insight, only the second stage serves as the basis of full virtue. Plato and Patanjali thus appear to be discussing closely related, if not identical, transcendental experiences and making comparable claims about their purported empirical effects.

VI. The question naturally arises of how to account for these parallels of experiential accounts and empirical, claims. The conventional contemporary wisdom with regard to the relevant passage from Plato is that they are best understood as literary inventions. But

19 *Ibid.* p. 2.

20 *Ibid.*, p. 92.

21 *Ibid.*, Book III, sutras 16-22, 25-28, 32-36, 41, 49, 52, pp. 315ff etc.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 8.

23 *Ibid.*, Book I, Sutras 47-51, Book II, Sutra 55, Book IV, Sutras 22-34, etc.



## The Philosopher, the Yogi, and Enlightenment: Plato's.....

this, of course, has not been the standard interpretation with regard to Yoga. For in the case of Yoga, it is generally granted that experiences of the sort described, whatever their ultimate significance, both can and have occurred. Thus reading Plato in the context of Yoga suggests that Plato at least could have been referring to comparable experiences. This suggestion is strengthened by the unique pains Plato took to have the relevant passages understood as an "innocent" statement of factual truth. It is also, of course, further strengthened by the fact that Platonists for the first thousand years following Plato's own life generally interpreted his work in this experiential way.

Moreover, quite independently of Plato and Patanjali and their ancient traditions, there is now a growing body of empirical evidence that experiences of the sort described above both occur and are often followed by empirical effects akin to those claimed. Descriptions of experiences corresponding closely to those under discussion are, for example, often found in the autobiographical accounts of highly productive creative geniuses such as Brahms, Valery, Wordsworth, and Einstein.<sup>24</sup> And these accounts, coupled with their frequent claims of the positive effect of the experiences in question on creative ability, have led to the extensive literature on the relation of these experiences to creativity and "self-actualization".<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, independently of such studies of genius, extensive research on thousands of ordinary people practicing traditional meditation techniques now indicates both that many of them report experiences corresponding closely to those we have been discussing, and that growth of intelligence, moral maturity, overall mental and physical health, and self-actualization are correlated with regular repetition of these experiences.<sup>26</sup> We will return to the subject of such meditation-related research later, here noting only that, together with the research on self-actualization and the anecdotal literature on creative geniuses, this research suggests that the most natural explanation of the parallels between Plato and Patanjali noted above is that they arose from observation of the relevant empirical phenomena, rather than a serendipitously congruent products of their respective imaginations.

24 See, for example, Jonathan Shear, *The Inner Dimension; Philosophy and the Experience of Consciousness* (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1990), especially chapter 5, and J. Shear, "The Universal Structures and Dynamics of Creativity," *Journal of Creative Behavior*, Vol. 16, No. 3, Fall 1982.

25 See, for example, Abraham Maslow's *Toward a Psychology of Being* (Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1968), and *The Farther Reaches of Human Nature* (New York: Viking Press, 1971).

26 See, for example, the references in note 38 below.



VII. For students of Yoga, none of this will be particularly surprising. But students of Western philosophy, including even eminent Plato scholars, seldom appear to attend to the experiential aspect of Plato's work, despite Plato's own emphasis. Reading Plato in the context of Patanjali thus serves the important function of drawing attention to the empirical component, and apparent basis, of otherwise highly puzzling passages in Plato's work.<sup>27</sup> But it can do much more than this.

Consider, for example, a central line of the *Symposium* where Plato has Diotima tell the young Socrates that the activity of love is to "bring forth [*tokos*] upon the beautiful". Socrates responds by remarking, "I'm afraid that's too deep...for my poor wits to fathom".<sup>28</sup> Diotima's explanation then fills the next six pages of the dialogue, and the final stroke of her explanation is the description, quoted above, of the act of contemplating absolute Beauty itself and "bringing forth" [*tikte*] upon it wisdom and virtue. Thus the central activity of love (the topic of the dialogue) is, somehow, to "bring forth the Beautiful" by contemplatively experiencing absolute Beauty within, first as an "open sea" and then, in the "final revelation", as purely transcendental and unmanifest.

The notion of such an activity is, of course, likely to appear quite puzzling to the modern Western philosopher. So puzzling, indeed, that it is often ignored. And the connection between it and the transcendental passage which is the highlight of the dialogue (a connection extending even to the use of the cognate Greek terms [*tokos* and *tikte*<sup>29</sup>] in the two passages) not surprisingly also generally goes unnoticed. Read in the context of the *Yoga Sutras*, however, this activity of "bringing forth" upon the transcendental ocean of pure beauty or bliss within will not be so puzzling. For this activity, or something very like it, is the central topic of the *Yoga Sutras*' third chapter.

This chapter begins with four sutras defining these practices, *dharma* (sutra 1), *dhyana* (sutra 2) and *samadhi* (sutra 3), and state that together they comprise the practice of *samyama* (sutra 4).<sup>30</sup> These

27 For a more extended application of this approach that includes Zen and Vedanta and a wide range of Platonic dialogues, see *The Inner Dimension*, Chapters 1 through 3.

28 *Symposium*, 206b-c (p. 558).

29 That is, "bringing forth" and "brings forth."

30 *Dharana* is a "fixity" of attention, *dhyana* (or meditation) is a "continuous flow" of the mind in the same direction. In the practice of *samyama*, the unfluctuating background state of sam-



text of these sutras, and Vyasa's commentary, make it clear that samyama is a practice or activity of the mind in settled interaction both with some object of attention and with the nonfluctuating samadhi-state of pure, unbounded bliss-consciousness. The next sutra then states that by mastering the practice of samyama "the light of [supreme] knowledge (Prajna) dawneth" (sutra 5).<sup>31</sup> Thus samyama is (1) an activity involving interaction with an ultimate, inward, unbounded, non-fluctuating, blissful, ocean-like level of awareness; (2) supposed to be productive of true transcendental wisdom. As such it could equally be a description of Plato's "bringing forth upon the Beautiful".

Comparison of other sutras from the *Yoga Sutra*'s third chapter with Alcibiades' description of Socrates reinforces this close relationship between Patanjali's samyama and Plato's "bringing forth upon the Beautiful". These sutras describe a variety of effects which samyama is supposed to produce. They include, among other things, un-seduceability, mastery over hunger and thirst (Sutra 30), supernormal calmness (Sutra 32) and mastery over the five "elements" (Sutra 44).<sup>33</sup> Socrates' reported un-seduceability, indifference to hunger and thirst, extraordinary calmness in the midst of battle, and apparent resistance to the effects of greatly reduced temperature (one of the "elements") clearly correspond to the effects predicted by these sutras.<sup>33</sup> Other parallels are also readily located, such as the extraordinary power and effectiveness of Socrates' speech (Sutra 36)<sup>34</sup>, and his supposed immunity to the intoxicating effects of alcohol.<sup>35</sup>

Our thesis that Plato and Patanjali were both discussing the same family of experiences, related practices, and their purported empirical effects<sup>36</sup> thus allows us to understand why Plato should have followed Socrates' speech about the activity of love not only with Alcibiades' descriptions of Socrates' contemplative experiences, self-sufficiency

adhi is said to allow the object and processes of dharana and dhyana to "shine forth" in purity, undisturbed by thoughts or other mental activity. *Yoga Sutra*, pp. 276-83.

31 *Ibid.*, Book III, Sutras 1-5, pp. 279-85.

32 *Ibid.*, pp. 482-83.

33 *Symposium*, 219e-221b (pp.570-72).

34 *Ibid.* 215b-216a (pp. 566-67) and *Yoga Sutra*, Book II, Sutra 36, p. 247. See also Aranya's commentary, *ibid.*, p. 248.

35 This "immunity," however, obviously did not extend to the effects of Hemlock.

36 Patanjali's claims of supernormal abilities, including levitation, invisibility, control over one's size, etc., of course also often go quite beyond anything claimed by Plato.



and virtue (as predicted by Diotima), but also with his extended descriptions of *Socrates'* supposed unusual abilities (of the sorts predicted by Patanjali). Thus our comparative study has once again helped provide an integrated understanding of otherwise problematic and seemingly unrelated texts. And the fact that our analysis helps integrate major, otherwise unconnected portions of *Plato's* text in turn reinforces our thesis that *Plato and Patanjali* were discussing the same overall family of experiences, practices, and postulated results.

VIII. This thesis is further supported by direct meditation-related empirical research. This research involves subjects practicing the techniques of the "TM-Sidhi program," an advanced procedure of the Transcendental Meditation (TM) program developed by Maharishi Mahesh *Yogi*, the leading disciple<sup>37</sup> of the late Swami Brahmananda Saraswati, Shankaracharya of Jyotir Math. This TM-Sidhi program utilizes the samyama procedure and sutras from the third chapter of Patanjali's *Yoga Sutras*, and extensive physiological, psychological, and behavioral research has been conducted on it since its inception in the mid-1970's.<sup>38</sup>

Research involving the practice with one of Patanjali's sutras in this program is of particular relevance for our present discussion. The sutra in question states that [by practicing samyama] "On the polestar, motion of the stars is known."<sup>39</sup> In this research the experimental subjects were asked to submit drawings of any clear ex-

37 Compare, for example, the following characterization of Maharishi by Swami Brahmananda Saraswati's successor at Jyoti Math.

From the Tradition of Shri Shankaracharya, He is Disciple just like master, Destroyer of Tamas of Inner Self, King of Rishis...the reason of the welfare of Tradition. Bestower of calmness in three layers of existence, Incarnation of Yoga, indeed of Shankara, whose speech is true speech, whose demeanor is precise...He is inner Self, His course of speech is incarnate from Indra the creator...

(New Delhi, January, 1975).

38 The techniques of the Transcendental Meditation program are widely practiced throughout the Western world, and are the most extensively researched meditation techniques reported in the scientific literature. For a compilation of nearly four hundred research studies, reprinted for the most part from scientific journals such as *Scientific American*, *J. of Clinical Psychology*, *Psychosomatic Medicine*, *International J. of Neuroscience*, *J. of Creative Behavior*, *Electroencephelography and Clinical Neurophysiology*, *Perception and Moto Skills*, etc., see *Scientific Research on the Transcendental Meditation Program, Collected Papers*, Vol. 1-5 (Vlodrop, the Netherlands, MIU Press).

39 *Yoga Sutras*, p. 482.



periences they had with the samyama practice with the sutra which were completely unexpected, and not derivable from the sutra's meaning (e.g., anything an astronomer could be expected to expect). The results indicated clearly that the samyama practice with this sutra systematically enlivens (in advanced subjects) an apparently innate perceptual/conceptual response, and produces a specific, complex nested-umbrella like "vision" of the cosmos.<sup>40</sup> The important point, in the context of our present discussion, is that Plato describes the same experience, with its specific geometric structure and its luminescent colors, movements, and pure sounds at the end of the *Republic*<sup>41</sup>. It thus appears that, in this case at least, the practice of Patanjali's samyama produces highly specific, innately activatable experiences that Plato knew of, described, and characterized as innate,<sup>42</sup> once again reinforcing our conclusion that Plato and Patanjali were discussing the same general family of transcendental practices, experiences, and predicted empirical results.

IX. Some mention should now be made of the standard hermeneutical criticism of commonsensical empirical approaches to cross-cultural comparison of texts of the sort we have been making. This criticism reasons as follows: (1) Our experience is in general not merely objectively given, by actively *structured* by us. (2) Both our physiological constitution and our cultural heritage (language, symbols, beliefs, expectations, etc.) play significant, pervasive roles in this structuring. (3) As a result no experience in general, and no "mystical" experiences in particular, can be exactly the same across different cultures.<sup>43</sup> Taken as a rough generalization there is certainly truth in

<sup>40</sup> This research was first presented at the Eighty-Sixth Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association. The original research paper, "Plato, Piaget, and Maharishi on Cognitive Development" by the present author, is reprinted in *Collected Papers*, Vol. 2, and a shorter version, "Plato, Piaget, and Maharishi on the Stages of Cognitive Development," is found in *Piagetian Theory: Development Perspectives in Adult Development*, edited by Daniel W. Kee, et al., (Los Angeles: University of Southern California, 1984). For a discussion of the significance of these experiences for interpretation of Plato's texts and reprints of experimental subjects' drawings, see *The Inner Dimension* Chapter 2 and the Appendix, and also "Maharishi, Plato, and the TM-Sidhi Program on Innate Structures of Consciousness", *Metaphilosophy*, Vol. 12, No. 1, January 1981.

<sup>41</sup> The so-called "spindle of necessity", *Republic* 616b-617 (pp. 840-41).

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 621a-b (844).

<sup>43</sup> See, for example, Steven T. Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism", in *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis*, edited by Steven T. Katz (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978).



this hermeneutical argument. But when taken as an absolute dictum it is both misleading and false. Since it is a truism that different experiences (whether found between cultures or within a single one) are unlikely ever to be *exactly* the same, the relevant questions about "sameness" of experiences are almost always ones of (1) *in what ways* experiences are the same and different, and (2) whether the samenesses or differences are more important for particular analyses, rather than (3) whether experiences are *absolutely* the same. Thus questions of "sameness" or "difference" of different experiences are properly empirical, to be decided by means of analysis of their content rather than by general, *a priori* fiat.

With this in mind, let us briefly examine the experiences we have been discussing to see how our claims of "sameness" measure up to the standard hermeneutical critique. We have seen that both Plato and Patanjali (1) describe two major stages of transcending ordinary experience within, (2) characterize the first stage in terms of an unbounded ocean or sea of positive affect (so positive, indeed, that it is taken to be the ultimate goal of all desire), and (3) insist that the second stage is entirely devoid of all concrete contents (sensory objects, words, etc.) whatsoever-

Consider the second stage in Plato and Patanjali's accounts. It is easy to see that this stage, as described by each thinker, is completely outside the range of the distinctions relevant to the hermeneutical critique. For in both cases the major defining characteristics of the experience is the complete absence of all the kinds of contents (words, symbols, conceptual expectations, etc.) that are the substance of hermeneutical distinctions. As a result there can be no such contents in either experience to distinguish one from the other. Thus the hermeneutical critique cannot apply to these particular experiences. More can be said on the subject of the independence of these and other related highly abstract experience from the hermeneutical distinctions and critiques.<sup>44</sup> But since the argument above is logically sufficient, let us now instead turn to the first stage described in Plato and Patanjali's accounts.

Here we find the logic is different, but the result is the same. For it hardly seems intelligible to presume that the two experiences likened to vast, unbounded oceans must be different simply because they occur in different cultures, when the descriptive phrase (e.g., "vast

44 See Jonathan Shear, "Mystical Experience, Hermeneutics, and Rationality", in *International Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XXX, No. 4, December 1990, and *The Problem of Pure Consciousness*, edited by Robert K. C. Forman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).



ocean") successfully identifies the same objective phenomena (huge, seemingly unbounded bodies of water) in both cultures in question. Thus, insofar as the experiences are properly described as "unbounded oceans," they would properly appear to be identifiable as "the same." To be sure, Plato refers to an open sea of pure "Beauty," and Patanjali to one of "bliss," and these terms are not identical in meaning. Thus to an extent the experiences may differ, and on rounds relevant to hermeneutical concerns. But they are also strikingly similar (1) in their abstractness, (2) in the single image used to describe each (unbounded ocean), and (3) in their affective nature (supposedly being utterly fulfilling, that which one ultimately desired in all of one's other desirings, etc.). The standard general hermeneutical critique this poses no problem for our observations that both Plato and Patanjali describe, distinguish, and identify very similar if not identical stages in their transcendental experiential accounts.

Finally, we can note that the hermeneutical critique present no problem for our observation that the research discussed above no Patanjali's "pole-star" sutra provides direct empirical evidence that Plato and Patanjali were (at least sometimes) referring to and emphasizing the same domain of inner experience. For this research indicates that modern Europeans and American practicing Patanjali's technique from ancient India experience the same, unique innate structure described by Plato in ancient Greece—surely a major cross-cultural sampl . Differences between the experimental subjects' responses and Plato's descriptions are, to be sure, sometimes locatable in the verbal descriptions accompanying the subjects' drawings. For Plato likened the structure to the undergirdings of wooden ships, and the modern subjects often described them in terms of umbrellas (although sometimes also in terms of ribs of ships). Here cultural factors of the sort hermeneutic thinkers are concerned with the obviously at work. Nevertheless, the correspondence between the drawings and Plato's descriptions are readily apparent, and entirely independent of any subtle differences of ancillary verbal reference. Thus this research goes well beyond the observation that the standard hermeneutical critique poses no obstacle to our analysis. For it provides direct empirical evidence that Plato and Patanjali were here concerned with the same family of inner experiences.

X. In conclusion, our empirically-oriented comparative analysis has suggested a straightforward, literal and interconnected interpretation of otherwise problematic and/or largely unrelated passages of the *Symposium*. In particular, it has enabled us to give experiential content to Plato's description of the vision of the Beautiful, to see why this description should be Plato's final characterization of the



otherwise problematic activity of "bringing forth upon the Beautiful", and to locate connections between these passages and Alcibiades' descriptions of Socrates beyond those derivable from the texts of the *Symposium* alone. And it has done this in a way unaffected by the objections raised by the standard hermeneutical critique. In short, it appears to have yielded an unusually coherent understanding of this important Platonic dialogue.

We can also note that enhanced understanding of the *Symposium* can be expected to be of particular value for our understanding of Plato's thought as a whole. For the Socrates of Plato's dialogues is Plato's exemplar of the philosopher, and the *Symposium* gives a fuller portrayal of Socrates than any other dialogue. It is the only dialogue which contains an extended description of Socrates' personality and behavior, the only one in which Socrates makes unambiguous self-referential claims to knowledge, the only one which describes what he was purportedly taught as a youth, came to believe as an adult and attempted to persuade others of and the only dialogue containing an extended description of the transcendental experiences purportedly central both to this belief and to the development of true wisdom and virtue. Thus the *Symposium*, more than any other dialogue, gives us Plato's portrait of both the inner nature and outer behavior of the true philosopher, the man or woman of true wisdom and virtue.

Finally, we should note that the transcendental experiences we have been discussing have until recently seldom been taken seriously, when discussed at all, by modern Western philosophers, even-despite Plato's own emphasis—when they were analyzing Plato. The growing body of empirical research on these kinds of experiences, however, has begun to make it possible to examine them in rational, empirical ways acceptable to modern Western scientifically-oriented philosophical thought. Given the long-standing importance of such experiences in Indian philosophical thought, it is not unreasonable to think that comparative philosophical analyses, above and beyond clarifying the role these experiences play in classical texts, may be able to suggest useful ways of evaluating their significance for modern Western thought.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, we can speculate that such analyses might even help reconnect the objective, abstract, and formalistic concerns of modern Western philosophy with the classical ideals of wisdom, unfoldment of inner values and enlightenment characteristic of its ancient Greek origins.

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45 Compare, for example, *The Inner Dimension* Chapters 4-8.



## Book-Review :

**Swami Sivananda Radha :** *In the Company of the Wise; Remembering My teachers, Reflecting the Light.* Price \$22.95, 240 page hardback. Published by Timeless Books, Box 50905RW, Palo Alto, CA 94303-0673. Resources, photographs, bibliography. ISBN: 0-931454-23-9, LCCN 91-7431.

Ever wonder what it would be like to achieve higher consciousness at the feet of a world famous guru, mystic Hindu cave dweller, or Christian saint ? One remarkable 80 year old woman has studied with them all. Now Swami Sivananda Radha shares her encounters with 20 of the world's great spiritual teachers in her latest book, *In the Company of the Wise; Remembering My Teachers, Reflecting the Light.*

Swami Radha has been both teacher and disciple during the course of her exceptional 35 year journey of spiritual discovery. The author of books, tapes, records, and a newsletter devoted to the yogic tradition, she makes Eastern philosophy accessible and practical for the West. Radha investigates the nature of human consciousness at Yasodhara Ashram (a non-denominational yoga training center and retreat) she founded in the forests of British Columbia over 30 years ago. She is also a popular corporate consultant and an accredited college instructor.

Having established a chain of study centers in Canada and the U.S., Swami Radha made good on her promise to her first guru, Swami Sivananda. Under his tutelage, she became the first Western woman initiated into Sanyas. John White, author of *Frontiers of Consciousness* deems this holy order "the capstone of the yogic tradition". White, who writes extensively about Radha, calls her a "spiritual midwife" because her life's calling is helping others attain spiritual rebirth and expanded awareness.

Her voyage of self-discovery, and the stories recounted in this book, began in 1952. Knowledge that would change her life forever came from her first teacher, a modern Indian saint. After completing her initiation—which included receiving a mantra; total submersion in an alien culture; and taking vows of poverty, chastity, and service to God—this undaunted woman left India for North



America. Her assignment was to establish learning centers in the West. A lone woman in an orange sari in 1956—and an adherent of a little-known, even bizarre religion—she had just 25 cents to her name. Yet Swami Radha went on to build a spiritual empire.

Her path to enlightenment, and the gurus she met along the way, are all described in Part I of this intimate and candid book. By sharing her adventures—and her meetings with remarkable holy men and women—the secrets of these gurus, saints and sages are revealed at last. Many of their teachings have been unavailable to Westerners until now.

This book is more than an account of one woman's spiritual awakening and transformation. Nor is it merely a who's who of gurus. Part II of *In the Company of the Wise* is a handbook for spiritual seekers of all faiths. Here Radha brings her experience as both teacher and disciple to the fore to explain the intricacies of finding and studying with a guru.

Her practical guidelines include how to know if working with a master is the right choice and how to locate a reputable teacher or study center. She also explains how to tell the true "spiritual genius" from the less enlightened "pseudo-guru". The roles of both master and disciple are explored, as is what the student can expect to learn. Illusions seekers have are covered, and references are provided for both those wanting to work with a guru (via her list of reputable ashrams) and those preferring to study on their own (suggested readings end each chapter). This book presents a rare opportunity to learn by the example of an exceptional spiritual leader. No other source provides so intimate and practical an approach to this little understood aspect of Eastern spirituality.

I highly recommend Swami Radha's new hardback to anyone considering the guru-guided path to higher consciousness. Those looking for an inspirational personal adventure story will enjoy the book. And students of alternative religions, Yoga, Eastern philosophy, parapsychology, or women's studies will find much to contemplate here. In short, people seeking greater spiritual awareness and expanded intellectual capacities owe it to themselves to read *In the Company of the Wise. Remembering My Teachers, Rfleecting the Light*. This is one guided tour into the uncharted areas of higher consciousness you won't want to miss.



## I

## On Description and Reality: *Neti Neti*

Lawrence E. Johnson

Repeatedly, in one way or another, we are told by various of the Upanisads that the One, the Self, cannot be described. As the *Bṛihadaranyaka* puts it,

That Self (Atman) is to be described by No, no! [*Neti neti*] He is incomprehensible, for he cannot be (is not) comprehended; he is imperishable, for he cannot perish; he is unattached, for he does not attach himself; unfettered, he does not suffer, he does not fail. (*Bṛi.* iii, 2, 26)<sup>1</sup>

This is one of the most commented upon of Upanisadic passages, and it is with some trepidation that I shall presume to offer further commentary. What I shall *not* presume to do is to offer to explain the full meaning of the passage. That would be presumptuous indeed, for those far more knowledgeable and skilled than I. It would be presumptuously foolish for anyone to attempt to do so in the face of a passage which tells us that reality cannot fully be described. More cautiously, I shall attempt to explore certain aspects of this teaching. Upanisadic issues cannot really be taken separately, of course, but I shall concentrate primarily on certain issues having to do with description and reality, or the relationship between words and reality. I shall attempt to explore these issues in the light of the *Bṛihadaranyaka* and other Indian teachings, and also in the light of more recent Western philosophy of language. On that basis I shall offer some thoughts about how this teaching ought to be interpreted, and I shall caution

<sup>1</sup> I use the Mullar translation, that being perhaps the most widely available. Similar passages occur at *Bṛi.* ii, 3,6; iii, 9, 28; iv, 2,4; iv, 4,22; and iv, 5,15.



against what I believe are misinterpretations. However, I shall not attempt a full textual exegesis of the above or any other passage.

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Reality, *real* reality, can never fully be captured by words. That this is so is a major difficulty in understanding the Upanisads, yet it is central to their most profound messages. Our words are a grid we impose upon reality. We describe things both according to how they are and according to how our conceptual schemes and modes of description organize them. One and the same reality may appear very different ways as seen through different conceptual schemes, but the differentia and relationships of reality go beyond—*necessarily* go beyond—what could possibly be conveyed by any conceptual scheme or mode of description. Reality is not exhaustible by description. That this is so has far-reaching implications. That we may better seek beyond description, let us now look more closely at description. After having done so, we may the better be able to ponder the thought of the Upanisads.

### DESCRIPTION

What do descriptions have to do with what is described? The first point to notice, a very central one, is that description is relative to a mode of description. The description at which we arrive depends on the way of describing which we employ. This is true even in mathematics, wherein the described is constituted by its description. Consider a simplistic example: a mathematical form, let us say what we call an hyperboloid, in mathematical space.<sup>2</sup> Even from a purely mathematical point of view, there is an infinitude of ways in which the same hyperboloid could be described. For one thing, it will depend on where we locate the point of origin of our coordinates, how we orient them, and what we choose as our unit length. We can then describe the hyperboloid with a formula of some degree of complexity. Had we established our coordinates in some other way we would have gotten other formulae to describe the same hyperboloid. Indeed, we might have used different *types* of coordinates. Instead of the usual Cartesian coordinates we might have employed a system of polar coordinates, cylindrical coordinates, or any of various other alternatives. All of these mathematical descriptions of the mathematical hyperboloid are, of course, formally equivalent, being inter-translatable.

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2 Actually there is more than one sort of hyperboloid. What I have in mind is saddle-shaped and in three dimensional space. I omit the mathematical description.



There are yet other ways in which the hyperboloid might be described. We might describe it as being saddleshaped, elegant, a mixture of concave and convex, or interesting. We might describe it in any number of other ways. These descriptions, of course, differ quite markedly from purely mathematical descriptions. For one thing, mathematical descriptions describe mathematical objects *totally*—totally, that is, with respect to their mathematical system. By definition, a mathematical object is, *qua* mathematical object, what it is specified to be by its formula. That it should be describable as saddle-shaped or whatever in addition is a reflection of the interests or values with which we approach it. It is not that such things are purely subjective. Elegance may or may not be, but being saddle-shaped or concave is adequately definable and objectively determinable. There is an unlimited number of properly definable and objectively determinable properties which apply to the object. The critical point is that the knower or thinker who conceives of the object does so in terms of one or more among an infinitude of possible schemes of description, any scheme actually being employed manifesting thereby the mind of the conceiver. I started with an example from mathematics because mathematical object more than anything are comprised by defining description. Even there we see that the form of our description and how we think of the object are expression of us as well as of the object (and its defining description). While a mathematical hyperboloid or other object (as distinguished from some thing which more or less answers the description) is that which answers to its defining description, even a mathematical object is subject to further description reflecting the point of view of the describer.

Description is exhaustive of reality only insofar as reality is taken to be confined to the defining system. What then of reality at large? The world is not a system of mathematics. It is not defined into existence by us, nor is it limited to the bounds of any formal system. Any actual thing which is more or less an hyperboloid will be so only because it is what it is and not because it is made so by definition. In describing actual things we have all the problems with trying to describe a mathematical object, and more besides. In the first place, there is no description which an actual thing must by nature satisfy, since its nature is not comprised by definition. Rather, description, properly to be applicable, must answer to that thing. There is, of course, considerable question about whether *any* description can properly be applicable to any object. This is not a simple question but one which is quite complex.



Suppose now that we have some actual thing before us which is more or less an hyperboloid. It might be a plastic model of an hyperboloid, an actual saddle, or perhaps a "saddle" formed by two mountain peaks. How are we to describe such a thing? There are many ways, of course, but none exhaustive. As we have noted, all description is relative to a descriptive scheme and no description is ever exhaustive of what is described. There are always other descriptions available and that we choose to describe the object in one way rather than in another—say, as being saddle-shaped rather than as being double-peaked—reflects our own interests, habits, pre-dispositions, and, of course, values. Moreover, not only will the object be many things as well as being hyperboloidal, being perhaps plastic, interesting, or brown, it will be any of those things only to a degree of approximation. Any actual thing will be but imperfectly hyperboloidal at best, even if its divergence can only be observed with a microscope. The only question is whether the thing and the description have a sufficiently good fit relative to our intents and purposes in the matter—and what is hyperboloidal enough to suit me might not suit a geometer. Our criteria for being saddle-shaped might be looser but it is still a matter of degree and whether it falls within a suitable range. Whether the object is plastic will also be a matter of approximation, as any actual substance always contains some traces of impurities. Moreover, the term 'plastic' refers to materials of a great variety of molecular types with a wide range of physical properties. Our use of the term is imprecise, and whether the description is appropriate for the described is again relative to our intents and purposes. Similarly, a term such as "brown" refers to a fairly wide chromatic range and actual objects will not reflect absolutely no light outside that range. And so it goes. Descriptions of actual things are always a matter of approximation and relative to the purposes of the describer.

It is not *merely* that descriptions are always approximate to some degree, however great or slight. They always have some degree of relativity to the purposes of the language-user. Suppose I say "That is water", indicating some object of description. Perhaps I am indicating the lake on the university campus. Someone might object that it is not truly water because it contains various impurities, ranging from sediments and dissolved salts to fish. For purposes of the chemistry lab, the material in the lake would not count as water while a sufficiently pure piece of ice or even some steam would. For most purposes the lake would count as water, as would the ocean, but the steam would not. Were someone desperately thirsty and asking for a drink of water, I would be acting atrociously if I gave them a cup of



sea-water. That was not what they were asking for, though the lake-water might do in an emergency, And so on. What the word means is a matter of what it is used to do, a matter of context and the language-user's intentions and linguistic purposes. No matter how much we define and precisely specify, description can never be entirely separated from those intents and purposes.

In summary, what we have come to is that all descriptions of actuality, even the most seemingly objective, implicitly have aspects of subjectivity and incompleteness. No description of an actual object is exhaustive and all description rests on the descriptive scheme employed by the language-user. All description is approximate, within degrees of tolerance and relative to the intents and purposes of language-users. We misrepresent reality and mislead ourselves insofar as we foolishly imagine that reality breaks along the lines presupposed by our descriptive schemes. Some thinkers have found these limitations disagreeable and have sought a means to overcome them.

### DESCRIPTION, ATOMISM, AND HOLISM

It was thought that perhaps we could overcome these limitations by finding a descriptive scheme which, at least in principle, allows us to formulate descriptions which are exhaustive of reality or some portion of it, and which do not distort the truth. We would need a language which was so structured as to reflect the structure of the world. If we could find such an ideal scheme then alternative descriptions, when accurate, would be mutually intertranslatable. We would start with certain truths which were simple and fundamental, with all other truths being compounded out of them. Truths about automobiles could be reduced to truths about components, truths about molecules to truths about atoms, and so on. Truths about complex experiences would be reducible in principle to truths about the basic units of experience. As the constitution of a mathematical system dictates the principles of translation between any formulations within it, so brute fact might give us principles for translating between alternative schemes of description for actual objects. Whether we describe a chair as being four-legged (etc.) or as Danish Modern will be a matter of convenience, as will be whether we talk about furniture at all, or say the same thing by talking about wood or molecules. We can talk on any level of generality we please or use any valid descriptive scheme, yet by reducing to more fundamental levels of description we can relate what we say to any other valid descriptive scheme. This, roughly, was the goal of the Logical Atomists, who hoped to develop an ideal language the structure of which reflected the structure of the



world, offering a means for describing the world correctly and without distortion. In the West, this program springs from the work of Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, and arguably has precursors going a very great ways further back. Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* provided the classic articulation of the vision.<sup>3</sup>

- 1 The world is all that is the case.
- 1.2 The world divides into facts.
- 2 What is the case--a fact--is the existence of states of affairs.
- 2.1 We picture facts to ourselves.
- 2.21 A picture agree with reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.
- 3.251 What a proposition expresses in a determinate manner which can be set out clearly: a proposition is articulated
- 4.01 A proposition is a picture of reality.  
A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.
- 4.022 A proposition *shows* its sense.  
A proposition *shows* how things stand if it is true. And it *says that* they do so stand.
- 4.06 A proposition can be true or false only in virtue of being a picture of reality.
- 4.121 ...Propositions *show* the logical form of reality.  
They display it.

According to this scheme there is fundamentally one way of describing reality, one determinate way, with what is said being true or false accordingly as it accurately pictures some component segment of reality.

A major problem for the atomists was that of finding the atoms. According to the *Tractatus* (3.23-3.251), that there are atomic facts—with every complex fact having exactly one analysis in terms of simple facts—was absolutely necessary, else language would not have a definite sense. At that time Wittgenstein just assumed that language, at least when it was working properly, did have a definite sense. But what are atomic facts? Various candidates were proposed, from universals to private sense-data, though no persuasive case was made for any of them (all of them having severe disadvantages). Wittgenstein himself did not say what atomic facts were, merely arguing that there had to be such. Quite apart from those matters, we might well

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<sup>3</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. I quote from the translation by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1961. References are to the various propositions as numbered by Wittgenstein.



doubt whether there is *any* level of basic simple facts which cannot be analyzed further. This in itself would not be an insurmountable problem for the theory. So long as we could assign a particular description to a particular logical level and analyze to a lower level in just one way, we might perhaps keep moving to lower levels *ad infinitum*. We would thereby retain rigidity of structure, with language having a definite sense. More broadly, though, we may doubt whether we can *always* integrate one descriptive scheme with another, so that one scheme can be reduced to another or both to a simpler and more basic schemes. May be they sometimes have irreducibly different reductive schemes. Then we would have equally valid but different schemes of description leading to different (relative or absolute) simples, the schemes not being inter-reducible. To suppose an example for which there is some evidence one person or group of people might come to use color words for somewhat different ranges of the color continuum than do other people. One person might then consider a given object to be blue while another considers it to be green. Through prior habituation, moreover, they come to associate together certain color ranges so that, now irrespective of color names, a given shade may appear to one person to be obviously significantly similar to colors of one range and not to those of another, while to another person the opposite might be the case. To one person the shade is obviously similar to its fellow blues; to the other it is obviously similar to its fellow greens and is not a blue at all. In such a case one person's color simples and descriptions based on them might well be said to be irreducibly incommensurate with those of another person. In his later *Philosophical Investigations* (47-48), Wittgenstein himself seems to have come to a similar conclusion, that what are simple and complex is relative to the "language-game" we are using—and that some language-games are just irreducibly different from others.

Description, then, does not occur in the abstract but is relative to the frame of reference and purposes of the language-user. It is thereby a matter of value—our values and interests—as well as of fact. Fact and value are inextricably united. Thus it was that the *Chandogya*, telling us that the way to Self-realization is one of getting our knowledge in order, and the *Brihadaranyaka*, telling us that the way is one of getting our values in order, were in their own ways showing is the *same way*<sup>4</sup> Moreover, we ultimately must take account

<sup>4</sup> I discuss this point at further length in my "Self and Salvation: The Brihadaranyakn", under submission to *Darshana International*. [You will wish to revise this footnote accordingly, if you decide to publish that one.]



not just of descriptions as they occur individually but as they fit in with one's entire awareness of and fit with the world. Our awareness is no more composed of discrete and independent atoms than we are. W. V. O. Quine came to the conclusion that

...our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a corporate body ...even in taking the statement as unit we have drawn our grid too finely. The unit of empirical significance is the whole of science... The totality of our so-called knowledge or beliefs, from the most casual matters of geography and history to the profoundest laws of atomic physics or even of pure mathematics and logic, is a man-made fabric which impinges on experience only along the edges. Or, to change the figure, total science is like a field of force whose boundary conditions are experience. A conflict with experience at the periphery occasions readjustments in the interior of the field. Truth values have to be redistributed over some of our statements. Reevaluation of some statements entails reevaluation of others, because of their logical interconnections—the logical laws being in turn...further elements of the field. Having reevaluated one statement we must reevaluate some others, ...But the total field is so under-determined by its boundary conditions, experience, that there is much latitude of choice as to which statements to reevaluate...<sup>5</sup>

Through purely secular reasoning the philosophy of language has moved beyond atomism, which can only be inadequate, to a more holistic approach. There is now almost universal agreement with Quine that some such move is necessary (though certainly there is disagreement in detail). Our awareness of the world is not a collection of discrete and independent units of awareness, nor can truths stand on their own or even have an identity on their own. Our awareness of the world is an interconnected whole which is concerned with the world as a whole, and which presupposes a self. The points raised here have an important bearing on our inquiry into the Upanisadic *neti neti*.

We should not be put off by Quine's un-Upanisadic language. He uses the term 'science', for which we might prefer something like 'awareness of (and inquiry into) reality'—which is what science is in the broad sense, and what the Upanisads are concerned with. Nor need reference to truth values and the laws of (formal) logic worry us. Quine's central point is that we must adjust our awareness as a whole to reality as a whole. Certainly that is what the Upanisads, in their own way, call on us to do. It is imperative that we, as clearly as

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5 W. V. O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", *Philosophical Review* 60, 1951.



possible, be aware of reality as a whole. The Brahman, our Self, is a whole:

That Self is indeed Brahman, consisting of knowledge, mind, life, sight, hearing, earth, water, wind, ether, light and no light, desire and no desire, anger and no anger, right and wrong, and all things. Now as a man is like this or like that, according as he acts and according as he behaves, so will he be ... And here is the verse; "To whatever object a man's own mind is attached, to that he goes.. " ... the man who...desires the Self only, ...being Brahman, he goes to Brahman. (*Bri. iv, 4, 5-6*)

Instead of picking and choosing within the Brahman, or orienting ourselves toward a fragment of it, we must seek to realize it as it is, on its own terms.

To know our Self, the Brahman, is to be aware of the whole. To know the Self, the Brahman, is to be aware of it immediately, by being it, without the distorting mediation of our limited cognitions in maya. But is this an awareness of a reality beyond all description and differentia? Or would it be possible in principle successfully to adjust our cognitive scheme to reality as it is? Or might it perhaps be that while there are differentia within the unity, these are differentia which cannot even possibly be represented by any descriptive scheme? What, it might further be asked, are we to make of the conceptual distinction between *Saguna* Brahman and *Nirguna* Brahman?

## DESCRIPTION AND REALITY

Let us begin by returning to the question of whether it is at all possible to describe reality or any aspect of it. A superficial answer is that of course it is possible, we describe things all the time. Some of the descriptions we apply, though, are quite inadequate. A better question would be that of whether it is ever possible *adequately* to describe any aspect of reality. But then, we must ask, adequate for what purpose? There are different standards of adequacy for different purposes. Certainly I can describe for someone how to get to the nearest post office, in a way which is adequate for the purpose at hand, that of helping the person find his or her way there. Certainly what I am describing is an aspect of reality, however distorted my awareness of it might be. All that is clearly and trivially true. More to the point, can we describe reality or any aspect of it with *absolute* adequacy? *Neti, neti*, replies the Upanisad. Any description of reality is inadequate in some respect. Whether or not one accepts that reply as revealed truth, it is true as a matter of reason. I shall try to explain why I conclude that it is true as a matter of reason, and what that truth does and, very importantly, does not amount to.



What would it be for a description to be absolutely adequate, in the sense of being adequate for *every* purpose? Were that only a matter of increasing precision to the point of theoretical exactness, that would be possible in principle if not in practice. Purpose, though, do not vary merely by the degree of precision which they require. They vary according to the presuppositions and values which they presuppose. To be adequate for every purpose which we foolish and limited beings in maya might have would require with respect to an inconsistent conglomerate of presuppositions and values. We could not even describe a rainbow if we had to do so with respect to every possible way of thinking of colors. Anything we said, and any way we had of saying it, would fly in the face of some other possible way of doing so. Whatsoever subject-matter we identified, and whatsoever distinctions we drew in dealing with it, the distinctions we drew would run counter to some other distinction we might have drawn. Any description, to be a description, must be from some point of view and thus contrary to other points of view and so could never be adequate from every point of view. Accordingly, no description could be adequate for every purpose.

All limited points of view have built-in distortion. It would hardly seem like a fault of a description that it is inadequate from every faulty point of view. More to the point, we might well ask whether description could be adequate from an undistorted point of view—from, as it were, the standpoint of the Brahman itself.<sup>6</sup> It has been argued that this would be impossible because any descriptive scheme must falsify reality, inasmuch as description posits divisions in a reality which in truth is undivided. Relatedly, it is argued that description falsifies reality inasmuch as it imputes differentia to a reality which in truth is undifferentiated. This latter argument, to be at all viable, at least tacitly rests on the assumption that differentia are incompatible with unity. I shall, briefly, argue against these two arguments. I maintain that description does not necessarily posit division, and that unity does not preclude differentia. However, I shall then argue that for other reasons no descriptive scheme can be absolutely adequate for describing reality as it is. That this is so has other implications than those which have frequently been drawn, as I shall discuss in connection with the *Saguna-Nirguna* distinction.

6 The term 'point of view' and 'standpoint' spring from metaphors which become somewhat unfortunate in this connection. The point of view of the Brahman would have to be a point with infinite radius. This of course is connected with the more than merely verbal issues of on what basis descriptive schemes are to be formed.



Let us first consider the claim that description posits division. The argument is that description requires distinctions between this and not-this, and so posits division between this and not-this where in truth there is only unity. This is a conclusive argument in application to any who do posit division with distinction. Certainly it applies to the logical atomists, who imagined that the world divided into unit facts suitable for matching with properly selected unit propositions. I maintain, though, that this is not a matter of an intrinsic fault in the activity of description in itself. Rather the fault lies in the wrong and misleading assumption that description presupposes division. Description does not necessarily falsify reality, so long as we do not falsify it by misunderstanding what description does. We would do well to become as clear as possible about what we do when we describe. We may then the better understand our relation to reality. To that end I shall explain why I maintain the description does *not* presuppose division.

### DESCRIPTION, NOT DIVISION

To describe is to say something about something. We in some way pick out some subject-matter and say something about it. By way of an analogy which I find useful, picking out the subject-matter is something like shining a spotlight on a stage. We may move the patch of illumination, broaden or narrow its scope, bring the light in from a new angle, or color it according to our interests in drawing attention to and illuminating some portion of the stage. The patch of illumination is not itself part of the scene illuminated, nor does our illuminating it presuppose or create any real division between what is illuminated and what is not. Whatever is there was there all the time, and is not changed as we manipulate the spotlight. All that is changed is our view of it. Those views of language which suppose that reference must tie units of language to unit referents are false to the world and false to our use of language in describing it. Our use of language is more flexible than that, as the previously given examples would indicate. To continue the analogy, once we have established the patch of illumination we may describe what is there, as illuminated and from that point of view. Once we have established reference we may describe what we are talking about, from that point of view—but that is not to presuppose that our way of doing things is an intrinsic feature of reality or that no other way is possible. To argue that description entails division we would need to rely on a broader claim, that differentia of any sort are incompatible with unity. Such claims have frequently been made, and to these we now proceed.



If differentia are incompatible with unity, then, since description clearly requires differentia, the assumption that reality is a unity forces us to the conclusion that description as such necessarily falsifies reality. This of course is the position taken by Advaita Vedanta and its chief proponent, Shankara. Differentia is maya, so it is claimed, and description is error which describes only illusion. I deny that conclusion, though I agree that reality cannot be described with absolute adequacy (the inadequacy not being one of inaccuracy). I shall not call into question the assumption that reality is One, a unity. That reality is indeed a unity has the authority of revelation, in Upanisadic thought, and there are also secular arguments which can be adduced to support that doctrine. I shall not at all be concerned here with the issues of whether such authority or such arguments are conclusive, but certainly I shall question Shankara's theory that being an absolute unity implies being absolutely undifferentiated. I recognize that there is much in the Upanisads which seems to support Shankara's interpretation, particularly in the *Brihadaranyaka*:

It is neither coarse nor fine, neither short nor long, neither red (like fire) nor fluid (like water); it is without shadow, without darkness, without air, without ether, without attachment, without taste, without smell, without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind, without light, without breath, without a mouth, without measure, having no within and no without, ... That Brahman, ... is unseen, but seeing; ... unknown, but knowing. There is nothing that sees but it, nothing that hears but it, nothing that perceives but it, nothing that knows but it. (*Bri.* iii, 8, 8 & 11).

The Brahman, then, spans all differentia and is the unity at the root of all differentia. An undifferentiated Brahman would certainly do that, but might not a differentiated unity span all diversity? The Upanisad further tells us that

They who know the life of life, ... the mind of the mind, they have comprehended the ancient, primeval Brahman. By the mind alone it is to be perceived, there is in it no diversity. He who perceives therein any diversity, goes from death to death. (*Bri.* iv, 4, 18-19)

If we interpret diversity as differentia, then Upanisadic authority not only permits but mandates Shankara's conclusion. If, though, division into diverse components is the diversity which is ruled out, we might still take the Brahman as being a differentiated unity. This, I believe, is the preferable interpretation.

Let us review Shankara's basic argument. If two things are related at all, he argues, even if they are related by what is seemingly total opposition, they must have something in common at a deeper level. That relationship involves connection we have on Upanisadic



authority, for instance on the strength of the statement that "As all leaves are attached to a stalk, so is all speech [i.e., all differentia] attached to the Om" (*Chand.* ii, 23, 4). Everything in the universe has some sort of relation to everything else—else they would not be in the same universe—and so must be connected with everything else by virtue of a deeper unity. Ultimately all of reality is a unity. Let us grant the point that unity underlies all things and all diversity. The critical question is whether the unity at the root of diversity is an *undifferentiated* unity. That the diversity is unified is taken by Shankara to mean that differentia are unified into non-differentiation on the most fundamental level of reality. Rather, we might well ask whether its being at the root of diversity—indeed, being the reality of the diversity—means that it is a differentiated unity. I agree with certain of the other Vedantic schools that absolute unity does not imply absolute non-differentiation. That would follow only if differentiation implied division.

There is a strong *prima facie* case that reality is differentiated in the fact that it *appears* to be differentiated. Appearances can be very deceptive, but from whence can even a deceptive appearance of differentia arise if not from reality? Reality may be very different than it appears to be, but the appearance of differentiation must arise from some differentiating principle—which if it is to give rise to something must be real enough to do so. If it is our ignorance which gives rise to the appearance of differentia, then our ignorance must to that extent be real. Whatever it is which gives rise to the appearance of differentia must itself be differentiated, as from uniformity uniformity can yield only uniformity. By no means did the Advaita Vedantins accept the force of this line of argument, however. As the sun appears many when reflected in bits of a mirror or broken glass so, they argued analogically, the One appears differentiated when distorted by our ignorant misapprehension of reality. The fault with the analogy, of course, is that it depends on *two* things being real: the sun and the differentiated bits of glass. Yet those who maintain that reality is an undifferentiated One cannot allow our differentiated ignorance to be real as well as the One. On the contrary, they maintain that ignorance is our own misapprehension of the One. This they cannot properly claim. If our ignorance is, while differentiated, real, then reality is not an undifferentiated unity. If our ignorance is not real, then we are not deluded. Advaita Vedanta tries to avoid this difficulty by assigning ignorance a status of intermediate reality, it being unreal yet still real enough to cause misapprehension of our undifferentiated oneness—our misapprehension being itself not entirely real. We have, then, semi-real



ignorance causing semi-real misapprehension in a cycle which is unreal—seeming to be real only because of itself (which is unreal). But how, at any level, could there be ignorance or misapprehension without there being, at that level, ignorance or misapprehension to give rise to it? Evidently, for there to be even the semi-real ghost of differentia, there must be some differentia in reality. This we can know, even if we cannot know those differentia.

We arrive at the conclusion, then, that the Advaita Vedantins have not succeeded in showing that differentiation is incompatible with unity, and more positively, that differentiation is compatible with unity, and that reality indeed is differentiated. I maintain, however that its differentia cannot adequately be captured by any possible descriptive scheme. I shall explain why this is so in connection with the conceptual distinction which is sometimes drawn between *Saguna* Brahman and *Nirguna* Brahman.

### SAGUNA AND NIRGUNA BRAHMAN

The conceptual distinction between *Saguna* Brahman and *Nirguna* Brahman is an important one in its own right, quite apart from this discussion, and certainly it would be appropriate to consider it in connection with the preceding. *Saguna* Brahman is that which is determinate, with differentia, and so is said to be subject to description. It is thought of as the unifying ground of the many, and is frequently thought of personified as Ishvara. *Nirguna* Brahman is that which is indeterminate, without differentia, and so is not subject to description. According to Shankara, *Saguna* Brahman is the highest manifestation of the Brahman, but in ultimate truth the Brahman is *Nirguna*. That conclusion certainly seems plausible, as we are told so emphatically that the Brahman is indescribable. These, however, are not the only alternatives. Those alternatives would be exhaustive if only those things which were without differentia were indescribable, but that is not necessarily the case. Properties are not the same as predicates. Meaningful predicates concern properties, but it may be that we cannot associate all properties with predicates—at least not simultaneously. What I am suggesting is that it might be possible for the Brahman to have properties—that is, be differentiated—yet have properties which cannot adequately be captured by any descriptive scheme.

Why, though, can we not assign every property a predicate? The matter is not that simple. The difficulty is not that an adequate descriptive scheme would have to provide for an infinitude of differentia. Infinity does not imply impossibility, it being quite possible to enti-



rely specify in infinite scheme. The difficulty is not even that it would require an exceptionally large infinity, though it would require a descriptive scheme providing for a non-denumerable infinitude of differentia. There is a non-denumerably infinite number of real numbers yet it is possible, in principle, to define and order them all. Likewise, a descriptive scheme could provide for a non-denumerable infinitude of differentia. The difficulty, then, is not one of sheer magnitude, nor is it one of fineness of distinction between differentia. The difficulty runs much deeper than that, being rather that any descriptive scheme preempts other equally valid descriptive schemes. Relatedly, a difficulty is that no descriptive scheme can itself specify how it is to be attached to reality. These difficulties being insuperable, it may be that the *Saguna-Nirguna* distinction does not exhaust the possibilities. Let us consider these points of difficulty in order.

We cannot draw up predicates to coincide simultaneously with every line of differentiation in the Brahman. The predicates would conflict with one another. That is not because the Brahman is internally inconsistent. Nothing which is real could be internally inconsistent. It is because any way of distinguishing predicates would conflict with other equally valid ways of doing so. For instance, as we have noted, any way of distinguishing the colors of the spectrum conflicts with other similarly adequate ways of doing so. Perhaps, though, it would be possible to represent the whole spectrum *en mass*, as it were, without arbitrary division. We might perhaps specify it in terms of a certain range of wave-lengths of light. Why that range, though, instead of another? The reason can be only that we are interested in that range of wave-lengths because of the range of our visual apparatus. (And even so, by trying to define the color-spectrum entirely in such terms we leave out of account the qualities of colors as colors. Yet our subjective experiences of such secondary qualities as color must have some standing in reality.) There are other ranges of wave length we might have demarcated, and there are ways of describing radiation other than in terms of wave-length. (We might, in fact, describe it in terms of energy levels—a mode of description which could apply to other things as well.) That we draw distinctions as we do, rather than in alternative ways, is a reflection of our interests and convenience, and, at any level of generality, preempts other ways of describing the same reality. Not only are there other ways of describing radiation, to continue the example, there are other ways of describing physical reality than in terms of radiation conceived of as we find it convenient to conceive of it. And so it goes. What there is reality. Any way we have or could develop of drawing distinctions within reality would not be mandated by



reality but would have an element of arbitrariness, and would preempt other no more arbitrary ways of drawing them. But could we not—in principle, if not in practice—draw *all* distinctions? By way of analogy, suppose all possible lines on a plane were to be drawn—which, of course, could never really be done. Were all the lines drawn, no lines would then be lines. There would be only the plane. Were all distinctions drawn simultaneously there would then be no lines of distinction and no areas of similarity, and every point in the descriptive scheme would be one of absolute singularity. There would no longer be description, for description would no longer have content.

To recognize this is not to require that we obliterate all our distinctions *ad nihilo*. That would be to see only emptiness in the fullness of reality. The rainbow is differentiated, differing continuously throughout. No distinctions can be drawn which are entirely adequate or non-arbitrary, and to truly see the rainbow we must see beyond the distinctions we would impose upon it. Yet we must not imagine that the rainbow is an undifferentiated uniformity. To truly know the rainbow we must know differentia in unity. Only so could we know the Brahman.

There is another, related, reason why no conceptual scheme can ever entirely be adequate to describe reality. No matter how well articulated, a conceptual scheme is not itself reality. There must always be some gap between it and reality. Reality is prior, and the description must be applied to it. There will always, necessarily, be a multiplicity of ways, some better than others, in which a scheme could be applied to reality. Which one we are to use is not itself something which can be specified within our descriptive scheme. As Wittgenstein recognized (*Tractatus*);

“Whereof one cannot speak, thereon one must remain silent.”

That whereof we cannot speak is not nothing, but includes the critically important matter of how that which we can say applies to that which we say it about. Of course, as Russell points out, that can be specified in a metalanguage—but then we have the problem of just how that metalanguage is to be applied. And so on. No matter how long we postpone the problem, though, through however many meta-levels of language, the gap between our descriptive scheme and its field of application remains. In his more mature *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein came to the conclusion that understanding a language is not just a matter of knowing the stipulated rules (meta-rules, etc.), but requires understanding *how* this structure is to be applied in actual use. As Quine and Davidson have so eloquently pointed out, there is a major gap there, not easily filled. One can



learn a descriptive scheme, one can learn a whole language, in the sense of learning what the various terms are and how they do or can fit together—and yet not be able to apply it to reality properly. Indeed, one might observe users of a given descriptive scheme or language and even come to be able to apply it oneself, on occasion, in a way which is outwardly correct—and yet not quite grasp how it is properly to be applied to reality. For instance, the linguistic structure and the bulk (at least) of observed usage might be consistent with native speaker's talking about things, events, or appearances of particular sorts, which can lead to the expression of quite different thoughts. We may think that we understand what is being said and then be confronted with a statement which is astonishing or simply incomprehensible. Or perhaps we never come to realize that our understanding is radically defective. Quine uses the example of a linguistic community in which reference is made not to rabbits, as at first seems evident, but to rabbit-parts or rabbit-appearances of certain sorts. It might take one a long time to catch on. Again, one might learn the language of theatrical criticism, and by aping others and by saying things which sound good, one might seem to know what one is talking about. (Some theatre critics, and many of their readers, seem to think that there is no more to it than this.) For that matter, one might be able to say things about the Upanisads and seem to understand them when one does not properly understand at all.

All communication requires understanding and all understanding requires insight. This is true about even the simplest of communication about even the simplest of things. To understand any description of anything we have to have some grasp of how the language-user is using language and to what end. To understand even "The cat is on the mat" we have to understand which cat and mat are being referred to, and what, for present purposes, is to count as being on. Most worthwhile communication requires more insight than this. We always have to take account the intents, purpose, and point of view of the language-user in a particular situation. What did he/she mean then, in that context, for what purpose, and to what degree of precision? Being told more can be of help, but to matter what we are told, and how much, we must at some point have insight. We must have insight into how language is being applied, and we must have some grasp of the reality to which it is being applied. While description helps us to understand reality, it is equally and importantly

<sup>7</sup> I maintained that Yudhisthira lied when he told Drona that Aswatthaman had been killed. While there was an interpretation according to which the words were true, that was not the interpretation which he intended Drona to employ.



true that insight into reality helps us to understand description. Be it momentous or miniscule, there is always a gap between description and reality, one that can never be filled by more description. However accurately it might point, the finger which points to the moon is not the moon. Whatever we might say about it, the Brahman will forever be beyond the reach of even the finest of description.

The Brahman, then, cannot fully be captured by description, yet it is the unity which spans all differentia.

As all waters find their centre in the sea, ... and all the Vedas in speech, — As a lump of salt, when thrown into water, becomes dissolved into water, and could not be taken out again, but wherever we taste (the water) it is salt, — thus verily, O Maitreyi, does this great Being, endless, unlimited, consisting of nothing but knowledge, rise from out these elements, and vanish again in them. (*Bri. ii, 4, 11-12*).

It is not a *Saguna* Brahman which is determinate and subject to exhaustive description, nor is it yet a *Nirguna* Brahman which is devoid of all differentia. Far from being empty, it is full with all reality:

That (the invisible Brahman) is full, this (the visible Brahman) is full. This full (visible Brahman) proceeds from that full (invisible Brahman). On grasping the fullness of this full (visible Brahman) there is left that full (invisible Brahman). Om (is) ether, (is) Brahman ... One knows through it all that has to be known. (*Bri. v, 1, 1*)

Reality, we have concluded, is full, being continuously differentiated, and validates all valid schemes. Reality is more than the descriptive schemes, and its differentia cannot be captured by summing over descriptive schemes. This cannot be done anymore than we can form a line by joining together a large or infinite number of points (or a plane by joining together lines). Things are the other way around. The point, mathematical or spatial, has its very identity only in terms of its surrounding system—line, plane, space, or whatever—and can be understood only in terms of that system. Similarly, descriptive schemes have their identity only in terms of an ambient reality, and can be understood only in terms of that reality. This is not to deny, absurdly, that description can tell us about reality. Assuredly descriptions can—in their own terms—tell us about reality. It is the business of descriptions to do so. Rather, I am saying that reality cannot be described entirely and uniquely, and that ultimately, every description has to be understood in terms of that reality to which it is proposed to apply. As we are told by the *Katha Upanisad* (ii, 5, 14-15), with echoes elsewhere in the Upanisads (*Mundaka Up.* ii, 2, 10, and *Svetasvatara Up.* vi, 14) and in the *Bhagavad Gita* (xv, 6):

This is That. How then can I understand it? Has it its own light, or does it reflect light? The sun does not shine there, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings, and much less this fire. When he shines, everything shines after him; by this light all this is lighted.



## *Freedom of Will—An Analysis in terms of Can and Could*

*R. K. Singh*

The issue of 'the freedom of the will' occupies a central place in the metaphysics of moral acts. Moral values are said to be essentially bound up with the freedom of the will. Freedom is a fundamental condition of the possibility of all moral phenomena. Without the foundation of freedom moral virtues lose their distinctive meaning, without freedom one's moral being becomes completely transformed into a state of moral neutrality.

The ethical concepts of guilt, merit, accountability, responsibility, praise or blame clearly presuppose freedom in the sense that one is free to act, i.e. he could have acted differently from the way in which he did act. Even in the moral consciousness there underlies a conviction that we ought to act in one way rather than in another, that one way of action is good or right and another bad or evil. But, as Kant urged, there could be no meaning in an "ought", if it were not accompanied by a "can".

In face of the principle of universal causation, the questions, such as, whether we are free to will what we will, whether we are free to choose between alternative possibilities, or whether we are compelled to choose one of them by something extraneous to us, have continually perplexed the thinkers. Their main problem has been whether or not Free Will is inconsistent with the principle of causation, which, according to Moore, depends to a large extent on the meaning of the word 'could'. The crucial expression in the discussion of free-choice is 'He could have done otherwise'. For, one is not held to be fully responsible for one's act, if he could not have done otherwise than he did, or could not help acting as he did. It is contended that to act by necessity and in such a way that one cannot



avoid the act does not seem to be praiseworthy or blameworthy. This is often expressed in the slogan "ought implies can". For an action done by me when say "I ought not to have done it", it implies that "I could have refrained from doing it", and similarly to say of an action not done by me that "I ought to have done it" involves the implication that 'I could have done it'. But if determinism be held to be true, I could not have done anything else but what I did, on the particular occasion, under the total set of circumstances that led to the action. Under those circumstances, only one act—the act I actually performed—was open to me.

The words "can" and "could" are, however, very ambiguous. "Can" is called a modal auxiliary verb which is used to mean "possibility". The different senses of "can" express the different ways in which something can be possible, but it is a vast, and as such a pretty difficult, task to investigate all the sense of "possible". Nevertheless, we may mention some of the uses of the verb "can". Some of its uses are clearly conditional or hypothetical, while some others are categorical. In its conditional uses, "can" means "Can if conditions such and such are satisfied". But, it is the categorical sense of the word which is required by free-choice; and in such contexts "I can" is stated to mean "I can no matter what". In its categorical use of the verb 'can', "X can do Y, unconditionally whatever happens" must mean that x's doing of Y will not be contingent upon any further conditions introduced into the situation, at the same time it must not mean 'X will do Y'. For, this will amount to saying that all possible actions actually do occur, which is a strong sense of determinism.

In the crucial expression 'He could have done otherwise', 'he could', according to Moore, means 'he would if he had chosen' to i.e., he would have acted differently if he had chosen to. He does not entertain the view that a man could not have chosen differently. For, it was possible, before the choice was made, either that he would choose as he did, or that he would choose some other way. It was possible that he could have chosen either of the two ways. Nowell-Smith maintains that we call those actions free, and to which we ascribe praise or blame, which we believe that a man could have chosen not to perform. This amounts to that he would have chosen not to perform it if certain conditions had been different. Both Moore and Nowell-Smith thus demonstrated that free choice was compatible with universal causation on the ground that 'He could have acted otherwise' meant the same as 'He would have acted otherwise if something had been the case' and it was then shown that one way or the other the something might, often, have been the case.



The above points have brought out one distinction of a great importance—the distinction between the so-called conditional use of 'he could have' and the indicative use of it. In its indicative use 'he could have' means 'he was able to' and this is different from 'he would have been able to, if something or other'. To say of some one that he was able to do something does not indicate anything at all about what he would have done in certain specific circumstances. Thus the use of 'can' and 'could' as ability words in the expression 'I can do something' brings out the meaning that 'I am able to do it', but it does not mean that I constantly am doing it rather that I am able to, which means that if I decide to do it I will. In certain cases no amount of my deciding or willing will enable me to do a thing. So there are certain things that I can do and certain other things that I can't. But at any specific moment one can do only one thing, the thing that he actually does. And what he does depends on what he wants to do. The determinist would say that in the circumstances in which the man is, he could not have wanted anything different. Although I could have done other than I did, because I would have done other than I did if I had chosen to, yet I couldn't have chosen differently, the conditions being just what they were. What I desire is itself one of the set of conditions on which my choice depends. 'I could have' means 'I would have if I had chosen to'. And I could have done otherwise if I had chosen to do so, if all the conditions including the choosing had been the same. Choosing is itself one of the conditions of action; and if the choice had been different, the act would have been different. If I had chosen differently, then one of the conditions of action—the choice—would have been different, and so not all the conditions would have been the same. This means that if all the circumstances—external and internal—be the same, which are never exactly the same, I would have done the same. Thus I am free to do an act if I can do it, and to say that I can do it is to say that I will do it if I choose. In this sense, we are all free in many of our actions.

Ewing also thinks that "it is of some philosophical importance to discuss the logic of 'could' and 'can'". He feels that determinism will not be in a strong position unless it can offer a tenable analysis of the crucial cases of 'could' on which the indeterminists rely. He offers an explanation perfectly compatible with 'could' being understood deterministically, though, he asserts, it does not in itself entail determinism. He explains, 'could' is frequently applied in cases where free will would never be seriously ascribed. The words 'can' and 'could' are also used of inanimate objects and of events which are not conceived to be in any way dependent on free will. It might



well be meaningfully said 'the weather this summer could have been better' or 'the car could have gone faster' or 'petrol can explode', yet in saying so, nobody would think that free will is being ascribed to the weather or the car or the petrol. Plainly 'could' here does not mean 'would if it had chosen', but it seems reasonable to say that it means 'would under unspecified conditions of some sort' (Ewing does not maintain that all 'can' and 'could' propositions are hypothetical but that some are.) The use of 'could' in this way provides a good explanation of inferring 'A could' from 'A could if'. To say that 'A could' means 'A would under some conditions or the other' is justified if it can be shown that one is entitled to say that it could under certain partially specified conditions. From 'petrol can explode if a flame is applied to it', it may be inferred without qualification that it can explode, if 'A can' means 'A will under some conditions or other.' But the conditions must be assumed possible. For, in the case of 'I could if I had chosen' there are many things which I could do if I chose but it is impossible for me to choose to do because it requires more intelligence that I possess to think of them and of those things it would be untrue to say that I could do. The form of the argument is not therefore simply: 'A can if p, A can', but 'A can if p, p is possible, A can'. This brings it nearer to the ordinary hypothetical: 'A has property X if p is true, p is true, ... A has property x'. In the argument: 'I can if y, y, ... I can' the sense of 'can' is different in 'I can if Y' and 'I can'. The difference lies in its being relative to the fully specified set of conditions. In the one case it is relative to a more and in the other to a less fully specified set of conditions. When we infer 'A can' from 'A can' from 'A can if Y', we are inferring that since A can under conditions Y, A can under some conditions or other. But from this it does not necessarily follow that we could significantly say 'can' as distinct from 'will' without reference to any conditions or that such a 'can' would have any application. On the determinist view proposed 'can' means 'will under certain conditions'.

Now, the hypothetical statements including the verb 'can' may behave in the normal way wherein it gives a condition of the ability itself, or they do not thus behave, rather here protasis gives a condition of the occurrence but not of the ability. My choice to do something may be a condition of my doing it but it is not a condition of my ability to do it as a dispositional property of mine. And the application of a flame to a piece of wood is a condition of its actually catching fire, but not of its having the dispositional property of being liable to catch fire when a flame is applied. Thus in the latter the if-clause is included in the statement defining the ability itself, while in the former it gives a condition of possessing the ability. Where the



ability itself is defined as the ability to do so-and-so if p, p is not a condition of the possession of the ability expressed by the can-clause but of its exercise. Even an ability 'to do A if one chooses' might figure in the apodosis of a hypothetical which admits the ordinary inferences.

Ewing says that the significance of the difference between the two phrases 'A can do B' and 'B can happen' seems to be that the former makes the occurrence or non-occurrence of B dependent on A. This usage is specially associated with those actions in human beings which are called free but is not limited to those. We sometimes use 'could' of men in a similar sense in which we use it things. That occurs when the reference is to abilities or inabilities.

The determinist does not seem to maintain that there is no sense of 'could' in which a man could have acted in a way different from that in which he actually did act. The determinist also maintains the distinction between cases in which a man is physically pushed and cases in which he acts as he chooses, and he may say that free action consists in the latter. In case of the action caused by his choice, his action would have been different or would not have occurred at all if he had chosen differently or not made the efforts of choice. The question at issue is not whether we could or could not have ever acted differently, but in what sense of 'could' we could have done so. The determinist sense of 'could' is a relative one, whereas the indeterminist sense is an absolute one. The determinist usually holds that we could have acted differently in the sense that we should have acted differently if our choice or act of willing had been different. The indeterminist asks whether we could also have chosen differently and insists that for us to be really free it must have been possible for us also to choose differently, everything else, including our own nature, being the same. According to the determinist to assert freedom in this sense is nonsense or at least incompatible with the principle of causality.

Prof. Brandt has brought out the sense of determinist 'can' as under. When the determinist says that nobody ever 'can' do anything other than what he does, the word 'can' is here used in a sense utterly different from that in which it is used when we say 'No human being can leap over the Qutub Minar'. The statement "He could not have done or it was impossible for him to have done anything, on a certain occasion, other than he did" ordinarily means that "even if his desire to do something different has been at maximal strength, and he had tried his best, he would not, on that occasion, have succeeded in doing anything other than he did". When some-



body could not have done something in this sense, it is said that it was physically or psychologically impossible for him to do it. On the other hand, when I say I cannot attend the party on a particular day, I simply mean that my previous commitments are such that it is my moral duty to attend to the commitment and not to go to the party that day. And whether it is physically possible, in this sense, for a man to do something is very important for whether he is morally obliged to do it. A man is not morally obliged to do anything that is beyond his power to do. Nor do we blame a man for having failed to do such an act. 'But certainly determinism does not at all imply that a person cannot do anything other than what he does in this sense of can'. The determinist says that an act is an instance of some causal law and in theory it could have been predicted. And to say so is quite different from saying that it would not have been different if the agent had tried his best to do something else. The sense of 'can' as adopted by determinists in the sentence 'people cannot do anything other than what they do' is thus different from ordinary sense. And on account of that special sense, a determinist need not excuse a person for an act of theft, since in the ordinary sense he could have helped it whereas a Kleptomaniac is excused.



## 3

*Medjugorije in the Shadow of War**Javan Parnii, Abd ul Noor*

I visited Medjugorije in Hercegovina, Yugoslavia in December 1991 from Sunday 15th to Wednesday 18th, to experience and write on how this religious phenomenon is responding to the war,

Medjugorije has become well known in the Catholic world for reported visions of the Virgin Mary, which began on 24th June 1981. Some children from the village, the oldest of whom was 18 years old, claimed to have seen the Virgin beckoning them to come to her as they were on the lower slopes of Mount Podbrdo, which lies just behind the village. They reported that she spoke to them, beginning a visionary audience which has now lasted for over ten years. A first Father Jozo, the village priest at the time, was reported as being sceptical and critical of the children. Later that year, as the Federal police sought to intervene, he reported experiencing a vision of the Virgin Mary himself in which she asked him to protect the children. From that time he did so, and he was imprisoned by the Federal authorities in October of the year.

The phenomenon of visionary experience is one recognised by the Roman Catholic Church as valid in principle, as something which truly arises from time to time. In each claimed event, considerable practical problems arise. Many claims are made which on investigation are not accepted by the Church authorities. The case of Medjugorije is still under investigation by a commission of the Bishops of Yugoslavia, the Vatican having faulted procedurally an earlier adverse report by the commission of the Bishop of Mostar. Under the guidance of the theologian Bishop of Split, Catholics may believe in the visions as a matter of personal human belief, but not as a matter of divinely established faith as would be the case if the experiences are formally recognised by the Church.

**The Journey to Medjugorije.**

My journey began in a sense when, some two years previously, I awoke to some awareness of the reality of religious experience, and



set out to understand this and to discover what import or fate this Mystery of Being held for me. More immediately, I resolved to take some interest in this war to draw close to this common human experience that remains so prominent in the affairs of mankind.

I visited Belgrade on Friday 29th November, intending to pass on to Sarajevo, but currency conversion problems forced me to return to Germany on Saturday 30th. I arrived in Zagreb on the evening of 2nd December, suitably furnished with a considerable supply of Deutschmarks, which is highly advisable if travelling in Eastern Europe. Staying in a hotel for the first two nights, I found myself with some refugees from Vukovar. Zagreb had been attacked several weeks previously, and somehow combines a vital, cosmopolitan life-beat with the air of a city at war.

On the Tuesday 3rd, December I made my introduction to a number of Peace and Green activists in Zagreb, being impressed with their ingenuity and dedication, though they are few in number. The Peace Movement in Zagreb centres around The Antiwar Campaign Committee, set up by Green Action Zagreb and the Society for Improvement of the Quality of Life in Croatia. Neither of these are political parties as such, but campaign actively in the political and public domains. The former has an obvious ecological bias, whereas the latter has more of a 'New Age' spiritual orientation. The committee is endeavouring to maintain links with Peace movements in Belgrade, Sarajevo, and in the other Republics of Yugoslavia, which remains a geographical and cultural entity devoid of political union and its necessary substrata of tolerance, mutual acceptance and sense of community. The movement's most ambitious initiative, which may have an influence and value far beyond the present crisis, is the creation of a Foundation of Conscience, which invites subscription to certain general principles of civilised conduct, and seeks to promote human conscience, consciousness and responsibility towards this and all conflicts.

With an introduction from a Zagreb acquaintance to Branco Roso, Vice President of the City Executive, I visited Osijek on Thursday 5th to Thursday 12th December, travelling by bus and returning by train. As an unofficial guest of the City I was permitted the luxury of sleeping in the cellar of the City Hall, after an uncomfortable first night in the central shelter with just a blanket. During the days I did some basic volunteer work the City Ambulance Service, and some liaison work for the City during the evenings. As it happened, my exposure was limited compared to the recent experience of the service. The people working in the hospital and ambulance service could be from any hospital or ambulance service in Europe. Thinking of themselves



as ordinary people with ordinary jobs, homes and borrowings, problems and aspirations, the events of the last few months has transformed their lives with grotesque surrealism. Several of the ambulance staff have lost their homes, and now live on the job and in hospital cellars. Of their colleagues Vukovar, they told me only three out of seventeen were left alive. They often have to recover casualties under fire which is not merely indiscriminate, but deliberately targetted at them and the hospital. The work of the hospital is all underground as it is unsafe to use the ground and upper floors. Conditions are crowded and difficult, but a good working order was being maintained as far as I could see under the circumstances. Many cases that would normally be treated in hospital are having to be left in their homes, where the people are without heating and power. The apparent normality with which people cope with these circumstances is one of the phenomena of war: They have suffered bombardment for months, and have the prospect of weeks or months more in view, and the knowledge that it may end as a second Vukovar. Their sense of duty and quiet resolution made a powerful impression on me.

Returning to Zagreb to stay with some friends I had made, I ascertained that my projected journey to Medjugorije was possible. It may distress the traveller to discover the Bus Company will not sell return tickets, but this is established policy rather than fatalism. Leaving Zagreb at 5:30am on Saturday 14th, the coach travelled by Pag and Split to Imotski, where I spent that night. About an hour from Imotski, we came upon very extensive brush fires. I was not able to ascertain whether or not these had been started deliberately. The following morning I took a more local coach from Imotski to Mostar.

There are said to be some fifteen thousand Federal troops around Mostar. Much of the country of Hercegovina is Croatian, and I was surprised to discover at a Militia checkpoint on my walk from Mostar to Medjugorije that I was amongst Croatians, particularly as I had been half shadowed some of the way by a Federal helicopter. There was some occasional shooting in the hills several kilometers away, which was from automatic weapons but almost certainly just training. The fact that civilians were moving about on the road in cars, individually and in family groups, indicated the general viability of my intentions.

The war is being fought on a series of fronts strung out in a broad crescent from Osijek along the Bosnian frontier to Sisak and back round to Dubrovnik in the south. Yet surprisingly, there are cases of peace on these borders, and it is particularly strange to find oneself crossing these borders by coach. My return to Zagreb on



Wednesday 18th was by coach through Bosnia, passing within 30 kilometers of Osijek.

### At Medjugorije.

I arrived at Medjugorije in the early evening of Sunday 15th December. Having found a room for my stay, I attended evening mass. The church was full, almost entirely of villagers, with a coach or two of people from neighbouring communities.

There is a small international community of foreign Catholic priests and resident pilgrims. I first met Toney Brooks from Alabama, on the morning of the 16th. Toney was very helpful, introducing me to Father Philip Pavich of Iowa and of Croatian descent, and to Father Slavko Barbaric, and to some of the other resident pilgrims. Toney gave up the ownership and management of a Radio network in Kentucky this year to be in Medjugorije at this time. Other resident pilgrims have made a like decision to come this year together with established resident pilgrims who have stayed on. The regular pilgrim tours have almost completely ceased, with a last coach of Americans having left on November 23rd. One coach of Americans and one of French was expected to come in December, however.

Medjugorije is a village of Croats in Hercegovina, and the Croatian national flag was in evidence as it is in many villages and towns in this region. The village has profited greatly from the pilgrimages, and in evaluating the experience this powerful vested interest and the ways in which it can influence the consciousness of the visionaries must be borne in mind. Most villagers have converted their homes in the last decade, to provide comfortable modern rooms for pilgrims. Extensive building work was in progress, most of it now halted. The village has something of the air of a seaside resort during a wet February. There has been fighting within twenty five miles of the village, Toney told me, but that was several weeks previously. Two Croatian businesses had been bombed in Mostar during the previous week, he said, in attempts to provoke conflict. Mostar is some 20 kilometres from Medjugorije.

### The Visionaries.

The visionaries were all well, to Toney's knowledge. The four girls, Marija Pavlovic, Vicka Ivankovic, Ivanka Ivankovic and Mirjana Dragicevic were all in the village. Both the boys were away. Jakov Colo was in Italy and Ivan Dragicevic was in America, but expected to return by Christmas. I briefly met Vicka, who doesn't speak English. Father Slavko Barbaric took me to meet Marija on the evening of Tuesday 17th. She was ill and he went to her at home to give her Mass. We spent about half an hour with her and her family,



## Medjugorije in the Shadow of War

drinking some excellent herb tea after the Mass. Her bearing was modest, quite shy in fact, yet calm. I asked her if the messages of the Virgin were specifically Catholic, having made it clear I was not Christian. She said the appeal of the Virgin Mary was to everyone to respond as they could. As a Catholic, she understood her experience in Catholic terms, and expressed a hope that people would be led into the church, recalling one case with pleasure where this has happened. Marija's understanding of the visionary ministry of the Virgin seems not to be exclusivist though formal Catholic theology is so.

The visionaries bear a great responsibility to their community and to the Roman Catholic society and others who have responded to their experience and profession. Medjugorije has become powerfully symbolic to many in the Catholic community around the world. In the shadow of war this responsibility and symbolism is sharply accented. Those who believe the visionaries experience corresponds with some reality, or that it may do, will sense with particular acuteness this responsibility. Medjugorije appears to be part of the living tradition of Catholic Mysticism that contributes much to the vitality of the Catholic Church.

The visionaries have publicised a series of messages which they claim are messages for the Virgin Mary to the world. They have a peculiar regularity, being given on the 25th day of each month. Generally, they are of about one paragraph length. The messages claim to continue the tradition of Fatima, an earlier manifestation of the Virgin Mary from the beginning of this century. The general tenor of the messages is that times are critical for mankind, nature and the planet, and that we are called to prayer, deeds and sacrifice which can change the course of events. The messages, in English translation, use a traditional language referring to Satan as a real being. The messages do not refer specifically to events, but the message of July 25th said "... At this time peace is being threatened in a special way, ...". The message of October 25th was different in character, saying simply "Dear children ! Pray ! Pray ! Pray !", and did not include the final "Thank you for having responded to my call" with which the messages generally end.

Father Philip Pavich discussed the matter of the secrets, each visionary being said to be given ten secrets, of whom two have had all ten and the others nine. It is not known by the priests of Medjugorije whether this means there are ten or sixty secrets. What is the purpose of the secrets, anyway, if only the visionaries know them, and do not reveal them ? Father Philip referred to an incident concerning the secrets which complicates matters. A Doctor Ludvik



Stopar of Maribor University, Psychiatrist and Parapsychologist, conducted research into the events at Medjugorije in 1982 and 1983. He claims to have hypnotised Marija Pavlovic, under which she revealed her secrets as at the time. In an interview with a Frere Rene Laurent in Doctor Stopar said that professional confidentiality bound him not to reveal the secrets. Doctor Stopar reported in December 1982 that in his view the experiences of the visionaries should be taken seriously and investigated by a Bishops commission as "theistic parapsychological phenomena".

### The Religious Community:

A religious community has grown up around Medjugorije including priests, others in Holy Orders and resident pilgrims. Over a long discussion with Toney Brooks on the Monday afternoon I was well able to gauge the strength of conviction with which he and others have committed themselves to coming to Medjugorije at this time. Bosnia Hercegovina is potentially explosive, and conflict here may be much worse than what has passed so far. Transport to and from Medjugorije is still running, but that is quite extraordinary in itself and cannot be assured. Nothing has proved sacred so far in this war and the community is well aware of their high profile as a symbol of Roman Catholicism.

The priests and resident pilgrims stress that, their faith is not dependant the validity of the visions. Some of them have already given several years of their lives to Medjugorije, and all now here made commitment of their lives in coming and remaining. They live in daily contact with the visionaries, and must therefore be impressed with their integrity. Faith flows like water, and once flowing to its destined sea, seldom flows back to the watershed where born. The psychology of those who make commitment in faith is such that further experience is interpreted very much in the light of the tradition and conviction in which they flow. The priests and resident pilgrims are obviously intelligent people: Religious conviction is however the mainstay of their being. It would be difficult for them even to entertain doubts that struck to the root of their faith. Their being and deeds testify to their faith, as Roman Catholics and personality to the visions of the Virgin Mary.

I met a lady from California who I know only as Marian who gave up her job and home to come, intending to spend a year here if funds last. We fell into conversation on the Tuesday afternoon after the Two 'o' clock rogation on Mount Podbrdo. She had always been of the Catholic tradition, but spent some ten years of her life associated with a circle of 'New Age' friends of various persuasions, and



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considered this had greatly helped her to progress in her faith. The group had ceased to meet, but had stayed in touch. Marian is frankly pluralist in her attitude to other religions, and readily agreed that the Roman Catholic tradition itself is a broader church than its theologians will formally admit. She said she did not feel particularly brave in coming here: She felt simply that she was following the will of God. That led to some interesting talk about how we come to know what our religions require of us.

Among the resident pilgrims is a Melona von Hapsburg, whom I did not meet, and a lady of Magyar German family from Munich who has closely befriended Marija Pavlovic. A community known as the Oasis of Peace has been established in the village, though I found none there when I went to visit them. Their site was obviously actively occupied, so I must have just missed them.

After my visit to Marija with Father Slavko Barbaric, I was privileged to spend the rest of the evening with him and my lady from Munich. We went to a village some 9 kilometers distant where I met his mother, a lovely old lady who is obviously very proud of him, and then to his sister's house where we had an excellent supper. Conversation among the monfolk was obviously of war and politics, but Croatian, which meant little to me. Father Slavko has been committed to Medjugorije for several years now. Educated in Germany in theology and psychology, he speaks excellent English and German as well as his native tongue. We had an interesting argument over whether his personal conviction on the visionary experience should be subject to the formal findings of a remote Church commission over his direct experience and judgement. If I understood him correctly, a negative report of the commission would leave him free to maintain his personal human conviction where it did not conflict with doctrinally established divine revelation. He felt that the visions were wholly consistent with and part of the Roman Catholic tradition. The visionaries are of a Catholic upbringing, and the close interest of the Church with a very close personal ministry to the visionaries would tend to cultivate how the visionaries understand their experience.

### Conclusion.

The visionary experience of Medjugorije has come to symbolise a call to the conscience and consciousness of mankind to awaken to the Mystery of Being and to answer the demand of the times. In Christian terms this means coming to Christ in prayer, deeds and self sacrifice. This call has become starkly poignant in the shadow of this war. Philosophers and theologians of this century have observed how the same agreed facts support completely different views of reality. For some Medjugorije may prove the futility of religious ideals in the face of the real world, and human nature in particular. For others, Medjugorije may come to be a symbolic triumph, whatever happens. True Christianity may be the sternest creed, with none truly coming to Jesus but by the Cross.



## 4

*Tagore's Concept of Man and Humanity**D. R. Bhandari*

Rabindranath Tagore was a Poet, Philosopher, Educationist, Artist and a Prophet of Freedom. Being a poetic-philosopher, he was also a visionary and communicated the truth that were revealed to him emerging through his poetic images. We feel that we have to go deep into the poet's realisation to learn the truths and evidences which he has attained through his illustrious life and self-hood. As we study Tagore, it becomes clear that he was a great lover of human beings and great humanist. It is very true, in his philosophy man is given the key status. He considers man with great dignity and uniqueness, so, our main concern over here is, man in Tagore's Philosophy. He speaks of man as having two essential aspects of his nature, the finite and the infinite. One way man has to acknowledge the rule of universal laws and at another he is beyond of all laws. We shall have a glance to understand these two aspects of man's nature.

According to Tagore, man is abode by a lower one or finite aspect of his nature, where as, he is relieved to attain a higher one or the infinite in the other aspects of his nature. The lower one is biological and physical nature which he has received from the cosmic evolution, and the higher is the spiritual nature which makes man unique and gives him an amount of freedom. This is also called as the "Surplus" in man. Thus Tagore combines in man, the physical nature with the spiritual and calls him "the earth's child and heaven's heir".

The physical or finite aspect is determined in term of biological and the psychological facts. It represents self which lives and moves in the world. It is in and through this finite that the infinite is realised. The spiritual or infinite is expressed in man's longings and aspiration of higher kind. It enables him to thrill at art and music. It helps him to love and feel compassion.



The finite nature of man has three dimensions. These three composed aspects are Animality in man, mind in man and the spiritual potentialities of man. Man, in his finite nature, shows some of the qualities and characteristics of the animal world. To some extent he is also determined by the stimuli coming from the environment. He has some instinctive and mechanical ways of action and behaviour. He is also conscious of his self and many of his actions are guided by the motives of self-satisfaction. He shows his habits to combat with others for satisfaction of his needs and desires, like animals. These express that the man is an organised being endowed with life and the nature of belonging to animals.

Man in his finite existence, possesses certain character that distinguish him from other living beings. The possession of mind is a unique factor in man. This differentiates his reaction towards the environmental factors. For example, animals have to accept and surrender to the forces of nature like rain, flood etc. Whereas man, by dint of his physical capabilities tries to find methods to face the challenges of these forces. Even his senses are keenly developed and under the control of the self. Thus in his finite nature, man is superior to other aspects of existences. That's why animals can be tamed by the man. Tagore rightly says, "The elephants' trunk, the tiger's paws, the claws, of the mole have confined their best expression in the human arm".

Besides of these two dimensions, the finite nature of man itself gives the evidences of the spiritual potentialities to this. Man's desires are not always egocentric, They aim at the realisation of some social good. His yearning for aesthetic sensibility indicates that his finite self is also constantly bringing to excel itself. It is always be impelled towards others. The spiritual potentialities in man, makes him somewhat higher among this animal kingdom. Not only because he has a superior mind but he has a superior and enlightened sense of life. Apart from these three dimensions, the finite self has three controlling and regulatory characters. These three distinguished factors are acquisition, Ego-sense and the organisation of desires. Acquisition in one of the foremost tendencies of the finite self, through which he gains immense satisfaction. And due to this, he spends his energy in bringing to meet the demand of his body, food, clothing and shelter etc. All his struggles and conflicts are guided by desire for acquisition. Yet he does not remain satisfied, He longs for more and something new. Though in a way, all these keep him in bondage, yet this also indicates the presence of spirituality in him which extends the limits of one's own limited existence.

Man has vividly developed the ego-sense which seeks to satisfy his ego. Sometimes he may be even unreasonable in order to satisfy



his ego sense. All activities in the finite realm are ego-directed-desires, motives etc. all either consciously or unconsciously spring from the egoistic wants. Therefore the finite self wishes to maintain his uniqueness at all cost. He feels a peculiar satisfaction when he thinks that he is at last distinctly different from others.

The finite self is an organisation of desires. Some of them are merely physical solicitous and intentional, and rest of them go beyond the individual. One of the intrinsic and normal desire is for embodied and materialistic comforts, to satisfy the needs of the body and mind. There is also the general desire of the physical system as a whole. Again, there may be a desire of a general or social nature, to be socially prominent etc. These different kinds of desires gradually go to constitute the finite self.

The above description of the finite-self shows that the finite-self is the natural for ordinary man. Tagore also emphasises the fact that this represents a real aspect of normal man. This finite self grows and develops into the infinite. Tagore has deliberately exposed the infinite aspect of the man's nature. This aspect of the man's nature has been called the 'Universal', the 'Surplus' or the 'Divinity' present in man. Tagore refers to many experiences of life that bear witness to this aspect of man's nature. According to Tagore, wherever man undertakes suffering and sacrifice to do something good, he realises the element of divinity present in him. Therefore he says "We have seen man conquering pain by undaunted powers, plunging into fiery ordeals only to march forward with triumph..... This power that lies behind is, neither physical nor mental, it belongs to the inward self, where man is united with his God."

Here by 'Surplus' we mean the capacity to going beyond one-self. This 'Surplus' enables man to transcend his limitations and makes him realize his higher destiny, which the animals might never do. Therefore, Tagore says, "the most important fact that has come into prominence along with the change of direction in our evolution is the possession of a spirit which has its enormous capital with a surplus for in excess of the requirements of the biological animal in man". Further, the infinite aspect of man's nature creates in him yearning for mukti. No other creation can aspire for this immortality. Man feels that there is something in him which asserts immortality, in spite of the obvious fact of death. It is that deeper unity in him which from the centre of this world radiates towards the circumference, which is in his mind, yet grows beyond his mind, which through the things belonging to him expresses something that is not in them, which while occupying his present, overflows its banks of the past and the limits of the future. It is the personality of man conscious of its



inexhaustible abundance, has the paradox in it that it is more than itself, more than as it is seen, known and used. And this consciousness of the infinite ever strives to make its expression immortal. On account of the presence of this aspect in man, he feels attracted towards nature. He is thrilled by the beauties of nature and its sublime powers of natural forces.

Man is not alien to nature inspite of its working against his plans and projects. The consciousness of the infinite in man, according to Tagore is basically creative. This does not mean to construct something new. Creativity is the capacity of having and giving expression to novel ideas, it is the power of having new and original visions. This aspect of man has been described as the artist in man. Therefore, it is rightly said, a man is by nature an artist because he functions normally in a creative manner and his personality is naturally self-expressive".

On account of man's infinite nature, personality becomes dynamic and overgrowing. The growth follows from the character of creativity, progress by carrying the past along with oneself and yet creating and adding something fresh and entirely new at every stage. His personality does not grow merely physically, it incorporate an inner growth also, which is an evidence of the fact that infinite aspect of man's nature is essentially active.

The creative aspect of man's life extends that he is free to create and manifest his own world to enjoy his creativity and manifestation of infinite self. Thus man can enjoy a certain amount of freedom in the physical realm which is according to Tagore, is like the freedom inside a cage. The physical man is limited by the limitations of the physical entity. The freedom that characterises the infinite nature of man, is spiritual freedom, the freedom to break the shackles of the finite-self and to aspire for the realization of oneness or unity. Perfect freedom, according to Tagore, lies in a perfect harmony of relationship, in the realization of the universal within the individual.

Joy in life and joy in creation belong to man, according to Tagore. All the expression and activities of the infinite aspect of man are expressions of joy. Joy, according to Tagore is inherent in the soul and whatever is considered to be beyond the physical is nothing but an expression of joy. Man's natural urge for realization of the "Truth", the good and beautiful is an expression of joy. Joy helps him to forget the worries and anxieties of life, it is joy that makes him moral or religious or noble. Joy is both, the condition of his spiritual growth and also its ultimate goal. When man forget his infinite and becomes slaves of the bodily aspect of his life, his joy is reduced



to the materialistic things and vice-versa. Joy thus constitutes the higher—the spiritual aspect of man's nature.

Tagore calls this aspect of man's nature as "Jivan-Devata. It is the "Lord of life" because it gives "Joy" of existence. "Jiwan-Devata" is God in man, the element of Divinity present in man which makes him God-like. Thus Tagore, joyfully express that this God-like man is a perfect human being. No doubt, that he dreamed of a perfect human society, a perfect human being, a united and conquered humanity on this mother earth. He endeavoured to make a man to realize, that he is not only a finite man like the other creatures around in the world but man is a infinite one, that he is god-like and there is a human being having a deep love and great respect for the each man and each creature. He believed that a happy, peaceful and beautiful life could be built on earth through the efforts of the passionate, artistic, creative and non-violent man, and in large the humanistic society. In his earliest poems, he voiced a desire to "merge with humanity". That was abstract humanism and love for man in general. His man, as a human being, is frer-creative, unique and devoted to serve the humanity with all joys, beauties and artistic sense. Tagore insisted that the man has to unite to form a single harmonious and indentical mankind, where knowledge is free, where the world is not broken up into nations, peoples, races, whites and blacks, and fregments by narrow domestic walls. In his own word "the nation is the gratest evil for the nation", And so all the elements which make distinction between a man and that of the others. Tagore was great humanist and creative genius. His entire creativity is animated with the ideas of liberation, beauty, truth and love. According to him one must recognise oneself in others, so that one can feel the life beating in others, like in oneself. Tagore always loved man and humanity with all his heart.

Thus, Tagore being a great humanist, speaks of man, in his relation to the infinite spirits. In his philosophy of man, Tagore has described very distinctly the finite and the infinite aspect of man's nature and their relationship with each other aspects of the one and the same nature. Moreover, Tagore glorified man as crown of creation. This fact comes out very clearly, when he says "The life in water is silent, the animal on earth is noisy, the bird in the air is singing. But man has in him the silence of the sea, the noise on the earth and the music of the air". In fact, Tagore constantly struggled for the perfection of man and the development of his peripheral and inner personality. All these comes up with his great love for humanity and his intimacy with man's nature. The love of Tagore for mankind, is mainly due to his profound spirituality and devotion for the humanity, as love for God. Thus, we can reverently conclude by saying that Tagore was primarily a philosopher of humanity.



## Towards An Idealizational Mind-Brain Identity Prototheory

Rossen Stuppov

"Weltknoten" (Schopenhauer), "World Enigma" [Haeckel] or "Himalayan Problem" (according to Bulgarian philosopher Save Petrov) are a small part of characteristics, with which the Mind-Brain Problem has been decorated in the history of philosophy. More than a millenium and a half after St. Augustine's anguish with the sphinx of time, it seems like each one of the known philosophical approaches to the explanation of the mind could say: "If no one asks me about it, I know; if I want to explain when asked, I do not know". What was attractive as a purpose in the reductive explanation attempts of Feigl, Place, Smart and Armstrong was reduced in an ingenious and just uncompromising way by the eliminative efforts of Feyerabend and Rorty. The dominating functioning of their conceptions in the philosophical theory of 70s was eliminated by the functional approach to Mind-Brain Problem by Putnam and Fodor. With a diverse and multiplied team of adherents, this approach still retains its top positions against the background of the currently practiced methodological schemes of explaining the mind in hidden competition with the not so unexpected emergence of M. Bunge's emergentist materialism. The latter has his historical predecessors in the conceptions of C.D. Broad and R.W. Sellars and lately in those of R. Sperry and E. McMullin. They, together with the historical materialism of Marx and Engels according to Teichman (1, p. 55) are the cultural niche on which J. Margolis delivered his cultural emergentism.

Unfortunately, the basic tactics of the above mentioned approaches to defending the right of conceptual existence in philosophy was the well known "bellum omnium contra omnes". The practical consequences of the discord among the materialists was immediately exploited by the dualism to regenerate it in a noncartesian form-f.ex.



the conceptions of Puccetto and Dykes, and Popper and Eccles. Although under the sun of materialism as a dominating philosophy in the 20th century, interactionism added nothing new in principle to the Mind-Body Problem, it still succeeded in laying some falsifying imprints on its image. In a self-critical manner we should admit that though being a philosophy of action and more particularly of the man and his mind, the dialectical materialism, does not manifest activity to the Mind-Body bouillon muddled by the different materialisms and dualisms. This article is an attempt to partially compensate for the somewhat belated dialectical-materialist presence in that debate of the century—which may have potentials to reveal—by far not as a consolation—some non-ephimerical advantages. They are expressed not so much into the possibility for a critical reflection over the received approaches to mind-body problem, which slipped into their habitual conceptual schemes, but rather in the synthesis of their strong points, which is a well known patent of dialectical materialism.

Myopia to the methodological merits of the opponents whatever their philosophical creeds, is characteristic not only of the materialisms and not only with regard to mind-body problem. Paradoxically as it may seem, this conduct becomes a norm in the development of the different approaches to mind-body problem. Conceptually they gained strength from focussing the attention primarily on the shortcomings of their opponents. This could not but generate bias in the explanations offered. The truth about the complex nature of the mind should not be thrown into the dustbin as an useless private acquisition, following eventual criticism by one of another approach of a newly-emergent opponent. The truths about a part of the mind's reality should be transformed into particular truths about its nature within a true programme and approach, notwithstanding that they have been obtained through the means of the rivalling approach.

The positive points of the different materialisms in the mind-body problem are the result of their common piety to science and the scientific methods. As far as, the scientific method is concerned it is valid for the different versions of dualism too. This already indicates the principally important role of the ontological, epistemological and the methodological storeys of the respective programmes.

In a more specific aspect should be mentioned the idea of Feigl in contrast to Armstrong (2, p. 33)—to identify the mental with a certain type of cerebral processes (3, p. 90). An achievement of Feigl's programme was also the anticipation of studies with bioelectrical potentials—the so called "Evoked Potentials". It anticipated the



structural difference in the state of mind of an individual rationalizing different real phenomena (3, p. 51-52). An unrealized opportunity, this trend in Feigl's materialism can serve as a basis of re-interpreting the scientific material of Eccles's interactionism (4, p. 79-107).

Mario Bunge's emergentism makes up for the fatal underestimation of emergency in Feigl's reductive programme. Another merit of Bunge's programme-for difference from some dialectical materialists (10)-is the powerful attack on an archaic myth of the immateriality of mental phenomena (5, p. 61). It succeeded in undermining the pillars of the supernatural explanations (6, pp. 16-21, 40, 86 etc.; ref. other interesting articles by Irv. Thalberg (7), The cultural development of emergency on the part of J. Margolis to some extent overcame the unquestioned deficiencies of the predominantly psychobiological approach of Bunge, to show the mental processes are inherent to animals and a person is animal endowed with a personality (6, pp. 74, 186). The underestimation of Bruner and specially of Vigotskii by the materialists in mind-body problem is one of the reasons for their "bottom-up" approach. It embodies the spirit of Russel's strategy "always to master the simplest phenomena first".

Though well aware of the difference between the human and animal consciousness (8, p. 448)—not without the help of Marx and Engels (8, p. 111, index 7) — Popper remains in the context of biological evolutionism, thus annulling the *cultural essence* of his World 3 (8, pp. 72, 45). The latter inconsistently includes wrong theories and timelessness truths. This aspect of World 3 is incompatible with Popper's claims of objectivity of World 3. In its present form, World 3 is a degenerated form of *human activity* forcibly distracted from the generative activity of the mind (World 2 according to Popper). The differentiation of World 3 as a Plato essence from the human mind, is a mystification of the determining role of human practice in the world of man.

The common framework of the majority of materialistic versions of mind-body problem is the *abstraction of identification of the human mind with the animal psyche*. The difference between the mind and the animal psyche corresponds approximately to that described by Vigotskii between the high and low mental functions of humans. The abstraction of identification is the basis of precision in formal sciences, but in the context of the immature mind-body problem, it manifests *ontological reduction* with regard to the reality of mind's specificity. Besides, it dilutes the *objectively different hierarchy* of the imagination, (inner) speech (Lurie A. R.) and memory, organised through the human intellect, and the sensations, perceptions and



emotions, which develop in the animal, regardless of the dictate of the intellect. "Affective and cognitive processing", writes E. Le Doux, "reflect unique processing functions of distinct neural systems" (9, p. 359).

From methodological point of view it is important to indicate the cumulative rationality of the approaches availing of the abstraction of identification expressed in continuously increasing abstractness. It is all the more increasing if in a hypothetical field as mind-body problem, we make use like Bunge of the formal apparatus of the theory of sets, applicable only where ready and articulated theories exist. Methodological programmes raised by abstractions and unintentional idealizations can not be distances from the hypothesis and prototheories (M. Bunge) in psychology and neurophysiology. A characteristic feature of such programmes resp. approaches is *the lack of a mechanism* for gradual negation of the abstractions and the intentional idealizations, if any. In this case, idealization implies certain temporary negation of something less significant in a scientific situation empirical contents.

Redirection of different materialisms from an elementarist strategy to (some of) the higher mental precesses determines *the methodological features of the suggested dialectic form of materialism* in mind-body problem. The concept of mind cannot avoid the determinant in man's psychic life-intrapsychic dynamics of higher cognitive functions-as the essence of the mind. It is not rational to accumulate in the analysis *phenomenal characteristics* of lower psychic forms such as sensation, for instance, in the materialism of Feigl, Cornman or as dialectical materialist D.I. Dubrovsky (10), before having understood the nature of the mind. For this reason, my suggestion is that materialistic analysis should be oriented towards *counterempirical* i.e., *idealizational study* of the intellectually organised psychic functions of consciousness, and respectively—to put it in dualistic terms—their higher than the C-fibres socioculturally impregnated cerebral mechanisms of the specifically human zones in man's left hemisphere (A. R. Luria). And since idealizations and their correlation to abstractions are of importance for the version suggested here, I shall consider briefly their analysis.

By idealizing I understand *a temporary negation by reducing to zero* of a less significant for a given scientific situation empirical contents. The idealization, while negating, implicitly preserves in thought an attitude to the negated contents. As idealizations *eliminate* the specific features and the accidental from the surface of the phenomenon studied, they cognitively construct its essence in pure form.



They are a tool for temporary negation of the phenomenal variant in experience. Idealizations complement abstraction which *preserves* already familiar factors of the essence of the phenomenon studied. During its conceptualization these factors are thought of as relatively non-excludable.

Idealizations are brought into the dialectical form of materialism because of its orientation towards the higher psychic functions as the mind. In order to *simplify analysis* of their incredibly complex intermingling with psychic processes in the sensory modalities, it is necessary to *eliminate the latter temporarily through idealizations*. In addition, it is necessary to eliminate temporarily the use of *the results* of introspective knowledge *as a starting point for analysis in mind-body problem*. This does not mean to negate the psychological reality of the introspection from the character of the ones suggested by Lashley or Hebb. There is no doubt that both lower and cognitive processes covered by the mind 'open' to the personality through the introspection. However, some psychologists express justified doubt as to the adequateness of introspection as a method. "Whatever is accessible for conscious observation — Z. Pylyshin writes, — may not have an important causal role in psychological processes" (11). For the introspective psychological study the *inner hierarchy of psychological processes* also remains elusive. As a psychological mechanism introspection is a later product in the development of man's intellectualized cognitive processes. Its phylogenetic and ontogenetic secondariness makes it possible—and *for the prototheory of the mind even necessary* — to temporarily idealize results from the introspection. Verbalization of introspective data must be used but combined with the correctives which impose neuropsychological methods as the basic ones in the study of the mind.

The concept of the mind can be achieved by *bilateral idealization* of lower psychic functions, phenomenological features of the introspective knowledge of higher cognitive processes, respectively the empirical specifics of brain events established through neurophysiological methods. The dialectical approach with the help of idealizations and abstractions has as an objective to reproduce the mind in itself as *an abstraction idealized in a certain degree*. The interrelation between abstractions and idealizations constructs the essence of the mind — "no essence without identity". It is a non-sensory abstract object of reflection through idealization of the reflection of empirical elements, properties, relations of the brain and the psychic, taken separately.

The object of cognition in general and in mind-body problem in particular however are not abstract constructions but their approxi-



mation to the reality studied in its variety of connections and relations. The methodological programme of dialectical materialism possesses a mechanism for both reaching to the level of abstractness and simplification of analysis through idealization, and the gradual negation of these latter and by that for nearing our cognitive constructs to the empirical surface of the reality studied. This mechanism is the dialectical method whose modern reconstructions (12 : 13, pp. 13-29) avoid the traditionally employed criticism. With the help of the dialectical method there is a possibility for incorporating the philosophical projects and constructions into the body of an actually developed factual prototheory (14, pp. 190-194). Cognitive psychology and neurophysiology are in such a favourable stage for philosophical and methodological intervention precisely because of their relative immaturity.

As long as the idealizations reject empirical feature of objective significance, the mind abstraction obtained—precisely because of these idealizations—with a definitely lowered degree of truthfulness. But it is also a methodological approach which gives a concept of the mind in a relatively *pure* form. The next process—which could be accomplished through a series of subtheories—is a process of gradual negation of the admitted idealizations. It does not reject, but develops in a differentiated version our *initial fallability abstraction* of the mind. This process runs not only in the direction of the nomotetical and noumenological neuropsychological, but also towards mental idiographies so as to reveal “the goal of increasing our understanding of the particularities of individual lives” (15, p. 426).

Another important specifics is that the idealization of forms of the psychological organisation of the mind is deeper, than the carrying out of the same process with regard to the neurophysiological. This is an understandable consequence of the general assertion that the introspectively established phenomena and processes in the mind are a *development* with regard to the socioculturally impregnated cerebral processes, as their embedded essence. It is namely the conceptual richness of the features of the mind as an introspectively established phenomena, that makes impossible the *short-sighted empirical identification* of knowledge by sequantance with the neurophysiological processes of knowledge by description.

The dialectical approach to the mind-body problem provisionally *eliminates through idealization* introspectively conceptualised phenomena from the sphere of mental experience resp. empirically established factors from the sphere of cerebral processes. But as a conception it *cannot replace the immediately* given by ‘physical connation’ as Feyerabend claims, nor serve as ground for Churchland’s



defence of eliminative materialism (16), let alone to "pragmatised" Rorty (17), p. XVI. 166, 205). *Ontologically* entity cannot displace phenomenon, because the latter *develops and differentiates* it. *Epistemologically* psychological theory cannot be dismissed as "primitive precursor" (16, p. 114). It gives structure to the development of noumenological (neuro-physiological) theory where the abundance of intentional psychological links is the ideal aim of neurophysiological theory (18, p. 294). *Methodologically* every psychological theory contains a mental diversity of factors that should be embedded into a neurophysiological type—identity.

The dialectical ontological approach to mind-body problem is neither solely reductive, not holistic alone. But it assumes a reductive simplification as long as it makes use of *idealizations* to evade the empirical identity of the mental with the cerebral in the conceptions of Feigl, Smart and Armstrong. Apart from this, the dialectical approach *develops* its initial abstraction to an *integrity*, as far as it rejects the provisionally admitted idealizations, by which it would come closer to the immediate experience of the subject. This possibility has skipped the mind of the IT adherents, oriented towards the lowful coextensionalities restricted within type-type identities (19, p. 280). The complete development of the dialectical approach to the mind-body problem also presupposes an analysis of philosophers' hesitations with regard to the logical relations between bridge laws and identities within the framework of heterogenops reduction whose importance and complexity make it a subject deserving a separate article.

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## 6

## Realism and the Meaning of General Words

A. Kasem

### I

The problem of *universals* has been a perennial problem in the domain of philosophic literature. It has had a very long antiquity, descending from the time of Plato and Aristotle. Of late, it has become customary among thinkers to introduce the problem of universals as a problem of meaning of general words. They attempt to search for the answer as to what is common to a group of objects called by the same name. Or in other words how do we apply a general word to a group of particulars which share certain characteristics in common? To say more explicitly and linguistically, what is there by virtue of which we can determine the meaning of a general term? In this paper we shall precisely deal only with the realist theory about universals to see how it can provide the non-arbitrary and objective justification for the application of general words to particular instances to which they apply.

### II

Plato and Aristotle are both realist in the sense that they believe in the objective and independent existence of universals. However, they differ profoundly in an answer to the question what is common to a group of particulars subsumed under a general word. According to Plato, a universal is a substantive, an entity which not only does not depend on the mind for its existence, but does not require particulars either. Thus it appears that universal has its being in a non-spatial, non-temporal world quite independent of the world of space and time. Consequently, although the existence of particulars in the latter does logically depend on the existence of universals in the for-



mer, the converse is not true. The universal Table, for example, would continue to exist although all tables should disappear from our world and no table ever be thought of again. Thus on Plato's theory what is common to a group of particulars called by the same name is that each of them stands in a certain identical relationship to the same substantial entity or universal. However, Plato did not explain this relationship even up to his own satisfaction.

Aristotle, on the other hand, did not accept this mysterious realm of substantial universals of Plato. He found it quite unnecessary and added that a universal was not a substantive at all, but a characteristic or property. Thus it was essentially something which belong to particulars. Hence on Aristotle's version of the theory particulars and universals are inter-dependent. As for instance, there could be no tables unless each shares the characteristic of being a table. At the same time there could also be no such characteristic without there were tables—real or possible.

### III

Now we shall try to bring out how the theories of realism sponsored by Plato and Aristotle seek to explain the meaning of general words. At the outset, we must note a basic misconception about the origin and philosophical import of realism about universals. It has been supposed that realism in general, and Plato's theory in particular, emerge simply from misunderstanding of the linguistic function of abstract nouns. But the Greek thought before Plato made little use of abstract nouns. He coined many of them, including that of which 'quality' itself is a latinization, for his own philosophical purposes. Moreover, in his earlier discussions the Forms were often introduced by odd circumlocutions. The philosophical theory, on the whole, precedes the linguistic phenomenon from which it is sometimes believed to have arisen. Realism about universals, therefore, can neither be established by an appeal to linguistic form and uses, nor be explained away as a misunderstanding of them, but it must be considered on its own merit.

However, some commentators like Pears claim that the realist theory of objective universals seeks to answer at least two general questions: (i) "Why are things what they are?" and (ii) "Why are we able to name things as we do?". This makes it appear that, although Plato and Aristotle sometimes distinguish these two questions, it is characteristic of Greek thought to confuse them. Nevertheless, they can be distinguished by saying that the first question requires a dynamic answer from scientists and the second a static from logicians.



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We shall, however, concentrate on the second question which would be the explanation of the meaning of general words and try to elicit how the realist theories are to cope with this question.

We may presuppose that the realist argument about the objective existence of universals can be justified not only from the metaphysical and related epistemological consideration, but also by semantic consideration, i.e., consideration about the structure and function of language. The prime, though not the only, function of language is to provide a means of communication of our thoughts to each other. And the proficiency with which it performs that function depends very largely on its feature of generality. And language, as we know, is composed of words as its atomic components and as external sensible signs of thought, which can be divided into two classes—proper names and general words, Aaron says, “the classification of words into proper names and general words is exhaustive, so that all words which are not proper names are necessarily general words”. This distinction between proper names and general words is no doubt a landmark in the domain of philosophical literature Hobbes in a succinct paragraph in *Leviathan* sees the distinction thus: “Of Names, some are *Proper*, and singular to one only thing; *Peter, John, This man, this tree* : and some are *Common* to many things; as *Man, Horse, Tree*; every of which though but one Name, is nevertheless the name of diverse particular things”. Thus it is palpable that a proper name designates either a particular person or a particular place, e.g., ‘John’ or ‘Washington D.C.’. The only means of referring to a particular thing in its particularity or uniqueness is by using a proper name. And the traditional ideal of proper name reads: One name, one thing named—*unum nomen unum nominatum*. But the case with general words is somewhat peculiar and apparently bewildering. They do not, indeed, refer to one particular person or one particular place; their whole point and usefulness is that they can be applied to anyone of a whole range of particular objects, events or situations. The word ‘table’ or ‘man’, for instance, refers to any particular table or particular man, but quite possibly applies indifferently to any particular table or man one cares to choose. And the ideal of general words, as traditionally set forth, is spelt out as: One and the same name for many things—*unum nomen multa nominata*. Now the question naturally crops up: Is there anything in the real world which is the counterpart of the term ‘man’, as the man John is the counterpart of the name ‘John’? If not, how are we to explain the role of such terms as ‘man’ making statements about the world? What justification have we for grouping many different things under, the same general term? It is, therefore, now the occasion to see how the two



realists—Plato and Aristotle, the thinkers of opposite poles—manage to explain this controversial issue in their realism about universals.

We have already seen that Plato and Aristotle are both realists in the sense that they believe in the objective and independent existence of universals. But they differ sharply in their views of what universals are and how they are related to particulars. For Plato, universals, or in his own terminology Forms, are self-sufficient entities which may or may not have particulars related to them. For Aristotle, on the contrary, universals exist only in virtue of their relation to particulars and it is only in terms of this relation that we can explain what a universal is. Thus the successful use of general words, on Plato's theory, necessarily requires to posit a Real behind the veil of appearances, a Heaven where are laid up the Forms of Table, Tree, Mud, Beauty and a host of other Forms. So the application of general words, such as 'table', 'tree', etc., is possible, because, first, Forms exist eternally in the world of Becoming, and because, secondly, we apprehend these Forms *a priori* and innately, so that we do not cognize but recognize the manifestations. On the other hand, the significant use of a general word, on Aristotle's theory, depends on the postulation of a self-identical repeatable property (or set of properties) shared in common by all and only those individuals subsumed under the term. This theory amounts to claiming that the use of general words and abstract terms could find common identical qualities which they imply or denote and of which they are used much like proper names.

One off-shoot of realism consists in the linguistic proposal of classifying general words with proper names, so far as their function in a given language is concerned. But even if a proper name and a general word both refer to one and only one thing, the onto-logical status of the 'thing' referred to in both cases differs fundamentally. In the case of a proper name, it would be a unique individual, while in the case of a general word, it would be an identical quality or relation shared by the individuals in common. Hence, for realism in general, any significant use of general words presupposes the existence of objective universals or common properties.

Let us now consider which one of the two versions of realism about universals has had on the whole a much stronger hold on philosophers than the other. The theory of Forms seems to be much more than a theory of universals. It is also a theory of rational, particularly mathematical, knowledge; and since the Forms are ideal standards of value, it is the foundation of interrelated ethical, aesthetic and political theories. The Forms are the homes of eternal truths, the ideal objects of rational science, and the standards of rational choice



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and artistic endeavour. It is these developments which have lent the theory most of its charms. But as a theory of universals, or as an explanation of how two or more things can be called by the same name, it is open to devastating criticisms.

Most people, confronted with the two versions of realism, would feel that the views of Aristotle are much closer to common sense than Plato's. This reaction is, however, endorsed by the attitude of the two philosophers themselves. It is clearly uneconomical to postulate an entire realm of objects, 'a supra-sensible world' of universals. No coherent account can be formulated of their intelligibility and contribution to our ordinary knowledge of sensible objects. Thus Plato is a kind of realist who sees himself as bringing news of a realm of entities of which the ordinary man is only dimly aware, if indeed he is aware at all. Aristotle, by contrast, is the kind of realist who prefers to consider the existence of universals as simply obvious. Plato definitely endeavours to prove the existence of the Form, but Aristotle does not in the same way try to prove the existence of universals, rather he is much more concerned to prove the non-existence of Plato's Forms. Hence we have reasons to believe that Aristotle's views are much closer to common sense and in Plato's theory both the Forms and their relation to particulars are apt to be seen puzzling and mysterious. Aristotle's universals seem to be easily identifiable with familiar things, e.g., colours, biological species and the like.

Much of the immediate plausibility and common sense appeal of Aristotle's theory comes from the fact that his teaching about universals can very easily be read as a restatement in philosophical language of very ordinary and familiar facts. When, for example, Aristotle says that the universal *man* is 'said of' Socrates, or that the universal *white* is 'said of' such and such an object, he does not seem to be claiming to inform us anything new about Socrates or about the white object. But when Plato tells us that men are men in virtue of their relation to the Form of Man, or that beautiful things are beautiful in virtue of their relation to the Form of Beauty, he definitely does claim to be telling us something new. And the muddle lies in understanding what this information can possibly be. What on earth is 'imitating' or 'participating' in the Form of Beauty, if it is not the same thing as just being beautiful? Plato himself was seriously concerned about this problem. In the *Parmenides* he attacks vigorously his own theory precisely on this point, and commentators even proceeded to maintain that towards the end of his life Plato abandons the theory of Forms because of these pernicious difficulties.

The most fundamental objection consists in that as a theory of universals the postulation of separate Forms is gratuitous. Whatever



it is, about the ordinary world of things existing in space and time and perceived by the senses, that encourages us to postulate this other world of Forms, must surely be intrinsically describable. This description, whatever it is, will be the simple answer to our question about what underlies and justifies the use of general terms. It would be possible only if we were looking not for what constitutes "This thing participates in the Form of Beauty" to mean the same as "This thing is beautiful", but for something like a causal explanation that it would make sense to postulate some related further entity, i.e., 'participating in Beauty' should mean something *different* from 'being Beautiful'. It is this requirement which evidently entraps Plato into difficulties.

It is a separate question to consider whether Plato could have averted these difficulties even at the cost of deserting the explanatory claims for the theory of Forms. Indeed, if he like Aristotle, had explained the Forms with reference to our understanding of the subject-predicate sentences such as "Socrates is a man" or "This object is white", we would have been making the relation between Forms and particulars an integral part of his account of what the Forms are. So it is difficult to see how this could be reconciled with the conception of Forms as entities existing independently. Hence we may conclude that realism of the Platonic version runs into difficulties of a kind from which the Aristotelian form of realism does not suffer. We need not, therefore, devote serious attention to Platonic realism. What is important in it is the doctrine that things have identical qualities in common, and this is a doctrine which can best be considered apart from the theory of Forms. However, it would be mentioned that the Aristotelian theory that things have self-identical repeatable common property as the basis for the application of a general term is also not free from objection which we shall not consider here.



## Plotinus and the problem of the Unity of the human being

Kevin Corrigan

Among the many problems which the *Enneads* pose, perhaps the most acute is the problem of the unity, and meaning, of the individual human being. Why is this a problem? It is a problem because for Plotinus the concrete, individual being seems to be merely the illusory shadow of reality and not real in any authentic sense itself. And this points to the further difficulty, namely, that if, in the words of one commentator, Plotinian psychology is "based on a thoroughgoing Platonic dualism",<sup>1</sup> then how is it possible to view the compound union of soul and body as anything more than a temporal association from which the soul must be freed? Furthermore, if this compound existence is only an association and, therefore, not really a union, what is it that makes each of us one? Is the principle of our being here, so to speak, our "Being There"—a rigid otherworldliness, as R. Bodeus would have it?<sup>2</sup> Or again, is Plotinus a radical monist in the sense that it is the One alone which is the true ground of any real individuality we may possess? For example, Fr. Leo Sweeney, S. J. has argued, from an examination of VI, 9 (9) 1-8 (principally *panta ta onta to heni estin onta*, all beings are beings by the one) and III. 8(30), 10, 14ff.) that "what alone is real in any existent is the oneness it has from and with the One and not the apparent additions and individuation it has put on."<sup>3</sup> From this perspective

<sup>1</sup> See H.J. Blumenthal, "Aristotle in the Service of Platonism" *International philosophical Quarterly* 1972, 340-364. Cf. Id. *Plotinus' Psychology*, Nijhoff 1971, 12

<sup>2</sup> This is the conclusion of R. Bodeus, "L' autre homme de Plotin", *phronesis* 28, 1983, 256-264.

<sup>3</sup> L. Sweeney, S.J. "Are Plotinus and Albertus Magnus Neoplatonists?" in *Graceful Reason. Essays in Ancient and Medieval philosophy*



Intellect and Soul *are* simply the One on their own levels, and thus whatever diminished reality we may accord them, we can hardly speak of a genuine view of selfhood for Plotinus—at least in any meaningful sense of the term “self”<sup>4</sup>—and even less still of a proper concern for individuation, such as we find in Aristotle or St. Thomas.<sup>5</sup> However, if we adopt this view, how are we to explain the many analyses of the flight and ascent *through the whole of reality* of the soul or the self<sup>6</sup> to the One? And how are we to view the present general consensus that Plotinus does have a philosophy of the self,<sup>7</sup> and that on the whole he favours Forms of individuals?<sup>8</sup>

In this paper, it is not possible to treat the whole range of this problem in the *Enneads*. What I propose to do, then, is to provide three rather new perspectives upon three different areas of Plotinus’

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*phy Presented to Joseph Owens, CSSR on the Occasion of his Seventy-Fifth birthday and the Fiftieth Anniversary of his Ordination* (ed. L.P. Gerson, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, 1983, 177-202), 189, note 38 (hereafter cited as “Plotinus and Albertus Magnus”). See also Id. “Plato, Plotinus and Aristotle on the Individual”, in *The Roots of Civilization; The Emergence of the Individual*, volume to appear and arising from a two-year symposium at Coppin State College, Baltimore, 1984-85 (This paper has been very kindly furnished to me by Fr. Sweeney and will be cited hereafter as “Individual”) and also Id. “Mani’s Twin and Plotinus: Questions on ‘self’”, to appear in *Neoplatonism and Gnosticism*, arising from a University of Oklahoma 1984 conference (This paper has again been kindly furnished to me by the author and will be cited hereafter as “Mani”).

- 4 See L. Sweeney, “Mani” (cf. note 3), 35-48, and also Id. *Review of Metaphysics*, 30, 1977, 533-534.
- 5 Cf. L. Sweeney, “Individual” (note 3), 27-30.
- 6 See especially VI, 9 (9); III, 8 (30); V, 8 (31); V, 5 (32); VI, 7 (38), 21-35.
- 7 See, for example, the major work by G. O’Daly, *Plotinus’ Philosophy of the Self*, Dublin 1973.
- 8 For the controversy see J.M. Rist, “Forms of Individuals in Plotinus” *Classical Quarterly* 13 1963, 223-231; Id. “Ideas of Individuals in Plotinus: A Reply to Dr. Blumenthal,” *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 24, 1970, 298-303; H.J. Blumenthal, “Did Plotinus believe in ideas of Individuals?”, *phronesis*, 11, 1966, 61-80 (—ch. 9 in *Plotinus’ Psychology* Nijhoff, 1971); Plato S. Mamo, “Forms of Individuals in the *Enneads*,” *Phronesis*, 14, 1969, 77-96; J. Igal “Observaciones al Texto de Plotino,” *Emerita*, 41, 1973, 92-98; A. H. Armstrong, “Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus,” *Dionysius*, 1, 1977, 49-68. For an assessment see K. Corrigan-p. O’Cleirigh “The Course of Plotinian Scholarship from 1971 to 1986” in *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, Band 36. 1, Berlin-New York 1987.



thought. These are first, the problem of individuation, second, the meaning of the union of soul and body, and third, the question of the ultimate principle of unity in the human being. My intention is firstly, to show that, no matter how diminished the reality of the individual being on each of these three levels, it is still meaningful, and indeed necessary, to *speak of the individual* in some sense in each of these, and thus, secondly, to demonstrate that the substantial unity of the composite human being, a unity which we may associate more frequently with the Aristotelian or even Thomist conceptions of historical man, is not absent from the Plotinian view, but instead is a unique and rather unfamiliar way.

### 1. Individuation

In order to evaluate the view that for Plotinus "individuality... is not positive, but negative, not an addition, but a subtraction, not being, but non-being",<sup>9</sup> our first task must be to compare Aristotle and Plotinus on the nature of individuation since it will be our thesis that Plotinus' view must be understood in the light of Aristotle. For Aristotle, in contradistinction to Plato, it is the individual which is central focus of his thought, the individual as grammatical and logical and logical subject of predicates and of accidents, the individual as persistent subject of change, the individual as compound of soul and body, which are correlatives to one another, and the individual as metaphysical subject in whom the indwelling primacy of form and act points both to the positive perfection of physical being and to the highest *energeia* of thought and contemplation in the divine "thinking of thinking."<sup>10</sup> Thus, for Aristotle, the individual thing is a singular, unique being which results from the fact that its substance is composed of substantial form and prime matter. Despite the many difficulties involved in the interpretation of Aristotle's notion of individuation<sup>11</sup>, it would seem fair to state that while the essential perfection

<sup>9</sup> L. Sweeney, "Individual" (cf. note 3), note 43.

<sup>10</sup> These viewpoints certainly overlaid but may be designated respectively as the viewpoints of the logical works, of natural philosophy, of psychology, and of metaphysics, first philosophy or theology.

<sup>11</sup> For the problem cp. G. Rodier, *L'Annee philosophique* XX, 1909, 10 11 and D.R. Cousin, *Mind* N.S. XLIV, 1935, 176 (cited in Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics* Toronto, 1951, 403, note 77). For a more recent treatment of both sides of the issue see E. Regis, "Aristotle's 'principle of Individuation' ", *phronesis*, 21, 1976, 157-166; L. Sweeney, W.J. Carroll and J. Furlong, *Authentic Metaphysics in an Age of Unreality*, New York, 1988, 181-182.



of corporeity must be derived from the substantial form,<sup>12</sup> nonetheless quantity and quality are properties of the composite nature and must be derived from both elements. Thus, body as a quantified, determinate entity as such must have its more direct proximate cause in prime matter, which as a real, positive and generic component of the individual being is more directly the cause of quantification is the existent.<sup>13</sup> For Aristotle, therefore, prime matter, together with substantial form, is a positive reality in the individualising of physical objects.

When we turn to Plotinus, *prima facie* the contrast can hardly appear less promising, for not only is the physical object regarded as 'shadow substance', as a bundle of qualities in matter,<sup>14</sup> but prime matter itself, Plotinus argues, is the ultimate source of evil.<sup>15</sup> How, then, could it be possible to uncover a positive view of individuation in the *Enneads*, if any view of the unity of the physical object must ultimately take into account the nothingness of prime matter? Here I shall have no wish to deny the negative side of physical existence for Plotinus. Rather what I want to make clear is that Plotinus' negative analyses do not commit him to any form of Manichean dualism or Gnostic *Weltablehnung*,<sup>16</sup> but they yield rather a new perspective upon the union of form and matter. Two passages in particular will help us demonstrate this thesis. The first is from an early treatise, III, 4(15), 1, 8-17 and it shows unequivocally that for Plotinus corporeal individuation is the result of the genuine shaping of *prime matter* by substantial form and that this can be viewed in a positive way when it is seen, implicitly, from the perspective of the perfecting form. This treatise follows upon the line of thought developed in V, 2(11), where we are given a glimpse of the generative power in the

12 See L. Sweeney, *Authentic Metaphysics in an Age of Unreality*, New York, 1988, 112-115. Id. "Individual" (cf. note 3), note 56.

13 In Aristotle the following passages seem to favour individuation from matter: *Metaph* 1016 B 32-33 (cf. 1054 A 34), 1035 B 27-31, 1074 A 33-35, 1034 A 5-8, and the following in turn seems to favour individuation by form: *Metaph* 1038 B 14-15, 1071 A 24-29, *De An.* 412 A 8-9, *Metaph* 1042 A 26-30, *De An.* 407 B 23-24, *Metaph.* 1041 B 7-8.

14 Cf. VI, 3(44), 1-8.

15 Cf. II, 4(12); III, 6(26); I, 8(51).

16 One should compare here C. Elsas, *Neuplatonische und Gnostische Weltablehnung in der Schule Plotins*, Berlin-New York, 1975 with U. Bianchi, "Religio-historical observations on Valentinianism" in B. Layton (ed.), 'The Rediscovery of Gnosticism. Proceedings of the International Conference on Gnosticism at Yale, New Haven, Connecticut, March 28-31, 1978, vol. 1: The School of Valentinus, Numen Suppl. 41, Leiden 1980, p. 110.



Plotinian hierarchy from that of the One to that of the soul's growth-power, the lowest psychic power. Does this growth-power produce nothing? Plotinus asks, and then answers that what is produced is absolute indefiniteness) to *gennethen ou psuctes eti eidos...all'aoristian einai pantete*), viz. prime matter. But when it is perfected it becomes a body, he continues, (*teleiounenon de ginetai sona*), taking the shape which is appropriate to its potentiality (*morphen labon ten te dunamei prosphoron*), a receiver for that which generated it and brought it to maturity<sup>17</sup> (*hupodochen tou gennesantos Kai ekthrepsantos*). This passage clearly demonstrates, therefore, that from the perspective of form *prime matter* is genuinely shaped into individual, quantified entities and moreover that prime matter can indeed be regarded by Plotinus as possessing a real and positive potency in individuation.

One might well object, however, that Plotinus can hardly reconcile this view of prime matter with the negative analyses of II, 4(12); III, 6(26) and I, 8(51). Furthermore, he makes perfectly clear in VI, 2(43), 14 and following that there can be no question of a positive evaluation of sensible substance or even of the form therein.<sup>18</sup> How then should we answer this objection?

The solution which, in my view, best accounts for all the different perspectives we find throughout the *Enneads* may be formulated as follows: for Plotinus, unlike Aristotle, sensible substance *as such* is only a shadow of true substance precisely because it is a vanishing point, so to speak, to the degree that one looks out towards the material substratum for substantial solidity.<sup>19</sup> On the contrary, in order to get a truly concrete view of the object, one must see that object within the encompassing, dynamic movement of the shaping form, in order to grasp whatever substantiality is truly present to it. Hence, in the second passage we have chosen in order to demonstrate Plotinus' new perspective on individuation, namely, II, 7(37), 3, 1-15, Plotinus distinguishes to views of corporeity. According to the first, body is the compound of all the qualities with the matter (4-5). This corresponds to the negative view which we find criticised extensively in VI, 2(43), 14 and VI, 3(44), 1-8. According to the second, how-

<sup>17</sup> Trans. my own except for A.H. Armstrong's "brought it to maturity". (*ekthrepsantos*)

<sup>18</sup> For an assessment of this problem in relation to the logical treatises VI, 1-3 (42-44) see K. Corrigan and p. Q'Cleirigh, "The Course of Plotinian Scholarship from 1971 to 1986" *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, Band 36. 1, Berlin-New York, 1987, 579-581.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. II, 6(17), 3, 20-29.



ever, corporeity is a formative principle (logos) which includes all the qualities, enters matter and perfects the body (6.11).<sup>20</sup> Thus, body is matter and indwelling formative principle (12: to sona huten kai logon enonta). This second view, then, is the same as that expressed in III, 4(15), 1, 8-17. According to both passages, individuation is through prime matter and substantial form, but this is not considered abstractly or simply as a sensible phenomenon. What is distinctive in Plotinus' approach is the *comprehensive, unified movement* of the thought itself. The concrete reality of body as a new union of indwelling form and matter (in which prime matter itself is shaped) is seen as a dynamic formative union in which matter is drawn into the provenance of substantial form. We may conclude, then, that there is a positive view of corporeal individuation in Plotinus and that this makes it necessary for us to take seriously the thesis that bodily unity is not just accidental or illusory, or merely a derivative function of Primal Unity itself, but a genuinely present unity of *logos* and matter.<sup>21</sup>

## 2. The union of soul and body

On this basis we can now proceed to a consideration of the unity of the human being in the union of soul and body. Here the questions we must face are as follows: is the Plotinian human being merely a hierarchical plurality of forms, in which the sense of a single agent at work is lacking?<sup>22</sup> In other words, is the human soul genuinely

- 20 Kai ei logos de eie hos prosetthon poiei to soma, delonoti ho logos emperilabon echei tas poioutas hapasas. Dei de ton logon touton, ei ne estin allos hosper horismos delotikos tou ti esti to pragna, alla logos poion pragna ... peri huten logon einai Kai eggenonenon apotelein to soma.
- 21 This is not to deny that from a different perspective (viz. to the degree that body remains unshaped, subject to corruption etc.) this union can also be seen to be fundamentally unstable and capable of dissolution and fragmentation. For, once one looks to the matter itself for foundation, one finds that the principle of unity which we first grasped is now lacking. Hence, for Plotinus we cannot demand of the matter the task which only the substantial form can accomplish—albeit to the degree of potentiality present to the matter.
- 22 For a view of the mediaeval problem on the plurality of substantial forms see A.C. Pegis, *St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century*, Toronto 1934, 147ff. Cf. T. C. Cowley, *Rygar Bacon: The Problem of the Soul in his Philosophical Commentaries*, Louvain-Dublin, 1950, 191ff. and for an evaluation of the background (especially re Plotinus) see my "The Irreducible Opposition between the Platonic and Aristotelian conceptions of soul and body in some ancient and mediaeval thinkers", *Laval Theologique et Philosophique*, 41, 3, 1983, 391-401.



present in historical existence by virtue of its own nature or is the union between soul and body ultimately little more than an accidental association? While I have no wish to deny the Platonic character of much of Plotinus' psychology, it is crucial to realise that the human being here and now for Plotinus is a genuine union of soul and body. We can show this in two ways. Firstly, Jesus Igal<sup>23</sup> has argued cogently that in the later part of the *Enneads* Plotinus develops a new kind of hylomorphism which by preserving both the transcendence of the soul and the unity of the compound "puts an end to the conflict between dualism and entelechism" (Igal, p. 332). For Igal this development of thought consists in Plotinus' substituting the Ammonian theory of the union of soul and body, illustrated by the analogy of light, with a new theory, influenced by the hylomorphism of Aristotle, of the union of a specific soul with a specific body by means of an emission "by a particular soul of an image of itself and the communication to body of a 'vida propria'" (Igal, 345). What Igal means by a "development" in thought is not a change in perspective so much as the appearance in Plotinus' thought of genuinely new elements all at once which constitute a coherent totality and which come together, in Igal's view, in what is a kind of synthesis of the new anthropology in the penultimate tractate on man, I, 1 (53). I am myself doubtful that Igal's view of an evolution in Plotinus' thought is correct,<sup>24</sup> but we can certainly go beyond Igal's thesis to show that Plotinus argues for the substantial unity of historical man in a way which is much more profoundly Aristotelian than Ammonian. In VI, 7 (38), 4-5, for instance, Plotinus asks how we can define "this man". If we are to define the *ti en einai eph hekastou* correctly, he answers, (even if, and especially if, we are dealing with forms in matter and definitions which must include matter), the definition—if it is to avoid being merely indicative—must include the productive cause of man; and this, what it means to be man (*to einai anthropon*), is that which makes *this man, indwelling, not separate* (*ti esti to pepoiekos touton ton anthropon enuparchon, ou choristen*).<sup>25</sup> Therefore, following Aristotle's cardinal principles of definition, Plotinus suggests that the definition of man can not be a merely indicative definition of the physical compound, nor a logical universal, for this misses both the *ti en einai* and the particular substance, but that it must be definition of the form which contains and manifests the cause, includes the matter, and is so intimately present to the particular that the latter is there-

23 "Aristoteles y la evolucion de la antropologia de Plotino", *Pensamiento* 35, 1979, 315-346.

24 For this see below.

25 VI, 7(38), 4, 18-30; cf. *De An.* 413 A 15:



by also defined correctly. Therefore, Plotinus concludes, since man can not be soul alone, why can he not be a compound (*sunamphoteron ti*), soul in a *logos* of a determinate kind (*psuchen en toiode logo*), the *logos* being an activity of a certain kind which is not empowered without the acting subject.<sup>26</sup> For Plotinus, then, the form is prior to both the universal and the singular, but in light of the form indwelling in the singular substance, the definition of man is simultaneously a definition of the *species* and also of *this man*.

Hence, we can see that Igal's theory of an "evolution" in Plotinus' thought must be incorrect, for it is clear that in VI, 8(38), 4-5 we have a special application to the case of the particular human being of the theory of physical individuation we have already seen in the early III, 4(15), 1 and the later II, 7(37), 3. We may, therefore, conclude that in the *Enneads* (1) there is an implicit theory of physical individuation form prime matter and substantial form and (2) there is also developed a view of the human being according to which even historical man may be said to constitute a genuine unity of substance and act. It is not possible, then, to take seriously the thesis that all individuation in Plotinus is illusion or non-being and that the One is the only true reality.

### 3. The 'unity' of mystical union

Once we have understood this, however, it is also important to go further and see that the question of unity for Plotinus is not simply a matter of the "given", but also, and much more, of the "to be discovered". The two definitions we have set forth above, viz. the productive and the indicative, show that the reality of the human being can be grasped in different ways. There can be no doubt, however, that it is only in the light of the substantial form that man is disclosed as in integral operational unity, for at any lower level the principle of unity can not be adequately accounted for.<sup>27</sup> On the other hand, this is not to say that it is ultimately only the One which is the real unity of each being, for the statement with which VI, 9(9) 1 begins, *panta ta onta to heni estin onta*, should not simply be translated: "all beings are beings by the One", for the simple reason that *to heni* is ambiguous: the One or the one; and it is the sense of ambiguity therein which Plotinus explores in the rest of the work. To

<sup>26</sup> VI, 7(38), 5, 1-5.

<sup>27</sup> In my view, this is the major point of the whole argument of VI, 3(44), 1-8, which takes the form of a sustained *reductio* of the position that substance in the full sense can be genuinely 'sensible'.



## Plotinus and the problem of the Unity of the human being

telescope the nature of unity into some sort of primal planisphere is to do violence to the whole development of the argument in VI, 9(9) and to ignore the only too evident autonomy of intellectual, psychic or physical beings which we can find on almost every page of the *Enneads*.

On the other hand, we must ask this further question: what sort of unity does Plotinus have in mind when he speaks of the unity of true, intelligible substance? All the evidence seems to point to the following answer, namely, that substantial unity, in the intelligible sense, cannot be conceived in merely quantitative terms (perhaps not even in terms of quality, (cf. VI, 2(43) 14, 11-22), but rather must be seen as *prior* to material quantification (ibid. line 21: οὐδὲν ἀνυψώθη) in such a way that real differences, including the *logoi* of quantity (cf. VI, 2(43), 21), have already sprung from within, not from outside, the substance. As Plotinus says in a rather revealing way in VI, 2(43), 5, 24-25, the soul is a being, not in the same way as white man, but rather as individual substance *tout court* (Εἶ τι ὅν μὲν ἡ ψυχή, οὐ μὲν τοῦτο, ὅς ἀνθρώπος λευκός, ἀλλ' ὅς τις οὐσία μονή).

In what follows I am going to suggest a somewhat novel solution to the problem of Plotinus' so-called monism, namely that "what alone is real in any existent is the oneness it has from the One."<sup>28</sup> We must, however, make two points clear. Firstly, any substantial notion of self, soul or intellect in Plotinus must involve the two characteristics of integrity and community, and this despite Plotinus' famous description of the mystic ascent as "the flight of the alone to the Alone".<sup>29</sup> Secondly, it is true that the ascent to a higher reality means the giving up of the self in favour of belonging to the higher reality.<sup>30</sup> But does this mean that thereby the lower self is annulled as mere illusion? An examination of the term *ekstasis* in both Aristotle and Plotinus will show that is not the case.

Firstly, let us look at Aristotle. For Aristotle, *ekstasis* means displacement, first in the sense of locomotion, and then in the senses of quantitative and qualitative change (even *per impossibile* substantial displacement).<sup>31</sup> Hence, it is of the very nature of physical objects

<sup>28</sup> L. Sweeney, "Plotinus and Albertus Magnus" (see note 3).

<sup>29</sup> VI, 9 (9), 11, 51. The "flight of the alone to the alone" may rather be taken as evidence that Plotinus' mysticism, despite the fact that it must proceed through the great community of the Divine Mind, is ultimately and intensely personal.

<sup>30</sup> See for example III, 8 (30), 9, 29-32; V, 3 (49), 3, 22-45; VI, 4 (22) 14, 16-31; I, 1 (52), 10; VI, 9 (9), 10, 13-17.

<sup>31</sup> 1) For Aristotle see *De An.* 406 B 11-15 (and see Hicks' note ad loc.) and *Phys.* 222 B 14-16. 2) For the contrast between



to grow by displacement or ecstasy; i.e. to move out of a previous state into a higher or lower determination, a real crossing of a boundary. Thus, Aristotle's usage implicitly sets up a framework for the term *ekstasis* in two different directions: on the one hand, vice is a corruption and an ecstasy, a departure from one's proper nature. On the other hand, ecstasy also points to the path of organic, and even moral, development which is completed in a faculty's *coming to itself* or complete self-realisation (*epidosis eis outo*, *De Anima*, 417 B 1-11). Hence we reach a profound paradox implicit in Aristotle's thought: though change is ecstatic, it can also be a process of unification, and this is all the more so insofar as the change is not really an alteration at all, but rather the realisation of a nature, of a faculty, as in thinking, contemplation and learning.<sup>32</sup> Or, in other words, the higher the *energeia*, the more intimate the degree of unity between subject and object (compare, for example, contemplative thought with sense-perception).

This will help us to understand a subtle colouration of the term "ecstasy" when we come to Plotinus, for here ecstasy is used in three major senses, all of which bear the connotation of a natural crossing-over of a boundary to or towards something which is real. These three senses are as follows; Firstly, a physical kinesis to real contact with an object. In this sense Plotinus calls movement ecstatic in that it stands out *to something*.<sup>33</sup> Secondly, something stands out from its nature in that it passes over into another (and thus is, in some way, defined by that other). Here the sense of *ekstasis* is most clearly related to *ektasis*, to a "being drawn out" or "drawing out." So, Nous is drawn out into multiplicity from unity or the physical world into extension from the non-extended, spiritual world.<sup>34</sup> Thirdly, a stand-

virtues as perfections and vices as *ekstaseis* see *Phys.* 246 A 15-246 B 3, 247 A 1-5 i cp. *En.* 1145 B 8-12. 3) For *ekstasis* in the sense of *alienatio mentis* see *Cateq.* 9 B 35-10 A 5 and as outside the ordinary realm of nature see *De Coelo* 286 A 19. The primary emphasis which links each usage seems to be one which rests upon the notion of a destruction of a prior state and hence emergence into a new state or reality.

32 See, for example, *De An* 417 B 1-16.

33 I, 1 (52), 5, 21-23: *epi ti ekstosis* (the close affinity with *ektasis* can be seen here insofar as *ektasis* is a variant reading for this passage), VI, 3 (44), 21, 46-22, 16.

34 Here the sense is closely related to that of *ektasis* (*ekteinomni*) and cognates. See, for example, VI, 7 (38), 17, 39-49 (cp. III, 6 (26), 17, 11-12), V, 3 (49), 7, 14, should probably be understood in this sense as a going out of one's own nature into another. Here Plotinus makes it clear in the context of intellectual



ing out from one's own nature in which the paradox of what it means to be a self is presented at its most intense. For here one passes over, not into another, but into an experience which Plotinus describes in many different ways: the self here is "not altogether itself;"<sup>35</sup> "intellect" must leave itself behind and become pure yearning pure, potentiality;<sup>36</sup> it must become foolish, loving;<sup>37</sup> on the other hand, it is to be "in the self alone," not *in* something else.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, for Plotinus the ecstatic experience is simultaneously self-completion (in a way that goes beyond any restricted notion of self) and utter displacement.

Instead of the phrase Aristotle employs of a faculty's coming to itself and expressing the complete self-realisation of its energy—*epidosis eis auto* Plotinus catches a new ambiguity in the principal passage in which he uses the term *ekstasis* of mystical experience: there, he says, it is perhaps not even a question of vision in the sense of an object of contemplation, but rather another form of seeing, an *ekstasis*, a simplification, a giving up of itself and a *yearning to touch* (VI, 9, 11, 22-25). The phrase translated "giving up of itself" is *epidosis autou*, an ambiguous phrase almost impossible to translate, which signifies not simply self-renunciation, but also a genuine *giving* of oneself and, at the same time, a growth or increase of oneself. Here, I suggest, Plotinus is consciously transforming the Aristotelian notion of the development and self-realisation of the highest activities into the much more complex attempt to describe a coming into oneself which is simultaneously a *giving of oneself* in a real encounter with God, an encounter in which, as in all other encounters, there is both passivity and activity. Plotinus is constantly perplexed as to how such an encounter might be communicated. If one asks whether the sudden seeing of the One, of the Good, is "from outside or inside," one is forced to negate the pure shock of affirmation which the intensity of the vision instils and state in perplexity that "it was within and yet again not within," (V, 5(32), 7). Hence, my first major point here is that ecstasy, in the highest sense, is *both* displacement and self-completion, a drawing out or extension of the self into an unrestricted energy in which boundaries can no longer be employed and yet in which an encounter more personal and more real than any other

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"repose" that this does not involve a standing outside its own nature.

- 35 VI, 9 (9), 10, 14-17; 11, 11-12.  
 36 III, 8 (30), 9, 29-32; V. 3 (49), 11, 1-12.  
 37 VI, 7 (38), 35. 19-27.  
 38 VI, 9 (9), 11, 38-42.



human activity is *given* to the self which gives itself.<sup>39</sup> My second point is that it is precisely in this most unified of all experiences that individual selfhood is *not* obliterated, but rather—even if this remains paradoxical—attained, because this experience of ecstasy—no matter how ineffable or how perplexing—is an experience of genuine two-

- 39 We may still ask: in what sense is this a personal experience, a communion, rather than the solitary flight of the mystic? Despite the fact that the Good, for Plotinus, is transcendent of everything, nonetheless it is also the most fundamental and familiar presence in us, a presence which we are not aware of because of its very familiarity (V, 5 (32), 10-13). In an unforgettable phrase the Good is "kindly, gentle and gracious, and present to any person who wishes it" (V, 5 (32), 12, 33-34). And indeed in a famous simile Plotinus describes how the soul enters into the divine world of intelligible beauty just as someone might enter a most beautiful and wonderful house. In the words of Plotinus:

Thus when a man enters a house rich in beauty he might gaze about and wonder at each of the splendours before him—until he sees the master of the house; and once he sees the master and falls into wonder, no longer with the ornamentation in the house but with something worthy of true vision, then he lets the ornaments go and looks only at this, and in looking without taking his eye away, no longer does he see an object of vision with the continuity of his contemplation, but rather he mingles his seeing with what is being seen.....in such a way that he forgets all the rest (VI, 7 [38], 35, 7-16).

Plotinus goes on, in the rest of the chapter, to attribute this experience not to the sober rationalistic intellect, but rather to an intellect in love, in fact a daft intellect drunk on nectar (*nous eron hotan aphron genetai methoustheis tou rektaros*, 23-25); and yet the loving, drunken state is still a part of intellect's nature, but that part where it enters into the genuine mystery of communion with God. Here, then, it is most significant that Plotinus uses a part with of the verb *ekteinonai*—to spread or draw out—of the Good. The Good, he says, spreads out above intellect and soul and fits itself to them, lifting them on high (35, 36-45). Hence, ecstasy is a true two-way communion for Plotinus, firstly, a genuine giving and completion of oneself, no matter how radical the giving might be; secondly, a moment of unrestricted illumination, or of becoming pure light or vision, in which a union more close than that of any other energy or activity is attained; this is way Plotinus speaks even of co-mingling, of touch, or of sseeing here. Mystical union is the most concrete of all experiences; and thirdly, ecstasy and ecstatic love one the result of what we can only call *grace*, a genuine illumination of the Good (without which even the Divine Intellect is boring; cf. VI, 7(38), 21, 11-13; 22, 5-7 especially *charitas dontos autois Kai Eis ta ephiemena erotas*, and 10 14). For Plotinus, then, it is the Good which gives even the love with which the soul is possessed, and it is the Good which lifts up the soul (VI, 7(38), 22, 5-7; 17-19).



way communion,<sup>40</sup> which is the completion of all *kinesis* or movement in that it expresses a reality or *energeia* closer than the unity of perceiver and perceived object, even closer than the most intimate unity of thinker and object thought. The highest principle of unity for the human self, therefore, is a principle not only of displacement, but also of self-discovery. Hence, we may conclude that individual unity of the different levels we have indicated is not at all illusory in the thought of Plotinus.

In conclusion, we have demonstrated three most important, but certainly overlooked, principles of Plotinus' thought. We have shown, firstly, that there is a genuine theory of individuation by means of substantial form and prime matter in the *Enneads*. In fact, it is necessary to emphasise Plotinus' development of Aristotelian thought<sup>41</sup> here in order to account properly for his positive view of the sensible universe. We have shown, secondly, that the historical human being is a genuine substantial and operational unity, according to the productive definition of VI, 7 (38), 4-5. Indeed, Plotinus clearly goes beyond so-called Platonic dualism and Aristotelian entelechism by insisting simultaneously upon the primacy of the substantial form and yet upon its indwelling productive character in the living body.<sup>42</sup> Thirdly, we have also tried to show (from an unusual Aristotelian perspective) that the ultimate principle of the unity of the human self, discovered in mystical union, is not the annihilation of what it means to be a self, but a giving of the self which is paradoxically also a receiving. It is here precisely that the ambiguity of Plotinus' descriptions can not be overlooked. For indeed the self is "changed" in mystical union, but also in the sense that its growth is radically perfected. Hence ecstasy in the deeper mystical sense is *the* most fundamental reality of the true human self for Plotinus and this highest unity is in fact, the precondition of an intelligible turning to the world.<sup>43</sup>

<sup>40</sup> See also now P. Hadot, "Structures at Themes du Traite 38 de Plotin", *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, Band 36, 1, 624-676, espec. 663-665.

<sup>41</sup> I would not restrict this to Aristotelian influence. Clearly, Stoic elements may indeed be detected here. See, for example, A. Graeser, *Plotinus and the Stoics: A Preliminary Study*, *Philosophia Antiqua* 22, Leiden, 1972.

<sup>42</sup> Concerning the question of a plurality of substantial forms, we might observe that whether or not Plotinus holds there to be a substantial form of body (cf. II, 7(37)3; IV, 5(29), 7, 36 (ousia hekato to eidos to photeinou protos somatos), nonetheless this can not be a fully integrated view unless it is seen within the higher principle of unity which is the intellectual soul in the full sense (cf. V, 8(31), 3, 20-21).

<sup>43</sup> This is, in fact, also the conclusion of W. Beierweltes, *Denken als Einen. Studien zur neuplatinischen Philosophie und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte*, Frankfurt 1985, 147.



## 8

## On Transmigration

A. P. Sharma

## INTRODUCTORY

It is well-known that the belief that the human soul passes after death into trunks of trees and the bodies of animals, is extremely widespread among half-savage tribes.<sup>1</sup>

Perhaps on the basis of fact it is assumed that the Aryans, on their amalgamation with the original indigenous inhabitants of India got the idea of the continuance of life in animals and trees. Although this assumption can hardly be proved, it gradually became popular with the ancient inhabitants of India.<sup>2</sup>

Among all tribes, low in the scale of civilization, the idea implied in such beliefs is not exactly that of the transmigration of soul in the ancient Indian scene, but simply the notion of a continuance of human existence in animals and trees. However, the Aryans who found their home in India, must have received their first inspiration for the development of the theory of transmigration from the aboriginal inhabitants. Perhaps the idea that they borrowed was 'the assumption of a constant, changing continuance of life in view the satisfaction of the moral consciousness-must always be regarded as their own peculiar achievements.'<sup>3</sup>

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- 1 The Sonthals are said to believe that the souls of the good enter into fruit-bearing trees. The Powhattans believed that the souls of their chiefs after death pass into particular wood birds, which they, therefore, did not kill. Mexican Tlascalans assumed that the souls of their nobles migrated after death into beautiful singing birds.
  - 2 Cough, following Tylor, "Primitive Culture," Vol. II, P. 6 Seg.
  - 3 Garbe Richard, "The Philosophy of Ancient India." Southern Publications, Madras, 1988, PP 5-6.



## On Transmigration

## THE DOMINANT BELIEF

The dominant idea of this belief is that in this life the effect of the good and bad deeds of the former existence are carried forward. But if that is considered true of that existence, must also be true of the previous ones. That means the formerly experienced happiness and misery could only be found in a preceding life. And this cemented the belief that the individual has a past life. Richard Garbe commenting on the doctrine of transmigration explains.

"The Samsara, the cycle of life, has therefore, no beginning; for the work (that is, the conduct or actions) of beings is beginningless. But what has no beginning has a universally admitted law also no end. The Samsara, therefore, never ceases, no more than it never begins."<sup>4</sup>

Influenced by such beliefs Shri Mahaveera and Gautama initiated their own philosophies which were greatly influenced by the later Upanishadic line of thought, as well as, with the belief in transmigration. Both Mahaveera and Gautama believed that Nirvana could only be achieved through the cessation of the chain of birth and rebirth and thereby, a code of conduct was evolved by them, which they thought, could enable man to lead a life that would transcend the 'Self' from the temporal temptations, helping it in bringing a stop to rebirth.

According to Buddhism when a person dies, his character lives after him, and by its force brings into existence a being, who though possessing a different form is entirely influenced by it. And this process will go on until the person in question has completely overcome his thirst for being, leading him to Nirvana.<sup>5</sup>

The meaning of Nirvana in the literal sense is to 'blow-out' or 'become-cool' and may signify the heaven of nothingness'. Thus it may also mean literally "the un making of ourselves." This idea hardly is different from the Upanisadic Moksa, which further leads to the thought of being free from all kinds of suffering.<sup>6</sup>

As a matter of fact, the fabulous details of the theory of the Karma worked out in Jainism, did draw a great deal from primitive mythology and had hardly anything to do with logical thinking. As a result of their theory of Karma which they deduced from the mythologically oriented reflection, their ethics was evolved in which the highest goal was to get rid off all old Karma and to stop the influx of new Karma, as well as, stopping the process of rebirth.<sup>7</sup>

4 Ibid., p. 6.

5 M. Hiriyana "Out lines of Indian Philosophy", George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1951, pp. 153-54.

6 Ibid., pp. 151-52.



The Gita perpetuated the same belief. It says:<sup>8</sup>

च एवं वेत्ति पुरुषं प्रकृतिं च गुणैः सह ।

सर्वथा वृत्तमा नोऽपि न स भूयोऽभिजायते ॥

This is, that he who thus knows the Purusha and Prakriti together with the Gunas, *whatever his life*, is not born again.

In chapter XVIII, Slokas 60 and 61, Shri Krishna addressing Arjuna reminds him of how Maya (ignorance) deludes the self and makes it believe in the objects of the world, which consequently makes the self fettered by its own karma caused by Maya.

In the Gita there are innumerable references where mention of death and rebirth is made. The cause of rebirth is assigned to Maya or ignorance which is developed as a result of human desires towards the objects of nature.

In quite a recent past H.N. Benerji who headed the para-psychology department at the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, also spent a lot of time and money to rediscover the phenomenon of transmigration. Unfortunately he had to wind up the department for want of adequate proofs.

Although in Christian world of European origin they do not believe in the theory of rebirth, a more recent publication relating to the phenomenon, entitled, "Life After Life", has perhaps shaken the western world.<sup>9</sup>

Besides, occasional publications in the news-papers and journals about the transmigrating episodes have also tried to keep the belief alive. These reported episodes are generally of two kinds. One—in which the child upto a certain age remembers his/her past life, and the other in which a person after clinically declared dead, came back to life as he/she was picked up by mistake by the Yama. Thus the cycle of the thought gets going in the same direction.

### NEW DIMENSIONS

My contention or argument in this small paper is not so much to refute the notion of birth and rebirth, but to seek its long range

7 Chattopadhyaya Debiprasad, "Indian Philosophy", Peoples Publishing House, New Delhi, 1964, p. 137.

8 Swami Swarupanand, Shrimad Bhagavad Gita, Advaita Ashram, Calcutta, 1957, p. 301.

Whatever his life etc., whether he be engaged in prescribed or forbidden acts, he is not born again. For the acts, the seeds of rebirth, or a knower of truth are burnt by the fire of knowledge, and thus cannot be effective cause to bring about births.

9 Moody A. Raymond Jr. Life After Life: Mocking bird Books U.S.A., 1977.



effects on the Hindu multitude who have astoundingly been influenced by the thought of reincarnation.

A good number of well educated people were informally questioned on the issue of reincarnation. Almost all of them exhibited belief in the other world. During the course of discourse they presented arguments in favour of the notion of rebirth. No kind of scientific arguments which demanded valid proofs, were neither presented nor accepted by them. Almost all of them believed in Fate as well as in Causal phenomenon or Determinism and assigned the cause of misery or success in this world to the deeds done by them in their previous lives.

Almost all who believed that previous life existed, believed in the principle of Cause and Effect and Determinism, which leads to Fatalism and not freedom to the self.

Now, the belief in the Causal Phenomenon leads to, that each action has its own reaction, which is implicit in the notion that good and bad deeds would lead the soul after death, to heaven or hell respectively. So far the theory of Karma does not lead to any harm as the notion of morality is implicit in it.

But to this, many new ideas, such as, bathing in the Ganga, giving alms, animal sacrifice or such other rituals conducted with the view to redeem the effects of one's bad deeds, have been added which have brought new dimensions to the outlook of life. Not only people try to cancel their bad deeds through bathing in the Ganga or by offering alms to the poor, they also out-wit the theory by indulging in more unsocial acts of various kinds which are detrimental to the growth of a good society. The social evils like dowery, burning the brides, murdering innocent people, arson, adultery and such other crimes, which probably are thought of to be rectified either by offering alms or by taking a dip in the holy waters of the Ganga, have cropped up in abundance in the past many decades. Thus a constant deterioration of values has become a frequent phenomenon with our society in the modern times.

#### BELIEF VERSUS TRUTH

But a belief can never be true unless it can be verified. Bertrand Russell would never accept a belief unless there exists a fact corresponding to the belief". Thus a belief is true when there is a corresponding fact and is false when there is no corresponding fact"<sup>10</sup>. Therefore, beliefs cannot be accepted as something corresponding to truth.

<sup>10</sup> Russell Bertrand: "The Problem of Philosophy". Oxford, New York, 1983, p. 75.



While writing the 'Forward' to "Life After Life" the famous parapsychologist Elisabeth Kubler Rose M.D. commented.<sup>11</sup>

Dr. Moody will have to be prepared for a lot of criticism mainly from two areas. There will be members of the clergy who will be upset by any-one who dares to do research in an area which is supposed to be taboo. Some religious representatives of a denominational church have already expressed their criticism of studies like this. One priest referred to it as "selling cheap grace". Others simply felt that the question of life after death should remain an issue blind faith and should not be questioned by anyone".

The second group of people are mainly scientists and physicians who regard this kind of study as 'unscientific' as research done in this field do not reveal any facts to prove the phenomenon. There fore, beliefs are untestified notions of people, which emerge either due to superstitions or whims. Sometimes beliefs simply lead to conditioning the people and do not allow them to see the truth. In Krishnamurti views beliefs are dangerous cliches because they endorse a species of mental idleness that is crippling. He says, 'belief is one thing, reality is another'.<sup>12</sup>

In his famous book entitled, 'The Only Revolution' Krishnamurti remarks:<sup>13</sup>

"Beliefs can never lead to reality. Belief is the result of conditioning, or the outcome of fear, or the result of an outer or inner authority which gives comfort. Reality is none of these—the credulous are always willing to believe, accept, obey, whether what is offered is good or bad, mischievous or beneficial. The believing mind is not an enquiring mind, so it remains within the limits of the formula or the principle."

Thus, the belief in transmigration or reincarnation which has been in vogue since the dawn of the Vedantic philosophy, has been conditioning people to the extent of misinterpreting even the theory of Karma by giving it a new direction, adding various rituals which have given birth to other unfounded beliefs. Therefore, the cycle of thought in this respect, goes on and on.

#### BELIEF AND EDUCATION

Education is neither a belief nor an abstract entity. It is the practical part of the contemplative aspect of philosophy in which the theories propounded by the educational philosophers, are practised to be accepted or rejected. Hence beliefs should have no access to the realms of education, for they may adversely affect education and misdirect the educational planners. Belief, truth and education are more or less three different aspects which may continue influencing persons who behold them. But belief is not a truth, and education is the process which helps man perceiving the truth, and redeeming him from all the unfounded beliefs.

11 Life After Life, op. cit., p. xi.

12 Holroyd Stuart. The Quest of the Quiet Mind: The Aquarian Press: Wellingborough, Northamptonshire, 1980, p. 61.

13 Krishnamurti: The only Revolution: Victor Gollances London, 1970, p. 24.



## 9

*Was Hemacandra Really A Misogynist?**Frederick H. Holck*

Women are the torch on the path to hell,  
the root of all suffering,  
the main cause of discord.<sup>1</sup>

What kind of man was he, who held this view of women? Was he really a misogynist as he is portrayed in encyclopedias and other books on Jainism and Indian literature?<sup>2</sup>

He was born (1088) into a merchant class Jain family near the city of Ahmadabad in Gujarat, and received the name of Gangadeva. At about the same time that the First Crusade in Christendom got under way, the eight-year-old youngster was given into the care of a monk Devacandra, and shortly thereafter was initiated into the monastic order of the Svetambaras, the "white-clad." He received the name Somacandra. The highly intelligent boy went through the usual formal training which included the study of the Jaina-Sutras, Prakrti, Sanskrit as well as Logic, Grammar, Dialectics, and Poetics; At the age of about 21 (1110), after the completion of his studies, he was ordained as an Acarya; taking the name of Hemacandra, by which he is known in the history of Jainism.

Nothing is known about his-life for some years following this ordination, until he entered the service of the vigorous king Jayasimha, a Sivaite, who had invited him to represent the Jain faith as a pandit at his court. There he found all the support and encouragement he needed as an author. He first wrote a Sanskrit grammar, Siddhahemacandra, dedicated to the king. This was to become a celebrated piece of work. This success encouraged him to compose other works, lexica and textbooks on poetics and metrics, as well as an historical account of the royal dynasty.

<sup>1</sup> Yogasastra, II, 87.

<sup>2</sup> See B. Walker, *The Hindu World*, New York, 1968, Vol. I, p. 436.



When King Jayasimha died, his grand-nephew Kumarapala became the new ruler of Gujarat. After some successful war campaigns the king converted to Jainism. Tradition has it that, visiting a Jain temple, he listened to a sermon preached by Hemacandra which impressed him so much that he took the vow of a layman (1160). Subsequently the king had many Jain temples built in his realm and enjoined upon his subjects the strict observance of ahimsa and other Jain rules. This appears to have been an event in Jainism similar to the case of the case of the well-known Emperor Asoka in Buddhism some 1300 years earlier. At the same time the king commissioned Hemacandra to write a textbook on asceticism, a general catechism known as *Yogasastra*.<sup>3</sup>

Despite his extensive involvement in the affairs of his religious community, Hemacandra continued his creative activity. He composed a number of books and commentaries, and, especially between the years 1159 and 1172, a comprehensive work consisting of 10 books: the *Trisasti-salak purusa-caritra* or the *Life of the Sixty Three Best Men*. This monumental opus deals with the life stories of the 24 Jinas, the 12 Emperors (cakravartins) of India, and other outstanding individuals.<sup>4</sup> This work in particular serves as the basis for the present investigation. In a sense it constitutes the story of Jainism, a more or less legendary account, down to the 24th Tirthankara, Mahavira. In it Hemacandra implicitly reveals his own thoughts and attitudes toward life, moksa, people, deities, events, and, special to our interest-women.

Although Jainism and Hinduism are two distinct religions, the religion of the Jains and the lives of the followers of the Jina are so deeply grounded in the Hindu tradition that many Hindu features, even those in conflict with the basic teachings of Jainism, were adopted. Hemacandra tells about the ancient gods and goddesses of the Hindu pantheon and incorporates them into his account. It is no surprise, then, to see that he, as well as other Jain authors, uses much material from Hindu mythology.

Jain monks and laypeople alike held the same general views shared by most men in Indian society of the Middle Ages. This applies especially to their views on women. Following the Vedic period, women were basically considered impure and thus on the level of outcasts, or, at the best; Sudras. This limited their position in society considerably. They could not participate in most religious functions.

3 See G. Buhler, *The Life of Hemacandracharya*, trans. M. Patel, Calcutta, 1936, pp. 29-31.

4 See J. Hertel, trans., *Ausgewählte Erzählungen aus Hemacandras Parisistaparvan*, Leipzig, 1908, pp. 3-5.



or even in such simple daily events as eating together with their husbands. The Dharma-Sastras are quite explicit about the role of women, their restrictions, their duties, and their worth. Most considered them incapable of attaining moksa unless they were reincarnated as men. They were characterized as interested only in sexual pleasures, as dishonest; unfaithful, wicked, with an intelligence bordering on stupidity, and it was considered that any indication of virtue on their part was in reality nothing but a sign that they lacked the opportunity to satisfy their evil desires. To this A. S. Altekar argues convincingly that the very negative comments of some Hindu authors didn't necessarily reflect their true feelings about women. Rather they propagated their radical views with the intent "to dissuade men from marriage and family life"<sup>5</sup> which were regarded as roadblocks on the way to liberation.

Hemacandra lived in an environment where such views were prevalent. However, being a member of the Svetambara branch, he held a rather moderate position—insofar as his sect admitted female ascetics. The "space-clad" Digambaras, who insisted on the nakedness of their ascetics, declared women unfit for liberation, since they could not fulfill this requirement because of Jainism's attitude toward carnal temptation. To be sure, the whiteclad Jains did not demonstrate any particular esteem for the female sex either, yet women were given the same chance as men in the pursuit of moksa. When we look now at the wealth of material relating to women, contained in Hemacandra's voluminous Purusacaritra, we must keep in mind the purpose of those and most of his other works. As an avid teacher and a forceful missionary, he wants to instruct and subsequently convert his listeners and readers to his religion, to the Jain way of life. Whatever story he tells, whatever sermon he preaches, he tries to show that the pleasures of life are a hindrance to liberation; on the other hand, that a life of self-denial will ultimately lead to moksa.

Right at the outset of his work, when referring to the pleasures of King Mahabala who was always "surrounded by woman in front, at his sides and at his back," a faithful, spiritually advanced minister with the meaningful name of Svayambuddha, laments:

While we look on, our Master devoted to pleasure of the senses is carried away by his senses like wicked horses... When love, containing pain within the immediate pleasure, is served, it increases excessively like a skin disease that is scratched. This love is a messenger from hell; love is an ocean of sin; love is the bulb of the creeper of calamity; love is the stream for the tree of evil. People, overcome by love, as if by wine, wander

<sup>5</sup> *The Position of Women in Hindu Civilization*, 3rd ed., Delhi, 1962, pp. 322f.



off the path of good conduct, and fall into the pit of existence .....women, like poisonous creepers, through the sight, touch, and enjoyment of them, serve only for intense confusion. Maidens are willingly nets of the hunter, Love, and a source of evil to men, who are like deer. The ones who are friends in pleasure are friends only for eating and drinking, since they do not consider the Master's good in the next world.<sup>6</sup>

These remarks clearly represent Jain thought. And, as there have always been individuals who question an established pattern, it is not surprising to see that Hemacandra has this position challenged by a follower of the materialist Carvaka system, who propagates the hedonistic view:

Abandoning pleasures of this world and striving for them in the next world is like licking the elbow, leaving what is to be licked, in the hand.....There is no next world from the very fact of the non-existence of people for the next world. There is no soul apart from the body.....Therefore pleasure of the senses is to be constantly enjoyed without fear.....Destruction of one's desires is foolishness.....If people are born and die according to karma, as a result of what karma do bubbles appear and disappear?

Therefore, the proponent Sambhinnamati recommends, "our Master should unhesitatingly enjoy himself with young women, charming with beauty of form. He should eat and drink at will. So long as one lives, let him live happily with pleasures of the senses. He should not trouble himself by religious actions,"<sup>7</sup> since there is no fruit of dharma and non-dharma. Of course, Hemacandra has Svayambudaha refute this heretical view. He uses this as a welcome opportunity to attack materialism and to clarify the minds of his readers by further expounding Jain doctrine.

As it regards his attitude toward women, we can recognize a "party line" position which was held officially by all monastic members of his order: Getting involved with women, to paraphrase a modern slogan, is "hazardous to your spiritual health." In the words of one of his characters, "acquiring a wife.....is the cause of wandering in existence (samsara),"<sup>8</sup> which causes infinite pain. In the context of Jain doctrine, any emotional involvement, be it with a person, animal, or object, is an obstacle to emancipation. When he refers to the four permissible goals in Indian Tradition, Mahavira states in a recorded sermon: "Wealth and love (artha and kama) are valuable in name only, in reality they are worthless."<sup>2</sup> Hundreds of similar sta-

6 Hemacandra, *Trisastisalakapurusacaritra*, trans. H. M. Johnson, Vols. I-VI, Baroda, 1931-62, I, pp. 33-35.

7 Op. cit., I, pp. 37f.

8 Op. cit., VI, p. 35.



tements and thoughts can be found in Hemacandra's works. If they are taken out of context, we may end up charging him with misogyny. However, there is another side of this great Jain author and poet. He gives numerous descriptions of beautiful women and maidens that cannot be attributed to a man who supposedly hates them. He has the eyes of an artist that can detect and appreciate beauty. Let me quote from two typical cases:

In due time Svayamprabha attained youth, like a place in the forest the enchanting wealth of spring. With her moon-face she looked like the full-moon incarnate, and with the blackness of her abundant hair she looked like amavasya (i.e., the night of the new moon) embodied. Her eyes which extended to her ears were like lotus ear-ornaments.....she was beautiful with high breasts like pleasure mountains of Sri. Her navel looked like a whirlpool in the river of loveliness.....Among the women of the gods, asuras, and Vidyadharas there was no duplicate of her-the treasury of the beauty of the body.<sup>10</sup>

This description ends with the information that the young princess paid homage to two Jain munis who in turn instructed her in the right belief. She became a lay-woman and assumed the required duties.

The other case has a different ending:

There the lord of Sriprabha, greatly delighted, saw Svayamprabha, who surpassed the lightning in radiance. She was like a bed of lotuses in a river of loveliness under the guise of exceedingly tender feet, hands, eyes, and face. She had round and tapering thighs .....She was adorned with broad hips clothed in white, like a river with a sandy beach covered with groups of kalahansas. She looked like the middle part of a thunderbolt with her waist very slender as if from carrying the weight of her high, swelling breasts. She shone with a neck that had three folds, and a deep voice announcing the great victory of King Love as if by a conch. She was adorned with lips that surpassed the bimba (in redness), and with a nose that had the beauty of the stalk of the eye-lotuses. She stole away the heart by her lovely smooth cheeks and forehead, that stole the wealth of the Laksmi of the full moon divided. She had ears that were thieves of the grace of Ratipati's pleasure-swing, eye-brows that stole the beauty of Smara's bow. She was decorated with a braid of hair that had the glossy beauty of collyrium, that was like a circle of bees following her lotus-face. From the wealth of jeweled ornaments on her body, she gave the impression of being a kalpa-creeper endowed with motion. She was entirely surrounded by thousands of charming lotus-faced Apsarases, like the Ganga hy rivers, etc. Then, in the midst of an embrace, the princess fell from heaven, like a leaf from a tree.....<sup>11</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Op. cit., VI, p. 336.

<sup>10</sup> Op. cit., III, p. 30.

<sup>11</sup> Op. cit., I, p. 51.



These are just two examples of the many in which Hemacandra dwells on the physical features of beautiful women. Although these and many similar descriptions frequently end with a conversion, or a sudden death as the result of expired life-karma—and thus demonstrate the questionable value of female beauty vis a vis moksa—they nevertheless reveal, taken with other factors, that Hemacandra does not object to beautiful women *per se*. Why, then, would he paint such elaborate and attractive pictures! What he objects to is simple a detrimental attitude as it is expressed in the latter case by king Lalitanga, who, after the sudden death of his beloved wife Svayambuddha, reflecting the attitude of Hemacandra, advises him: "Why are you bewildered on account of a mere woman? Wise men do not reach such a state even at death", whereupon Lalitanga bewails: "Death is easy to bear, but separation from a wife is very hard to bear. A gazelle-eyed woman is the only thing of value in the world, without whom all is valueless."<sup>12</sup>

Beauty in combination with virtue is the main characteristic of the ideal woman. Throughout his work Hemacandra tells of women who realize this ideal. There is, however, a definite purpose behind it. Beauty and virtue are only of relative value, relative to the satisfaction of a man. Again, Hemacandra expresses here the sentiment of his contemporary male-oriented society. To a good woman a husband is as much as a god. Total devotion to a husband is the valid religious life-style for a lay-woman. The immaculate performance of her duties as a wife has a positive effect on her future as it relates to moksa. What he considers these virtues to be is contained in the following quotation: "King Krtavarman had a wife, Syama, the face ornament of all the harem. She was like the Sri of the family incarnate; like wifely fidelity embodied; like the chief divinity of beauty, grace, and charm in person. The queen walked slowly, slowly always...as if her mind were occupied with meditation on her husband... Wherever the mistress walked on the earth, there happiness followed always, like night followed day."<sup>13</sup> In another example he states; "King Hariscandra's chief queen, dearer than life, beautiful, was named Laksmivati, like Visnu's Laksmi. Because of her good conduct, modesty, affection, cleverness, and good breeding, she was moonlight for the delight of the night-blooming of her husband's mind. Speaking to her husband in a voice gentle from affection, she poured a stream of nectar, as it were, into the canals of his

12 Op. cit., I p. 52.

13 Op. cit., III, p. 39.

14 Op. cit., V, pp. 79f.



ears. She was like a living creeper with shoots in the form of arts, with flowers in the form of modesty and other virtues, with fruit in the form of devotion to her husband."<sup>14</sup> These two examples are representative of Hemacandra's concept of an ideal woman. With few exceptions these women are almost always members of the ruling class.

Occasionally Hemacandra portrays very exceptional women. Their purpose and function is not always limited to the service and satisfaction of a husband, but may extend to special tasks in the religious sphere. The qualifications of some of these women are impressive. Queen Laksmivati's daughter, Kanakavati, is a good example of such an exceptional maiden:

Leaving sweet and simple childhood gradually, she became suitable for learning all the arts. She learned the alphabets, grammar, dialectics, metrics, and rhetoric. She attained facility in poetry, painting and sculpture. She was expert in all kinds of gambling, and skilled in the art of the charioteer, and knew how to apply massage, how to cook and how to use magic and sorcery. In addition she qualified to be a teacher in song, dance, and instrumental music, Indeed [Hemacandra concludes] there is no art which the beautiful and gifted maiden did not know thoroughly.<sup>15</sup>

Such comprehensive training in the arts was normally available only to males. In fact, the first part of her curriculum is almost identical to that of Hemacandra. Kanakavati was certainly an exceptional daughter. This became apparent when her parents could not find her a suitable husband. Because of her over-qualifications in every respect, the common practice of parents' choosing a suitable bridegroom for their daughter was not employed. Instead, svayamvara rite (self-choice) was exercised, according to which the princess herself chose her husband from among a number of suitors. This is a ceremony which developed in the Epics among the Ksatriyas, and which was still practiced in certain cases during the time of Hemacandra. It appears that the frequency of svayamvara cases depended on the difficulty of finding the best possible candidate for an exceptional maiden.

Hemacandra tells about another princess. Davadanti, who likewise was thoroughly versed "in the ocean of all the arts. She displayed her learning in the interpretation of sacred Jain knowledge to her father." Everyone was impressed by her beauty, skills, virtues, and devotion to the arhats. But when the question of marriage came up, the same problem arose as in the previous case. "Her parents suffered...from anxiety about a bridegroom suitable for the multitude

<sup>15</sup> Op. cit., V, pp. 80f,



of her various virtues". When she was eighteen, the king "had not found a pre-eminent bridegroom for her", and he arranged for a svayamvara.<sup>16</sup>

These two, as well as similar incidents, clearly reveal that Hemacandra accepted the occasional superiority of women. Female authority, however, he sees in the service of a greater purpose, reaching into the realm of Jain *Heilsgeschichte*. The most perfect woman, therefore, is the mother of an Arhat or Tirthankara, the Jain concept of *theotokos*. There are 24 arhats, each one born of a woman. Underlying all 24 cases is a certain pattern: The mother, always a queen, is a saintly person, a banner of virtues, possessing a body of divine beauty and loveliness, gifted with superior excellence, walking very slowly, meditating on the royal husband, having a sweet voice, being courteous, modest, never jealous of co-wives, or angry with the husband, considering marriage vows as if they were religious vows, free from deceit, and unfettered by all the sources of pride, etc. Characteristic too are the 14 great dreams entering the future mother's mouth, beginning with a white elephant and ending with a smokeless fire. These are the unmistakable signs that the jiva of a future tirthankara has entered the womb. From this moment on deities attend the expecting mother daily and serve in various capacities. The embryo, possessing three kinds of knowledge, grows secretly, not causing any pain, rather increasing the beauty of the mother.<sup>17</sup>

The mother of an arhat receives the highest form of veneration from the gods:

Hail to you, o mother of the world, bearing a jewel in your womb, you have become the essence of all women, giver of light to the world. You are fortunate, you are purified, you are the first in the world. This birth of yours has fruit in this human-world, since you are the mother of a man-jewel..... Rejoice, you whose son is for the delight of the world. O Mother of the World, this is a fortunate moment for us today because of the sight of you... you alone are the source of jewels, since you have borne this jewel of a son...<sup>18</sup>

It does not require much imagination to recognize a similarity between this exaltation of a mother and the position Mary occupies in Christian tradition. An objective appraisal of these hymnlike praises, however, reveals the same conditions as they are present in the cases of beautiful and virtuous women, whose purpose is to serve and satisfy their husbands. A woman, being the mother of an arhat, receives such a high esteem only by virtue of giving birth to a tirthan.

16 Op. cit., V, p. 99.

17 See op. cit., IV, p. 12.

18 Op. cit., II, p. 40.



## Was Hemacandra Really A Misogynist ?

kara. She is a means to an end. Without her son, who is 'the delight of the world', she would not be 'the first in the world', or 'the mother of the world.' Her status would be that of any other beautiful and virtuous wife of a royal husband.

A unique phenomenon in the Svetambara tradition is the 19th arhat, Mallinatha, who happened to be a woman. This fact is not generally known; at least the standard texts in comparative religion do not mention it. Hemacandra is quite explicit and gives an interesting explanation how such an event could happen. He presents it almost like an accident, though it fits very well in the Jain understanding of karma.

A prince, Mahabala, happily married (500 wives), realized one day after a Jain sermon that his life-style was an obstacle to liberation.<sup>19</sup> "I am afraid of existence," he said to his six childhood friends, whereupon they all decided to become mendicants. "As we have enjoyed worldly pleasures together, so we shall enjoy together the bliss of emancipation in the future." They agreed to perform identical penance. However (and here he reveals the character of Mahabala) the ambitious king deceived his friends by making excuses such as "today my head hurts, today my stomach hurts, today I am not hungry, etc." He ate much less than his friends and performed superior penance. His ambivalent behavior had to produce the same types of karma, also ambivalent. On the one hand fasting is a most excellent form of asceticism, suited for liberation, whereas deception has a detrimental effect. Because of this unusual combination he acquired striveda karma, which is a woman-inclination-karma, causing to be born as a woman, together with the body-making karma of a tirthankara, on account of his devotion to the Arhats. Eventually, after an interim existence as a god, he was born as the daughter (and nineteenth arhat) of queen Prabhavati. Here Hemacandra clearly relates deception to the female sex, an attitude quite common in India and represented in numerous stories in Indian literature. This trait reappears in Mallinatha in the form of an ingenious approach whereby she outsmarts her suitors. Mallinatha grew up into a most beautiful young woman. The monk Hemacandra is exuberant in his praises of her beauty, sparing no opportunity to describe her unique features. "No woman, neither of mortals or gods, is the equal of Malli. Indeed, her unique beauty is not within the sphere of words". Various suitors approached each one overwhelmed by her beauty. These suitors, without knowing, happened to be reincarnations of the six friends whom Mahabala had deceived. As her father refused to give his daughter to any of them, they united and besieged the kingdom. As the situation

<sup>19</sup> Op. cit., IV, pp. 53-56.



worsened, the female Arhat informed each of them separately through messengers that Mallinatha would be given to him. She arranged for her statue to be set up in a private room with six openings, concealed by a white garment. Each suitor in succession was given the opportunity to see the statue. Mallinatha—being all-knowing and in anticipation of this situation—had this statue made earlier and had a bowl filled with food which was covered. When the infatuated suitors appeared, Mallinatha removed the cover from behind and immediately there arose the odor of the putrid food. The foul smell was unbearable for the six kings, and they turned their backs, no longer interested in the maiden. At that moment the Arhat began revealing to them the true value of the human body with the purpose of converting them. "Such an odor comes from the throwing of food into it every day", she said. "What shall we say of that which originates in the womb from the semen and blood of the parents; afterwards becomes an embryo, then a fetus, then nourished by a liquid from food and milk made by the mother, plunged into the hell of the placenta, made to live in the excrement of the body...the stone house of filth...having an evil odor, resembling a city sewer? How can discerning people show the least devotion to this body, disgusting inside and outside?"<sup>20</sup>

The person speaking these words is not speaking them as a woman. Sexual identity is absolutely immaterial. Here speaks the Arhat who accidentally happened to be born a woman. After this event Hemacandra no longer refers to her as a woman, let alone to her beauty, but has her addressed as Lord Malli, the Jina, whose virtues are praised over all the earth. Needless to say that, unlike the other tirthankaras, who eliminate their pleasure karma by way of brief marriages, Mallinatha maintained celibacy to the very end. The six kings followed her advice and became mendicants, while Lord Malli wandered from village to village and city to city enlightening souls capable of liberation.

That Hemacandra does not underestimate female intelligence we have already seen in the case of very exceptional women. He demonstrates this capacity in women in many instances throughout his work. Women are as able as men to acquire liberating knowledge. For him there exists an intellectual and spiritual equality of both sexes. The Jain dharma is open to every human being irrespective of sectarian or social affiliation. This attitude is well presented in the case of Sulaksana, a deserted Brahmin wife who listened daily to the religious instructions of the Jain nun Vipula. "From her teaching her wrong-being disappeared like the sourness of vinegar.....She attained

<sup>20</sup> Op. cit., IV, p. 65.



faultless right-belief.....She learned properly all the true categories of Jiva and ajiva, etc. She grasped the Jain dharma, adequate for crossing samsara.....In her arose disgust with objects of the senses, subduing the passions, and disgust with never-ceasing birth and death. Finally she took the lesser vows,"<sup>21</sup> living the life of a lay-woman. Here, both the spiritual and intellectual categories of Jainism in their theoretical and practical aspects are mastered by a simple woman.

Another interesting manifestation of female intelligence combined with cleverness is found in the story of queen Mrgavati. In it Hemacandra intends to communicate to his readers that female quick-wittedness can be a virtue when the ultimate purpose is conversion and initiation. The widowed queen who wants to protect her reputation as well as her infant son is hard pressed by king Candapadyota, who is eager to marry her. She thought, 'My husband is dead and my son is a little child. Following a stronger person is good policy. But in the case of this lustful man, it would result in a stain on my family. Therefore a trick is proper in this matter. I shall stay here, and, luring him by flattering speeches, shall pass time with the hope of finding a suitable occasion.'<sup>22</sup> She pretends to comply with his request to marry him under the condition that he build a high wall around her city for the protection of her son, and that he fill the city with money, grain, fuel, etc. As soon as the fortification is completed and everything is stacked up, clever queen Mrgavati closed the gates and mounted soldiers on the wall, whereupon the embarrassed king withdrew. The main point Hemacandra wants to make, however, is the subsequent disgust of the queen with the world, and her initiation by Arhat Mahavira.

Another admirable feature of good women is their determination. This is quite contrary to the common belief that all women are morally and emotionally weak. Hemacandra presents instances of women who are determined to sacrifice their lives in order to keep vows, to maintain their purity or their devotion to a husband, or for religious reasons. In a story about previous incarnations the wife Bundhamati confesses to a Jain abbe:<sup>23</sup>....."blessed lady, I shall resort to death so that breaking the vow may not happen either on my husband's part or mine." Whereupon she fasted and hanged herself with ease. She abandoned life like spittle, reports Hemacandra. When her husband learned about her mode of death, he thought: "She, having a strong resolution, died from fear of breaking her vow. I, on the other hand, have broken the vow." In this case it is the husband, the *male*, who

<sup>21</sup> Op. cit., II, p. 132.

<sup>22</sup> Op. cit., VI, p. 202.

<sup>23</sup> Op. cit., VI, p. 181.



lacks determination, while the woman represents the strong, determined and faithful element.

Another determined character is queen Prabhavati, a devout Jain woman who realized by why of bad omens that she was short-lived. She said to her husband:<sup>24</sup> I am not afraid of death. On the contrary,.....there is cause for joy on my part, since it is a warning to me to give up worldly things completely. Do not create any obstacle to my taking now the vow of mendicancy for which the time is suitable..." Thus addressed with importunity, the king replied, "Chief-queen, do whatever is pleasing to you..." Then, having attained complete indifference to worldly things, and having fasted, she died, and became a powerful good in the first heaven

Perhaps the most impressive demonstration of unshaken religious determination is the test of Sulasa, a Jain lay-woman.<sup>25</sup> Ambada, a leading disciple of Mahavira, appeared, with the help of the magic power of transformation, in the house of Sulasa, asking for alms for "a sadhu who is worthy." However, she refused at the time that he asked, realizing that it was for an unworthy monk. Next he appeared as god Brahma in meditation, having assumed the posture of Tirthankara statues, accompanied by Savitri and a hamsa. He taught dharma and delighted the townspeople. Summoned by her women friends who rejoiced: "God Brahma is here", Sulasa steadfastly refused to see the god, afraid of acquaintance with false belief. The next day Ambada assumed the form of Visnu holding the conch, disc, and other utensils attributed to this god, and confusing many people. However, the determined Sulasa, "not moved from right belief", did not go to see the apparition. Eventually Ambada appeared as the 25th Jina, saying to her: "Sulasa, the Master of the World, the Lord Jina has arrived; come and pay homage to him". However, she responded: "Certainly, there is no 25th Jina. This man is some evil-minded rogue who deceives the people". When he saw Sulasa unshaken like this, he revealed his true identity and praised her steadfastness in the true dharma.

I think it is essential to remember what purpose stories such as these serve. They are interspersed throughout Hemacandra's work for the edification and inspiration of his readers and listeners. They are told for the sake of emulation of the characters, not for the exaltation of women

There is still another side to women which Hemacandra presents in his work. As the purpose of the preceding stories was essentially

24 Op. cit., VI, pp. 291f.

25 Op. cit., VI, p. 248.

26 Op. cit., VI, p. 329.



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to encourage virtuous behavior of women as manifested in some outstanding examples, so does the great monastic teacher point to the evil behavior of women as a general warning.

The gifts of beauty, intelligence, and determination which, as we have seen, Hemacandra considers to be desirable features in virtuous women, can become very dangerous tools if misused by irresponsible women. When he refers to those cases, he is very explicit and develops the stories in minute detail to serve as a warning for unwary and naive potential victims. Hemacandra is especially critical of greed courtesans as they can be hired for any dishonorable assignment, or simply used as an instrument for the consumption of pleasure Karma. The courtesan Magadhika may be as good an example as any. She was summoned by king Magadha:<sup>26</sup> "Lady, you are clever. You possess the arts. From birth you have had a constant livelihood from many men. Make fruitful your arts in my business, having delighted the ascetic Kula-valuka by marriage." "I'll do it," she promised cleverly, and, being a depository of intelligence, conceived a plan. At once, like deceit embodied, she became a fictitious laywoman, a trick frequently used, and was considered genuine by simple-minded Jain ascetics. Her specific assignment was to seduce the great ascetic and to bring him to the city of Campa. To make the long story short, she succeeded in tricking him into accepting contaminated sweetmeats, whereupon he became ill. She nursed him back to health by massaging his limbs. He was gradually made well by her care, and "from the contact with her body, from her gentle speech, the muni's mind wavered." Needless to say, the courtesan's scheme was a complete success. Hemacandra laments at the end of this story: "O! what account is penance in association with women! What does a man, blind from love, not do, like a slave of women?"

No man can be sure that he won't be exposed to the attacks of unscrupulous woman. Although they can be very dangerous, a determined and self-disciplined man is able to withstand their schemes and temptations. This seems to be the message Hemcandra wants to communicate to his readers in his temptation account of the Jina Mahavira. The evil forces of the universe, represented in the jealous and envious god Sangamaka,<sup>27</sup> tried to interrupt the great meditation of the 24th Arhat by various means such as a rain of sand, depriving the Jina of inspiration and expiration. After that, an army of ants tortured the Master's body unsuccessfully. Likewise huge scorpions and serpents, a wild elephant, and numerous other painful tortures proved ineffective; he continued his meditation. In desperation the god Sangamaka resorted to a different approach, thinking:

<sup>27</sup> Op. cit., VI, pp. 92-99.



"I wonder if instruction in love would be futile now. For even great men have been seen to break their heroic vows when they have been looked at coyly by women who have become missiles of love". He instructed goddesses of the six seasons to begin their attacks by using stimuli that appealed to all senses. sounds, fragrance, dramatic actions with erotic dance patterns, while partly disrobing themselves. When Mahavira remained unperturbed, they addressed him: "If you are indifferent to the body, why do you not give us even your breast? If you are compassionate, why do you not rescue us now from Kama whose bow has been drawn suddenly? Relax your severity. Fulfill our wishes". They talked like this for a long time. The teacher of the world was not disturbed by the songs, music, and dances, nor even by the contortions of their bodies and the enticing talk of the goddesses.

It is clear that Hemcandra does not tell these stories for the amusement of his readers. They are serious messages that are to serve a very definite purpose: If you want to succeed on the road to liberation, beware of unscrupulous women! G. B. Shaw's sarcastic remark could have also been pronounced by Hemacandra: "A woman seeking a man (husband) is the most unscrupulous of all the beasts of prey". To help strengthen the resistance of mendicants in regard to women, Hemacandra recommends, among other factors, the nine controls of chastity: not to use a bed, bedding, house, or seat connected with women, animals, or eunuch; to avoid all conversation with women; not to join any gathering of women; not to look at women's features; not to eat highly flavored food; not to take too much food or drink; not to think about former pleasures with women, nor indulge in anything pertaining to the five senses which arouses love; and to avoid pleasure.<sup>28</sup>

His advice for laymen who want to progress spiritually, and who have not yet gained the desired detachment from women, is: Think of the true nature of women's bodies, reflect on their abandonment by the noble munis. Think, that women, charming outside, are filled with liver, blood, impurities, phelgm, marrow and bone, bags of skin sewn together with sinews.<sup>29</sup> This will eventually lead to the right attitude where there is no longer any distinction between straw and women, enemy and friend, gold and a stone, emancipation and existence. "A person who is subject to love accepts maidens. Women, however, are no more than stones to the Master, who has conquered love."<sup>30</sup>

28 Op. cit., VI, p. 18.

29 Op. cit., IV, p. 359.

30 Op. cit., I, p. 182.



Hemacandra is not only concerned with the detrimental effects of unscrupulous women upon men, laymen and monks alike, as regards sexual matters. There are other areas as well in which women misuse their influence or power in order to gain some selfish advantage. He points to a widowed queen who is willing to have her son killed for the sake of retaining her lover<sup>31</sup>, or to another evil-minded queen who poisons her stepson so that her own son can become king.<sup>32</sup> He portrays them as determined characters who don't shy away from any vicious means that would lead to the desired result. "The persistence of women", he states, "certainly exceeds the persistence of a termite".<sup>33</sup>

Even in more harmless cases he maintains this view. When another queen wants a certain favor from her hesitant husband, Hemacandra has her enter the so-called anger room, a place to which an angry queen retires in order to gain something desired.<sup>34</sup> But if neither heinous acts nor simple tricks work, he has women resort to magic. When King Vikramayasa paid too much attention to the beautiful Visnusri, the other "women of his household, angered by jealousy, used sorcery against her. Because of their magic, she withered away moment by moment and died".<sup>35</sup>

The frequent tension and ever hostility between Jains and Hindus is reflected, too, in interpersonal relationships. In numerous instances Hemacandra portrays Hindu nuns in a very unfavorable light. Whenever they are referred to they appear as spiritually ignorant, foolish, greedy, or unscrupulous. Especially do they function as go-between, devising schemes for illicit affairs.<sup>36</sup>

Hemacandra shares the prevalent Indian view that women are not independent. They belong ! In the ideal case they belong to a husband. The lack of a husband is a calamity.<sup>37</sup> Princess Jayacandra, who became a man hater out of frustration, laments. "Women without husbands are dead while alive". Another woman states: "There is no other desire of women than to obtain a very superior husband".<sup>38</sup> Women without husbands are a liability. King Bhanuvega, the father of eight unmarried maidens, offered his daughters, almost in desperation, to a visiting prince, imploring him: "You are a suitable husband for the maidens. I ask you to marry them, the eight of them".<sup>39</sup> Another father is nagged in the middle of the night by his worried wife: "You have a daughter endowed with infinite beauty and grace. Why do you not search for a husband? How can a man sleep whose daughter, debt, enmity, or disease is increasing in size? Yet you sleep heedlessly."<sup>40</sup>

In most cases, with very few exceptions, the birth of a daughter is not welcome. Hemacandra expresses this view very eloquently,

31 Op. cit., V, p. 234.

33 Op. cit., VI, p. 318.

35 Op. cit., III, p. 168.

37 Op. cit., IV, p. 95.

39 Op. cit., III, p. 182.

32 Op. cit., V, p. 11.

34 Op. cit., III, p. 10.

36 Op. cit., IV, p. 73.

38 Op. cit., V, p. 338.

40 Op. cit., III p. 201.



adding an interesting explanation, as he tells the story of the miserable householder Nagila<sup>41</sup> who wandered around like a ghost looking for food. His poor wife Nagasri was as unfortunate, having given birth to six daughters, one after the other. "Like boils on the body of a man with skin disease, boil under boil. These daughters were voracious by nature, ugly, like offspring of a village swine". In the course of time his wife conceived again—indeed another daughter. Then he began to reflect: "Of what karma is this the fruit, that I experience the calamities of hell in this world? I am tormented by these daughters as if by enemies of a former birth..."

Yet even when a woman is married happily, she can find fulfillment only when she has given birth to sons. When childless queen Sudarsana learned of a merchant's wife with two sons, she reflected to herself: "Indeed, this merchant's wife, who looks upon the face of man, is very superior, for whom daughters-in-law always perform service. Alas! for me who have no son, no daughter-in-law, who am lacking in merit. My life is in vain, even though I have become the heart of my husband. Women without children (sons) are blameworthy, are to be grieved over."<sup>42</sup>

These observations based on Hemacandra's major work are certainly not exhaustive. They are rather the beginning of an interesting research project the purpose of which is to correct distorted and exaggerated views on Eastern religion that are so widely disseminated in word and print.

Summarizing our findings so far, it becomes apparent that Hemacandra is neither a misogynist nor is he a philogynist. He views women with an open mind, and realistically, considering his philosophical position. He appreciates their beauty and virtues and virtues as well as their shortcomings. Although their main function is to serve and to please, they are equal to men in the intellectual and spiritual realm. Their place in society is ideally with a husband. When they discharge their duties with dedication, he has high praise for them. A woman's role as wife and mother can be surpassed only when she, with the permission of her husband, or as a widow, takes the vow of mendicancy.

When Hemacandra is critical of women, he is usually critical also of men and the physical in general. Where there is a seductive or unfaithful woman there is also a responsive or aggressive man. In view of moksa—the liberation from samsara—all physical pleasures are detrimental. It is in this context that all statements of disgust and all negative remarks about women and sensual pleasures must be seen; when taken out of this context, the entire picture is distorted.

41 Op. cit., I, p. 53.

42 Op. cit., II, p. 269.



## IO

*Pratityasamutpada**Suman Sinha*

Gautama Buddha preached the doctrine of *Pratityasamutpada* or the doctrine of dependant origination or the second noble truth. The doctrine analyses twelve causal links of human suffering. To get a clear conception of the doctrine, a few lines on Buddha's life and his four noble truth need to be written.

Buddha was the son of King Suddhodana. Though brought amidst worldly pleasure and care, he turned out to be a man of spiritual detachment and lofty idealism. Buddha had no love for palace. Instead, he had love for humanity. From the very beginning of his life, he used to be moved when he saw some one suffering from pain. He became more restless when he was confronted with the sight of an old man who was weary and sad. Next, he saw a man, sick and pale. And the third instance that moved him was the sight of a dead man. All these horrifying scenes led Buddha wonder, why people suffered? What made them suffer? What would liberate mankind from suffering?

King Suddhodana made every effort to keep Buddha intact with palatial comforts. He married him to a beautiful princess, Yasodhara. But Buddha's mind was set with the motive of redemption of mankind from suffering and married life could not stop Buddha from taking a plunge in his mission to ameliorate human beings from suffering. Later, after, sometime he had a son, Rahul.

One night at the age of 29 Buddha left the palace, his wife Yasodhara and his newly born son Rahul. He wandered for about 7 years and at last, he got insight of truth under the Bodhi tree on the bank of Niranjana at Bodh Gaya. Thereafter, Buddha travelled far and wide preached his doctrine of 'The Four Noble Truths' known as *catvari aryasatyami*. They are:

- 1 There is suffering (*dukkha*).
- 2 There is a cause of suffering (*dukkha-samudaya*).
- 3 It is possible to stop suffering (*dukkha-nirodha*).
- 4 There is a way that leads to the cessation of suffering (*dukkha-nirodha marga*).

The world is full of suffering is stated in the 'First Noble Truth'. The very existence of man is painful. Every one who is born has to die. As long as men live, they suffer from various diseases. This makes life full of pain and suffering. Further, men are born, they grow old. In old age, men become helpless and weary. All these again make him suffer. In words of Radhakrishnan.

"... existence is pain, the struggle to maintain individuality is painful, and the fluctuations fortune are frightful."

The 'Second Noble truth' states the twelve causal links that results into human suffering. In his Second Noble Truth, Buddha establishes cause-effect theory. In other words, every effect has a cause.

- 1 S. Radhakrishnan—Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Allen and Unwin, Reprinted in India, 1985, p. 363.



Once the cause is removed effect automatically disappears. This is also known as the doctrine of dependant origination or *pratityasamutpada*.

In the 'Third Noble Truth' Buddha preaches that if the cause is removed, suffering comes to an end. Man attains *Nirvana* or *Enlightenment*. *Nirvana* is a state of extinction from all sorts of false desires and lust. The condition of rebirth stops.

*Nirvana* is attained by following eight fold paths. This is prescribed by Buddha in his 'Fourth Noble Truth'. They are as follows:-

1 *Right views*:- Right views contain in the right knowledge of the four noble truths, because they help in doing away with the wrong views of world and life created by ignorance.

2 *Right resolve*:- With the true knowledge of four noble truths one must resolve to give up worldliness and ill feelings towards others.

3 *Right speech*:- This consists in the abstention from lying, slander, unkind words and frivolous talks.

4 *Right conduct*:- This involves abstention from killing, stealing, sensuality, lying and intoxication. These are known as five VOWS. *Panca Sila*.

5 *Right livelihood*:- One should earn livelihood through honest means.

6 *Right effort*:- Following these paths one tries to lead a reformed life but can be disturbed by old evil thoughts or new ones. Right effort contains in suppression of any such evil thoughts.

7 *Right mindfulness*:- This contains in keeping away from any sort of attachment which causes bondage.

8 *Right concentration*:- Last step is meditation or *right concentration*. After following the seven steps one steps into the stage of concentration which helps him in cessation of suffering.

Following the eightfold path of Buddha man can attain *Nirvana*. The eightfold path is also known as Middle path as it avoids the extremity of both luxury and austerity.

After briefing the points on life and teachings of Buddha, I would concentrate on the doctrine of *Pratityasamupada* or Second Noble Truth which forms the centre of Buddha's teaching.

The doctrine of *Pratityasamutpada* is about the rootcause of suffering. Here Buddha discovers through twelve causal links the root cause of suffering. They are :

1 Suffering i.e., disease, old age, death, etc. or *jaramarana* is caused by *jati* or will to be born. If a man were not born, he would not have been in these miserable states. Birth has its condition as well.

2 It is will to be born or *jati* i.e., will to become or *bhava* i.e., tendency to be born.

3 Tendency to be born or *bhava* is caused by our tendency of clinging to the object of the world. This is *upadana* which is condition responsible for our desire to be born.

4 *Upadana* or clinging is due to *trsna* (thirst) which is lust or desire to enjoy objects.



5 *Trsna* or thirst is caused by sense experience. It is evoked by some pleasant feeling or *vedana*. *Vedana* is, thus, the cause of our thirst or craving.

6 *Vedana* arises due to contact of sense-organs with objects. This is *sparsa*.

7 *Sparsa* is the effect of the cause of six organs of cognition. This is *sadayutana*. *Sadayatance* is the collective phrase for *mauas* and the five senses.

8 *Sadayatana* is due to mind body relation i.e., embryonic organism or *Namrupa*. *Namrupa* constitutes the perceptible being of man.

9 *Namrupa* is due to initial consciousness of the embryo or *vijnana*.

10 *Vijnana* crops up due to impression or *samskara* of our past existence. The present existence, is the impression or effect of our past deeds.

11 *Samskara* or impression which causes rebirth is due to *avidya* or ignorance about truth. *Avidya* fails us to realize the real nature of world.

12 *Avidya* or ignorance is the root cause of suffering.

Buddha through twelve links of causation established that ignorance or *avidya* is the root cause of suffering. Ignorance fails a man from seeing the life and world in their true perspectives. It gives rise to false desires. He craves for sensual enjoyment, power and wealth. He forgets that every thing is impermanent and will disappear after some times. The false desire which is caused by *avidya* or ignorance makes man suffer. As Radhakrishnan says :

.....the cause of pain: that craving which leads to rebirth combined with pleasure and lust, finding pleasure here and there, namely, the craving for the passion, the craving for existence, the craving for non-existence.

Few lines from Dhammapada high light the same views.

The lines are as follows :

Sabbam dukkham chandamulakam chandanidanam.

Chando hi mulam dukkha a ssa.

All suffering is rooted in willing. Spring out of willing; willing is the root of suffering.<sup>3</sup>

These twelve links of causation are known as *Pratityasamutpada*.

"By applying the causal Formula to the Aryan Truths, it can be seen that it is a sense impression (*phasas*) gives rise to a sensation (*vedana*) that is neither pleasant nor painful, but is indifferent than no craving (*trsna*) results and therefore no clinging (*upadana*). This *upadana* or prejudice is the fuel that keeps the fire of life burning. Without it there is no more becoming (*bhava*), no rebirth (*jati*), and no more sorrow (*dukkha*). This is liberation, the deathless state of *Nirvana* (Nibbana).

2 S. Radhakrishnan and Charles A Moore—A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1973, p. 274.

3 George Grieme—The Doctrine of the Buddha, Motilal Banarsidas, 1965, p. 65.



The above twelve causal links cover to explain past, present and future life. Past is said to be the cause and present its effect. Present is again the cause of future life: The Buddhist law of causation can be arranged into three periods of life (past, present and future) as follows:

- |         |   |
|---------|---|
| Past    | 1 Ignorance or <i>Avidya</i> .                            |
| Life.   | 2 Impression or <i>Samskara</i> .                         |
|         | 3 The initial consciousness of embryo or <i>Vijnana</i> . |
| Present | 4 Mind and body relation or embryonic organism or         |
| Life.   | <i>Namarupa</i> .   |
|         | 5 Six Organs of knowledge or <i>Sadayatana</i> .          |
|         | 6 Sense—Object of <i>Sparsa</i> .                         |
|         | 7 Sense—expression or <i>Vedana</i> .                     |
|         | 8 Thirst or <i>Trsna</i> .                                |
|         | 9 Clinging to objects or <i>Upadana</i> .                 |
|         | 10 Tendency to be born or <i>Bhava</i> .                  |
| Futnre  | 11 Rebirth of <i>Jati</i> .                               |
| Life.   | 12 Old age, death etc. or <i>Jaramarana</i> .             |

The collection of these twelve entities or causal chains has been summarised in the following verse:

The doctrine of *Pratityasamutpada*, means production of an effect due to some cause or condition. The root cause of suffering is ignorance or *avidya*. If ignorance or *avidya* is removed suffering comes to an end.

Regarding *Pratityasamutpada* Buddha says: "The Buddha postulates that life is a stream of becoming. There is nothing permanent in the empirical self. One thing is dependant on another. This is the law of dependant origination *Pratityasamutpada*."

Hence, if the conditions are removed effects automatically end. Thus, destruction of ignorance of *avidya* results into the end of *samskara*; destruction of *samskara* is followed by the destruction of *namarupa*. When *namarupa* is discarded *sadayatna* ends. Further, end of *sadayatana* ends contact, as well, and destruction of contact destroys sensation. When sensation is destroyed there is no thirst. Thirst disappears and so does attachment: By the destruction of attachment becoming is destroyed and by the destruction of becoming birth is destroyed. Once birth is destroyed old age, death and disease or *jaramarana* cease. With the destruction of these causes, man is redeemed and he reaches the goal of liberation or *Nirvana*.

The doctrine of *Pratityasamutpada* is the central teaching of Buddha. The twelve causal links (*dvadasanidana*) are known as the wheel of rebirth.

Thus, the doctrine of *Pratityasamutpada* demonstrates a valuable truth that the will to live is the ground of our existence, its negation is our liberation. The liberation i.e., *Nirvana* is the only motive of Buddhist Philosophy. The doctrine of *Pratityasamutpada* has gained in its favour an unparalleled esteem in the field of philosophy.

4 G. F. Allen—The Buddha's Philosophy, Allen & Unwid, Ltd., London, 1959, p. 58.

5 S. Radhakrishnan & Charles A. Moore—A Source Book in Indian Philosophy, Princeton University Press, America, 1973, p. 272.



## Editorial

### COURTSHIP

*Panos D. Bardis*

From the Latin *co* (together) and *hors* (garden).

Courtship is the relationship between a normally unmarried male and female who are planning marriage to each other. If we disregard the related concepts of love, mate choice, betrothal, and engagement, we may say that, in Biblical times, the main features of courtship itself were the following:

1. Selection of partner by kidnaping. At the feast of Shiloh, a city 12 miles northeast of Bethel, the Benjamites were told: "Go and lie in wait in the vineyards; And see, and, behold, if the daughters of Shiloh come out to dance in dances, then come ye out of the vineyards, and catch you every man his wife of the daughters of Shiloh" (Judges 21: 20-21).
2. Selection by purchase. "And Jacob served seven years for Rachel" (Genesis 29:20). In the eighth century B.C., the Prophet Hosea bought a wife, Gomer, "for fifteen pieces of silver" and for an homer of barley, and an half homer of barley" (Hosea 3:2).
3. Giving presents to the parents of the bride to secure their consent. Abraham's servant, for example, "brought forth jewels of silver, and jewels of gold, and raiment, and gave them to Rebekah: he gave also to her brother and to her mother precious things" (Genesis 24:53). And, according to Deuteronomy, if a man sleeps with a woman, he "shall give unto the damsel's father fifty shekels of silver, and she shall be his wife" (22: 29).
4. Selection by parents. When Shechem fell in love with Dinah, the daughter of Jacob, he asked his father Hamor, "Get me this damsel to wife" (Genesis 34:4).



5. Giving a daughter as a-reward. Caleb, the prince of Judah, declared, "He that smiteth Kirjath-sepher, and taketh it, to him will I give Achsah my daughter to wife" (Judges 1; 12). And when Goliath, the Philistine giant of Gath, came to defy Israel, it was promised that "the man who killeth him, the king will enrich him with great riches, and will give him his daughter" (I Samuel 17:25).

6. Selection by servants. About 2026 B.C., Abraham's eldest servant, who was looking for a wife for Isaac, said to Bethuel and Laban, Rebekah's father and brother, respectively: "And now if ye will deal kindly and truly with my master, tell me: and if not, tell me; that I may turn to the right hand, or to the left" (Genesis 24:49).

7. Selection by messengers. Abigail, the wife of Nabal, who was a prosperous but foolish sheepmaster in south Judah, "went after the messengers of David, and became his wife" (I Samuel 25:42).

8. Selection by edict. Michal (short for Michael), was the younger daughter of King Saul (1003 B.C.). Although she loved David, her father decreed that he disapproved of the union unless the young man killed 100 Philistines. Thus, David demanded: "Deliver me my wife Michal, which I espoused to me for an hundred foreskins of the Philistines" (II Samuel 3-14).

9. Suitor's visit to a maid. When Samson (about 1100 B.C.) went to Timnath, he saw a beautiful Philistine woman with whom he fell in love. Later on, "he went down, and talked with the woman; and she pleased Samson well" (Judges 14-7).

10. Individual selection by the man. "And Judah saw there a daughter of a certain Canaanite, whose name was Shuah; and he took her, and went in unto her" (Genesis 38-2)

11. Individual selection by the woman. When Boaz (around 1100 B.C.), a wealthy man of Bethlehem, was sleeping near a heap of corn, Ruth the Moabitess "came softly, and uncovered his feet, and laid her down." Then she said, "I am Ruth thine handmaid; spread therefore the skirt over thine handmaid" (Ruth 1-7:9).

12. Strong bonds of affection. "Jacob kissed Rachel, and lifted up his voice, and wept" (Genesis 29-11). Shechem's "soul clave unto Dinah the daughter of Jacob, and he loved the damsel, and spake kindly unto the damsel" (Genesis 34:3). "And Saul saw and knew that the Lord was with David, and that Michal Saul's daughter love him" (I Samuel 18:28).

13. Ideal love. The highest form of courtship is found in the Song of Solomon, which begins with the mutual admiration of the lovers, continues with the development of perfect love, and gradually leads to



## Courtship

marriage. This masterpiece has been interpreted in at least seven different ways, namely, as being literal, typical, allegorical, dramatic, literary-erotic, moral-didactic, and liturgical. The usual Jewish theory has been that the bridegroom symbolizes Jehovah, and that the Shulamite bride stands for the Jews. Many Christians, on the other hand, believe that the bridegroom is Jesus, while the bride represents the church. Some of the most beautiful verses are as follows: "Let him kiss me with the kisses of his mouth: for thy love is better than wine" (1-2); "By night on my bed, I sought him whom my soul loveth: I sought him, but I found him not. I will rise now, and go about the city in the streets, and the broad ways I will seek him whom my soul loveth: I sought him, but I found him not" (3:1-2); and "Who is this that cometh up from the wilderness, leaning upon her beloved? I raised thee up under the apple tree: there thy mother brought thee forth: there she brought thee forth that bare thee. Set me as a seal upon thine heart, as a seal upon thine arm: for love is strong as death; jealousy is cruel as the grave: the coals thereof are coals of fire, which hath a most vehement flame. Many waters cannot quench love, neither can the floods drown it" (8:5-7).

Some of the most famous cases of courtship in the Bible were Isaac and Rebekah, Jacob and Rachel, Shechem and Dinah, Boaz and Ruth, and so forth.



# I

## Some Aspects of Buddhist Ethics

A. T. Hopkinson

### INTRODUCTION

This work discusses certain aspects of Buddhist Ethics. It begins by looking at Western Ethics. Then moves on to discuss dharma, karma, Theravada Buddhism, relation of monks and layman, Mahayana, the Budhisattva path, skill in means and Pure Land. It concludes by noting the importance of mind in Buddhist ethics.

### WESTERN ETHICS

#### Plato

Plato stated that, because virtue always led to right conduct, it seems to be knowledge: but we may be mistaken in over looking the claims of right opinion, which so long as a man possesses it may serve him as well, for practical purposes, as knowledge in the full sense. Right opinion is something that you can take on trust, and is converted into knowledge only when you have worked out the explanation for yourself and can understand the reason why it is true.

Defects of right opinion as opposed to knowledge are its instability and impermanence and its mysterious origin, which makes it sometimes impossible for one man to impart to another, just as great statesmen are not able to pass on their virtue to their sons.

Virtue is something not imparted by teaching but simply comes to a man by divine inspiration without taking thought.<sup>1</sup>

Just as the ideal state consists of the integration of three different classes (governors, police and lower orders) so the soul is the integration of appetite or impulse, thought or reason and an element capable of curbing impulses and taking orders from reason as the police curb the lower orders and take orders from the governors;<sup>2</sup>

1 See Plato, *Meno*, Penguin Classics 1981, p. 155ff.



## Some Aspects of Buddhist Ethics

## Aristotle

In his works *ta ethika* transliterates as the ethics but translates rather as matters to do with character and *ethike arete* which is translated often as moral virtue is more proper excellence of character.<sup>3</sup> The soul (*pusche*) has a rational and a non rational part. In the case of the former there is the completely rational part and also that aspect of the rational which is the seat of appetites and desires which may be rational if they conform to reason. Rational control of desires is moral virtue prompted by practise which introduces habits which involve following the mean. An action is not virtuous because it follows the mean but because it conforms to reason and as a result of that it will, in fact, involve a mean.

Wholly rational part of the soul is intellectual virtue divided into unchangeable truths which are domain of *sophia* (theoretical wisdom) and truths and objects subject to change which are the domain of *phronesis* (practical wisdom, prudence, common sense), *Phronesis* discovers what are rights in action and thereby makes it possible for desires to conform to reason by discovering ends and then relating means to ends.

The highest and for man is *eudaimonia* (happiness, fulfillment of one's function). The highest virtue is theoretical wisdom; an activity of which man is capable because of something divine in his nature. Its exercise he approximates to the life of God and for man as for God his highest function is thought. (88ff)<sup>4</sup>

Aristotle claimed that every art and every investigation, and similarly every action and pursuit is considered to aim at some good. Hence the Good is that at which all things aim.

But there are differences between the ends at which they aim: some are activities and others results distinct from the actions, the results are by nature superior to the activities. And there are many arts and sciences and thereby they have many ends.

If.....our activities have some end which we want for its own sake, and for the sake of which we want all other ends...this must be the good, that is the supreme good. 63.

(Therefore) a knowledge of the Good is of great importance to us for the conduct of our lives? (We are) more likely to achieve our aim

2 Compare *Katha Upanishad* 1, 3, 4 where the *atman* is compared to the owner of a chariot, the body being the chariot, *buddhi* or intellect the driver, the horses the senses and *manas* the rein by which the intellect controls the senses.

3 J. A. K. Thomson, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, Penguin 1988, p. 27.

References are to Thomson op. cit.



if we have a target? (Therefore) we must describe at least in outline what the Good really is.

It is the most authoritative and direct science. Clearly this fits the science of politics; for it is political science that prescribes what subjects are to be taught in states, and which of these the different sections of the community are to learn, and up to what point...under this science come those faculties which are the most highly esteemed; e.g. the arts of war, of property management, public speaking,.....if politics makes use of other sciences, and also lays down what we should do and from what we should refrain, its end must include theirs; and this end must be for the good of man. For even if the good of the community<sup>5</sup> coincides with that of the individual, it is clearly a greater and more perfect thing to achieve and preserve that of a community; for while it is desirable to secure what is good in the case of individual, to do so in the case of a people or a state is something finer and more sublime. (64)

All knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good. What is the highest of all practical goods? Both ordinary and cultured people say that it is happiness. But views on what is happiness differ.

Ordinary people see it as something obvious and familiar like pleasure or money. Also most people are impressed by someone who pontificates. (66)

Cannot be a universal good such as Plato held to be the culmination of his theory of Forms. For things are called good therein both in the category<sup>6</sup> of substance and that of quality and in that of relation; and that exists in its own right, viz substance, is by nature prior to what is relative so that there cannot be any common Idea in these cases things are called good in as many senses as they are said to exist; for they are so called in the category of Substance (e.g. God or mind) and in Quality (the virtues) and in Quantity (what is moderate) and in Relation (what is useful) and in Time (opportunity) and in Place (habitat) and so on. Clearly, then, there cannot be a single universal common to all cases, because it would be predicated not on all the categories but in one only (69-70).

Happiness is something which we choose for itself and never for any other reason. (73)

The question now arises "What is happiness?" The answer may be grasped by asking what is the function of man. The goodness and

5 Buddhism is, of course, concerned with the salvation of the individual.

6 For the convenience of the reader we have included a brief list of the categories in appendix one.



## Some Aspects of Buddhist Ethics

proficiency of a man is considered to lie in the performance of his function. Whereas joiners and shoemakers have certain functions or activities, man as such has none, but has been left by nature a function less being? Every one of our members has some function, such we not therefore assume that in like manner a human being has a function over and above these particular functions?

What is it? It cannot be life for life is a thing shared by plants also and we are looking for man's proper function; so we must exclude from our definition the life that consists in nutrition and growth. Next in order would be a sort of sentient life but this is shared by animals of all kinds.

There remains then a practical life of the rational part. If the function of man is an activity of the soul in accordance, or implying, a rational principle; and if we hold that the function of an individual and of a good individual of the same kind is generically the same, the latter's distinctive excellence being attached to the name of the function; and if we assume that the function of man is a kind of life, viz, an activity or series of actions of the soul, implying a rational principle; and if the function of a good man is to perform these well and rightly; and if the every function is performed well when performed in accordance with its proper excellence; if all this is so, the conclusion is that the good for man is an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, or if there are more kinds of virtue than one, in accordance with the best and most perfect kind. (76)

## Hume

David Hume felt that, since morals have an influence on the actions and affections it follows that they cannot be derived from reason; and because of that reason alone... can never have such influence. Morals excite passions and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.

As long as it is allowed, that reason has no influence on our passions and actions, it is vain to pretend, that morality is discovered only by a deduction of reason.<sup>7</sup>

Reason is the discovery of truth or falsehood, ...agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real existence and matter of fact. Whatever ... is not susceptible of this agreement or disagreement, is, incapable, of being true or false, and never be an object of our reason. Actions may be laudable or blameable; but they cannot be reasonable or unreasonable.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> David Hume *A Treatise Concerning Human Nature* 457.

<sup>8</sup> Hume op. cit. 458.



...reason ...can have an influence on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites a passion in forming us of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers the connection of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting any passion.<sup>9</sup>

...erronst (of judgement), are so far from the source of all immorality, that they are commonly very innocent and draw no manner of guilt.<sup>10</sup>

If the thought and understanding were alone capable of fixing the boundaries of right wrong, the character of virtuous and vicious either must lie in some relations of objects, or must be a matter of fact which is discovered by our reasoning. (Human understanding is concerned with the comparing of ideas and the inferring of matter of fact<sup>11</sup>).

If morality is capable of certainty and demonstration must confine yourself to the four relations capable of that degree of evidence namely resemblance, contriety, degrees in quantity and proportions in quantity and number. This list can be compared with the list of Aristotelian Catagories later in appendix susceptible of certainty and demonstration you run into absurdities. For, as you make the very essence of morality to lie in relations, and as there is no one of these reactions, but what is applicable, not only to irrational. but also to an inanimate object; it follows, that even such objects must be susceptible of merit or demerit.<sup>13</sup>

Morality lies in actions of the mind between internal actions and external objects. If internal only we would be guilty of crimes in ourselves independent of our situation in the universe. if external only then inanimate objects would be susceptible to morality.<sup>14</sup>

To prove that moral laws are eternal we must prove the connection between the relation and the will and that it is so necessary that it must take place and have its influence in every well disposed mind. For there is no connection between cause and effect except what is discoverable by experience. If I ask why incest is condemned in humans but not in animals I cannot say it is because man have will but animals do not as this is to argue in a circle as the turpitude must exist before it can be discovered and it is therefore independent of our reason<sup>15</sup>

9 Hume op. cit. p. 459.

10 Hume Ibid.

11 Hume p. 463.

12 Hume Ibid. p. 464.

13 Hume p. 463—4.

14 Hume p. 465.

15 Hume p. 466-7.



## Some Aspects of Buddhist Ethics

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Animals are susceptible of the same relations with each other as humans. Though their lack of reason may hinder them from perceiving moral obligations it does not stop those obligations from existing as they must exist antecedently to their discovery in order to be discovered.<sup>16</sup>

Hume goes on to say that moral distinctions are derived from a moral sense. Since virtue and vice are not discoverable merely by reason, or the comparison of ideas, it must be means of some impression or sentiment they occasion, that we are able to mark the difference between them. To have a sense of virtue, is nothing but to feel a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. We do not infer a character to be virtuous, because it pleases: But in feeling that it pleases after such a particular manner, we in effect feel that it is virtuous.<sup>17</sup>

It may now be asked in general, concerning this pain or pleasure, that distinguishes moral good and evil, from what principles is it derived, and whence does it arise in the human mind. They are not produced by an original validity and primary constitution in every instant as our duties are infinite and our original instincts could not be such as to impress on the human mind the multitude of precepts contained in a complex system of ethics from our very first infancy, some general principles are therefore need.<sup>18</sup>

Are these principle found in nature? Hume answers no. For in the sense of nature as opposed to miracles, both vice and virtue are equally natural; and in the sense of nature as opposed to what is unusual, perhaps virtue will be found in the most unnatural. Both heroic virtue and the most unnatural barbarity are equally unnatural. Nature is opposed to what is artificial and virtue and vice are both artificial. Therefore we are brought back to saying that virtue and vice distinguished by pleasure and pain.<sup>19</sup> Hume can be summarized by saying that to consider character, trait or act virtuous or vicious is to have a special sort of feeling of pleasure or displeasure towards it.

**Kant**

Kant claimed that common morality enjoins respect for others for as for oneself; it forbids exceptions in one's own favour; it regards all men as equal; before the moral law.

<sup>16</sup> Hume p. 468.

<sup>17</sup> Hume p. 471.

<sup>18</sup> Hume p. 473.

<sup>19</sup> Hume Ibid.



The moral law rules us absolutely and necessarily and we feel its power even when defying it. I might be forced to betray a friend else be killed my self but it is only with a consciousness of doing wrong; and the moral law itself, unlike any motive desire, propels me onward destruction.<sup>20</sup>

Thus Lord Coleridge quoting from Lord Hale (1 Hale, P. C. 478) in *R V Dudley and Stephens* "If a man be desperately assaulted, and in peril of death, and cannot other wise escape, unless to satisfy his assailant's fury he will kill and innocent person then present, the fear and actual force will not acquit him of the crime and punishment of murder if he commit the fact, for he ought rather to die himself then to kill an innocent". ([1881-5] All E. R. Rep p61).

The moral agent is differently motivated and differently constituted from the agencies of nature. His actions have causes as well as reasons. He make decisions for the future and thus distinguishes his actions from his destres and does not suffer his desires always to overcome him. Only a person has rights, duties and obligations; only a person acts for reasons in addition to causes; only a person merits our esteem.<sup>21</sup>

There is no merit in acting as a good man acts merely from self interest. Kant rejects the idea that happiness can be the determining ground of the will. He points out that we would reject the man who was willing to commit perjury on the grounds that he had gained advantages thereby basing his theory on the fact that he regarded it as his holy duty to consult his own happiness.<sup>22</sup>

Even the maxim of universal happiness cannot be the basis of the moral law. For, the data on which this is based is the dependent on the very changeable opinions of each person and thus we can only have general but never universal rules thereby.<sup>23</sup> Here he is attacking Utilitarianism.<sup>24</sup>

In all moral efforts there may be a conflict between duty and desire and thus there arises in every moral being the idea of consciousness.

20 Roger Scruton Kant Oxford 1982 p72-73

21 Soruton ibid

22 Kant Critique of Practical Reason, Library of Liberal Arts 1956 p 36

23 L W Beck Kant-Critique of Practical Reason, Bobbs-Merrill, 1958 p37

24 Note also the habit of Mahayana teachers of prefacing their remarks by stating that all creatures desire happiness



Kant distinguishes between the 'good will' of the moral agent from the 'holy will' of that acts without resistance from desire and which needs of imperative.<sup>25</sup>

Kant believed that there is nothing in the world or even out of it that can be called good without qualification except a good will. For if the gifts of good fortune are used by a bad will the evil of the whole situation is increased. The universe is constructed on rational principles and man is fundamentally rational and thus an action cannot be right unless you can give a reason for it<sup>26</sup>.

Kant's moral philosophy can be summarized in the maxims that one should treat people as ends and not means and that every act of a moral nature should only be committed if you are will for your decision to be a universal law.

### Hegel

Hegel regarded the universe as a spiritual evolution according to a dialectical process reaching its highest conclusion in the self conscious life of man. In human history we see a dialectical growth in this power of thought reflecting on itself, which finds its expression in philosophy. Reason as the characteristic quality of man was also held by Aristotle. Though the philosopher is not necessarily morally better. However Hegel emphasised the social system to which the individual belongs rather than the individual himself. The conscious effort of the individual to realize his own good is useless or even evil if it is not in harmony with the social institutions in which the universal or absolute mind expresses itself.

The doctrine of Sittlichkeit (ethics) is that morality reaches its completion in a community. Sittlichkeit is the moral obligations a man has to the ongoing community of which he is a part based on established norms and uses. Whereas moralitat is the opposite and is an obligation to realise something that does not exist; where what ought to be contrasts with what is. At times public life is so empty of spirit that moralitat expresses something higher. But the fulfillment of this comes in realised sittlichkeit.

Kant is criticised by Hegel for identifying moral obligation with sittlichkeit by presenting an abstract formal notion, which holds of man as an individual, and which being defined in contrast to nature is in endless opposition to what is.

25 T K Abbott, Kant's Critique of practical Reason and other works on the Theory of Ethics, London 1879 p168

26 W Lillie, An Introduction to Ethics, Methuen 1971, pp147-9



Everything that man is, for Hegel, he owes to the state; only in it can he find his essence. All value that a man has, all spiritual reality, has only through the state. (VG111)<sup>27</sup>

The goal of world history is that Spirit come to knowledge of what truly is, that it give this knowledge objective expression, realise it in a world which lies before it, in short, produce itself as an object for itself. (VG 74)

(An individual) can separate himself from other particular individuals but not from the volksgeist (spirit of the people) VG. The state is not there for the sake of the citizens; one could say, it is the goal and they are its instruments. But this relation of ends and means is quite inappropriate here. For the state is not something abstract, standing over and against the citizens; but rather they are moments as in organic life, where no member is end and none means.....The essence of the state is ethical life. (VG 112)<sup>28</sup>

### BUDDHIST ETHICS

We will now look at Buddhist ethics beginning with the concepts of Dharma<sup>29</sup> and karma. But first we note that the Silasamyuktasutra, which survives in the Mdo Shu section of the bka gyur as the Tshul khrims yang dag par idan pa'i mdo states that the fate of those who fail in morality is worse than those who hold a false view of the self.

#### Dharma

A history of the interpretation of the term Dharma shows that E Burnouf called "la loi". Mrs Rhys Davids referred to it as "that which the concept of "law" represents. Beckh in 1916 said that it was the combination of the concept of natural and moral law. Mrs Rhys Davids moved from "the message of the good way of life" She discerned a moral imperative not adequately communicated through law, truth etc. She finally suggested "the ideal of ever becoming a more in the long way towards the most". By 1920 Geiger conceived of Dharma as an expression of the Absolute venerated by the Buddha

27 VG—Die Vernunft in der Geschicht (the introductory part of Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of history, put together from cycles of lecture notes after his death) ed. J Hoffmeister Hamburg 1955

28 Charles Taylor, Hegel, CUP 1987 p355ff

29 Sanskrit and Pali words have been used interchangeably. But generally in accordance with the work that is being quoted or in accordance with the works that have had some influence on the particular topic being discussed.



as a central concept in Buddhist thought. In the Theragata verse 303 Dharma protects the one living Dharma. Protection being in the sense in which a female animal protects her young (rakkhati)<sup>30</sup>

Varnashramadharma and sadharansdharma are absent concepts in Buddhism as it is a religion of renunciation where the ideas of the duties owed through one's caste and stage in life.<sup>31</sup> [It is also interesting to note in passing that, in the light of this that svadharma is more important for the welfare of society than varnasdharma according to R C Gupta in his The Wisdom that is Hindu Dharma.<sup>32</sup>

As the Gita says:

"Better is one's own Dharma, (though) imperfect than the Dharma of another well performed. He who does the duty ordained by his own nature incurs no evil"<sup>33</sup> (BG 18 47) and "Looking at thine own Dharma, also; thou oughtest not to waiver, for there is nothing higher for a Kshatriya than a righteous war" (BG 2 31). I am somewhat puzzled by this theory as I feel that both types of dharma are of equal importance. For, the functions of the individual are important but the structure of the varna are vital to the correct running of the sacrificial system with each level having it assigned duties: the Brahmins to perform the sacrifice, the Kshatriyas to protect it and rule and fight, the Vaisas to provide the wealth and the Sudra to serve the others. But we will not go into this as we are discussing Buddhist and not Hindu ethics.]

The Eight Fold Path is a duty only to oneself. A Buddhists, svadharma is therefore only to seek nirvana. This is not true of the Bodhisattva as he works for the saving of all beings and this theory only applies to the Theravada schools. The panca sila makes Buddhist no different from any others. It has no radical moral rules in it. Again the advice to laymen in the Sigolavada is uninteresting. Its general advice is thrift and prudence.

Nargajuna, the second century AD Madhjamika philosopher said, when speaking of Naihsreyasa Dharma, that Buddhist philosophy was a subtle and profound vision which terrify the foolish who are not

30 J R Carter, Dharma, Western Academie and Singhalese Buddhist Interpretations. A Study of a Religious Concept, Hokusaido Press 1979. p171ff

31 R F Gombrich, The Duty of a Buddhist According to the Pali Scriptures, in W D O Flaherty and J M Devett, The Concept of Duty in South Asia, Vikas 1978, pp107ff

32 ER Publishing Corp 1987

33 All Gita quotes are from Swami Swarupananda's Shrimad Bhagavad Gita, The Indian Press Pvt Ltd 1982



prepared for it (Ratnavali I 25) and which cannot be expressed in words.

### Nairatmya

Nairatmya is the truth that I am not, I will not be, I have nothing nor will I have. In other words, it is the truth of no self (2). Without the medium of the skandhas the I cannot be seen (3) and as long as there is the assumption of the skandhas there is the assumption of the I and as long as the latter exists there is action which will lead to rebirth (3)<sup>34</sup>

Everything when analysed is related (dependent) on another and so nothing is a thing in itself and cannot ever be so. Nothing is identical with anything, nor is it differentiated; nothing comes into existence, nor goes out and nothing is terminated nor permanent<sup>35</sup>

As Murti states; "Nairatmya provides a firm basis for universal altruistic ethics, because it leaves no room for differentiation of oneself from another. In this context the concept of samata (sameness) is important. Really there is no difference between the Buddha and phenomenal existence, there is a sameness between oneself and others. My suffering affects me because of attachment to myself and another's suffering affects him and not me for the same reason. As there is no uniqueness about me in as much as all beings desire happiness and hate suffering let fear and suffering be destroyed in all and not just in particular cases.

(And) Because of the sameness of beings and of their existential situation there is an organic unity of existence and suffering.<sup>37</sup>

In chapter 9, of the Vimalakirtinirdesha sutta, the "Dharma Door of Non Duality," Vimalakirti states that we are taught that the world has the nature of voidness, so there is neither transcendence nor involvement; neither progress nor standstill. Thus, neither to transcend nor to be involved, neither to go nor to stop—this is the entrance to non duality. Thus Samsara and nirvana are aspects of the same.

A B Creel points out that Dharma in Hinduism is what underlies and creates law in the universe.<sup>38</sup> But dharmashastra works do not enter into any subtle or detailed examination of the principles of

34 K S Murti, *Naihsreyana Dharma*, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies 1984 p3

35 Murti pp7-8

36 Murti pp17-18

37 Murti pp19f

38 A B Creel, *Dharma in Hindu Ethics*, Firma KLM Pvt Ltd, 1971, p3



ethics. However, this does not make India unethical-the highest philosophies were meant to show the way to salvation and not a plan of life's derivivity.<sup>39</sup>

It may be said that writers on Philosophy take for granted a life lived according to the dictates of Dharma and ethics do not therefore form a separate branch of Indian philosophy.

Dharma can also be seen as the constituents of the universe. In the Abhidharma traditions there arose a distinction between conventional (samvriti) and ultimate (paramartha) truth. The former is the world in which we live, the latter are the elements which really compose the world of our experience. These building block are the dharmas. Thus in the Theravada tradition there are 81 conditioned and one unconditioned (nirvana) dharma. In the Sarvastivadan tradition 72 conditioned and 3 unconditioned.

In the realm of ethics the Theravada Abhidharma includes:

25 morally good dharmas

14 morally bad

13 morally neutral dharmas.

All of which are mental constituents thus showing the importance of mind in Buddhist ethics.<sup>40</sup>

### Karma

We now move on to the concept of karma.

This doctrine can be summed up in the phrase "a man is born into the world he has made. (Satpatha Brahmana XII 9. 11)<sup>41</sup>

However, it is Buddha Dharma which is said to be controlling the universe. It is the moral order. Reliance on this alone, according to the Buddha, makes the agent free from all suffering. Dharma is, figuratively, "king of kings" (AN III)<sup>42</sup>

By Buddha Dharma we mean the teachings and way of the Buddha. The tathagata is said to have the Dharma as his body, (the Dharmakaya is one of the triple bodies, trikayas, of the Mahayana concept of the Buddha in which he might be said to be the manifestation of Dharma) and the Brahman as his being, to be one with Dharma is to be one with Brahman (DN III 84, 81). This, according to

39 Raju Philosophical Trends in Twentieth Century India, Revue International de Philosophie vol 37 p268

40 P Williams, Mahayana Buddhism, Routledge 1989 pp14-15

41 N C Padhi, Karma and Freedom, Upugupta Publications, 1986 p 60

42 Padhi op cit P 168.



Padhi, clearly indicates that he speaks of the moral order, not the metaphysical order, as the tathagata concept stands for an embodiment of moral ideal and the term Brahman stands for expansiveness. What controls our life is the moral order which for Buddhism is the karmic principle.<sup>43</sup>

The principle of karma is laid down in the adage "as ye sow so shall ye reap"; all actions are dependent. (The wheel of becoming traditionally starts with the idea that ignorance generates karma) So the moral aspect of the law of karma is stressed by the Buddha.

Three types of action are possible;

- 1 Bodily—kayakamma
- 2 Speech—vicikamma
- 3 Mind—manokamma

A good human action results in success and a bad results in suffering. (Though, since all karma which has any effect must lead to rebirth in order for its consequences to be fulfilled and since all existence in samsara is suffering, it might be argued that all karma results in suffering.) Thus righteousness is engraved into reality.

Actions are seen as significant in terms of volition. "I say monks that cetana is karma; having thoughts of intention, a person performs an action by body, word or thought". (A3. 415) As Buddhagosa says, in talking, of killing five factors are involved: a living being, the perception of a living being, a thought of killing, the action of carrying it out, and death as a result. The karmic result is also worse the more spiritually advanced the victim according to Buddhagosa. (Papancaśudani Sutta 9) Though the five greatest sins are to deliberately cause blood to flow from the body of the tathagata, to kill an arhat, to kill ones parents or to cause a schism in the sangha. Buddhagosa deals with morality in the visuddhimagga. Though, of this 161 verse work only seven percent is devoted to morality and the rest is split, more or less evenly into wisdom and mediation. Nevertheless, it is still the largest Hinayana work on morality. On the question of what is morality it answers that it is:

- 1 Cetana—willful action
- 2 Cetasikam—observance of non greed, non hatred and non-delusion
- 3 Avitkhamo—non transgression by body, speech and mind
- 4 Samvara—restraint assisted by:

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43 Padhi Ibid.



## Some Aspects of Buddhist Ethics

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- a Patimokha
- b Sali—mindfulness
- c Nana—knowledge
- d Shanti...peace
- e viriya—zeal

The first two are lay and the third and fourth monastic moralities.

We can summarize Buddhagosa's conclusion on sila in the Visud-dhimagga as follows

1 Basic lay morality— 10kammapathas	Monastic morality patimokkha
2 Resolving to avoid evil and do good	Avoiding evil and doing good
3 Being motivated by guilt ottapa	and embarrassment hiri
4 Mundane morality performed for an ulterior motive sila as means to an end	Supermundane morality by sotapannas etc with no ulterior motive sila as an end in itself.

The ten good paths of action (dasa kammapatha) are to refrain from:

- 1 Taking life
- 2 Taking what has not been given
- 3 Misconduct in sexual relations
- 4 Lying
- 5 Slandorous speech
- 6 Harsh Speech and to be:
- 7 Non covetous
- 8 Non Malevolent
- 9 To hold right views

However, bad actions are committed through the influence of the klesas of greed (raga), hatred (dosa) and delusion (moha). A good deed for a bad reason is karmically bad. There are also unconscious motives which derive from ignorance:

- 1 desire to extend ones live(jivitukamma)
- 2 desire to avoid death (amaritukamma)
- 3 desire to maximise pleasure (sukkhakamma)
- 4 desire to avoid pain (dukkhatikula)

Karma can be categorised according to colours. Black karma leads to bad results, white to good results, black and white to mixed results and neither black nor white leads to no result but rather to the exhaustion of karma through being motivated neither by desire



nor for self gain but by the volition to renounce self centered behaviour.

It can be also classified with reference to its time of operation

- 1 Immediately effective
- 2 Subsequently effective
- 3 Indefinitely effective
- 4 Ineffective

Life is therefore a series of aggregates (skandhas) kept going by the power of karma performed by the individual.

P Chandra states that the doctrine of karma is compatible with the doctrine of the lack of self. The doctrine of no self is purely a logical consequence of the fundamental doctrine of universal impermanence and the causal production of all phenomena. Early Buddhists treated the Self as part of the phenomenal world and not beyond it. Presumably he means that there is nothing over and above the skandhas. Chandra sees Buddhism as denying the static nature of the self, not its reality. He is wrong, of course, Buddhism does deny the self<sup>44</sup>. It can be seen in the simile of the stream. Life can be seen as being like a stream which is in a continuous state of flux. Just as an event upstream effects things further down so an event karmically effects later lives.<sup>45</sup> Or rebirth has been likened to the changing of a light bulb. The stream of life continues like the flow of electricity. Nagasena gives a similar reply to King Milindha when he says that the flame of a lamp that burns through the watches of the night is not the same flame though they all come from the same lamp.<sup>46</sup>

We will now look at some specific schools.

The Sarvastivadins believed that past, present and future exist simultaneously. Events of life move from future into present then past. So life states function in the present, they exist in their own nature (svabava) at all times. (Though surely nothing is existent by its own nature but is dependent). So a human action continues to exist after its eventing in the present and can continue to from the past to affect the present skandhas. They also believed in a glue like entity called prapti (possession) which inserted various events in the life series of a person.

44 Samsara is characterised, inter alia, by change and dependent origination: the self is unchanging and thereby cannot be part of the phenomenal world.

45 P Chandra, *Metaphysics of Perpetual Change*, Somaiya 1978 p 179

46 T. W. Rhys Davids, *The Questions of King Milinda*, SBE vol 35, Motilal Banarsidas, 1982 p64.



The Sautrantikas rejected this theory as they saw the prapti theory as leading to a series of infinite regress. For them events last a moment but leave behind a potential (bija-seed) which can manifest itself and effect (vasana--perfume) the individuals life.

The only way to escape from all forms of rebirth is to bring karma to an end which requires the rooting out of all tanha<sup>47</sup> and raga.

Rajagirikas and Sihdhartikas held that everything was determined by kamma including kamma itself. An absolutely fatalistic view that approaches the Ajivika,

The Andhakas held that since land served to fulfill the enjoyment of prosperity and sovereignty and since rebirth into a prosperous or kshatriya life was the result of good kamma then land must be kamma vipaka.<sup>48</sup>

Moving on to the Mahayanists we find that Nagajuna rejected the theory of cause and effect on the basis that if cause and effect are the same then cause and effect are meaningless and the infinite regress of what causes the cause to produce the effect can arise and, even if there was production, would not the fact that cause and effect are the same lead to reduplication and thus fill the world with identical objects?

Furthermore, if cause and effect are different, then if cause exists before effect how can there be any connection between them. (Hume states in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Book 1 Section VI, that "Tis therefore by experience only, that we can infer the existence of one object from that of another" and goes on in the same section to talk of "a new relation betwixt cause and effect"—"This relation is their constant conjunction").

If cause and effect exist at the same time, then how can one cause the other. But if they do not exist at the same time than there will always be a gap between different objects and than gap between the connecting object and what it connects which leads to another infinite regress.

Cause and effect connects discrete entities and this is rejected by Nagajuna in favour of the theory that all entities are empty(sunya)<sup>49</sup> of separateness or independence (svabhava-self existence). All

47 Desire. see p 23 on Dependent Origination.

48 S N Dube, *Cross Currents in Early Buddhism*, Manohar 1980 pp 334-6.

49 All composite things are like a dream-Diamond sutra in *D T Suzuki Manual of Zen Buddhism* Rider 1983.



things are interdependent, nothing exists by its ownself nature, and this, for Nagajuna, is what is meant by dependent origination. Thus there is the doctrine of the two truths that things exist conventionally but not ultimately.<sup>50</sup>

The Yogacara school had the concept of the three natures (tri-svabhava) namely the imagined, dependent and perfected nature and for them the world was a mind creation through the result of karma—a world created by a force of actions-unreal like a magic illusion.<sup>51</sup> For the Yogacapist the whole of existence is the product of karma and the fact that beings seem to see the same world is the result of similar karma.<sup>52</sup>

Paradoxically, in popular Theravada Buddhism the concept of transference of merit (good karma) from one individual to another exists. For, the individuals place in the hierarchy of suffering has, to his mind, been conditioned by past karma. The individual can also act in a morally responsible way to enhance his virtue or power and ensure a good rebirth. But he also has a social imperative as a committed member of society. The idea of merit transference makes possible the accommodation of the Buddhist theory of karma with the social imperative.<sup>53</sup> There is also the constant appeal of the writers of Mahayana works that their efforts may benefit all living beings. And the whole of the bodhisattva's life may be said to be one of merit transfer as he holds back his advancement to nirvana by returning to the world.

50 D W Mitchell, Karma in Buddhist Thought in S S Rama Rao, The Dimensions of Karma, Chanakya Publications 1987 pp 66-94

51 See A T Hopkinson, The Concept of Idealism and Time in Yogacara, Kant and Berkeley, Darshana International XXVIII, No 4 pp 13ff.

52 To give a similar idea from the Zen sutras: "Buddhas and sentient beings grow out of One Mind, and there is no other reality than this Mind... When bodhi is realised, your own Mind, which is Buddha, is realised. Huang Po's Sermon from the Treatise on the Essentials of the Transmission of Mind in Suzuki op cit p 112ff.

53 G F Keyes, Merit Transference in the Kammic Theory of Popular Theravada Buddhism, in C. F. Keyes and E V Daniel, Karma, An Anthropological Inquiry, University of California Press 1983 p 283.



## *A Critical Survey of the Platonic and Aristotelian Conception of Truth*

*Ravindra Kumar*

The concept of truth is an integral notion of the problem of knowledge; any endeavour to know reality involves the notion of truth. Infact, no epistemological study can be comprehensive unless the key concept of truth is discussed. It is this that in any philosophical enquiry truth has been a subject of major concern for any thinker in the West as well as in the East. In the western tradition the concept of knowledge and in the Indian tradition the concept of Prama imply the concept of truth. This agreement does not, however, mean that they agree in toto about the meaning of truth. There are a number of theories propounding the meaning and criterion of truth. As it is very difficult to give an account of each one of them in a short article, I have attempted here to present one of them in the earliest phases of the history of western philosophy.

In the west a distinct and significant trend regarding the meaning of truth can be traced for the first time in Plato and Aristotle. They realised the importance of clarifying the meaning of the concept of truth in order to construct a satisfactory theory of knowledge. I like to point out here that even when they have not defined truth in so many words but a clear trend regarding the criterion of truth is visible in their writings. I wish to mention in the very start of the article that both Plato and Aristotle advocate the correspondence theory of truth in regard to ascertain truth. It may be objected in the case of Plato that if his account of truth can be termed as the correspondence theory of truth as the term 'correspondence' is lacking in so far as his theory of truth is concerned but in essence he accepts the basic requirements of the theory, I have termed his notion of truth as correspondence theory of truth. Let us now see what the correspondence theory is?



The correspondence theory of truth, in its broadest sense, accepts a relation between what people asserts or thinks on the one hand and somethings else which may be fact, a situation, an event or the like on the other hand. And the relation is accepted as the relation of 'agreeing with' or 'corresponding to' between the two. In other words, the exponents of correspondence theory of truth believe that a true thought is one which corresponds to a fact, state of affairs, a situation or whatever. Thus, it involves two factors, one internal and other external. Let us discuss the theories of Plato and Aristotle and see if they fall in the category discussed above. I, now begin with the existence theory truth propounded by Plato.

### Plato : Existence Theory of Truth.

In Plato's writings the term 'truth' has been used in both metaphysical and epistemological senses. In his metaphysical concept of truth he has accepted it as ultimately real but when considers truth as an epistemological concept he believes that true knowledge is the knowledge of reality. I am emphasising the epistemological side here as I am not principally concerned in the metaphysical side. To know reality is to acquire true knowledge. According to Plato, knowledge is expressed in judgement. We express ourselves in the form of judgement in order to assert something. In the process of framing a true judgement plato believes that soul enters into a discourse with itself and asks itself questions and answers them and takes a decision<sup>1</sup>. In this manner Plato believes that judgement involves contemplation.

When Plato says judgement involves contemplation, he is clear that a judgement is always based on careful selection from the two aspects for he who judges onething judges the other also. It is why, judging is an establishment of a relation either affirmative or negative between two aspects. We may not agree with Plato's analysis of judgement but it is important that he considers truth as an attribute of judgement. Infact, in answer to the question, what is true or false, Plato would say that truth and falsity are ascribed to a judgement. So it is a two factored concept. But when is a judgement true?

Plato has answered this question in 'Theaetetus', when he says that inorder to apprehend the truth, apprehension of truth is essential. Hence, the knowledge of reality is a precondition for the knowledge of truth, according to him. It is clear from the dialogue between socrates and Theaetetus when Plato writes:-

1 Theaetetus in *The Work of Plato* ed; Henary cary, G. Bell and Sons, London, 1890. pp. 428-29.



Socrates: For is it possible to apprehend truth that of which we cannot apprehend the existence?

Theaetetus: Impossible<sup>2</sup>

It is clear from Plato's account of the concept of truth that he believes in the correspondence theory of truth as he admits.. that a true judgement is directed towards something existing and a false judgement towards something not existing.

Plato's version of the correspondence theory of truth has been called 'the existence theory of truth'.<sup>3</sup> But Plato does not consistently admit that in all cases the truth or falsity of judgement is based on existence of a thing. It becomes clear when we consider Plato's account of false judgement. According to him, whereas a true judgement refers to an existent thing; a false judgement need not to an existent thing. In the case of false judgement, it is different from judging thing that do not exist. In Theaetetus Plato spells out several alternatives of a false judgement. According to him, we may fall in the trap of a false judgement when our judgement is mistaken. In other words, it may be due to judging something as real object for same other real object. In modern psychology, judgement of this kind happens to be based on an illusory perception. Further a false judgement may also be due to the fact that one has something in the mind whereas the thing is nothing. This kind of false judgement happens to be based on hallucinatory perception. If we consider these different types of false judgements, it is obvious that in all the cases of false judgement reference to an existent object is not necessary. Therefore, Plato believes in existence theory of truth but he does not believe in existence theory of falsity.

Plato's notion of truth may be gleaned from his dialogue 'Sophist' also. He has mentioned the following two propositions—

(i) Theaetetus is sitting down

(ii) Theaetetus is flying<sup>4</sup>

The proposition (i) affirms what is, whereas proposition (ii) affirms what is not. On the basis of affirming 'what is' the notion of truth can be explained and on the basis of affirming 'What is not' the notion of falsity can be explained. Aristotle has generalised this point and has given a classical definition of truth. Infact, all varieties of correspondence theory of truth can be traced to Aristotelian conception

<sup>2</sup> *The Encyclopedia of philosophy*, Vol. II (ed.) Paul and others, Macmillan Company and The Free Press, New York, p. 224.

<sup>3</sup> Henry Cary, op.cit. p. 427.

<sup>4</sup> Sophists-Politikus in *Plato and other Companions of Socrates*, by G. Grote, F.R.S. II<sup>nd</sup> ed. London. p. 454.



of truth which itself finds its clue from Plato's point of view presented here. No doubt, we do not find any explicit use of the word 'correspondence' or any other equivalent term in Plato's explanation of the theory of truth, his use of the words 'judgement' and 'reference of judgement' is sufficient to place him as an exponent of correspondence theory of truth. What other relation except correspondence can explained the relation between the two terms. Therefore, the correspondence theory of truth can be traced back to plato's account of truth and inspite of its being inconsistent, rudimentary and undeveloped it has provided a basis to Aristotle's theory of truth. Therefore, I intend to take up Aristotle's view of truth as it has been developed from plato's version.

### Aristotle: Correspondence Theory of Truth.

Aristotle's formulation of the notion of truth has been regarded as the starting point for all varieties of the correspondence theory. Even the modern semantic theory of truth is regarded to originate from Aristotle.<sup>5</sup>

Credit for formulating the laws of logic in clear and unambiguous terms goes to Aristotle. Infact, his other epistemological discussions mainly arise out of his concern for logic. A true judgement, according to plato, is formed on the basis of speculation where one selects between the two aspects but Aristotle formulates it on the basis of law of excluded middle when he says that there can not be anything between two contradictories but of any one subject.<sup>6</sup> In course of justification for the law of excluded middle, Aristotle defines truth in the following word:

'To say what is that is not or of  
What is not that it is, is false while to  
say of what is that is, and what is  
not that it is not true'<sup>7</sup>

The three laws of logic (i) Law of identity (ii) Law of non-contradiction and (iii) the Law of excluded middle have been stated as the laws of thoughts. Aristotle is aware of this fact as he considers the question of truth and falsity in respect of thought. According to him, it is thought that affirms or denies every object of thought. Therefore,

5 Tarski, A, *The Semantic Conception of Truth in Semantics and the philosophy of Language* (ed.) Linsky, L., University of Illinois Press at Urbana, 1952. p. 15.

6 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* (trans)-Hippocrates B. Apostle. Book I, 7, Indiana University Press, 1966, p. 70.

7 *Ibid* p. 70



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thought either thinks truly or falsely. It means, Aristotle has argued that 'when he connects in one way by asserting or denying it thinks truly and when in the other way it thinks falsely'.<sup>8</sup>

Aristotle explains his account of truth when he says that it is impossible for being the contradictories either only true or only false. It would amount to annihilation of the stand point so asserted. For example, 'Every thing is true', this statement speaks something about both contradictories. It means that the statement which is contrary to this statement would also be true and contrary to statement 'Every thing is true' is the statement 'Every thing is false'. Assertion of the first statement amounts to annihilation of the second statement. Similarly, he who says that 'Every thing is false' makes also his own statement false. Although, Aristotle's account is concerned primarily with the formulation of these laws of thought in the sense of formulating laws for consistent thinking they are not divorced from reality. Aristotle has connected the notion of truth and falsity with 'being' and 'not being'. He considers 'being' as truth and non-being as false. To him, if it is a being it exists and if it exists, it is true; similarly if it is non-being, it does not exist and if it does not exist then it is false. In this sense, Aristotle has propounded 'the correspondence theory of truth', though his notion of falsity gives rise to several serious objections.

Indeed, it requires a serious consideration to accept Aristotelian account of the nature of truth based on the principle of excluded middle. It seems that the main connection of the principle of the excluded middle is subject to certain qualifications. The demand for these qualifications does not come from the multivalued logicians or from other modern logicians, having adopted some new formal principles if the principle of excluded middle is applied then we have to admit that every meaningful statement is either true or false. But feature of ordinary speech does not agree to it. By the expression ordinary speech is meant the way on empiricative sentence is uttered. The sentence, "All Smith's children are girls", is meaningful, and, the principle of excluded middle asserts that every meaningful statement is either true or false. Hence, the sentence, "All Smith's children are girls" would express a true statement if Smith had children and if all his children were girls. In the same way the sentence would express a false statement if Smith and children had if one of the children was a boy. But Smith had no children then the sentence would express a statement which would be neither true nor false. It is, therefore, the

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. p. 72

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. pp. 158, 59.



principle that every meaningful statement is either true or false hardly stands to the test of the features of ordinary speech and critics have argued that the principle of excluded middle which has been the ground of Aristotelian account of the nature of truth needs certain qualifications. It must be made clear that the sentence 'Smells must be either white or not white' is different from the sentence, 'All Smith's children are girls'. The former sentence is not meaningful as it suffers from 'category mistake' and objection raised in the case of latter sentence is trivial as in the case of former sentence. The principle of excluded middle does not assert that every objections must meaningfully apply to every subject. The primary condition of Aristotelian principle of truth and falsity is that the statement must be meaningful. In the case of 'Smells must be either white or not white', this primary condition has not fulfilled, the statement is not meaningful. Hence, two cases. I have mentioned should not be confused.

It is clear from the study of the Platonic and Aristotelian account of truth that the quest for ascertaining the true nature of the concept of truth has engaged the philosophers since the beginning of philosophical enquiry. The Greek thinkers specially Plato and Aristotelian realised the importance of clarifying the meaning of the concept of truth in order to construct a satisfactory theory of knowledge. Although Aristotle can be named to have clearly paid down the correspondence theory of truth, we cannot minimise the contribution and importance of Plato's account. Plato's version that a true judgement refers to an existent thing seems to be the basis of the theory and that has been accepted by the propounders of all varieties of the theory. But when he says that a false judgement refers to a non-existent thing, his account of truth deviates from normally accepted correspondence theory Aristotle has tried to free his account of truth from this type of deficiency. According to Aristotle, the law of excluded middle asserts that of the two contradictory qualities one must be true, it, however does not asserts that which of them is true and which of them is false. So, the principle of correspondence cannot be applied to things stated as false. All the same these deviations do not minimise the importance of his formulation as we find that some of the advocates of correspondence theory admit to have derived their ideas from Aristotle. In fact, the account of truth by Plato and Aristotle seems to be starting point of all varieties of the correspondence theory. In discussing the nature and criterion of the truth the two masters have opened a new perspective and that is what philosophy demands.



## Necessity and Related Issues

P. R. Bhatt

This paper is an attempt to justify the thesis that there are necessary statements knowable *a posteriori*. The attempt is largely Kripkean in spirit.<sup>1</sup> However, we feel that some of the insights of Moore could be of much help in our discussion. For convenience, we divide the essay into following sections. In *Section I*, we deal with Moore's concept of a simple notion with a view to employ this notion in a wider context. *Section II* is fully devoted for the appraisal of Kripke's notion of *rigidity* and related issues: We find certain basic difficulties in accepting Kripke's notion of rigidity. We suggest certain modifications to his notion of the rigid designator in *Section III*. We argue that it is only those terms which express simple notions designating some existents are rigid. We call such terms 'rigid simples' for convenience. Finally, we deal with necessary statements knowable *a posteriori* in *Section IV*.

To begin with, let us, clarify certain terminological preferences and related issues so that one understands the thread of our arguments. The phrase 'possible world' has been used by philosophers in two distinct senses: Kripke uses the phrase to refer to something that is stipulative,<sup>2</sup> where as, traditionally philosophers have used the phrase to refer to ontological alternatives. We do not consider stipulative possible worlds seriously for the following reasons: (a) What one stipulates wholly depends on what one wants to stipulate. That

<sup>1</sup> We limit our discussion to Kripke's position in "Identity and Necessity" in *Naming, Necessity, And Natural Kinds*, Stephen P. Schwartz (Ed.), (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 66-101; and *Naming And Necessity* first published in G. Harman and D. Davidson (Eds.), *Semantics Of Natural Language*, (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1972), revised and enlarged edition (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980).

<sup>2</sup> For the view that possible worlds are stipulative see *Naming And Necessity*, pp. 15-20; 44; 49.



being so, such a stipulated possible world cannot reveal anything that is worth knowing which one does not already know. (b) All the unstipulated possibilities would have no place in one's possible world scenario if we are to consider possible worlds as stipulative. That is to say, one conveniently eliminates all those possible situations and possible worlds from one's consideration which are problematic. Hence, what matters to us are only the ontological alternatives.

A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all ontologically alternative worlds where ever the object designated exists. And a simple notion would be one which cannot be analyzed, defined or understood in terms of other notions. A term which is used for expressing a simple notion would be a simple term. A term is considered to be rigid or otherwise on the basis of what it designates, and it is considered to be simple or otherwise on the basis of its meaning, i.e., the notion it expresses. And if a term is both rigid and simple, we call it *rigid simple* for the sake of convenience. Proper names, natural kind terms, names of certain qualities, names of units of measurements are some examples of rigid simples.

The proper name 'Tully', being a rigid simple, would designate the same man in all ontologically alternative worlds according to our view. The same is true of 'Cicero'. Hence, the identity statement 'Tully is Cicero' is necessary, i.e., the statement is true in all relevant ontologically alternative worlds. Such worlds in this case are those where the person named 'Tully' exists.

'Tully' means the same as 'Cicero', namely the person named after these words, and since both the terms cannot change their meanings in any ontologically alternative world as they express simple notions, the statement ought to be true in all possible worlds due to the very meanings of the terms. That is, the identity statement is analytic, and is true due to the very meanings of the constituent words, even in a possible world where Tully does not exist.

The thesis mentioned above, though attractive, is not fully acceptable, for the following reasons; (a) We believe that the truth value of an identity statement between two proper names could be discovered empirically. If the statement is true because of the very meanings of the terms involved, then we cannot claim that the truth value of the statement is discovered empirically. (b) We do not expect any two proper names to denote the same person as a matter of pragmatic rule, unless specified to the contrary. Users of natural language believe in the economy of words for pragmatic reasons. The ceremony of naming is performed only when it is necessary. It is generally assumed that an occasion to name a person arises only if one



lacks a name, or a special circumstance demands a new name. Under normal circumstances, an identity statement between any two names is to be taken as false, unless proven to be true. (c) The position that an identity statement is only an analytic statement if it is true, is not acceptable to us, for we believe in the possibility of metaphysical statements.

Yet, with certain reservations, we can accept the thesis that an identity statement between two proper names is analytic. The truth value of such statements could be claimed to follow from the very meanings and rules of the constituent words. But, we have already noted that there is a tendency to treat an identity statement between two proper names to be false unless stated otherwise. In the first place, if we do not know that the identity statement, 'Tully is Cicero' is true, the statement is synthetic for us. And, if we know the truth value of the statement already, there is no advantage in claiming the statement to be analytic.

But, the statement would not be simply analytic if it is true; it would be necessary in the metaphysical sense as well. The conception of metaphysical necessity includes the sense that it is true in the actual world *necessarily*; however, it cannot be false in any possible world. A crucial difference between an analytic and a metaphysical statement would be that an analytic statement is true only in the actual world given the logico-linguistic rules of the constituent words, while a metaphysical statement is true in all relevant ontologically alternative worlds regardless of the logico-linguistic rules for the uses of constituent words. It does not make much sense to say that analytic statements are true even in possible worlds.

If one could stipulate a possible world in such a manner that the statement 'Tully is Cicero' is false due to the fact that Cicero is a different person in that possible world, or for some such reason, then it is a valid objection to Kripke's theory. This is so because he considers possible worlds to be stipulative and one is free to stipulate a possible world in a manner in which the identity statement is false. However, he thinks that this is not possible. For Kripke, the fact that a proper name is rigid, implies that it designates the same person in all stipulated possible worlds. Kripke believe wrongly that this follows from the very notion of a rigid designator. He cannot show that the identity statement is not false in a stipulated possible world if the name 'Tully' designates some one else other than Tully in a possible world. He cannot prove that the term 'Tully' is a homonym<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Kripke believes that homonyms do not refute rigid designation theory. Note here what Kripke has to say: Some have mistakenly thought that the simple fact that two people can have the



even if the name designates a different person in a possible world. The causal theory<sup>4</sup> does not help Kripke in identifying homonyms since there cannot be causal chains in a possible world and counterfactual situations. The properties of objects designated by names do not help him to identify homonyms as no property is essential to an object. Contingent properties of the object designated which function as criteria for<sup>5</sup> fixing the referent of a name, need not be the same always; and hence even criteria cannot be of any use in defining homonyms. Thus, even if the name 'Tully' designates a different person in a possible world than Tully himself, the fact that the term designates some one makes the person Tully for Kripke, because he has no grounds to declare the term to be a homonym.

Perhaps, being aware of the difficulties, Kripke prescribes an extra-linguistic rule for the uses of words as a correcting measure. He states that the terms be used with our meanings and our references in describing things in possible worlds. The success of Kripke's theory heavily depends on the uses of terms in a certain manner in describing things in different possible worlds: he expects that the terms be used keeping the meaning and reference unchanged.

We may note here that if an identity statement is false in a stipulated possible world, that may not have any serious implications for metaphysical statements in our view. For example, it is possible to claim that Tully is not Cicero in a stipulated possible world, which by no means is an ontologically alternative world, where one stipulates Cicero to be a different person in that possible world. This is possible because the stipulated possible world is a mental construct and in stipulating this possible world in such a manner one has stipulated a new use of the term 'Cicero.' Thus, one has first converted the name Cicero into a homonym, and then tried to show that the identity

same name refutes the rigidity thesis. See *Naming And Necessity*, pp. 7-8.

- 4 See *Naming And Necessity*, pp. 90-97; 139. Kripke's theory of proper names is popularly known as the Causal Theory. Please see "The Causal Theory of Names" by Gareth Evans in *Naming, Necessity And Natural Kinds* for a detailed version of this theory. This paper also appears in *The Philosophy Of Language*, A. P. Martinich (Ed.), (N. Y. : Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 292-304. It first appeared in *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Vol.* 47 (1973), pp. 187-201,
- 5 See *Naming And Necessity*, Lecture II, pp. 71-105. Kripke believes that the function of a criterion is to fix the reference. And he also claims that a criterion is a contingent property of an object that is used for identifying the object in a context. Also see "Identity And Necessity", pp. 92-93.



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statement could be false in that stipulated possible world. Unlike Kripke, we consider that rigid designators have meanings, and it is the meanings of such terms that make them rigid. No one would deny that if one uses a homonym in a sentence, the sentence could express two propositions, one being true, and the other being false, in two different contexts.

Nonetheless, we could discuss necessity in Kripkean sense. Kripke has maintained that the identity statement between the names 'Tully' and 'Cicero' is necessary in the weaker sense, for the reason that the identity statement is true in all possible worlds where Tully exists, and the statement has no truth value in a possible world where he does not exist.<sup>6</sup> We shall adopt this notion of weak necessity with the following modifications. Kripke's possible worlds are stipulative mental constructs; and according to him a necessary statement in the weaker sense is true in all those stipulative possible worlds where the designated object exists. On the other hand, we shall hold that a statement is necessary in the weaker sense of the term if it is true in all ontologically alternative worlds where the designated object exists. Thus, we shall understand by a 'necessary statement' a statement which is true in all relevant possible worlds, failing which the contingency of the statement gets established beyond any doubt.

One may opine that proving an identity statement between two rigid simples is necessary if the statement is true, is to prove only the obvious one. One may even add that this thesis has no philosophical merit for the following reasons: In the first place, the thesis is nothing but a conditional statement. It is a statement of the 'If.....then' form. And a necessary statement cannot be conditional; it must be categorical. In the second place, it may be said that we would be guilty of making metaphysical necessity subservient to epistemology by making necessity dependent on truth values which are epistemological notions.

Undoubtedly, a necessary statement cannot be a conditional statement. And the statements that are necessary in the weaker sense are not conditional statements. This doubt would be based on a misreading of our thesis on necessity. One may conceivably accuse Kripke of having maintained such a ridiculous thesis, as his possible worlds are not ontological alternatives, but convenient, stipulated worlds. However, our thesis is quite different from Kripke's. We

<sup>6</sup> Kripke would call an identity statement between names of existents *weakly* necessary if true, for the reason, that such statements do not have the truth value 'true' in possible worlds where the denoted do not exist. See *Naming And Necessity*, pp. 109-110. Also see "Identity and Necessity", p. 68.



claim that if there is a metaphysical statement which is necessary, then it must be true in our actual world; for, our actual world is one among the many ontological alternatives. Hence, the 'if' part of the statement, 'The identity statement between names is necessary, if it is true', should not be read as a condition for the truth of the statement, but rather, a situation where we discover the metaphysical necessity of the identity statement in the actual world. It would be quite correct to say that 'if' part of the thesis only functions as a criterion. If it were a statement of the 'If' have been the sufficient condition. It does not function one like that at all, because there are other conditions which must be fulfilled, such as, the condition that the terms should be rigid simples, for the statement to be necessary in the metaphysical sense.

### SECTION I

Moore held the view that some notions are simple and some are complex. He presents the following enumeration of simple and complex notions: (1) Simple notions cannot be defined.<sup>7</sup> There are only three types of definitions possible, he contends: (a) an arbitrary verbal definition, (b) verbal definition proper; and (c) what we may call *real* definition.<sup>8</sup> As the phrase itself suggests, an arbitrary definition would be one where we define a word to refer to something to which it normally does not. Defining a word in terms of its uses and usages elucidating the meaning of the term is verbal definition proper. And finally, a real definition of a word is the description on the *real* nature of the object or notion denoted by the word, which is not merely the description of the meaning of the word. A simple notion can be defined in the first two senses of (a) and (b). But one cannot provide a real definition of a simple notion according to Moore. (2) A complex notion is defined in terms of its properties and qualities all of which one can enumerate. But when we have enumerated them all, when we have reduced them all to simplest terms, then we can no longer define those terms.<sup>9</sup> For instance, we may define a horse in a certain manner: that it has four legs, a head, a heart, a liver, etc... all of them arranged in definite relations to one another. We could further define the parts of the horse, but this process would come to an end when we reach the simplest terms to be defined. We could define what is horse because we could identify different parts of a horse and the way they are interrelated.

7 For 'simple notion', see *Principia Ethica* by G.E. Moore, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1933), especially the first chapter.

8 See *Principia Ethica*, p. 8.

9 See *Principia Ethica*, pp. 7-8.



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There are many genuine doubts about Moore's concept of analysis or definition, and as a consequence, one is apprehensive about Moore's method of classifying notions into simple and complex. To mention only the pertinent ones: (1) Moore seems to maintain that one could describe a notion. He expects us to describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word while bestowing a definition. A notion is not a tangible thing like a horse with its discernible attributes. Therefore, a notion cannot be described in the manner in which one could describe a spatial and a temporal object signified by a word. At any rate, one could describe a notion indirectly. This is what one does when one provides an inventory of the uses of a word signifying a certain notion. (2) It appears that the distinction between the referent and the meaning of a word is blurred by Moore. As the referent of the term 'horse', we know only individual horses. The notion of the horse would be the meaning of the term 'horse' itself. And it is obviously frivolous to describe parts of meaning in the manner in which we describe parts of a living animal. The designated would have parts, but the notion of a horse cannot have parts in the same sense. A horse could be described displaying the relationship between different parts, but a notion cannot be described in any other manner than describing the uses and usages of the term 'horse'. Moore openly rejects this type of description of the notion of 'horse', by arguing that this would not be the real definition of 'horse'. If one is inspired by the account of a real definition given by Moore, one would never attempt a real definition of a quality or a property, since such things would not have parts. On the contrary, one would always claim that the definition of a substratum is a real definition, since a substratum would always have some distinguishable parts. (3) One would find subtle inconsistencies in his treatment of examples of simple and complex notions. For instance, he would vindicate the view that a horse<sup>10</sup> could be defined, while he would not grant that a color could be defined. While defining a horse he gives the description in general terms of a horse, i.e., he admits the possibility of reduction

<sup>10</sup> Moore uses the terms 'definition' and 'analysis' interchangeably. A proper definition of a notion is nothing but its analysis for Moore. What is analyzable and what is not, is not an issue which could be settled easily. This itself is a subject matter of serious study. Scholars agree that the notion of 'yellow' is simple, and therefore not analyzable: Moore gives 'horse' as an example of a complex notion. This, on our understanding, does not go well with Moore's position. This we believe is a slip. Moore was pre-occupied with ethical concepts and examples, and that could be one of the reasons for this slip. Moore is undoubtedly an acknowledged analyst, and a very cautious writer. His examples of 'right' and 'duty' as complex notions are not controversial.



of an abstract notion into a tangible entity with parts; however, while discussing the definition of the color 'yellow', he rejects the physicist's account of colors in terms of their wave lengths of light. In fact, the physicist is doing nothing else but to reduce an inexplicable notion into a measurable, tangible entity.

We could altogether ignore Moore's discussion on 'analysis' and 'definition'. One need not follow Moore literally; one can appreciate the spirit with which he addressed himself to the problem of simple and complex notions. The main point that Moore makes forcefully and repeatedly in *Principia Ethica* is that there are certain notions which are quite basic and unique. Comprehension of such notions in terms of other notions is impossible. They ought to be acquired independently. What is the core of the notion of simple is that it is irreducible. And therefore, it cannot be defined in terms of other notions. Verbal definition proper would give us the uses of terms, and such definitions help us to understand the meanings of terms. But this does not amount to reducing a notion to some other notions. If that were so, since all verbal definitions are nothing but definitions of one word in terms of others, one would express only an identity statement about meaning while defining a term. We may sometimes define a word in terms of two or more words. And this process ends when we exhaust all the verbal definitions of words. Note that the same identity statement about meaning gets expressed in different verbal definitions. In this process, one would go round in a circular way establishing identity statements about meaning again and again without ever finding the relationship between the language and reality. Moreover, defining each word in terms of other words would be nothing but an act of foolishness burdening the speakers of natural language with unnecessary words. Users of natural language always believe in economy of words. Quine is of the opinion that there is no redundancy of words in natural language.<sup>11</sup> Thus, we may conclude: though Moore thinks that verbal definition proper can provide us an account of the meanings of words defined, it would not be so at least in the case of terms which express simple notions. One cannot provide any verbal definition explaining the meaning of terms which express simple notions.<sup>12</sup>

11 See "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" by E. V. O. Quine, in *From a Logical Point of View* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953, 1961), pp. 20-46.

12 We depart from Moore's position here. Though 'good' is a simple notion, a proper verbal definition of 'good' explaining the meaning of the term could be given according to Moore. See *Principia Ethica*, p. 6. We believe that verbal definition proper



## SECTION II

Kripke believes that a rigid designator possesses no such thing as meaning which could determine its reference. However, he believes that one could successfully designate the same thing in all possible worlds by using a name. What would constitute the customary meaning of a rigid designator is not made clear by Kripke. The issue does not seem to bother him much. One does not find any coherent account of meaning of the terms which are rigid designators in his writings, except some stray remarks to the effect that he does not deny the customary meaning of words including proper names.<sup>13</sup> He does not seem to need meanings of words to tag them on to the objects, not only in the real world but also in the possible worlds. In his approach, initially this function of linking words with objects is assigned to criteria which are contingent properties of objects. Once a word and an object are linked in this manner in our actual world, Kripke does not seem to think that they have to be connected again in different possible worlds.<sup>14</sup> The implicit belief in his account is that if a word and an object are linked once, this linkage can never fail in the case of rigid designators.

Kripke's proclaimed thesis is that initially we need a criterion to fix the reference of a name, but subsequently, we could designate the same object without needing any criterion even in changed circumstances. Merely by using the name without assuming that the names have any meanings, one could successfully designate the bearer of the name according to him. This view, however, is ultimately untenable. Nothing that falls short of a simple notion, can, in principle, meet

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also fails to give the account of the meaning of simple terms. A proper verbal definition of 'good' when given would be nothing but the definition of *the* good. Moore believed that *the* good, i.e., that which is good, could be defined. See *Principia Ethica*, pp. 8-9.

- 13 Kripke is interested in restoring our intuitions about proper names in our theory of names. He is interested in giving a better picture of the situation. He does not hold the view that names have no meaning at all. See *Naming And Necessity*, pp. 32; 119; 138. He makes the following remarks in foot note 58: "...names do have a (partial) sense after all, though their senses may not be complete enough to determine their references, ...", p. 115.
- 14 This is the basic idea of a rigid designator. Once the word and object relationship is established with the help of a criterion, whether at the time of baptizing or subsequently, there is no need to find the word and object relationship every time one uses the name, and it is not necessary that one should know a criterion to identify the object denoted by the name before using a name.



the requirements of a rigid designator. It is only the terms which are associated with simple notions signifying certain existents could be rigid designators.

Identity across possible worlds is at the heart of the issue of rigidity. The notion of rigidity is introduced by Kripke to successfully avoid the issue of the criteria for transworld identity of things.<sup>15</sup> Taking Kripke at his word, we may think that transworld identity is not a genuine issue for him. But this would certainly be an overestimate. He believes in the dictum that *every thing is what it is*. He opines that it follows from the dictum, that Aristotle is Aristotle even in the possible worlds, irrespective of the properties he has in those possible worlds. This dictum is the basis on which the thesis that proper names are rigid designators, viz., they designate the same things in different possible worlds is maintained. It is opined that, there is no need to find a criterion to identify Aristotle in different Possible worlds as supposed by some philosophers.

Certainly, a thing is, what it is, but it need not be what we stipulate it to be. Aristotle is a philosopher, but he need not be one in a possible world. Aristotle may not have the attributes that we stipulate him to possess in a possible world. Surely, we can stipulate Aristotle to be the same person in a possible world; we can *also* stipulate the name Aristotle to designate a different person in a possible world. Both these views are compatible. One does not contradict the dictum that every thing is what it is either when one maintains that the name Aristotle designates a different person in a possible world. Kripke mistakenly thinks that one contradicts oneself by holding such a view. We do not, for instance, claim that Aristotle is a different person in a possible world, violating the *law of identity*. We claim, not as a matter of fact, but as a matter of stipulation, that the name 'Aristotle' designates someone other than Aristotle, in a possible world, even if Aristotle exists in that possible world. In fact, the dictum has no reference to the distinction between real and the possible worlds; it has much to do with the dichotomy between *appearance* and *reality*. By no means can we identify possible worlds with appearances, though this seems to entail from his position.

The dictum is quite valid is obvious; it is nothing but the law of identity itself. But, on the basis of this dictum, one cannot claim that Aristotle must possess the name 'Aristotle' in all possible worlds, though we could forcefully argue that Aristotle must be Aristotle in

15 Kripke believes that transworld identity is not a problem for rigid designation theory. See "Identity And Necessity", pp. 79-80, and *Naming And Necessity*, pp. 15-20; 49; 53.



all possible worlds where ever he exists without even specifying his attributes. The reason why the name 'Aristotle' could be used to designate different persons in different possible worlds when stipulated in a certain manner, is that the names are arbitrarily assigned to objects.

Being aware of the possibility of turning a name into an ambiguous word and thereby changing it into a non-rigid designator, Kripke puts an *extra-linguistic* condition on the users of natural language. He demands that in stipulating possible worlds, we should use *our* language with *our meaning* and *our reference*.<sup>16</sup> For instance, this condition allows one to use the word 'Aristotle' in talking about persons in possible worlds, only in a manner in which the word necessarily designates Aristotle in those possible worlds. Besides, if one does not stipulate his existence in a possible world, one is to declare that the name has no reference in that possible world. By imposing such a condition on the users of natural language, Kripke has made sure that one cannot produce a counter example to his rigid designation theory. For example, if one adheres to this stipulated condition, one cannot produce the following as a counter example: In a possible world, Tully does not possess the name 'Tully', but some one else has this name; and therefore, 'Tully' does not always designate Tully in all possible worlds.

By imposing this extra-linguistic condition on the users on natural language, Kripke has impaired his own thesis. He is, in fact eager to show that the identity statement between names if true in the actual world, would be true in all the possible worlds where the object named exists, not as a matter of stipulation, but as a matter of metaphysical necessity.<sup>17</sup> He cannot hold this if he sticks to his extra-linguistic condition. The condition has a crucial role to play in his account. It ensures that possible worlds are stipulated only in the manner in which an identity statement between rigid designators would be true in those possible worlds if the statement is true in the actual world. In fact, this extra-linguistic condition acquires the status of a *linguistic rule* while using our words in describing things in possible worlds. Due to this additional rule about the uses of words, it deductively follows that an identity statement which is true in the

16 See for the point about using our language with our meaning and our reference "Identity And Necessity", pp. 78-79.

17 Kripke believes that the thesis that the identity statements between rigid designators are necessary follows from the thesis that identical objects are necessarily identical. See *Naming and Necessity*, p. 4.



actual world must be true in the possible worlds as well, as a matter of linguistic convention.

Consider for instance, the identity statement 'Tully is Cicero'. The identity statement is true given the *facts* about the world and the *rules* about the words. Let us call this, situation *S*. Let us stipulate the possible world *w* in such a manner that Tully exists in that possible world. Given Kripke's extra-linguistic condition, situation *S* should prevail in *w*. (This is so, because the facts about the world that are relevant to the truth of the identity statement are assured by the stipulation that Tully exists in *w*, and the rules for the use of relevant words in the possible worlds are assured by the Kripkean extra-linguistic condition. In this manner we have created situation *S* in the possible world *w*.)

Given Kripke's condition as part of the linguistic conventions and the statement 'Tully is Cicero' is true, what follows is that the statement is true in all possible world where Tully exists by definition. And any statement that is true by definition in this manner, could only be considered as *analytic*. Besides, the very notion of a possible world is stipulative according to Kripke. By conceiving possible worlds as stipulative, Kripke has reduced them to something that could be defined at our will. It is we who stipulate the possible worlds in one manner or another. It follows that a possible world is totally a mental construct having no *antological* significance. Even if a statement is true in all possible worlds of this kind, that would only indicate that one has stipulated the conditions in these possible worlds in such a manner that the statement could not have failed to be true. This notion of necessity, is a *logico-linguistic* necessity, and therefore, is quite different from the metaphysical notion of necessity.

The said conclusion that identity statements are analytic if they are true in all stipulated possible world, is totally unacceptable to Kripke. Not because this conclusion cannot be validly derived from his theses, but because it completely nullifies the significance of a new, distinct notion called 'rigid designator'. Kripke is keen on drawing the distinction between *analytic* and *necessary* statement.<sup>18</sup> He believed that he could show the necessity of identity statements between rigid designators if they are true. He hoped that the notion of a rigid designator would work wonders.

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<sup>18</sup> Kripke clearly draws the distinction between *analytic* and *metaphysical necessity*. See *Naming and Necessity*, pp. 34-39. Also see "Identity And Necessity", pp. 84-85.



## SECTION III

Undoubtedly, rigid designators could work wonders, but not in the manner in which Kripke has introduced them. We shall have to modify the notion and the theses associated with it substantially as follows : (1) A meaning component has to be added to rigid designators, and they shall express simple notions. Essentially this warrants certain modifications in the *Causal Theory* of names : We can no longer hold the view that reference to an object could be made under any circumstance by merely uttering the name of the object. We shall have to emphasize the point that a person needs to know either the meaning of a name, or learn the meaning of a name after fixing the reference of the name with the help of a criterion in order to use the name as a rigid designator. (2) The extra-linguistic condition on the users of natural language will have to be lifted. By doing so, we shall eliminate the analytic nature of the identity statements between rigid designators. (3) The element of stipulation that is attached to the notion of a possible world has to be dropped from our conception. By doing this, we succeed in de-linking possible worlds from that of the act of stipulating them.

After suggesting the modifications to the troublesome aspects of rigid designation theory and the theses associated with it, what we arrive at basically is the notion of a 'rigid simple', which we had envisaged in the early pages of this essay. *Rigid simples* are those terms which express simple notions as their meanings, and designate their objects in all non-stipulated possible worlds. Names of substances; such as, proper names, natural kind terms; names of certain qualities of substances, such as, color terms; names of different units of measurements, such as, 'meter', 'liter' are some of the examples of rigid simples: the list is obviously far from being exhaustive.

To claim that a notion is simple is to claim that the term associated with it does not undergo any change in meaning. The notions are the meanings of terms, and if meanings of terms change, by implication they are not terms expressing simple notions. Moreover, terms associated with simple notions if have extension, they would retain the same extension always. By implication, if the extension of a term changes, the meaning of the term changes along with it and the notion in question would not be simple.

Terms that are associated with simple notions having certain extension, if used as names of certain other types of objects, would necessarily be homonyms. Simple notions are not accommodative in this sense, they never change their extension. In fact, this is one of



the reasons why simple notions cannot be defined or reduced to some other notions. Thus, if the extension of a term could change, the notion associated with it is complex; where as if the notion associated with a term is simple, the extension of the term cannot vary.

Those terms which are associated with simple notions if designate any thing they designate the same thing invariably. Identity through time intervals and across possible worlds is possible because that there are certain terms which are simple having extension. One would not require Kripke's extra-linguistic conditions to achieve rigidity. Terms which are associated with simple notions having extension would be necessarily rigid. They would designate the same thing in all ontologically alternative worlds. Nothing depends on our stipulation so far as rigid simples are concerned.

When we stipulate one name to refer to more than one individual, irrespective of the fact whether it is a counterpart or not, the term turns into a homonym. But this is not an exclusive attribute of proper names. Even the natural kind terms share this attribute with proper names. Consider the natural kind terms 'kite' and 'bat'. 'Kite' is the name of a bird, and 'bat' is the name of a mammal. But these terms are also used to refer to a plaything and the bat with which we play games respectively. Those who know these terms not only as the natural kind terms, but also as the names of things that are used in games, would intuitively know that the terms in question are homonyms. This is quite symptomatic. One could use this as an intuitive criterion to classify notions into simple and complex. Proper names, natural kind terms, names of certain qualities and the names of units of different measurements satisfy this intuitive criterion to classify them as simple notions.

The compelling reasons for the view that proper names are rigid simples are the following ; (1) Proper names have meanings, though we cannot specify the meanings in terms of other words or phrases. Each proper name has unique meaning unless two names are names of the same person or place, and one is defined in terms of the other. We cannot reduce a proper name to a set of descriptions important or otherwise of the object named, nor can we reduce one name to another. Therefore, it is apt to call such irreducible and indefinable terms 'simple' using Moore's terminology. (2) Proper names are rigid designators at the same time. Nothing other than the object that is designated by a name in the actual world is denoted by the name in a possible world if the object exists in that world, unless stipulated to the contrary, Therefore, following Kripke, we should call proper names rigid.



After Kripke, no one would claim that criteria of proper names constitute their meaning. If they were relevant to the meaning of the terms used as names, when there is a change in criteria, it should have resulted in corresponding change in the meaning of the term. But this does not happen. The primary function of a criterion in the context of names is not to determine the meaning of the term. The role of a criterion is only incidental, it is used for identifying the referent of a name in a given context as held by Kripke. And hence, the meaning of a name cannot be identified or reduced to its criteria.

Natural kind terms, such as 'gold', 'water', 'cat', 'dog' etc., also behave like rigid simples. Though scientists define natural kind terms in terms of supposed invariable properties of the things defined, these definitions at best serve as operational or as criteria to fix the references of these terms. These definitions are not to be taken as real definitions in the Moorean sense, where we attempt to define a notion in terms of other notions.

Let us now consider a quality or an attribute. Undoubtedly, yellow is a quality which is simple. And we could never use of the term 'yellow' to cover the things that have different colors as part of its extension without turning the term into a homonym. Therefore, the term 'yellow' is a simple notion, and would refer to the colors yellow even in a possible world. However, lemon being a contingent thing, it may not exist in a possible world, or may not be yellow; in that case, lemons would not be a part of the extension of 'yellow' in such a possible world. But, 'yellow' behaves like a rigid simple, for, it cannot change its meaning even in a possible world, and would be the attributes of the objects that are called yellow in all possible world where this color is exemplified.

Lastly, consider a unit of measurement, for example, 'meter'. Kripke has made our task easy.<sup>19</sup> The term 'meter' behaves like a rigid designator. The length of a rod which we normally call a meter is not always exactly a meter. The actual distance between the end points of a meter rod is a criterion to fix the referent, it is not itself a meter. The distance between two end points of a meter rod can change depending on the temperature in the surrounding atmosphere. A meter cannot signify different segments of distance. If we define the term 'meter' to signify some other segment of distance than the one which it normally signifies, than the term becomes homonym. Thus, it is obvious that the meaning and reference of the term 'meter' cannot change even in different possible worlds, because it is a rigid simple.

<sup>19</sup> For a detailed discussion on the example of 'meter', see *Naming And Necessity*, pp. 54-57.



## SECTION IV

We may now address ourselves to the nature of statements involving rigid simples. For the sake of convenience, we may first discuss identity statements between two rigid simples, for identity statements are the least problematic ones, and then on to other types of statements involving rigid simples.

Consider the example 'Tully is Cicero'. It follows from our thesis that if this identity statement is true, it is true necessarily in all relevant possible worlds which are ontological alternatives. This ought to be so because, the terms that constitute the identity statement are rigid simples. We have argued earlier that a proper name is a simple notion, i.e., its meaning cannot change even in a possible world. And we have pointed out that the criteria which help us fix the references of names are not constituting the meanings. Therefore, a change in criteria for the use of a name would not affect the meaning of the term. Moreover, proper names are rigid designators. This implies that a proper name would refer to the same individual in all possible world where the designated object exists. In any case, if a proper name designates someone else in a possible world than the one which it normally designates in the actual world, that would not prove that the proper name is not rigid; instead, it would prove that the term in question is a homonym. Therefore, it follows that the names 'Tully' and 'Cicero' being rigid simples cannot change their meanings and references in different possible worlds. Hence the thesis that if the identity statement between these two names is true in our world, it would be true in all possible worlds where Tully exists.

Consider a different type of example involving a property and a substance. Moore's celebrated example of yellow and Kant's often quoted example of 'gold' are best suited for this purpose. 'yellow' is a simple notion for Moore, and the natural kind term 'gold' is a rigid designator for Kripke. In our analysis, both 'yellow' and 'gold' are rigid simples. Being a simple notion, the meaning of the term 'yellow' cannot change even in a possible world. All the objects which are yellow fall within the extension of the term. Since, the meaning of the term cannot change, the extension also does not change. The same is true of 'gold' as well. It being a rigid simple, the meaning and extension of the term do not change even in possible worlds. 'Gold' designates gold, and only gold in all possible worlds.

The property yellow and the substance gold are contingent things. They being contingent, would not exist in all possible worlds. It may be the case that yellow objects exist, but not gold in a possible world; gold exists but the property yellow is not exemplified in another possi-



ble world; and gold exists and the property yellow is exemplified while gold not being yellow in yet another possible world. The first possible world in the sequence cannot have a situation where we would legitimately claim that gold is not yellow, since gold does not exist in this possible world. The second one is a yellow-less possible world and to claim that gold is yellow in this world would be to contradict oneself. And if we claim that the statement 'Gold is yellow' is not true, and therefore the statement 'Gold is not yellow' being the negation of the former must be true, then we assume that the term 'yellow' is not simple. This is so because, the term 'yellow' is an unexemplified property in this yellow-less possible world. That is to say, the term 'yellow' has no extension in this possible world. Given the fact that gold is yellow in the actual world, and not yellow in this possible world, it implies that 'yellow' is not a simple notion. This is because, if 'yellow' were simple notion, it could not have changed its extension. A term changes its extension if and only if it is not a simple notion. A certain type of change in extension of a term, necessarily brings a change in the meaning of the term. Without exception gold being yellow in our world, if it is not yellow in the possible world, the implication is that the term must have changed its extension. And such a crucial change in extension of the term in possible only when it changes its meaning. Therefore, it is reasonable on our part to think that if gold exists in a possible world that would not be yellowless world. However, the third possible in the above sequence has a different significance to our discussion. One might think that this possible world can have a situation where gold is yellow and therefore the statement 'Gold is yellow' is contingent.

But the statement is not contingent. The implication of holding such a view that the statement 'Gold is yellow' is false in a possible world where gold exists and the color yellow is exemplified, is that one of the two terms, is not in fact rigid simple. One need not define gold in terms of its color and therefore gold can remain gold in such a possible world despite its not being yellow. Having this consideration, one would suspect that the color yellow is not rigid simple i.e., the term may be simple, but not rigid. To claim that the term is not rigid is to claim that the term 'yellow' can designate properties which are not yellow in different possible worlds. But we intuitively see that a possibility is ruled out unless we claim that the term in question in a homonym. From the fact that gold is a part of the extension of 'yellow' in the actual world and under the assumption that it is not a part of the extension in a possible world, one could conclude that 'yellow' can change its extension. This in turn implies that 'yellow' is not a simple notion when possible worlds are taken into account.



However, if a notion can fail to be simple when possible worlds are taken into account, then the notion is not simple in the first instance. When one claims that a notion is simple, one claims that the notion remains simple in any context, otherwise the claim has little significance. When Moore claimed that 'yellow' is simple he implied that the notion would be simple in all possible worlds. And the notion being simple, if it has extension it cannot change its extension without allowing such a change to affect the very notion itself. Unless we are completely mistaken in thinking that yellow and gold are simple notions, it cannot be the case that there is a possible world such that gold exist and yellow is exemplified as a property of some objects, but gold is not yellow. Therefore, we think that the statement 'Gold is yellow' is necessary, i.e., is true in all possible worlds where yellow is exemplified as a quality and gold exists.

Now we are in a position to formulate the following thesis. 'Gold' and 'yellow' being rigid simples, if they are related in certain manner in the actual world, they would be related in the similar manner in all ontologically alternative worlds. In other words, if the statement 'Gold is yellow' is true, then it is true in all possible worlds where gold exists and yellow is exemplified as a quality. Therefore, the statement 'Gold is yellow' is necessary in the Kripkean sense.

Consider yet another example of a different kind involving units of measurements and their interrelationship. 'Meter' and 'cubic meter' are two units of measurements having the relationship:  $\text{volume} = \text{length} \times \text{breadth} \times \text{height}$ . Usually, volume is defined in terms of the product of length, breadth and height of an object. Strictly speaking, this is not a definition in the Moorean sense. 'Meter' and 'cubic meter' are distinct and quite different notions. We cannot reduce the notion 'volume' to the product of length, breadth and height of an object. The definition offered here is an operational definition, and nothing more. 'Meter' does not mean the length of the rod. The length of the rod can change depending on the temperature that is prevailing in the surroundings. The contingent property of the length of the rod is used as a criterion to fix the reference. Moreover, the meaning of the term 'meter' cannot change, and it cannot be reduced to its criteria either. Therefore, 'meter' is a simple notion. Since these units of measurements are used to measure the length and volume of solid objects, they have extension. 'Meter' designates the same length in all possible worlds; and similarly 'cubic meter' would designate the same volume in all possible worlds. Therefore, 'meter' and 'cubic meter' are right simples. Thus, we can conclude that if the statement ' $\text{Volume} = \text{length} \times \text{breadth} \times \text{height}$ ' is true



in the actual world, it must be true in all ontologically alternative worlds. Hence the statement is necessary in the metaphysical sense.

One could multiply examples, but that does not seem to strengthen thesis any more. However, we may point this out here that some of Kripke's examples of rigid designators are simple notions and some are not in the Moorean sense. For example, 'water', 'gold', 'heat', 'light' etc.. are examples of rigid simples, where as 'H<sub>2</sub>O', 'valency 79', 'molecular agitation', 'stream of photons' etc., are not rigid simples, but behave like descriptions, sometimes as definite descriptions.

We could now generalize on the basis of the above examples: Regardless of what prevails in a possible world, we could validly claim that the identity statement between any two rigid simples, if it is true in our world, must be true *necessarily* in all relevant ontologically alternative worlds. This conclusion is of prime importance to us for the reason that it opens up several possibilities of revising our traditional philosophical problems and their proposed solution in this light.



# The Luddites' Revenge : The Technopolis And the Limits of Post-Industrialism and The Information Society

Joseph Wany Smith

## 1. Introduction :

### The Post-Industrial Vision of a Global Information Village

Paul Davies and John Gribbin in their book *The Matter Myth: Towards 21st-Century Science*<sup>1</sup> give a wide ranging account of the fall of the mechanistic or reductionist paradigm, which viewed the Universe as a purposeless deterministic machine, and its replacement by a 'post-mechanistic' holism paradigm.<sup>2</sup> With this, many will no doubt be sympathetic. However, Davies and Gribbin then go on to link MFP-Australia, a proposed Australia-Japan technopolis into this emerging holistic synthesis. They say:

"...The MFP will involve research institutes, scientifically designed environmental schemes and social organizations, and advanced health, leisure and recreational facilities. There will be a strong emphasis on the networking concept, so that the MFP will consist of a collection of 'villages' linked with high-tech optical communications. The MFP will in turn be networked to other cities, and ultimately to the rest of the world.

The economic plan places a strong emphasis on ultra-rapid communications and information networking, so that information, ideas and strategies can be marketed anywhere in the world, thus overcoming Australia's geographic isolation.

1 P. Davies and J. Gribbin, *The Matter Myth : Towards 21st-Century Science* (Viking/Penguin Books, London, 1991).

2 For Australian developments along these lines cf, D. Mackan, "Science Friction", *The Age Magazine : Good Weekend*, 16, 1991, pp. 20 29.



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*Perhaps the most imaginative component in the MFP strategy is the recognition that education and scientific research are highly valuable resources that can be marketed like any other*"<sup>3</sup>.

Such a project they believe fits well with a world which is "a cosmic network, a network of forces and fields, of nonlocal quantum connections and nonlinear, creative matter"<sup>4</sup>. One would be led to believe from this that even the cosmos justifies the MFP project. However, a physical world comprising nonlocal quantum connections and cosmic networks of fields and forces, no more justifies the creation of a social network of information networking, than Newtonian Physics justified early capitalism. Further, the claim that education, knowledge and science are commodities 'that can be marketed like any other', is inconsistent with the bulk of holistic 'new science' which is highly critical of the reductionism of economics and the degrading effects of markets to treat everything and everybody as 'resources' and 'commodities'. Max Weber noted that the key to understanding the modern history of Western societies was through *rationalization*, the adoption of an economizing reductionist attitude of cost efficiency to all aspects of life. Davies and Gribbin's post-mechanist view of the MFP is consistent with the further economization of human life, this time to knowledge itself, so it hardly presents a radical epistemological break with the past.

However flawed Davies and Gribbins vision of the MFP may be, their book does illustrate an important thesis which underlies the entire MFP project. This thesis is that both science and economics are undergoing 'revolutionary' changes, from a materialist, modernist, industrial paradigm to a post-materialist, post-modernist, post-industrial paradigm. There is a change occurring from industrialist-based economies to service-based economies, from mass production industries to information-intensive industries such as new materials, semiconductors and biotechnology.<sup>5</sup> The industrial society was based upon mass markets, a focal image of consumption, centralized production strategies, comprehensive data bases, formalized information, planning for the average case and indirect feedback from consumer

<sup>3</sup> Davies and Gribbin op. cit. note 1, pp. 10-11, Emphasis added.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p 11.

<sup>5</sup> On post-industrialism cf. D. Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, (Heinemann, London, 1974). K.E. Boulding, *The Meaning of the Twentieth Century*, (Harper and Roy, New York, 1970); Z. Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages*, (Viking Press, New York, 1970); J.K. Galbraith, *The New Industrial State*, (Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1967); P. Drusker, *The Age of Discontinuity*, (Heinemann, London, 1971); A. Toffler, *The Third Wave*, (Collins, London, 1980).



to producer through the market mechanism. The post-industrial society is based upon targeted markets, many competing images of consumption, decentralized production strategies, purpose-specific data bases, 'subjective' knowledge, the interpenetration of local and global planning, and direct feedback between consumers and producers through communication systems.<sup>6</sup>

However, the post-industrial information society goes beyond the service society. According to Coates: "Everything premised on industry, from the patent system to inheritance laws, from manufacturing plant siting to highway design, is on the road to obsolescence, insofar as the post-industrial society calls for or permits a different re-organization of physical space".<sup>7</sup> Masuda sees the production of 'information values', rather than material values shaping future societies, with intellectual creativity flourishing rather than material consumption.<sup>8</sup> Bestuzhev-Lada sees all 'global problems' from environmental pollution to Third World poverty resolvable within 20-30 years using high technology.<sup>9</sup> Reich also sees a time of radical change with the end of national economies and the creation of one omnipotent global supermarket.<sup>10</sup>

Kenny and Florida<sup>11</sup> compare 'Fordism', with its low-skilled specialized workplace, with 'Fujitsuism', which uses integrative and flexible work organization, networking and shopfloor learning. It is epitomized by Japan which they believe has far surpassed US capitalism, and makes extensive use of information technologies. Other post-industrialists disagree with this assessment and see most advanced

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- 6 L. Hirschhorn, "Information Technology and the New Services Game", in M. Castells (ed.), *High Technology, Space, and Society*, (Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1985), pp. 172-188, citation p. 184. M. Piore and C. Sabel, *The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity*, (Basic Books, New York, 1984) see 'flexible specialization' as an alternative to mass production. Flexible specialization is a form of 'craft' production based on skilled workers producing a variety of customized goods. cf. also R. Jaikumar, "Postindustrial Manufacturing", *Harvard Business Review*, vol. 64, 1986, pp. 69-76.
  - 7 J.F. Coates, "New Technologies and their Urban Impact", *Urban Affairs Annual Reviews*, vol. 23, 1982, pp. 177-195.
  - 8 Y. Masuda, *The Information Society as Post-Industrial Society*, (World Future Society, Washington D.C., 1981).
  - 9 I. Bestuzhev-Lada, "High Technology and Long-Term Global Problems", *Futures*, vol. 19, 1987, pp. 276-281.
  - 10 R.B. Reich, *The Work of Nations : Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism*, (Alfred A. Knopf New York, 1991), p. 3.



nations already moving towards 'smart growth' in an integrated world economy.<sup>11</sup>

It is the aim of this paper to question both the truth of the above assertions as well as the desirability of the post-industrial information society itself. I understand the term 'technopolis' to denote not merely a science park or technology research university, but an entire city embodying the principal proposals of post-industrialism and the information society. The MFP technopolis project, for example, has been advertised to the Australian public as necessary for bringing us into the 21st century and its justification is primarily by way of the theory of the post-industrial information society. An effective criticism of post-industrialism will destroy the philosophical foundations of the technopolis, allowing others to build ecocities—ecologically rational cities—in their place.

## 2. A Critique of Post-Industrialism and the information Society

I shall presuppose here the truth of the thesis of the value-ladenness of technology: that science and technology are *not* neutral.<sup>12</sup> As Lyons has noted, there is "a legitimate sense in which something

- 11 M. Kenny and R. Florida, "Japan's Role in a post-Fordist Age", *Futures*, vol. 21, 1989, pp. 136-151; A J.M. Roobeek, "The Crisis in Fordism and the Rise of a New Technological paradigm", *Futures*, vol. 19, 1987, pp. 129-154.
- 12 W.E. Halal, *The New Capitalism*, (John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1986) and C. Nakano, 'Principles of Humanistic Enterprise in Japan: A New Economic System of the Future', *Futures*, vol. 21, 1989, pp. 640-646. On information technology as an extension of Taylorism and Fordism. cf. M. Cooley, *Architect or Bee ? The Human/Technology Relationship* (Langley Technical Services, Slough, 1981); B. Wilkinson, *The Shopfloor Politics of New Technology*, (Heinemann, London, 1983); D.F. Noble, "Social Choice in Machine Design: The Case of Automatically Controlled Machine Tools", in A. Zimbalist (ed.), *Case Studies in the Labor Process*, (Monthly Review Press, New York, 1979), pp. 18-50; J. Greenbaum, *In the Name of Efficiency ; Management Theory and Shopfloor Practice in Data-Processing Work*, (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1979); K. Kumar, *Prophecy and Progress ; The Sociology of Industrial and Post-Industrial Society*, (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1978).
- 13 Literature of relevance includes : H. Skolimowski, "The Myth of Progress" *The Ecologist*, vol. 4, 1974, pp. 248-258; D. Dickson, *Alternative Technology and the Politics of Technical Change*, (Fontana, London, 1974); J. Lipscombe and B. Williams, *Are Science and Technology Neutral ?* (Butterworths, London, 1979); E.F. Schumacher, *Good Work*, (Jonathan Cape, London, 1979); J. Zerzan and A. Carnes (eds.) *Questioning Technology : A Critical Antology*, (Freedom Press, London, 1988).



counts as good if one prudently seeks it and prudently rejoices at having it...and any quality is bad which one would be prudent to avoid and unlucky to possess...".<sup>14</sup> Technology, as Lyons shows, can be good or bad in that sense and a *fortiori* so can high technology. It is not, contrary received opinion, nonsensical to ask whether our 'high tech' future is a good or a bad thing.

In criticizing the post-industrialists a variety of arguments are offered making use of a variety of sources. First we should note that a post-industrial society is one where, unquestionably, knowledge is of primary importance. Knowledge is produced by *intellectuals*. This, as we shall now see, by reviewing Etzioni-Halevy's *The Knowledge Elite and the Failure of Prophecy*<sup>15</sup>, is the first rotten plank in the epistemic foundation of post-industrialism.

Etzioni-Halevy argues that intellectuals—defined as the producers of knowledge and ideas in Western societies—have functioned much like the prophets of old. They have criticized society and provided advice about the future directions of society. Etzioni-Halevy maintains that a cool examination of the evidence of the successfulness and the benefits of their advice indicates that they have in the main, failed. Yet like the prophets of old, they too have rationalized away their failure is not merely in the sense that some of the 'knowledge, which they have supplied has not been valid, but also in the sense that their theories and knowledge, when implemented have created even further problems for society. Intellectuals, or the 'knowledge elite, are caught in a 'structural dilemma'. Their social position and continuing existence depends upon funding, but to obtain funding requires demonstration of the social utility of their knowledge. The more applied knowledge they create, often to serve the interests of the princes and pipers of industry and government who pay them, the greater the chance of some of this knowledge being socially deleterious.

Etzioni-Halevy distinguishes between intellectuals or the 'knowledge elite' on the one hand, and the 'intelligentsia', 'new class' or 'knowledge class' on the other. The 'knowledge elite' are profession-

14 D. Lyons, 'Are Luddites Confused?', *Inquiry*, vol. 22, 1979, pp. 381-403. Citation p. 386.

15 E. Etzioni-Halevy, *The Knowledge Elite and the Failure of Prophecy*, (George Allen and Unwin London, 1985). cf. also M. Sagoff, 'Is Big Beautiful?', *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, vol. 1, 1984, pp. 269-280, where it is argued that large-scale technologies are more threatening to democratic institutions than to the environment, due to an alliance between business and bureaucrats to by-pass democratic processes.



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ally engaged in the creation of *theoretical* knowledge and ideas; 'new class' elites typically make use of such ideas in administrative and managerial pursuits. The new class elites include the knowledge elite but not *vice versa*. One reason for this is that the knowledge elite have influence but not direct power, for they primarily operate by convincing other of the validity of their ideas. This is quite unlike the operation of administrators and bureaucrats. Further, 'Etzioni-Halevy sidesteps the question of whether the knowledge elite are a class. They are seen for what they are, *elites*—minorities who by some special quality are influential in shaping the administrative, political, military, business and intellectual life of society. Most importantly, their guidance have been accepted by people in these spheres of life by a number of 'routes of influence'. These include their monopolization of higher education, their prominence in policy-making structures and think tanks', the membership of commissions of inquiry and leadership of quasi-governmental organizations. Thus far the argument is in broad agreement with the post-industrialists and internationalists, who see the emergence of a new knowledge-based society replacing the old industrial-capitalist order. Knowledge and planning become the basis of organized activity in the post-modern social order, creating a 'technetronic' society with all political judgements being made on the basis of knowledge supplied by the new technocratic elite. Etzioni-Halevy argues however, that the benefits of theoretical knowledge supplied by the knowledge elites has diminished and the costs and deleterious effects of the knowledge-based advice administered by intellectuals has risen. If this is so, then a principal thesis of post-industrialism is undermined.

For a start, there is an inevitable disparity between theoretical knowledge in the social sciences and humanities on the one hand, and policy formulation on the other, related to both the criteria for their success and the routes of their struggle for survival. Theoretical knowledge is judged to be successful by cognitive criteria such as innovativeness, originality, plausibility and internal consistency. Policies are judged by the criteria of fulfilling powerfully supported goals in widely accepted orders of priority that yield tangible results, to gain political support or favour. Theoretical knowledge thrives on criticism; policies do not. Bridging the gap between theoretical knowledge and policies is thus a formidable task. The problem, as Etzioni-Halevy notes, lies with the fundamental limitations of socioscientific knowledge itself.<sup>16</sup> Such knowledge is tentative and incomplete. Empirical research, even involving

<sup>16</sup> Etzioni-Halevy, *ibid.*, p. 41.



multivariate methods can seldom analyse all *relevant* aspects of social problems, often because what is 'relevant' is frequently contestable. Social science research often produces bodies of inconsistent empirical conclusions, conducted on different populations or on the same population at different times. Much social scientific research is not strictly testable at all, providing at best a philosophico-metaphysical theory; at worst, an expression of ideology. Many such mutually contradictory theories co-exist in uneasy tension within the social sciences. This, as well, is incompatible with the basic requirements of social policies.

The situation in the natural and physical sciences according to Etzioni-Halevy is also highly problematic, and perhaps more so. Theoretical knowledge in the natural sciences is frequently usable, but often harmful to society. The post-industrialists did not deny the existence of adverse effects of scientific knowledge, but maintained that alternative social arrangements may eliminate these problems. But for Etzioni-Halevy both the adverse and the beneficial effects of scientific knowledge are built into the scientific process. The *cumulative* nature of the practical results of science, means that at least some discoveries and inventions will be socially deleterious, which will in turn multiply. Discoveries once made cannot be 'undiscovered'. The alleged *value-neutrality* of science means that nothing will prevent such discoveries and inventions being made. The theses of the cumulative nature of scientific research and the value-neutrality of science are of course contentions, but they are doctrines typically accepted by the post-industrialists. The point to be made is that there is nothing in the inner logic of the structure of science to prevent detrimental (as well as beneficial) discoveries. Thus as more discoveries accumulate, the probability of deleterious social effects increase. It is true that the probability of benefits also increases; but there is no reason to believe that the benefits will be in response to, or solve, the costs and problems. The pressure put on scientists to realize practical results will exacerbate this trend. Further, the validation of scientific knowledge now is possible only by other scientists, constituting something of a closed circle. Detrimental scientific knowledge will be constantly disseminated and will grow as the international scientific community grows.<sup>17</sup>

Western society in Etzioni-Halevy's opinion is a society which is not moving towards greater prosperity, equality and freedom as the post-industrialists believed, rather it "is more...of a groping society which is increasingly overwhelmed by the complexity of its own pro-

<sup>17</sup> *ibid*, pp, 48-49.



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blems and its ever more pronounced internal contradictions".<sup>18</sup> These problems and contradictions include government overload due to the increasing complexity of modern society, the crisis of the welfare state due to an imbalance between growing government commitments and limited government resources, rising social inequalities, unemployment and the emergence of an 'underclass'. Further, there is an enormous and outstanding problem in squaring electoral principles of democracy with the growing power of large scale interest groups and bureaucracy. In Etzioni-Halevy's opinion this problem can not be solved because such interest groups do not represent any interests other than their own, and certainly not those of society at large. Bureaucracies are becoming increasingly powerful and autonomous from political authority, and this by its very nature is a threat to democratic institutions. Thus whilst knowledge has been increasing in importance, this knowledge has not served to increase the prosperity, equity and freedom of the West.

The physical sciences as well have harmful effects upon modern society, and this Etzioni-Halevy maintains, is inherent in the scientific process itself, being the unanticipated outcomes of solutions to previous problems. Etzioni-Halevy illustrates this with respect to various physical sciences. For example, an enormous quantity of money in Western societies is invested in medical research and development, but from about 1950 mortality has been declining, and life-expectancy rising, only slightly. The major diseases-cancer, heart disease and even AIDS have yet to be 'cured' by a 'magic bullet' and many of the drugs used by doctors to treat disease have killed patients. Old diseases, once thought to have been eliminated, such as TB and leprosy are making a comeback as drug-resistant, variants evolve. Mosquito-carried diseases such as malaria and dengue fever are on the rise in Asia, Africa and Central America, as mosquitoes develop multiple resistance and drugs used to treat such diseases lose their effectiveness. Immigration policies will no doubt introduce these epidemics into Australia and America. As well, the widespread use of antibiotics has through natural selection produced varieties of resistant

18 *ibid.* p. 52. p. Grim, 'Technology and Arbitrary Decisions', *Public Affairs Quarterly*, vol. 1' 1987, pp. 43-58, argues that the growth of technology leads to an increasing arbitrariness of decisions, for individuals and groups. Decision making is arbitrary when we are unavoidably ignorant of relevant considerations, and the growth of technology has ensured that we are ignorant of an increasing number of the ramifications of our use of such technology. Decisions then become increasingly arbitrary, and dangerous.



strains of disease-producing micro-organisms. This is an inevitable product of the use of such drugs.

The effects of science on warfare offers another example. Science and technology have, since ancient times, been closely linked with militarism and warfare, but it has only been in recent times that the capacity for mega-death has been perfected. Such armaments include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These have replaced the death anxiety which previous generations felt about disease, with a more general anxiety about the death of the human race itself. Certainly the fear of nuclear extinction has receded somewhat since Etzioni-Halevy's book was published, by a thawing of relationships between Washington and Moscow, but in many respects this fear has been replaced by a decentralized form of terror, where Third World countries may stand pitted against the West and where nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism becomes of prime concern. The possibility of a global nuclear war, occurring accidentally still exists. All of this has been discussed many times before, but what interests us here is who should take the blame for it. To what degree are scientists themselves responsible? Etzioni-Halevy makes a strong case that modern technology frequently has a dual purpose nature—warfare applications and peaceful applications are often two sides of the same coin. With increasing scientific development, the greater the quantity of developments that will be applied to warfare applications. This is part and parcel of the dynamics of scientific activity itself.

The effects of science on living standards offers another supportive illustration of Etzioni-Halevy's thesis. The knowledge obtained through rationalization and the increase in production, responsible for rising standards of living in the West over the last century, also has the inherent capacity to produce mass unemployment as high tech machinery replaces workers. It is true that the development of advanced technology does lead to the creation of new branches of employment—in the service sector for example. Nevertheless, the same process which is responsible for increased production is also responsible for structural unemployment. For example Japan's fifth generation computer project was to overcome the limits to present day computers which are essentially numerical information processing machines. The fifth generation computers would be required to be able to process knowledge, and reason in natural languages rather than precise symbolic languages. Such computer controlled robots will not merely be able to replace human workers in manufacturing, but also farmers and fishermen, teachers and a whole range of people working in the service industries. Inferior humanware could be replaced by superior computer hard-ware and software.<sup>19</sup>



There are a number of important works which support in detail the thesis that the post-industrial information society will either not increase human welfare, or will in fact decrease human welfare and create a wide range of social problems. Here only a brief summary is possible, but this will be sufficient to call into question the utopian technological optimism of those writers examined in the first section of this paper. We shall begin, by way of summary, with some more 'abstract' philosophical criticisms moving towards more 'concrete' criticisms.

O.E. Klapp in *Overload and Boredom*<sup>20</sup> offers a detailed exploration of the impact of information on the quality of modern life, especially with respect to information overload redundancy and noise. The information society is susceptible to boredom resulting from the degradation of information by redundancy and noise. Information can become redundant, and does so at a rapid pace because the information society is a high-output society where communication technology itself can render information useless or outdated. The information society is also a high-noise society, where the media and computers transmit irrelevant information which interferes with one's desired 'signals': "the slow horse of meaning is unable to keep up with the fast horse of mere information."<sup>21</sup> The large information load will increase the *entropy* of modern life. Klapp argues in the 'limits to growth' tradition, that there is nothing to prevent the application of the second law of thermodynamics to information. The larger the amounts of information processed, the greater the probability that information will degrade towards 'meaningless variety' or 'sterile uni-

19 cf. M. Cross, "Japan's Fifth Generation Computer Project: Successes and Failures", *Futures*, vol. 21, August, 1987, pp. 401-403; J.M. Unger, *The Fifth Generation Fallacy*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1987). On the thesis that high technology is low on jobs cf. K. Windschuttle, "Education, High Technology and the Future Economy", in R. Castle (et al eds.) *Work, Leisure and Technology*, (Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1988), pp. 107-113; T. Brady and S. Liff, "Job Losses Now, Maybe Some Later", in T. Forester (ed.), *The Information Technology Revolution*, (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1985), pp. 381-389; J. Northcott and P. Rogets, *Microelectronics in British Industry: The Pattern of Change* (Policy Studies Institute, February, 1984); P. Hills (ed.), *The Future of the Printed Word: The Impact and Implications of the New Communications Technology*, (Frances Pinter, 1980); S. Nora and A. Minc, *The Computerization of Society*, (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1980).

20 O.E. Klapp, *Overload and Boredom: Essays on the Quality of Life in the Information Society*, (Greenwood Press, New York, 1986).

21 *ibid*, p. 2.



formity'. This application of the concept of entropy to information challenges the technological optimism of the post-industrialists because it challenges the idea of *progress*.

Klapp's work establishes only a *limit* to the development of the information society; it does not by itself establish the *undesirability* of such a society. There are, however, a number of arguments for the later position, that will be briefly mentioned here and referenced. One of the most intuitively plausible arguments for the undesirability of the information society relates to its *dangerous* nature. Norbert Wiener, a founding father of computer science, saw an enormous danger, present in advanced computers, for the domination of humanity. The advanced computers raised once more the ancient paradox of slavery: a slave must be both intelligent (to be useful) and subservient, but complete intelligence and complete subservience are incompatible. Intelligent machines capable of human-like thought, may have interests which are not compatible with our own.<sup>22</sup> Less exotically, computers have enabled corporations and government bureaucracies to store an enormous amount of information about individuals and their daily activities which once could not be collected and stored. This has led to increased surveillance and the centralization of power by governments and industry.<sup>23</sup> However, if power corrupts, and if absolute power corrupts absolutely, a growth in the power of information technology and in its centralization, is more likely to be in the interests of technocrats than in the public interest.

There is also an extensive literature on the fragility and social vulnerability of the computer-based information society due to computer failure.<sup>24</sup> The breakdowns are due to either natural events such as fires and earthquakes, or computer-terrorism by hackers and sabotage. With respect to the latter vulnerability, a most dramatic example is of the 20 year old Australian computer hacker who disrupted the entire computer system of NASA, as well as penetrating the computer systems of the Lawrence Livermore National Labora-

22 cf. D. Burnham, "The Rise of the Computer State", in J. Zerzan and A. Carnes (ed.), *Questioning Technology: A Critical Anthology*, (Freedom Press, London, 1988), pp. 93-99, and O. B. Hardison, *Disappearing Through the Skylight*, (Penguin, London, 1991).

23 *ibid*.

24 cf. L. J. Hoffman and L. M. Moran, "Societal Vulnerability to Computer Systems Failure, *Computers and Security*, vol. 5, 1986, pp. 211-217; K. Lyyfien and R. Hirschheim, "Information Systems Failure—A Survey and Classification of the Empirical Literature", *Oxford Surveys in Information Technology*, vol. 4, 1987, pp. 257-309; T. Forester and P. Morrison, "Computer Unreliability and Social Vulnerability", *Futures*, June, 1990, pp. 462-474.



tory in California and destroying files in the computer systems of Execucom Systems Corporation in Austin, Texas.<sup>25</sup> A more experienced hacker with 'inside' information, seriously committed to computer terrorism could severely damage the information society within minutes, bringing about financial or military chaos—especially when considers the prospects of a hacker breaking into the computer systems that control nuclear missiles.

Computer systems failure caused by computer malfunctions are even more common. Indeed, as Forester and Morrison note, computer malfunctions have played their part in almost every serious systems failure from Three Mile Island to Chernobyl.<sup>26</sup> These failures may be due to either hardware or software failures. Hardware failures are usually due to faulty computer chips. For example, a single faulty 74/75 chip in a Strategic Air Command computer, resulted on 3 June 1980, in the false warning of a Soviet nuclear attack. Before this error was detected B-52 bombers and land-based missiles were placed on red alert.<sup>27</sup> Software failure, however, accounts for the bulk of computer failures. A number of studies have shown that at least half of all information systems are failures.<sup>28</sup> Gladden's survey has indicated that 75% of all systems development is either never completed or if it is completed, is not used<sup>29</sup>, resulting in a "crisis in systems development".<sup>30</sup>

Forester and Morrison argue that digital computers are *inherently* unreliable. These machines are discrete state devices using binary representations of data, and can exist in billions of states. However, each of these states has a potential error point and the execution of

25 "US Space Havoc' by Hacker", *The News*, August 13, 1991, p. 12.

26 Forester and Morrison, op. cit. note 24, p. 463.

27 *ibid.*

28 Mowshowith, *Information Processing in Human Affairs*, (Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1976).

29 G.R. Gladden, "Stop the Life-Cycle, I want to get off", *Software Engineering Notes*, vol. 7, 1982, pp. 35-39.

30 cf. Lyytinen and Hirschheim, op. cit. note 24, p. 258; J. Bubenko, "Information Systems Methodologies—a Research View", SYSLAB Report No. 40, The Systems Development and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, University of Stockholm, Sweden, 1986; J. Martin, *The Information System Manifesto*, (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1985); E. Sibley, "The Evolution of Approaches to Information Systems Design Methodologies", in T.W. Olle, H. Sol and A. Verriin-Stuart (eds.), *Information Systems Design Methodologies : Improving the Practice*, (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1986) pp. 1-17.



each state will in turn depend upon the correct execution of the previous state. The program will malfunction if the previous state is not correct. The complexity of modern digital computers is so great that it is impossible to predict or test all possible states before use. For example, a system designed to monitor merely 100 binary signals has  $1.27 \times 10^{30}$  possible combinations of signal inputs, and given the large number of sub-routines on the program (at least  $10^1$ ), there can be at least  $1.27 \times 10^{34}$  possible states of the system, any of which could cause software failure.<sup>31</sup> This would require a testing time far greater than the age of the universe. Worse, attempts to correct program errors will also introduce new errors. These criticisms, and others have been discussed in more detail by Shallis<sup>32</sup>, Reinecke<sup>33</sup>. Dreyfus and Dreyfus<sup>34</sup>, Ascher<sup>35</sup>, Roszak<sup>36</sup>, Siegel and Markoff<sup>37</sup>, Haynes<sup>38</sup> and Webster and Robins.<sup>39</sup> Webster and Robins' book *Information Technology: A Luddite Analysis*, offers perhaps the most detailed critique of the information society to date and gives a comprehensive critical bibliography up to the mid 1980s.

C.J. Hamelink writing in the edited volume, *The Myth of the Information Revolution*<sup>40</sup>, describes the 'information society' as a myth. The idea that we are entering a radically new stage of human history that will end the battle between winners and losers and the ruler and

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- 31 Forester and Morrison, op. cit. note 24, p. 469.
  - 32 M. Shallis, *The Silicyn Idol*, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984).
  - 33 I. Reinecke; *Electronic Illusions : A Skeptic's View of our High-Tech Future*, (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1984).
  - 34 H. Dreyfus, and S. Dreyfus, *Mind Over Machine*, (Free Press, New York, 1986),
  - 35 W. Ascher, "Limits of 'Expert Systems' for Political-Economic Forecasting", *Technological Forecasting and Social Change*, vol. 36 1989, pp. 137-151.
  - 36 T. Roszak, *The Cult of Information*, (Pantheon Books, New York, 1986).
  - 37 L. Siegel and J. markoff, *The High Cost of High Tech : The Dark Side of the Chip*, (Harper and Row, New York, 1985).
  - 38 R. Haynes (ed.), *High Tech: High Cost? Technology, Society and the Environment*, (Pan Books, Chippendale, New South Wales, 1991).
  - 39 F. Webster and K. Robins, *Information Technology : A Luddite Analysis*, (Ablex Publishing Corporation, Norwood. New Jersey, 1986).
  - 40 C.J. Hamelink, "Is There Life After the Information Revolution?", in M. Traber (ed.), *The Myth of the Information Revolution*, (Sage Publications, London, 1986), pp. 7-20.



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the ruled, is also a myth. Whilst it is true that in many advanced nations the service sector contributes considerably to GDP, most services are linked to industrial processes, production and distribution.

This basic point has been argued through in more detail by other writers, who defend the importance of manufacturing in modern societies. S.S. Cohen and J. Zysman in *Manufacturing Matters : The Myth of the Post Industrial Economy*<sup>41</sup> and M.L. Dertouzos(et al), *Made in America : Regaining the Productive Edge*<sup>42</sup>, are excellent defenses of the importance of manufacturing for the wealth of nation. Cohen and Zysman challenge the view of the post-industrialists that there exist 'stages of development' with agriculture as the first stage, industry the second, and knowledge-based services, the third stage. This view legitimatizes the loss of the market share of older industrial countries such as America and England to the Asian 'tigers' in industrial products as both a natural and a desirable thing. They point out that in a modern economy there is not a succession relationship between agriculture, industry and high technology services but a linkage relationship; with agricultural outputs being substantially increased by technological advances: This in turn generates industrial and service employment. Services are complements to manufacturing, not substitutes, and the loss of manufacturing or agriculture would lead to a loss of service jobs in the long term. High technology goods are primarily producer goods, not consumer goods, and are used in industry and production. Indeed, high, technology knowledge is a product of industrial processes. Consequently, the evolutionism of post-industrialism is a myth.

41 S. S. Cohen and J. Zysman, *Manufacturing Matters : The Myth of the Post-Industrial Economy*, (Basic Books, New York 1987). Also on the limits of information technology in manufacturing cf. B. Gold, "On the Potential, Requirements and Limits of Information Technology in Manufacturing", *Prometheus*, vol. 4, 1986, pp. 254-271. Gold says : "Despite the widespread emphasis on 'rational decision-making' we have not yet found any persuasive factual approaches by managements to evaluating proposals for additional applications of information technology, nor even for evaluating the results of past adoptions". (p. 256) This was an opinion formulated after Gold met with senior capital allocation officials of five major US firms. The eventual returns from the introduction of IT could not be evaluated because "their multiple effects cut across various operational and cost categories". (p. 256) Advances in data processing can only realize more of the inherent capacity of existing productive systems—data processing does not itself alter the production process.

42 M.L. Dertouzas, R.K. Lester, R.M. Solow and the MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity, *Made in America : Regaining the Productive Edge*, (MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989).



In concluding this critique of the post-industrial information society and hence of the technopolis, the question of globalization or internationalization should be addressed. Post-industrial utopians and internationalists, celebrate the creation of a 'global culture'<sup>43</sup>, Herbert Schiller<sup>44</sup> has pointed out that the dollar value of the economic activity of the leading transnational corporations, exceeds the entire GDP of the majority of the world's nations. Communications and information technologies have been of vital importance to the growth and maintenance of the transnational corporations' centrally controlled global empires, supplying international information transfer through computer-to-computer communications systems. This power, and the centralization of economic might, has directly contributed to the erosion of national sovereignty—the capacity of a nation to make policy-decisions reflecting *internal* interests. Schiller points out that whilst this is primarily a structural outcome of the process of transnationalization, spokespersons for the transnationals do what they can to ideologically discredit the concept of national sovereignty. The reason for this is that in principle, national sovereignty, in the form of economic nationalism, is a force that places a limit upon capital's freedom to pursue profits without restriction. Governments in the past have made decisions to protect 'vulnerable elements of the population', such as the young, unemployed and the aged, which have not been consistent with unrestrained capital accumulation. These measures of protection and equity are under threat as the power of transnational corporations to make resources allocation decisions grows—along with their ability to escape national jurisdictions. As Schiller notes: "With the existing means of communication, capital can, with relative ease, shift production from one site to another and play off one (national) group of workers against another. The outcome of these tricks is job insecurity, lower wages all round, and increased transnational corporate profits and authority".<sup>45</sup> The ability to shift capital, data and production across national borders effortlessly, undermines economic nationalist attempts to protect home industry and the domestic economy.<sup>46</sup> The internationalist Maurice Estabrooks celebrates this in his book *Programmed Capitalism: A Computer-Mediated Global Society*.<sup>47</sup>

43 For sociological writings by post-modernists on this topic cf. the special edition of *Theory, Culture and Society*, vol. 7, 1990.

44 H I. Schiller, "The Erosion of National Sovereignty by the World Business System", in M. Traber (ed.), *The Myth of the Information Revolution*, op. cit. note 40, pp. 21-34.

45 *ibid*, p. 25.

46 cf. G. Locksley, "Information Technology and Capitalist Development", *Capital and Class*, no. 27, 1986, pp. 81-105.



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For Estabrooks we will witness in the 21st century the birth of a programmed democratic global capitalist society, a kind of 'people's capitalism', where every citizen is a capitalist, freed by the power of information technology. In my opinion this is deluded thinking. There is not a scrap of evidence to support the view that every citizen will be a capitalist, and in fact there cannot be for the very idea is contradictory—if everybody drove what we now take to be a 'luxury' car, than such a 'luxury' car would become commonplace, and no longer a luxury. As well, no matter how much information technology we have at hand, all it can do by definition is to transfer and store information. Information itself can no more change reality than mere Platonistic ideas can: it requires physical action. We may be informed by the information society, but that information will not necessarily make us free. It may tell us that in a world where transnationals have the powers which Estabrooks concedes they have, democracy is an illusion. What point is there in having knowledge and being well-in-formed if the economic decisions that affect our lives are made by transnational corporations and global finance capital, whose interests are hardly in one-to-one correspondence with our own?<sup>48</sup>

Further, a sober look at the effects that the information revolution has already had upon advanced industrial societies will also make us sceptical about Estabrooks' position. Morris-Suzuki concludes from her study of the Japanese information society, in her book *Beyond Computopia*, that the information society is not offering the majority of people increased creative work or increased leisure:

"In Japan, the spread of information technology is *not* affording the majority of people more creative work or increased leisure. The most significant trends are, rather, the shift from routine manual production work to routine 'information transfer' work and from service work in the household to service work in the paid workforce; average working hours, meanwhile, are the same today as they were ten years ago. Though mass unemployment has so far been avoided (at a cost), insecure and transient employment in the peripheral workforce is expanding. Most importantly, Japanese people, while being promised greater opportunities for self-actualisation and for participation in voluntary communities, are at the same time experiencing increasing social atomisation and a growing sense of powerlessness to influence the organisational and technological forces which govern their lives. The intensifying research effort of this strongly knowledge oriented society, meanwhile, is not being directed to

47 M. Estabrooks, *Programmed Capitalism : A Computer-Mediated Global Society*, (M.E. Sharpe Inc., New York, 1988), pp. 169-170.  
48 cf. J. W. Smith, *The High Tech Fix*, (Avebury, Aldershot, 1991).



finding practical solutions to the most urgent areas of human need, nor even, in any meaningful sense, to raising the quality of life of most Japanese people. Instead, it is concentrated on areas which will result in the creation of more sophisticated, more highly value-added products for the prosperous minority of the world's population (and in so doing, will exacerbate the forces of protectionism and economic nationalism in Japan's developed trading partners)."<sup>49</sup>

We have, in conclusion, little reason for accepting the utopian millenarianism of the post-industrialists.

### 3. Beyond the Technopolis

To argue rigorously for each of the above points would require a much larger paper than this one. But this was not my set task. Here only a summary of a canon of critical literature on post-industrialism and the information society has been attempted—and this itself has been highly selective. Enough has been said though to call into question the social and philosophical foundations of a technopolis project such as MFP-Australia. But before concluding this essay I would like to respond to a criticism constantly made of the technocity critics. The criticism is an emotional one: to be against the technopolis is to be a Luddite; if we abandon the technopolis the sky will fall in and we will go back to the caves, or the primal slime.

Those who make such criticisms are typically ignorant of history. Luddism grew out of the industrial unrest of the 19th century, where *laissez-faire* industrial capitalists began introducing mechanization and the centralized organization of production. Local employers were also sceptical about such changes, but were ultimately forced to accept them in the light of the familiar vision of increased productivity. Webster and Robins, modern day Luddites, can be given at this point the opportunity to put the case for the accused:

"It was against this backdrop that Luddism came into being. But this Luddism, the real Luddism, was not the cry of the empty gut against innovations which inexplicably (at least to the victims) threw people out of work. It was an answer from many ordinary people to changes imposed from above—to the accompaniment of much talk about "natural" economic laws and technological advance—which had repercussions on their whole way of life. Luddism was above all else an attempt by working people to exert some control over changes that were felt to be fundamentally against their interests. It was a protest, in the days before the existence of any organized trade

49 T. Morris-Suzuki, *Beyond Computopia: Information, Automation and Democracy in Japan*, (Kegan Paul International, London and New York, 1988), pp. 202-203.



union movement let alone meaningful political parties to represent the disenfranchised, against new modes of accountancy, employment patterns, work rhythms, authority relations, and industrial discipline. New technologies were a part of these changes, an integral part of them, and the Luddites steadfastly refused to regard them in any other way.

In recent years, a number of scholars, most prominently Edward Thompson, have examined these responses which were expressed in Luddism. These have shown that the Luddites were not frenzied bigots: on the contrary, they were usually well disciplined and organized. They did feel passionately about what was being done to them in the name of progress, but their actions were measured: their targets were by no means indiscriminate, but carefully selected with due regard to the actions, policies, and attitudes of the particular manufacturer. (Not surprisingly, Cartwright's factory—itsself, significantly, well guarded—was the scene of the most vigorous Luddite assault in Yorkshire.) Most importantly, we now know that, despite the protestations of a long line of judges, politicians, and industrial managers, the Luddites did not protest against new machines *per se* but against the changed social relations which were being brought into being and of which mechanization was a part. Thus we find, for example, numerous instances of factories which used new machines being attacked, but only those worked by underpaid, untrained, and unskilled "colts" being destroyed.

Luddism, in short, was an answer—a political and moral response—from working class people to forces intent on destroying traditional social relations. It entailed an attempt to introduce alternative priorities to those being imposed by industrial capitalism. It was not a blind response, nor was it a matter of isolated protests, nor was it simply an industrial rebellion. It was a determined movement which shifted its scale of operations from villages across counties, which planned and practiced its sorties with some care, and which moved back and forth between armed raids on factories, industrial activity, and calls for political reform—in sum, what Edward Thompson calls a "quasi-insurrectionary movement".<sup>50</sup>

There is likewise nothing irrational at all in criticizing the ramifications of the machines of the modern—or post-modern-*laissez-faire* capitalists. This paper has been a small contribution towards this task. Its tone has been negative, but before any cure is possible, a diagnosis of the nature of the disease must be given. Others here will no doubt have much more to say about effective ecopolitical treatments and the convalescence of the body-social.

50 Webster and Robins, *op. cit.* note 39, p. 3, cf. also E.P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class*, (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968), p. 604.



## 5

*Ethics—The Pillar of Society**Mamata Kundu*

The development of our social existence is based not only in the discovery of past physical and vital evolution but our future mental and spiritual destiny and our place in the cycles of nature. In one side man follows a mechanical impulse to shape himself in the mould of the external influences of nature and in another side there in his subjective return he gets back to himself, back to the root of his living and infinite possibilities and the potentiality of a new and perfect self-creation begins to widen before him. In a response to both his external and internal urge man finds out a proper social existence which figures itself out in multiple values of life. The growth of a society depends on the growth of science, education, art and culture but morality is the root cause of the progress of all these aspects. Because society is not made of a particular class, privileged race or any isolated man but the growth of a society depends on as each man grows conscious of his real being, nature and destiny. A society may be said perfect where individuals may travel towards the divine perfection. Even science to pay thinks about morality for its fulfilled utilisation in human life. Science often misunderstood by the people as science means to them only machinery, the explosion of atom bomb, discovery of instruments and utensils etc. But science has important role in society to develop culture, to modernise the old industries and to enrich country with a fruitful result in agriculture. The 77th science congress which was held in Cochin University of science and technology from 4th to 9th February' 1990, communicated its plan that we should know that science is not apart from society but science is in society. Science may be utilised in human welfare instead of making civilization paralysed, in reconstruction of new society instead of complete destruction by atomic war and may be the fulfilled subject of total upliftment of society if there is an awaking of morality in human



mind. The president of this congress, Prof. Yashpal, the great educationist, authority in physics and chairman of University of Grants commission, said in his lecture, "science should not be treated as an additional activity, not only as a tool, not as some thing which necessarily must arise in some better developed countries and come to us second hand; instead it should be treated as part of culture of society, integral to our living, integral to our thinking, connected with our dreams, connected with concepts of ethics, beauty and spirituality and with very deepest questions we ask in regard to 'who are we, how are we related, where we come from and where are we going.'<sup>1</sup>

Moral consciousness is very dimly manifested today and it is the only reason that we are not at all satisfied in spite of great expectations from science. We always suffer from tension and anxiety about our uncertain future and our safety in all aspects. We have lost our simplicity and our spontaneous bliss in the midst of our excessive self-centredness and one sided attention to materialistic achievements. In the words of Prof. Radhakrishnan, "There is distortion of values, there is widespread escapism, a good deal of mass hysteria and people think of it and collapse in despair, frustration, hopelessness."<sup>2</sup> At present we live in a society which goes through an ultra-modern fashion in culture, education art and behaviour but the sense of value has become nil. We boast of our modernity but we have become more savage than the past. More and more we are welcoming artificiality in our life, the natural human qualities are found very rare in man. As if the progress of civilization is going to be stopped by the evil causes like meanness, selfishness and lack of truthfulness. Most of us generally show the altruistic attitudes but in principle we do respect and give importance to our egos only. Everywhere there is a distinction between the words and works and we should remember that it is the last stage of our moral degradation.

So morality here is the pivotal point to discuss if we think about a progressive culture in society from all respects. Tagore says, "Progress which is not related to an inner dharma, but to an attraction which is external, seeks to satisfy our endless claims. But civilization which is an ideal, gives us the abundant power to renounce which is the power that realises the Infinite and inspires the creation."<sup>3</sup> Moral urge can never be super imposed on man from outside but it is an inner inspiration manifesting itself out of an internal craving for peace and harmony. The time comes when he raises some questions like

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Yashpal. *The Science Congress*, 77th session, India, 1990.

<sup>2</sup> S. Radhakrishnan. *our Heritage* p. 98.

<sup>3</sup> Tagore. *Religion of Man*. p. 96.



how much he spent his life for the sake of others or how much for the sake of his own. Or did he try to attain the 'supreme good' in his life or he was totally dedicated to his 'complete good' through out his life? With all these questions he becomes restless. Man is a blending of animality and divinity. So he can neither ignore his finitude and limitations nor he can avoid his longing for truth. In the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan, "Man stands before the shrine of his own mystery. He enters it the moment he becomes aware of his own eternity. Apart from eternity there is nothing that can, strictly speaking, be called human. A meaningful ethical ideal must be transcendent to the immediate flow of events."<sup>4</sup> The call for moral awakening comes from within, from the deepest level of intuition. In fact when man becomes bewildered due to his inability to find out a harmony between his inner essential call for perfection and his external ways of life, he experiences some acute feeling of hunger for his inner perception of truth but he observes some anti forces preventing his craving for attaining truth. His misconduct wrong behaviour and lack of conscience are the main factors deviating him from right path. He needs then the correction of his ways, rectification of character and recognition of own self as an inner moral agent and thus ethics seems to him the most important subject as it is a science of good conduct. In Buddhism we find a similar attempt that emphasis is here given on ethical teachings instead of metaphysical problems and eight fold ways of right living are the means of attaining nirvana. Karma yoga in Gita has a great ethical impact on society which propounds the truth of niskama karma. And in Kantian philosophy also morality is established on practical grounds. Like an agnostic Kant says that metaphysical truths are unattainable, 'things-in-themselves' or Realities are unknown and unknowable. But he says that morality has a place in our practical reason because it is our practical reason which compels us to assume immortality of human soul, existence of God and freedom of will etc. Kant says that we are a blending of animality and rationality. The suppression of animality and to respond the call of conscience should be the aim of our life. Although his rigorism may be criticised as very hard to practise but in a paralysed society today it is a great need to us to control our desires, greed, cruelty etc. and to get back our real man within us. 'Duty for duty's sake,' treatment of man as an end not as a means all are very living facts which will enlighten us and uplift our lower self to the higher. Perfection of each individual gradually builds up its social structure with a strong culture. Culture is the manifestation of the sense of creativity potential in man. Culture depends on education, morality, art and science.

4 S. Radhakrishnan. *Eastern Religion and Western Thought*. P. 81



For a Progressive culture society needs a moral progress. Prof. James Seth observes, "Moral progress is morality in progress, 'progressive morality' never at any stage a progress to morality, or a progress from non-moral to moral stage."<sup>5</sup> The word progress literally means going forward or advancing; Progress thus signifies a continuous process--a series of changes each of which is a step that necessarily leads to a higher and richer step until the final stage--the goal of the whole series is reached. Our moral life may be said a progressive life when it through different stages in accordance with a moral ideal leading to the proper development of character, individual or rational. Moral progress implies that man is essentially a moral being, and that the germs of morality are inherent in his nature from the beginning.

Morality is not guided by any naturalistic law. Prof. Radhakrishnan rightly says that renunciation, self-sacrifice disinterested service to humanity are not stimulated by the workings of natural law.<sup>6</sup> Ethical thought is profound which gives a cosmic motive to morality. When morality will be in progress a transition from external to internal view will be found. Because "civilization is to express man's dharma and not merely his cleverness, power and possession."<sup>7</sup> When the moral consciousness gradually develops, human actions come to be judged more and more from an internal stand point, i.e., by reference to motives and intention. As Prof. James Seth observes "we can trace in moral progress a gradual transition from an external and utilitarian to an internal and spiritual estimate of action, from conduct and consequences to character and causes, from doing to being, from the action to man."<sup>8</sup>

Moral progress of an individual depends on his proper cultivation of intelligence to have a clear conception of the moral ideal and to estimate his duties according to the ideal. Besides, the influence of good company and the study of lives of saints and heroes, such as Socrates, Buddha, Jesus, Nanak, and Chaitanya will expedite moral progress. Moral progress of the individuals gradually constructs the new idealistic society where develops the feeling of equality, less egoism or altruism, feeling of right duties, feeling of coincidence between good and the virtuous and between good and vicious. Dr. Radhakrishnan says, "A just organization of society will be based on spiritual

<sup>5</sup> James Seth. *Ethical Principles*. p-318

<sup>6</sup> S. Radhakrishnan. *Eastern Religion and Western thought*. p 80.

<sup>7</sup> Tagore, *The Religion of Man*, p. 92, 1967.

<sup>8</sup> James Seth, *Ethical Principles*, p. 333.



liberty, political equality and economic fraternity.”<sup>9</sup> But it is very difficult to think about just well organised society unless it is based on a profound ethical discipline which comes from spirituality in man. In the words of Dr. Radhakrishnan, “we make moral judgments about individual lives and society simply because we are spiritual beings, not merely social animals.”<sup>10</sup> He further says, “If ethical thought is profound, it will give a cosmic motive to morality. Moral consciousness must include a conviction of reality of ideals.....When man realises his essential unity with the whole of being, he expresses this unity in his life. Mysticism and Ethics, otherworldliness and worldly work go together.”<sup>11</sup> Pratibodhaviditam matamamrtvam hi vindate, Atmana vindate viryam vidyaya vindatemrtam.<sup>12</sup> Mysticism where there remains no distinction between the subject and the object, where truth is revealed in intuition just like in a flash of light, seems to us otherworldliness and ethics on the other hand regarded as worldly or related to practical aspect of life both must be combined in order to make a vastness in the field of morality.

At present there is a bad tendency that socialism in both the East and the west is going to fall down. It is due to the fact that moral progress is in a crisis. Because the ideal or commonism is one of the point of moral progress. G.C Nayak in his 'philosophical Reflections' says that “most of the problems that have captivated our society through ages can be mitigated to a large extent, if, instead of nurturing this aristocratism or the monopolistic outlook, due emphasis is given on commonistic philosophy and if our educational system and social institutions are guided by such a philosophy.”<sup>13</sup> There should be the awaking of the consciousness of the common mass which is in deep slumber and is neglected all through the human history. No socialistic planning can be put to effective practice, if the common mass is allowed to remain for ever ignorant and dormant or ever neglected. If democracy or socialism is meant just to be an empty slogan for satisfying the individuals-it can never stand for a long time. There should be a spontaneous urge to measure all people on a common platform of most respectable humanism. We should develop our moral outlook to help in unfoldment of potential knowledge lying hidden in the poor and lowly. The days when the super position was given to the Barhmins, passed away. Because we give importance to

9 S. Radhakrishnan. *The Hindu view of life*. p-83.

10 Ibid. *Easteren Religion and Western Thought*. p-83.

11 Ibid. p-82.

12 *Kena Upanisad* 2.4.

13 G.C. Nayak. *The Philosophical Reflections*. p-138.



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some instances of different historical traditions where we find some effort of establishing equality. As we remember that Lord Rama depended upon ordinary inhabitants of his battle of justice, Lord Krishna respected Vidura, the son of a maid servant and Lord Jagannath received a cocoanut from Dasia, the untouchable, or Jesus Christ challenging his contemporary society with the question "who amongst you has never committed any evil deed?" Vivekananda said that the sudras will be the ruling class. Society may be introduced as a good organisation if there is no backward class and there is no question of exploitation. And it is possible if the feeling of oneness may be developed in human mind because it is the basis of fraternity, unity and strength. Social distinctions may be disappeared if love and other human qualities grow in Mankind. Love is one of the steps of approaching to perfection and just like a flame it illuminates lower self to be united with the higher. Prof. Radhakrishnan rightly says, "love is not the possession of a class. nor is imaginative piety, a commodity to be bought in market. Social distinctions disappear so far as these gifts go."<sup>14</sup> To develop our humanness is the greatest need at present as it is the fundamental basis of upheaval of moral consciousness in a society. If our humanity is lost we will be no more a man and the question of morality will be absurd. The great chinese sage Lao-tze said, "let us die. and yet not be rich. For we die when we lose our physical life, we perish when we miss our humanity And humanity is the dharma of human beings."<sup>15</sup>

To conclude it may be said that the perfection of each individual on moral grounds is the first point to recover our ill society and in this context we should remember Mahatma Gandhi who used to say, "Truth is God," "satyam vada dharman cara." Speak the truth, do the right—the truth and the right. "Truth is not something which we can casually get at. It requires considerable travel of human spirit to bring out harmony between the inward and the outward." 'Vak' (word) and manas (thought) must have identity."<sup>16</sup> We should minimise our demands and rights and should be careful about our duties. Such a consciousness can be raised in man when he proceeds to universality overcoming his meanness, lower self, hatred and anger." The higher the man, the fewer his rights and more numerous his duties."<sup>17</sup> Another thing is also very important that we should be dynamic in our look and in practice. Instead of being confined to tradition only it is better to, welcome some fresh views, ideals and thoughts to modernise our outlook, culture and society. J. C. Nayak says, "an essentialist static conception needs to be replaced by an operationalist dynamic views."<sup>18</sup> There should be the living theories more vividly applicable in practice. Society moves on the wheel of morality and science and hence it is our responsibility to help this dynamism.

14 S. Radhakrishnan. *The Hindu view of life*. p-86.

15 Tagore. *Religion of man*. p-95.

16 Radhakrishnan. *Our Heritage*. p-101.

17 Radhakrishnan. *The Hindu view of life*. p-84.

18 J. C. Nayak. *The Philosophical Reflections*. p-143.



## Religion in the Critical Decades

*Javan Al Brynaichi, Abd Ul Noor*

### 1 THE CHALLENGE.

That the next few decades are critical to the survival and wellbeing of our race is becoming increasingly obvious. Those of us who are held in the compulsive understanding of religious conviction will regard spiritual awareness as vital: Our race must rise in spirit, or fall to death.

First consider the problems that close in on us, which may from the first basis of agreement between all who become aware, whether we regard ourselves as theistic or atheistic, pragmatic or idealistic.

1. Our economy, to employ the term perversely, is unsustainable. Our industrial methods depend on raw materials that are being exhausted.
2. Our ecology, viewed as our interaction with the biosphere that sustains us and to which we are integral though cancerous, is unsustainable. Our lifeworld is dying, and we are the poison.
3. Our polity remains in the age of warring states: The proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weaponry continues to threaten massive, perhaps global destruction, out of any one of a number of regions of conflict. There is a proliferation of key decision makers with the capability of starting such conflict. The simple scenario models of the cold war no longer simulate, the risk management problems our statesmen face. Biological warfare depends on the use of controllable agents of a virulence limited in area and persistence, but is it not possible that an accident during development could release on the world an uncontrollable strain?
4. Our society is unsustainable. Our population essays exponential growth against an ecology of limited resources and an economy of



limited employment. Repression and the police organisation for it are considered as axiomatic principles of statecraft. The moral failure of Marxism in no way alters the basic facts of economic exploitation and class division. The military failure of Nazism in no way alters the basic facts of proliferating conflict between nations and peoples, the basic facts of proliferating conflict between nations and peoples, though these conflicts often cut across the nation state territorial system sanctioned by our international law.

The problems we face are not quadrivial: They are not soluble by the application of the classical scholastic and professional disciplines to discrete problem areas. That we are threatened with major discontinuities is becoming increasingly clear, but not the imminence thereof: Will we be faced with an overwhelming crisis with three hundred years? Thirty years? Three years? In the face of complex, interactive problems, integral solutions that solve several or all problems simultaneously will be more viable and effective than sets of partial solutions. Such integral solutions may require neither monolithic culture, leviathan bureaucracy nor a world scale state and police organisation. Any apparent solution which does require one or more of these conditions may fail catastrophically. Living solutions are required, born of like attracting like to work together in harmony. The deeper challenge is to orchestrate these into a living whole.

The beauty of the moral challenge presented is that we are not yet forced to act in simple self interest or react pragmatically to a developing crisis. We may elect to accept the challenge out of a sense of religious or moral duty, or in a spirit of generosity. For those of us who can and do accept the challenge, it is a good time to be alive. There are immense resources which may be brought to bear, chiefly the large numbers of educated and aware people who will seek and find some way of contribution. Modern transport, telecommunications and media techniques can enable cooperation and communication to take effect in an interweaving of many complementary international networks of people, the fabric of which, so woven, may lift humanity out of the mire.

## (2) RELIGION & SPIRITUALITY v. RATIONALISM

In the search for solutions many religious and spiritual people may share my sense that we are not going to solve these problems by rational human endeavour alone. Rational process and its instruments, theory, prescription, doctrine and ideology are necessary, as are the more esoteric arts of mastering these methods. Often they take on a cancerous life of their own, with the destructive potential of a computer virus in a real time system. Is creative mastery and



the inspiration to rise above our methodologies found in the depths of our being, or beyond ?

As we explore our subject we encounter certain great divides which present conceptual challenges to our ability to communicate, cooperate and to coexist. We will not find unanimous agreement on the necessity for these, though I personally believe we can substitute 'exist' or 'survive' for 'coexist' in the above. We have a choice: coexistence or noexistence. We are at a divide beyond which lie the shadowlands of reason, where the rationalist may hear grammatically and syntactically sound language devoid of meaning. It is obvious, however, that religion and spirituality are resurgent phenomena of importance in the world. These phenomena may be:

Psychological and sociological pathologies, which at best drain energy and resources into uselessness, and at worst may serve to trigger globally destructive conflict;

Psychological and sociological therapies, with a necessary effect somewhat analogous to dreaming;

Comprehensions of reality beyond the rationally observable world. The importance of these matters warrants the enquiry of the atheist and the agnostic.

I came to a compulsive awareness that I was theistic in outlook through contemplation of these problems. Observing and working with groups of intelligent people attempting to formulate sound theoretical solutions, necessarily partial solutions, to some of the discrete problems we face can effect a religious conversion where no evangelist would have succeeded. It seems intuitively obvious to some of us that something needs to work at a deeper level than can be fully expressed by human language or fully apprehended by human reason.

Religion may be an infection of the mind and heart. It may be contacted by inspired teaching, noble and beautiful example, and by contemplation. It is not a disease at such, though it can lead swiftly to death. It can bring great comfort to those in suffering. It is a strange attractor, drawing the pattern of one's life into tracks of striking simplicity or complexity. It may cause one to soar to patent sainthood, yet it can lead man down paths of darkness such that none might know he went only in the service of light. Fully contacted, it is immensely strong.

It is in its depths a compulsive awareness arising from contemplation of the mystery of being. That compulsive awareness may be theistic in the manner of the Buddhist and Advaita Hindu traditions.

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The compulsion lies in this: If one comes to doubt one's sense of the mystery of being after one's contact or illumination, one must there after doubt one's self to the full depths of one's being, and so doubt all others. This does not preclude recognition that the understanding of another may be very different.

It is living fire leaping from man to man across generations, devouring its victims as fuel for its light, Man dies: The light lives as if the essence of de Chardin's Noosphere. These shadowlands are a hellish place for a cool rationalist.

### (3) THE DIVISION OF RELIGION.

The sceptic may ask whether religion and spirituality can play any positive role in the great affairs of man. Indeed, the phenomena of the different major religions, and of sects and doctrinal differences within these religions which continue to develop, can be taken by the rationalist as a good *prima facie* argument against religion as he comprehension of reality and for the view that it is a pathological phenomenon. The rationalist may even assert that the tendency of man to look for non rational solutions to his problems is one of the major challenges facing humanity.

Contemplate the mystery of being, To be awake to that mystery which is beyond our rational powers to compass is to be fully alive, to possess the highest faculty of an evolved being. As man matures and ages, this sense of mystery, which is a youthful quality, often attenuates. This sense is closely related to youthful impressionability, the ability to learn new ways of thought, and to transform our structuring and organisation of knowledge. Further, deeper than the level of mind is that impressionability which responds to leadership of a moral character which develops rather than merely influences the pupil. It is the capacity to learn to become like ones master or exemplar. When these qualities attenuate, the capacity of man to evolve his being during life have attenuated. The most evolved of beings loses his individual capacity to evolve. This loss afflicts the man of religion who settles into dogmatic patterns of thought as much as the atheist who accepts mechanistically systematised patterns of thought. Great progress in science has depended on the insight to question the systematised thought patterns of the day.

Great developments in the religious and spiritual life of man have been led by men and women of great integrity and character, working under a compulsive sense of duty. But what have they discovered or developed? Given the great disparities between the theological and metaphysical systems of our religious and sectarian traditions, can



there be any transcendent reality capable of some comprehension by religious thought, or have we merely explored the depths of our own being?

Khuda, the Irani word for God, is close to Khud, the word for self. What mystery is greater than the mystery in man? How can God come to discover his own nature, masculine and feminine, better than through man? The spirit of process theology was alive in the Sufi traditions a thousand years before Darwin's ecclesiastical correspondents.

If there is some reality beyond our apparently known world, some reality accessible only to mystical process, does it possess any quality other than reflectivity? If so, does each soul reflect in isolation or does this reflective ether carry and resolve the infinite vibrations of sentient and suffering life? Do the generations of man in our religious traditions generate discrete vortices or images in this hypothetical ether which draw in like souls, or do they discover aspects of a greater unity? Does the mystic find communion only with some such image, or with some All father, Allthing, Blake's Nobodaddy? Do the Draculs of profane imagination take on some living reality in this reflective ocean that capture weak and impressionable souls who come into their vortices? What is the difference between such profanity and religious aspiration, where the captive soul incensed by Noor, Hebrew fire or Arab light, seeks union with or annihilation in the Beloved?

If religion and spirituality can play any positive role in the great affairs of man beyond the secular ones of culture and human organisation, a necessary base condition must be some reflective medium capable of bearing, sustaining, transmitting and perhaps ultimately resolving our impressions. We need to orbit some Solaris.

#### (4) IS THERE A SUPERIOR RELIGION?

This is a theoretically important question in natural theology. It is a very difficult question for someone infected by religion, as he can only address it with patterns of thought and organised knowledge peculiar to his religion. In those theologies which are exclusivist and imperative, this question, is of fundamental importance to the individual destiny of man. Religions spawn theological schools of thought. If there is one true religion, or one superior religion, it does not follow that any theological school of thought arising thereunder has comprehended it in its essence. Theology is the tool of man, and possibly the devil. Theologians analyse and divide, and communities are so divided. Prophets, Avatars and Mystics inspire, attract, unite.



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There may be a superior religion, but would anyone but God know of it? Is the purpose of life expressible partly as an examination in theology? Does one graduate to a test of spirit and vocation only after having passed the theological test of selecting the right religion, and the right sect within the right religion? This is undeniably true according to certain schools of interpretation in certain religions, but can this afford it's adherents any comfort? It seems to me that an exclusivist Christianity is the sternest creed. If Christ died for us on the cross, to save our souls, because God so loved the world, what does this demand of the Christian? Can there be any salvation for the Christian when all other souls are damned to burn, unless he himself comes fully to Christ by real, literal sacrifice of himself in evangelical ministry among the unbelievers? This may be true. Teilhard de Chardin has powerfully suggested the image of Christ as the fully evolved man. Survival of evolved planetary biosystems may indeed depend upon the evolution of a master life from capable of self sacrifice. Children often disappoint their parents, and noble families decay. The mastery of martyrdom, which conquers death and which replicates its image in the minds and hearts of the inspired, may be the most potent form of reproduction, exemplifying de Chardin's idea of sublimated sexuality.

It is a question of great practical importance for someone who awakes to spiritual awareness, who seeks a path and perhaps a guide to follow. A purely unstructured spirituality that seeks no information from the corpus of recorded experience and teaching is likely to prove somewhat solipsistic. Spiritual awareness is generally triggered by inspired teaching or example, and this provides an axis of attraction that will seem as sound as the sense of awareness so elicited. In any case it must be beyond the capacity of any man to study all the teachings of all religions, and know of all the examples of all the lives lived according to these teachings: Therefore we can not judge. We can only pray to catch a wholesome infection. Understand, then, the offence given when we refuse to contract such an infection from someone: It is to do with a sense of wholesomeness or holiness.

In presenting their teachings some religious teachers claim an inclusive comprehensiveness for their religion. If their religion is the better comprehension of reality then this is no doubt true in relation to the sincere religious endeavour of others, who may be progressing but at a lower level of awareness. The metaphysical cartographies of these religions and teachers none the less present impages of apparently very different worlds. In the history of mathematics there are



times when the development of an equation or structure has subsumed several more particular equations or structures into its generality, as a matter of rigorous demonstration. The metaphysicians of the inclusivist religious schools do not demonstrate their inclusivist claims with such comprehensive subsuming rigour.

In secular affairs the question is of no practical importance. We have our differences in religion before us as a test for the religious and the sceptic alike, and with these differences we must live and die.

### (5) IS THERE UNITY IN RELIGION ?

From a sceptical viewpoint, there is a unity of religious experience at the phenomenological level. The religious experience of man has been immensely creative in culture and in social organisation. The societies of religion have been the amongst the largest and most stable of human organisations. A plurality of empires have flourished and declined within the geographical domains of religious civilisation. The pathological effects of religion are well known, but religious conflict is more often a tribal or national-conflict emerging under an old religious banner. Conflict between religions perse does arise, for example the crusades or jihad, but it is usually bound up with political and economic factors. The worst such effects associated with religion are those of persecution and oppression, sometimes taken to genocidal length. This phenomenon may be associated with war, as for example the Reconquests of Spain under Ferdinand and Isabella, more often, however, it manifests as a form of policing activity within a jurisdiction supposedly at peace. This has also manifested under secular totalitarian regimes and has more to do with the psychology of man in political power than with religion. Generally, the social pathology of religion is a corruption of religious ideals, not a fulfilment. If, however, religion is to play a greater role in the affairs of man, the dangers of conflict and oppression associated with religion must also increase.

Those who are religious, who believe in the unseen, can believe at the deepest level in the working out of some unifying process or purpose in the apparently known world and in that reality of which the apparently known world is a part. Our concern is to what extent we can work to harmonise the religious affairs of man so that where common ideals exist, they may be given full expression. This need not follow from a pluralist conviction. The infection of religion is caught from someone of inspired teaching or example, and if any one religion or sect is seen to contribute disproportionately to progress in the affairs of man, this must serve to command respect and to lead people



## Religion in the Critical Decades

into its fold. Since the challenge facing us is one of coexistence, survival, a spirit of generosity, service and cooperation is necessary both to meet the secular challenge and to further our respective faiths. Conversion by force never won a heart, nor ever inspired one to die for faith. However lacking in the gift of inspiration we may be, we serve our faiths better by giving our blood, not seeking to shed the blood of others. Therefore the man of exclusive conviction may honourably enter the arena of cooperation, perhaps with more decision and purpose than one who is inclusivist or pluralist by conviction.

In seeking cooperation to promote common ideals, there can be no place for compromising ideals. The only sound basis for cooperation is on the basis of ideals genuinely held in common. What may work pragmatically in a power broking market such as a parliament will not serve to hold men together across religious, ethnic, national and economic divides. At the level of the unity of man, only the common ideals of man can serve as a bond. These common ideals are revealed in the lives of people, and can be imparted by recounting and further example. The ideals are thus caused to flower in the minds of men. Any attempt at prescription, or constructing a unifying theology and metaphysics, will at best be sectarian and more probably sterile. The best teachers use metaphysical representation as an impressionist tool for suggesting man's relation to the mystery of being, and not as a definitive cartography of reality. Those who hold to a plural or inclusive view of religion are probably best able to do this as they have conviction on their side.

If there is a unity of religious ideals, it must be revealed by vocation.

### (6) THE MORAL CHALLENGE.

If there is one true religion, and if there is one true sect in that religion, then the only special virtue its members can claim is that of having chosen or been born into it. This virtue is not obvious to the members of all other sects, religions and persuasions. All patent virtues are manifestly distributed amongst the followers of all religions and amongst those who do not express religion or spirituality. From the nature of the problems facing us, the struggle for ascendancy between faiths and ideologies must be played out by competing in the arena of cooperation, eschewing conflict save where duty admits of no other course. This was ever the teaching of religion, which must come to be practiced. In the course of such competitive cooperation, we may discover a greater harmony, a unity of man and of living religion.



The nature of the moral challenge is ultimately personal. However disastrous the flood of world events, and whatever destruction is released upon the world in the name of religion or otherwise in times to come, it remains for each man and woman to respond as best they can and make whatever positive contribution they can make. In an absolute sense, it is not the survival of our race and living planet that matters: It is a matter of conscience and consciousness. It matters how we relate to the mystery of being, and to all that is and in particular to all that which lives and knows joy and suffering. It matters that we take responsibility for ourselves and all that we can influence, that we accept dharma, duty.

This does not amount to a simple pluralism. If the Hindu first equated religion with a sense of duty, it may be that duty has found a more consummate expression in another religion. If the nature of God is love, then the purpose of man is love, and it may be that one religion teaches this better than all others. One of the names of God in Islam is Haqq, Truth. It may be that in times to come all men to regard one path as the better path to truth; Yet may they cherish and cultivate the other religions for their cultural wealth and their expression of truth, and to honour the memory of those who lived their lives in those paths to truth. If such a time is to come, man must coexist with man, with his living planet, and be at peace with the Mystery of Being.



## Duty for Duty's Sake : Any Justification in Religions ?

Sony Paul Pellissery

Kant's famous maxim, 'Duty for Duty's sake'<sup>1</sup> has been one of the invaluable principles in the moral philosophy especially in the section on duty. The maxim has been severely criticised by many on the charge of impossibility, rigorism and so on. Still the proposition stands relevant. Here my attempt is to examine its relevance in religions particularly in Hinduism and Christianity.

### Kantian Position

What is Kantian stand? Categorical imperative explains his stand thus : "Act only on that maxim by which thou canst will it to be a universal law"<sup>2</sup>. There is no room for 'ifs' in the proposition. What is right is universal. No body should act according to the circumstances. Categorical imperative is superior to all other powers. I am obliged to do it. What he demands is good will. Because only good will can perform good at any circumstances.<sup>3</sup>

'Duty for Duty's sake' : Our aim is virtue not pleasure. Then in performing our duties inclination or personal interest should not in-

1 Kant (1724-1804), profounded the entirely new theory-'Duty for Duty's sake'. According to it action should be done from duty. Actions in accordance with are not considered as morally worth. *Foundation of the Metaphysics of morals*, Kant, first sect. IV, 256), 1785.

2 The principle is called Categorical Imperative since it has to be followed and only it with an oughtness. *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason and theory of Ethics*, T.K.Abbot (Trans.), London, 1909, P. 38.

3 See, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant, Lewis White Beak (Trans.), New York, 1986, pp. 11-12



tervene.<sup>4</sup> For Kant I study my lessons for I am interested in acquiring knowledge, is not a moral act. He asks to suppress our inclinations and interests for knowledge and to learn the lessons from the sense of duty. The distinction is in between actions done 'from duty' and actions done 'in accordance with duty. While the former is oral act later is not.<sup>5</sup>

Here emotion has no place in moral life. We find a dispartment for affection and desires in his theory. For Kant this obligation turns men into slaves; nor for the hope of happiness, since this would be a mercenary ethics founded on pleasure and utility.<sup>6</sup>

### Duty : Hinduism and Kant

In Hinduism the best source about duty is available from Bhagavad Gita. The central theme of Gita is urge for action—"Do your Duty". Lord Krisna like Kant emphasises to discharge the duties in a disinterested way.<sup>7</sup> Nish kam karma<sup>8</sup> is the ideal suggested for moral life in this realm. Sri Krisna declares that "interested work even when under the dictates of religion is not so very helpful to moral progress".<sup>9</sup>

But these comparisons do not mean that Gita accepts 'Duty for Duty's sake'. Gita says, all desires are not bad. The desire after righteousness is divine.<sup>10</sup> Gita do not demand to root out our passions. It asks to purify them. The physical, vital nature is to be cleaned, the mental intellectual nature is to be purified, and then the spiritual nature finds its satisfaction.<sup>11</sup> What is required is that the duty must be done without selfishness. Desire towards duty is not mattered as Kant thinks. Even Lord desires his plan to be done on earth. That is why He asks Arjuna to fight, in order that injustice

4 Ibid, p. 16.

5 Ibid, p. 16.

6 *Christian Ethics* (vol.I), Peschke Henry C., Banglore, 1981, p. 77.

7 This advice was given by Lord Krisna when Arjuna was reluctant to kill his relatives in discharging his duties. For Lord Krisna these things should not be obstacles in doing duties. *Bhagavad Gita*, xi. 55.

8 Nish-not, Kam-desire, Karma-action. Action without desire.

9 To have/concentration and fulfillment in the work we should not have any association with the selfish desires. *Hindu Philosophy of Conduct* (Vol. I), Rangacharya. M., Delhi, 1985, p. 115.

10 *Gita*, vii. II.

11 'Pusti, tusti and santi are the respective ideals of the vital, the intellectual sides of man' *Indian Phitosophy* (Vol. I), Radhakrishnan, Bombay, 1985, p. 568.



may be removed from the earth. His actions are not for the sake of actions but for the sake of humanity.<sup>12</sup>

Gita preaches 'Duty for Duty' than Kant's dictum 'Duty for Duty's sake'.<sup>13</sup> Man does not and can not serve a concept like duty. He serves ideal, Lord who cares him and exists as the core of his being. Yoga in Gita proposes identity with God not with duty.<sup>14</sup>

### Duty : Christianity and Kant

Christian attitude towards duty is in hand with Kant's conception of duty in one side. That is clear from many teachings of Jesus in the Bible. "So you also when you have done all that is commanded you say", we are unworthy servants; we have only done what was our duty"<sup>15</sup>. Here as in Gita what is demanded is disinterestedness in the duties commanded to us. The self and its developments should not be our motives in discharging our duties. "When you help a needy person, do it in such a way that even your closest friend will not know about it."<sup>16</sup> As Krishna, Christ also doesn't give any value for the interested work : "And if you give to those from whom you hope to receive, what credit is that to you ... and lend expecting nothing in return".<sup>17</sup>

But the difference with Kant's dictum lays in the fact that a Christian fundamentally lives for God. If we live it is for God, and if we die it is for the Lord that we live, and if we die it is for the Lord that we die, so whether we live or die, we belong to God'.<sup>18</sup> Why a Christian obeys the laws given by God ? Because he is good and his will is the best way to achieve the Summum Bonum that have been planned for him by God. But these laws are not external, but they are imprinted in the conscience of each man.<sup>19</sup>

12 *Ibid*, p. 568.

13 Gita is more in accordance with Bradley's understanding of stations in life, since Gita believed in the varna system. An action done because of varna is not for individual or for society but for individual or for society but for God. *Out Lines of Ethics*, Dr. Ram Nath Sharma, Meerut, p. 237.

14 *Gita*, xii. T.

15 *Holy Bible*, Bk. 17, 11.

16 *Ibid*, Mt. 6, 3.

17 *Ibid*, LK. 6, 34-35.

18 *Ibid*, Rom. 14, 18.

19 "They show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness and their conflicting thoughts accuse or perhaps excuse them." *Bible*, Rom. 2, 15.



In the Kantian view, man's happiness, God's glory and eternal salvation, which are guiding factors of each action in Christian life are neglected. Rather he thinks man as a slave to the duty. Jesus' view contradicts this idea : Man is not for rules but rules are for man.<sup>20</sup>

### The Differing Points

In the religions that admit God as the supreme power, all the duties and actions are concentrated towards him. In the case of religions that do not accept God, the action may be directed towards liberation or to the equivalent. In short whether the religion is theistic or atheistic the maxim 'Duty for Duty's sake' is not agreed with.

No religion presses to suppress the desire or inclination towards duty as Kant asks. On the contrary sometimes religious leaders even advise to create a positive inclination and love for our duties to avoid suppression and psychological effects.

A kind of understanding the circumstances and situation in which action is done is seen in religions opposed to Kant's theory. The passions, social-forces may curtail the freedom of the doer. But for Kant at any circumstances man must fulfill his duty in order that it may become a universal law.

### Conclusion

Only conformity, without selfish motive is required in the performance of duties in the religion. What is mainly common for Kant's dictum and religions is that selfish interests are to be eliminated. Here one of the fundamental problems finds resolution. That is of clash between egoism and altruism. Whether man calls his meaning of and purpose of life as Krishna or Jesus or life-wise, he ultimately has to live for God and the life should not be self-centered but God-centered and society-centred.

In the evening of his life Kant himself felt the inadequency of his moral theory. "The opus postum shows the elderly Kant is ready to grant a more immediate and real role to God as a moral legislator."<sup>21</sup>

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20. On Sabath day Jews are no expected to eat nothing Jesus's disciples ate the grains of wheat when they were going through a field. then Jews criticised him on it. Then Jesus taught it. *Bible*, MK. 2, 27.
- 21 *History of Ethics*, Vernon J. Bourke, Gardon City, New York, 1968, p. 167.



## Book-Reviews :

### *A short review of nine books of Dr. R. N. Vyas :*

We have before us nine books of Dr. R. N. Vyas. Their titles are From Nuclear Destruction to Human Reconstruction, Education For Political Leadership, Recreating Educational System for a New World, From Consciousness to Super Consciousness, The Divine Religion, Melody of Bhakti & Enlightenment, The Bhagavadgita And Gyana Yoga, Indian Wisdom And International Peace, and Ethical Philosophy of Nuclear Age.

From Nuclear Destruction to Human Reconstruction has been published by Sarva Seva Sangh Prakashan, Varanasi. This small book tries to show the way of peace of the world can be achieved. It states. "Hence, let us all, the common men, unite to think constructively and to force our governments to work for peace and desist from conflict. If even fifty-one percent of the people of the world unite and resolve to work for peace and prepare progeny for peace, the horizons of peace shall come very close to it." (p 85)

The book is certainly a piece of constructive thought and deserves to be read.

Education for Political Education contains four chapters viz. Education And Politics, Indian Concept of Education for Rulers, The Western View of Education, and A Tentative Plan for Education of Leaders. The author has stated in his preface "I am sure that at least a great bulk of my readers will agree with me that if education is the path of leading a person to enlightened socialization and initiation into a socially sublimated life, we do need such education in an ample measure. Though such an education is very desirable for an average person who desires a full development of his personality, it is absolutely necessary for a political leader because of the power that he has to wield and the impact that his conduct makes on the average man". Dr. P. C. Chunder writes in his Foreword "Dr. R. N. Vyas has trodden an unfrequented path in the field of education..... His arguments for the need to educate rulers of men are stimulating."

Dr. Cunder is right. The book is really stimulating. It has been Published by Ambika Publications, New Delhi.

Creative Leadership too has been published by Ambika Publications. It contains five chapters viz. Leadership and Society, Propaganda, Public Opinion, Preservation of Peace, and A Perspective for New Leadership. The book tries to impress on the minds of its readers "that we must shake off our age-old, conventional, separatist, selfish pattern of political norms, we really want to be leaders and harbingers of human progress and prosperity." There is no doubt that Dr. Vyas has succeeded in giving a right norm to the readers.

Recreating Educational System For a New World, tries to show that spiritual basis of education has to be accepted if we really want



to see the world happy. The author writes "It is doubtful if we shall be able to find out any sensible person in the things found in our world. There are wars, conflicts, exploitation, religionism, blind nationalism, divorces, family dis-harmonies, mental ill health and many other things of the kind. We are living in a world which is more dangerous than the world in which our ancestors lived. Our scientific achievements have brought us more conflict than harmony, our economics have brought more exploitation than plenty, are religion has brought us more dis-union than unity, and our present education has brought us more madness than sanity.

This is the fault of our education. Our present education is based on stark materialism. If we really want to be happy, we must change the system of education by founding it on spirit. Spirit unites, matter divides; spirit makes man noble, matter makes man ignoble. There is no necessity of denying the significance of matter. Only it has to be interlinked with spirit. That is the only education that makes man free from the shackles of materialism".

The author pleads

"We have given much opportunity to our present materialistic basis of education. But it has brought us a host of problems. Why should we not now experiment with a spiritual basis of education for the reconstruction of the world?"

The book compels us to think in a non-traditional way in the domain of education. It deserves to be read to be properly understood.

The book has been published by Vohra Publishers & Distributors, Allahabad.

From Consciousness to Super Consciousness tries to draw the attention of readers to the fact that Indian Psychology "puts forth a higher ideal before us than the modern psychology. It rises above a mere analysis of mentations. It offers us a way of life. It offers us a way of religion that can bring about a change in our lives. It offers us a course of self-discipline that can help us in rediscovering our forgotten divinity and can aid us in unearthing our latent sublime potentialities".

The real nature of Indian psychology has been unveiled by the book.

The book has been published by Cosmo Publications, New Delhi.

The Divine Religion-Bhagavata Dharma and Oulture describes the real and the right nature of religion. Outlines of major religions of the world too have been presented before coming to the real nature of religion. The author writes "If my reconstructed view of religion is accepted, and it deserves acceptance, then religion shall prove to be a book for mankind. It is my firm opinion that authentic religion can solve many of our insoluble problems like obstacles in the path of establishment of international peace, social justice and welfare of individuals and human society"

The author has succeeded in giving the right concept of religion. He has done still better by describing the 'Nature of Culture as per the Bhagavata Dharma' which is extremely enlightening.



## Book-Reviews :

The book deserves to be read by every lover of religion. It has been published by Cosmo Publications, New Delhi. Melody of Bhakti And Enlightenment describes the significance of devotion. Apart from helping a person in God realization, devotion enriches life is freed from worries and anxieties that decolour the brightness of life.'

Syt. B.D. Sharma, then the Rajyapal of M.P., has given his appreciation of the Work in the following words:

"I have gone through your work 'melody of Bhakti And Enlightenment' Only a Bhakt can go sodeep into this subject. I congratuale you for bringing out this beautiful topic so elaborately.....Your approach and conclusion is deep and wide in a simple manner."

This adquately describes the merit of the book.

Persons of every religion can enjoy a perusal of this work. It has been published by Cosmo Publications, New Delhi.

The Bhagavadgita And Gyana Yoga expresses a new view-point about the famous Gita. There is a spate of works about the Gita. But the prrsent work tries to plead that it is meant for helping every person in leading a sensible and happy life. Thus the objective of the Gita is very practical. The author pleads 'Everyone of us can lead a happy and contented life, if he tries to get an inspiration from the Gita, irrespective of the fact whether one believes in God or not.'

The book contains eight chapters and four appendices viz. Anti-quity of the Gita, Nature of Gyana Yoga, Significance of Jivana Yoga, Every Individual Soul has a mission, Aparas and Para Prakriti, Kshara and A-kshara Purushas and place of Society in Gyana Yoga. The appendices are Shri Aurbindo on the Gita, The Bhagavadgita and Gandhi. The Bhagavadgita and Radhakrishnan and Straight from the Bhagavadgita.

The work is no doubt thoughtful and useful.

It has been published by Abhinav Publications, New Delhi.

Indian Wisdom And International Peace is a unique contribution of Dr. Vyas to the cause of International Peace as well as Indology.

The book has four long chapters viz. Introduction, The Basis of Peace, Significant Selections of Utterances, and Thoughts from the West.

It is easily the best work on World Peace. The author is right in thinking that 'the present work shall compel its readers to think about the desirability of peace and work for its attainment.'

The work deserves to be read and preserved.

It has been published by Gian Publishing House, Delhi.

Ethical Philosophy of Nuclear Age is a laudable contribution to literature on ethics. It has three Parts. The first part is 'Indian Ethics', the second part is Some prominent theories of Western Ethics and the third part is Humanitarian Ethics. The treatment is quite rational and the third part deserves to be read more minutely because of the enlightening views of the author.

The author concludes :

"We should not forget that we are living in the age of nuclear weapons that are capable of destroying the entire earth within no



time. Humanitarian ethics is in fact the Nuclear Age ethics, because this alone can give adequate guidance to conduct. If we really intend to save humanity from a catastrophic calamity, we shall have to draw inspiration from the new ethical philosophy. The sooner we realize this fact, the better it is."

Because of this constructive view and recreative tone, the work deserves to be read by every thoughtful reader. The book has been published by Akshat Publications, Delhi.

Apart from the above mentioned nine works, two more works of Dr. R. N. Vyas may be mentioned here. Their titles are 'The Synthetic Philosophy of the Bhagavata' and 'The Bhagavata Bhakti Cult And three Advaita Acharyas : Shankara, Ramanuja And Vallabha'. The first book bears a thoughtful foreword by Padma Bhushana, Knight Commander, Darshanacharya Dr. B. L. Atreya. He writes :

"Dr. Vyas has succeeded in placing before the English readers in a nutshell the entire philosophy of the Bhagavata Purana which is very extensive in size in Sanskrit, the language which many do not know these days. I recommend the book to every one who wants to sympathetically understand the religion of the devoted and the orthodox Hindus'.

This adequately describes the merit of the work. Apart from the philosophy of the Bhagavata, the work gives a vivid account of the controversy about the date of the work and conclude :

We conclude accordingly that far from being a creation of Bopadeva in the 13th century, the Bhagavata is probably the product of the 9th century B. C. When we say that it is the product of pre-Christian era, we do not mean that it existed in its present form in that distant past, but the kernel of the work was definitely composed at that time." This is an outstanding contribution of Dr. Vyas. It has been published by Meharchand Lachhmanda, Delhi.

The second book is a scholarly treatment of the cult of the Bhakti. It will be found quite stimulating by the lovers of spiritual knowledge which alone can give 'light and life un-affected by darkness and doom'. It has been published by Nag Publishers, New Delhi.

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**Anil Kumar Sarkar : *Dianamic Facts of Indian Thought*, Vol. I (published by Manohar Publications), Vol. II, III & IV (Published by South Asian Publishers, New Delhi).**

Dr. Sarkar has prepared these volumes as 'text book on Indian philosophy' as per his own statement. It is 'not a work of an exclusive cultural process which is Indian, but is an attempt to integrate the goals of entire thinking humanity'. Due to efforts of pioneers like Swami Vivekananda and Tagore, Indian philosophical thought got recognition in the West. Efforts of scholars like Deussen and Max-muller and conferences like East West Philosophers's Conference in Hawaii, the World Philosophy Conferences like Golden Jubilee Session of The Indian Philosophical Congress in New Delhi, The International Society For Metaphysics in Shantiniketan, and The International Society For Neo-Platonic Studies on Neo-Platonism and Indian



Thought in Canada and writings of brilliant scholars like Radhakrishnan, Dasgupta, Hiriyanna, D.M. Datta etc. Indian Philosophical thought has attracted the minds of many learned people in the West.

Indian Philosophy is a World Philosophy because it values every sensible system of thought and believes that ultimately true philosophy leads us to the Absolute. Indian Philosophy admits a distinction in the individual capacities of persons in grasping truth. Every system of thought is valuable for a person who pursues it. But his reflective capacity inspires him to reach higher domains of thought. The highest stage is reached when the truth of the Brahman, the Absolute is realized. One rises gradually to that position- Hence, a way reconciliation and not conflict should be adopted in seeking the nature of Supreme truth.

The world which has shrank considerably due to inventions of science needs an understanding the lofty character of Indian philosophy for creating an atmosphere of mutual understanding. Dr. Sarkar's volumes shall be helpful in understanding the basic nature of Indian Philosophy. Their main aim is just to acquaint a reader with the different view points of Indian Philosophy. No attempt to coordinate or evaluate them has been made, because of the limited objective of providing a text of Indian Philosophical thought.

The First Volume contains seven chapters besides a useful Preface. viz. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, Dynamic Currents and periods of Indian Philosophy, Vedic Philosophy and its interpretations, Upanishads and their Interpretation, Brahma-Sutras of Badarayana, Bhagavdgita and its interpretations, and Vedic-Agamic Auxiliary Scriptures. Second Volume discusses Charvaka, Jaina and Bauddha philosophies. Third Volume discusses Six Vedic systems and other currents. Volume Four presents Western Impact on Indian Thought. It has fourteen chapters besides the Preface viz. Indian and Western Cultural and Scientific Impacts, Nineteenth Century Socio-Religious Philosophic Movements, Ramakrishna-Vedakanda Movement, Rabindranath Tagore, Aurobindo's Philosophy of Supramental Experience, Gandhi and His Political Activities, Radhakrishnan's Philosophic Vision from East-West Perspectives, Contemporary Comments on Radhakrishnan, K. C. Bhattacharya, D.M. Datta, J. Krishnamurti, Haridas Chaudhari, Post-Independence India and World Order, and Nehru and After.

As a text-book of Indian Philosophical thought, the book is quite useful for a reader interested in Indian philosophy. Its utility is increased as it presents a development of a Philosophic consciousness from a comparative West-East perspective.

However a reader should keep his critical faculty intact while going through the work because author's views should not be accepted credulously.

For example the author writes in the Preface (ix) of the first volume:

"A comparative and critical attitude comes easily to Indian scholars because of the British pattern of educational system introduced during the British rule of India, and the same is continued with some modifications even to this date" This is a debatable observation.



Indian Philosophy right from its beginning has been critical. Every view has received some criticism from other systems of Philosophy in India. Thus from the Charvaka to Shankara and even to the days of Ramanuja and others this critical attitude has been continued. There is a well-known maxim in India that out of disputation, the truth may appear (*vade vade jayate tatva-bodhah*). Hence a compliment to the British rule for the critical attitude of Indian thinkers is not desirable.

However, it has to be said to the credit of the author that he has worked hard to provide philosophical information to the readers in his own way. Hence, the volumes deserve a perusal by all lovers of Indian philosophy.

**Anil Kumar Sarkar :** *Buddhism and Whitehead's Process Philosophy*, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi.

This book is a study of the papers of nine American thinkers in Buddhism. The view projected in the papers is that abstract intellectuality obstructs the continuity of experiential processes and is not suitable for an environment of human reflection. The author is of the view that Whitehead's process philosophy provides a progressively integral view of the experiential processes.

The author has been successful in presenting a comparative study of the thoughts of the Buddhist philosophy as well those of Whitehead underlining the similarity that exists between them.

The book is a good work on comparative study of the East and the West.

**Anil Kumar Sarkar :** *Sri Aurobindo's Vision of the Supermind*, South Asian Publishers, New Delhi.

The book presents the philosophic view of Shri Aurbindo. What is worth noting is the attempt to introduce Shri Anrbindo's Supermind as an extended consciousness beyond the Fourth or Turiya state of the Upanishads. The author finds a closeness between Anrbindo and whitehead (the favourite Western philosodher of Dr. Sarkar.)

The book contains six chapters viz. Sri Aurbindo and Haridas Chaudhari, Aurbindo's Philosophy from varied aspects, Chaudhari's evaluation of Sri Aurbindo, Chaudhari's World View: A Critique and Conclusion.

Shri Aurbindo is a profound thinker and his philosophic ihought has attracted learned people both in India as well as the West. The present work is a good addition to literature expounding his philosophic contribution.



## I

## Generalization

Archie J. Bahm

## SECTION A

## WHAT IS GENERALIZATION ?

Generalization is a process occurring whenever a person becomes aware that two or more things are alike in some way. Generalizing is becoming aware of a universal. A universal consists in the sameness of two or more things in some way. The things which are alike in some way are called "particulars." Universals depend for their existence upon the particulars for the way in which they are the same. An existing thing becomes a particular by embodying a universal when one or more other things either come into existence embodying the way (characteristic) or change by embodying that same way (characteristic). A particular thing depends upon its being a particular upon the existence of this sameness in some way with one or more other particular things embodying the universal consisting in their existing in that same way. Thus universals and particulars exist interdependently. Because much thinking abstracts, it has become convenient to refer to a universal together with all of its particulars as a "concrete universal" and a universal abstracted from its particulars as an "abstract universal," we shall adopt this language.

The word "generalization" has two accepted meanings. First, it means a process of generalizing. Generalization is a process of observing or creating an awareness of sameness in two or more things. Second, it means that which has resulted from the process of generalizing. A generalization is a statement of a universal. The first meaning is verbal, connoting a observed existence. Both of these

Understanding this article presupposes acquaintance with two articles published previously in *Darshana International*: "Intuition", XXVI, pp. 23-36, and "Inference",



meanings will be used in this article. Which meaning is intended should be evident from the context. Expected emphasis on nominal usages should not imply indifference to the importance of prior verbal or processing originating of most observed universals.

Although we intend that knowledge is possible (i.e., may become actual) in regarding the existence of some concrete universals as real (i.e., as existing whether known or not), the emphasis in dealing with universals in a work on Theory of knowledge is on universals existing in awareness, consciousness, experience. Emphasis, at least in the first part of this paper, will be to focus on concrete universals. It is to be expected that some attention to abstract universals later. But, according to the hypothesis being presented here all abstract universals exist only in minds and do not exist really (even though some philosophers do, or did claim that abstract universals exist (or have being) independently (even completely independent) of being known (e.g., Plato's IDEAS, Sanayana's "essences," and Whitehead's "eternal objects"). Inclusion of reference to universals in a theory of knowledge is not only warranted by also is necessary for adequacy because minds do make inferences regarding their existence (or being) as real and intend that the generalizations employed in such inferences are true.

Although in popular usage the term "generalizing" sometimes means concern for the sameness of two or more things, it does not always mean concern for the sameness of *all* of two or more things, but only for *some*, or for an indefinite or uncertain number, of things. But the meaning of the term "generalization" as used in this paper is intended to emphasize the sameness in *all* of the particulars referred to and thus to equate the meanings of "universal" and "generalization" so far as the products of generalizing are concerned. Interest in knowing that sameness exists in some particulars without concern for whether it exists in all of the particulars being referred to is a common kind of interest and may yield knowledge of the kind intended.

How to begin a paper on generalizing in such a way as to provide a sound initial grounding of theory in some obviously foundational way escapes me. Although my aim is to treat the problem of knowledge by observing some essential ingredients in its nature, and to point out clearly some of the bases which seem obvious after surveying the field, in my attempt first to analyse basic parts and then to gradually synthesize all of the parts in some comprehensive whole, I am confronted with the fact that experience functions wholistically and that the objects appearing in consciousness often are already



dynamic complexly integrated interdependent wholes having multivariant significances implicit in their natures.

I choose not to repeat the criticisms rightly raised against traditional empiricist and rationalist theories of the origin of ideas. But I find that, by beginning in the middle, so to speak, I am challenged to explain complexities by a method that is analytic in ways that lose much of what is obviously involved. My experience is not a "blossoming, buzzing confusion," as William James has said, but it is a rich conglomeration of intermingling varieties of apparent objects appearing continually with varying attention to what appears. "The organized wholes in immediate experience are original data : the beginning, not the end-product, of mental activity." [Charles F. Walraff, *Philosophical Theory and Psychological Fact*, p. 59. The University of Arizona Press, Tucson, 1961.] "It takes a very recondite and special interest to limit ordinary direct observation to color, line or texture, an attitude of abstraction that is very remote from the usual way of observing things." [D.W. Gotschalk, *The Structure of Awareness*, p. 18. University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1969.]

I must begin in some way, and following the topics outlined in the articles, "Intuition" and "Inference," is adopted as a suitable expedient : Generalizing within presence. Generalizing immediate inference. Generalizing intermediate inference. Generalizing mediate inference.

## SECTION B

### GENERALIZING WITHIN PRESENCE

All of the statements constituting the articles, "Intuition" and "Inference," are already generalizations. Thus, in one way, treatment of generalization has already advanced to great lengths. But the topics examined can now be attended to for the specific purpose of trying to understand the nature of generalization. Intuiting, inferring and generalizing have distinguishable natures. Even though we have already generalized about intuition and inference, additional generalization about the nature and kinds of generalization seems needed for an adequate account of the nature of knowledge.

Is there a simplest example of generalization? Whenever two appearances appear to be the same in some way (they are already the same in appearing or in being appearances), that sameness is universal. Such a universal is intuited. A person may intuit without generalizing, or without being aware of a universal, but a person cannot generalize, or be aware of a universal, without intuiting.



Is there any limit to the kinds or complexities of generalizations apprehendable within presence? Although limits do exist regarding what may appear in presence (and these limits vary in different persons as well as in the same person at different times), any awareness of two or more appearances (no matter how complex the appearances) as the same in some way constitutes awareness of a universal. For example, if one is aware of a kaleidoscopic festival parade on a busy city street as continuing (the apparent continuing being grasped in two or more instants within one presence), awareness of such sameness, or of any sameness in the two or more instants, is awareness of something universal. That is, the appearance of two or more complex dynamic gestalts as being the same in some way constitutes a universal (also a generalization). The point being emphasized here is that any apparent samenesses of two or more organic unities function as samenesses that can be generalized about. Awareness that two apparent opposites are mutually immanent and are the same in sharing such mutuality, involves both some universality and some generalization. Awareness that an apparent whole and its parts are both alike and different, and are also at least partially mutually immanent, involves generalization and universality. Generalizations apprehendable in presence can range from the simplest to the most complex.

Since existing things that appear as apparently real objects usually are very complex in nature, the recurrence, or simultaneous appearance of two or more complex objects also constitutes an apparent complex universal. The kinds of knowledge occurring even within one presence can be extremely complex, and variations in the kinds of combinations of characteristics existing in two or more apparently real objects complicate the kinds of knowledge experienced. Distinctions of kinds of combinations also occur in presence because they occur in the existing things causing awareness of apparently real objects. They also often occur in dreams and imagined objects. Knowledge of kinds is a kind of knowledge. Combinations of characteristics not only occur in particular objects as system gestalts, but recurrence of such objects involves a recurrence of systemness, and thus, even within a presence, universal systems and universal kinds of systems may be apprehended. Systems involve organic unity, and the sameness of the organic unities of two systems may be apprehended in a presence even even not present in the focus of attention.

Although each presence appears as continuous and thus as an undivided whole, it may also contain many apparent objects. When it does, it exists as a whole of parts embodying organic unity. But also when what is apprehended is apprehended as an organic unity, it



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also may be apprehended as a universal (i.e. an organic-unity universal). Such a way of apprehending seems to be involved in all observation of dynamic objects even when the organic unity is not attended to or apprehended as such. Every universal is already an organic unity, a whole (the sameness embodied in the particulars) and its parts (the particulars) existing interdependently. Universals apprehended within a presence are organic unities, and the presence (both it as a whole and its parts, including any apprehended universals) is an organic unity, even when its organic unity is not attended to or apprehended as such.

Since Organicism presupposes that organic unity is omnipresent in existence, and thus in each existing presence, how does it explain the claims of yogins to achieve awareness in which objects and duration are completely absent? Each person can, I believe, experience moments of seemingly complete rest in which what appears as completely static and in which awareness remains unchanged. Does this mean that organic unity is missing? Is what is apprehended as a moment of complete rest a whole without parts? If, as is claimed (or hoped for) ultimate basis for reliable knowledge (seeming certainty) is to be located in intuition, in awareness of appearance without intermediation, then when awareness apprehends what appears as a completely static appearance, must we not accept as a fact that a whole without parts can exist in presence and that organic unity is absent? Although the answer must be yes so far as particular moments of consciousness are concerned, the Organicist theory contends that the multiplicities of conditions causing the existence of such moments are sufficiently suffused with multiplicities of organic unities that the production of some moments of organic unities in which the unity or wholeness predominates and of other organic unities in which the plurality of parts predominates makes possible the occasional appearances of complete rests. Yogins promote actualization of such occasions.

1. *Time*. I have generalized about two dimensions of presence, appearing as pairs of polar opposites, i.e., past-future and subject-object, which not only recur constantly but seem to be present almost universally. Generalizations may occur not only about each of these four kinds of directions but also may occur within each of them.

A person may, when hearing a succession of sounds, such as those of an alarm clock, apprehend them as all alike as sounds and as embodying a universal of such sounds. One may observe each of the sounds as passing, so that a direction of such passings is also repeated with the occurrence of each successive sound. A sameness of such



repeated direction may be observed as a universal. As each sound ceases and becomes past, any awareness of such repeated cessation is generalized as a universal. And any awareness of repeated apparent becoming past is apprehended as a universal of such becoming past. Intuiting a generalization about successive alarm-clock sounds normally includes awareness of regularity in the repeated successions. Intuitively apprehending a generalization about a person's conversation may include irregularities. Thus generalization may be about either or both regularities and irregularities. But any generalization about irregularities will involve observing processes having differences that are at least alike in being differences and often alike in being like kinds of differences. All genuine novelties are alike in being genuine novelties, and such likeness, when generalized about, functions as a universal.

A person may, in ascending a stairs, be aware of a succession of achievements in advancing into the future, and generalize about the sameness reembodyed in each step. Thus one may apprehend generalizations both about passage into a past and advancement into a future, and both simultaneously (when hearing an alarm clock or climbing a stairs) all within a presence. When such successions are extended, generalizations may be extended through expanding presence and extending beyond presence. Repeated experiences of such extensions yield generalizations about an immediate past and an immediate future, and may serve as bases for inferring generalizations about an extended past and an extended future.

Surely nothing is more common in ordinary experience than an awareness that two or more objects appear to be alike in some one way or many ways. Awareness of an apparent sameness of two or more apparent objects constitutes an apparent universal. Some apparent objects appear as apparently real objects. Awareness of an apparent sameness between two apparently real objects constitutes an apparently real universal. All this can occur within presence, and also may occur through expanding presence and through expanding beyond presence.

2. *Self.* Although much awareness of objects neglects attention to awareness that a self or subject is involved in such awareness, a person may also be aware that the same subject recurs or continues the same during an awareness of two or more objects and that such sameness exists as a universal, whether not attention is focused on it. Such awareness of a subject (i.e., in any subject-object awareness) as a universal can occur entirely within presence, or through expanding presence, or extending beyond presence.



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Also, since objects normally are objects for subjects and subjects normally are subjects for objects, a subject-object sameness normally exists in awareness as a condition whether or not present in the focus of attention. A person may generalize about such a subject-object universal within presence or through expanded presence or through transcending presence.

Although there need be less doubt about apparent universals apprehended within presence than about those involving presence-transcending inference, habits of doubt acquired from attending to presence-transcending generalizations may actually infect a person's way of "giving" to what is "taken" when the sameness of two objects appears as given when the objects are apprehended as presented within presence.

## SECTION C

## GENERALIZING IMMEDIATE INFERENCE

When presence-transcending immediate inferences continue to remain the same, or to recur as the same, while a person is observing a tree, universality exists in such sameness. When a person is observing for a first time an apparently real object (e.g., a tree), the awareness of continuance or recurrence involves a generalization as the awareness continues or recurs. When the object is complex, its systemic complexity and organic unity are embodied in the generalization even if attention is not focused on such embodiment.

1. *Time.* When a person is aware of a series of objects disappearing from sight, as when bubbles are observed disappearing down a drain or when portions of the pavement disappear under a moving automobile, any sameness observed in such repeated appearance of disappearances constitutes a generalization and embodies a universal. When a person recalls that he blew out all of the lighted candles on cakes during three successive birthdays, his recollection of the samenesses (birthdays, cakes, candles, blowing out all) embodies a complex universal. When a person reads, with a naively realistic attitude, about the rise and fall of ancient dynasties, one's awareness that the dynasties were all alike in being dynasties, in rising and falling, etc., involves a complex of universals. All of these examples illustrate generalizations and universals pertaining to pastness, and are themselves all alike (and thus universals) in pertaining to pastness. But also, what is being emphasize here, when universals appear as embodied in continuing or recurring after-images, disappearances, memories, and accounts of past histories, the nature of generalization and universality is such that it can be so embodied.



When a person is anticipating continuing or recurring enjoyment of successive swallowings of a favorite beverage or succulent flavors while eating a meal, such anticipations of recurrence embody a generalization and a universal. When a person drives an automobile, and observes approached objects and approaching vehicles, one normally retains a persistingly alert attitude of anticipation. Generalization and universality exist in such continuing and recurrent alertness and anticipation. When a door-to-door salesman plans to call on several potential customers, he often expects some common kinds of response. Any awareness of such expected commonness exists as a universal in his present awareness. [It may or may not be realized as anticipated.] When a person enrolls in a college, one becomes aware of several courses to be taken, and one's awareness that they will all be the same in some ways (e.g., for three semesterhour credit) and that some kinds will be the same in some ways (all given in the history department) thereby embodies anticipated universals, as well as universals of anticipation. These examples illustrate generalizations pertaining to an apparent future. They illustrate how the nature of generalization and universality is such that it can be embedded in these ways.

When a person is looking out of the window of a speeding train, one's observation of seemingly passing objects normally involves not only both their sudden recurrent appearance and their rapid recurrent disappearance but also their almost simultaneous appearance and disappearance. Generalization and universality can thus be embodied not only in awareness of becoming past and of becoming future but also in awareness of both together simultaneously. The more complicated awareness of passage becomes, the more complicated is the universality embodied in such awareness.

Naively realistic immediate inferences of objects not only may infer the existence of apparently real universals in objects, e.g., two or more chairs being alike in having four legs, but also involve the sameness in two or more acts of inferring the existence of such chairs and their sameness. Universality is present in all naively realistic inferences to the extent that they are the same in any way, including being naively realistic inferences.

2. *Self.* Immediate inference regarding the existence of a real self as subject in subject-object relations may infer not only that a self continues or recurs in functioning as aware but also that such continuing or recurring functioning embodies a sameness existing as a universal. When such inferences become involved in the awareness of new objects or new kinds of objects causing differing responses of a



## Generalization

self as subject, any observable sameness in the new responses of a self as subject may be generalized about, not merely as a sameness of self but also as a sameness of a new kind of self-response. Generalizations about an immediately inferred real self may be both stable and enduring or variable and various.

Immediate inferences combining naive realistic appearances of both objects and subjects normally occur transparently but nevertheless embody universals constituted by any samenesses present in their recurrence. Recurrent variations in subject-object interactions may include awareness of feelings of satisfaction, confidence, conviction uncertainty, confusion or fear. Generalization is by nature such that it can function in relation to all other kinds of mediate inference previously outlined, including the larger, more comprehensive kinds, such as participation, mind, body, and environmental surroundings.

### SECTION D

#### GENERALIZING INTERMEDIATE INFERENCES

The importance of "intermediate inferences" in constituting "knowledge" should not be underestimated because they constitute most of our inferences in everyday living. Inferences are here named "intermediate" when and because they involve both some acceptance of objects as being real in the way they appear as real and retain some trace of uncertainty regarding whether and in what ways what is real about the objects is also different in nature from the way it appears. Thus intermediate inferences range from almost complete acceptance of what appears as real (as in immediate inference) to almost complete doubt about the revelatory capacity of such apparently real appearances (as in mediate inference). Thus the kinds of generalizations and resulting apparent universals vary enormously in nature and kinds.

1. *Time.* Knowledge of the past in each person is a product of both the uniformities in biological heredity, physiological functioning, environmental conditions, and social and cultural traditions in which a person has developed and is living. Thus generalizations involving intermediate inferences about what appears as past (times, processes, places, people, objects, groups, culture, etc.) involve both relatively stable and continuing conditions of many kinds and also the peculiar conditions occurring often with novelty (at least for the individual living adaptively), both unique novelties and novel kinds of situations in which novelties occur.

Since biological development has provided tendencies to see (hear, smell, taste, touch, etc.) objects as real and as real in ways



conducive to adaptation and survival, it has also provided tendencies to infer with confidence the ways in which objects appear as real. But uncertainties inherent in adaptive processes resulting from awareness to adapt as desired also conduce to caution and induce doubts about whether what appears really is as it appears. Hence generalization about uncertainty regarding apparently real things is itself a product of the nature and conditions of biological adaptation. Thus generalization is such that much of it results from the need for and nature of intermediate inferencing in relation to apparently real objects, past, present and future.

Knowledge about what is future tends to be experienced as more uncertain than knowledge about what is past. That apparently real future experiences will occur seems normally assured except perhaps for those expecting death. But how they will be experienced is conditioned by past failures of generalizations about intermediate inferences so that present intermediate inferences about the future tend to be suffused with uncertainty and thus conducive to alertness, attention, and an attitude of inquiry. It is true that some persons anticipate with serene confidence most of the time and that others seem to be always tense with anxiety. Generalization is by nature such that it occurs in intermediate inferences about what is future whether anticipated with serenity or anxiety.

Generalizing is processual and thus proceeds temporally in ways involving futurity. When each additional particular in which a universal is observed appears first as anticipated and thus as future, does any uncertainty inhering in intermediate inferences about what is future condition the generalizing process? Although persons may differ regarding such feelings of uncertainty, generalization is by nature such that uncertainties inherent in any intermediate inferences about presently apparent universals being also embodied in particulars expected to appear in the future also condition such generalizations. Acceptance of a doctrine of "working hypotheses" as essential to scientific method is normally accompanied by insisting on an attitude of "tentativity" regarding all hypotheses, thus integrating generalizations about uncertainty (and uncertainty about some generalizations) as inherent in the nature of the quest for reliable knowledge by such method.

2. *Self.* Knowledge of self involves generalizations and generalization is by nature such that it can yield knowledge of self. All generalizations are acts of observation by a self. So all generalizations are self-dependent (dependent on a self). Each self is by nature a generalizing process, both in generalizing about other things, in gene-



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ralizing about itself, and in generalizing about interrelations between itself and objects. A self is also in a sense a generalizing process, with or without awareness of existing as such a process, by generating or regenerating itself as the same self through continuing or recurring existing. That is, a self is a progressing concrete universal existence whether or not it becomes aware of itself as such in any distinctly conceptual way. So intermediate inferences about the nature of self, and of self as a generalizing process, seem warranted. [For examples, see my : "What is Self ? The Organicist Answer", *Darshana International*, Vol. II, 1962, pp. 9-35. *Why Be Moral ? Part I. Ethics: The Science of Oughtness*, pp. 87-140.].

Knowledge of objects, i.e., of apparently real objects, occurs in most people mainly in the form of intermediately inferred universal generalizations. Generalization is by nature such that we can generalize about perceived objects of many kinds and about many different ways of perceiving. It is such that we can conceive objects of many kinds and complexities, as concrete or abstract, as instantaneous, varyingly enduring or even timeless, and as obviously so or as extremely vague, unclear, chaotic, and self-contradictory, or as non-existent. Generalizations occur regarding images and ways and kinds of imaging, and feeling, and desiring, and how these are projected as apparently real objects of art and beauty and ugliness.

Most generalizations in adults appear in language, too often naively projected as having some kind of real existence, whether in sound waves, or on printed paper and in libraries, in some eternally real subsistence, or merely in other minds. Recurrent doubts about fully understanding, not only one's own language but especially foreign languages, tend to become more important as one learns more or more about languages, causing generalizations to appear more intermediate and less immediate. Generalizations about other persons begin in infancy and tend to mature along with generalizations about self. Although some persons gain seemingly complete confidence in their knowledge of, and trust in, other persons as understood, most knowledge of other persons includes generalizations involving uncertainty, even mystery, and sometimes fear. Learning to generalize about how other persons generalize, often quite differently, is one way of extending our understanding of the nature of generalization.

Knowledge of the real world, i.e., the apparently real world, as known through intermediate inferences involving it both to appear as real in the way that it appears and to appear in some way or ways as more than it appears, involves generalizations normally infected with uncertainty. When a person is engaged in solving a problem, then a



least two kinds of uncertainty are involved. When a person is confronted with a problem, one does not yet have a solution. Then one normally experiences uncertainties about whether one can attain a solution, about whether one's first (or second or third) hypothesis will work, and about how much testing or working with the hypothesis satisfactorily will be needed if a solution is to be found and accepted. This is a different kind of uncertainty that inherent in judging that there is more to what appears than appears and what its nature is. Since two kinds of uncertainty occur in such situations, we may inquire about how they are related. Each of the two kinds may be complicated and variable. But can both be reduced or overcome? If a person believes that one has solved one's problem satisfactorily, then the uncertainties related to the problem may be eliminated, although the generalized solution to many kinds of problems retain sufficient uncertainty that tentativity is retained as an essential characteristic of the scientific attitude and method. But uncertainties about ways in which what appears as real appears to be more than appears may be such that they can never be eliminated, even though, with continuing efforts to understand, uncertainties may be reduced somewhat although also uncertainties may increase as our efforts reveal that there appears to be even more of the more than what appears than appeared earlier.

Some persons may be quite unaware that these uncertainties are of two kinds and simply have vague feelings of uncertainty. But the more a person (or a task force, a society, or a civilization) is concerned about knowing more and more about what appears to be more appears, then more inquiry into its nature is pursued deliberately. Although it seems impossible to reproduce all of, or all of any part of, existence in minds, i.e., in awareness and in generalizations, the fact that we have had some success in learning more about what appears to be more than appears encourages us to continue our inquiries and serves as a warrant that our ignorance and uncertainties may be reduced. Recognition that generalizations about the impossibility of complete knowledge of the real world (existence) are warranted itself involves a generalization about such generalizations. Agnosticism is a necessary ingredient in any adequate theory of knowledge to the extent that some kinds of knowledge are not possible. But the inevitability of some agnosticism need not inhibit efforts to act on the faith that some more of what appears is more than what appears may yet become apparent. More knowledge of the real world seems in prospect for mankind even if the process of attaining it reveals still more about existence that we do not, perhaps cannot, know.



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Turning to generalizations about larger, more comprehensive wholes, i.e., to generalizations inclusive of the generalizations about our four directions (past, future, self, and objects) and to ways that they describe massive and extensive integrated wholes, such as societies and civilizations, embodying organized complexities of many kinds. These range from smaller organisms, such as a swamp, a family, a circus, a festival, a village, a university, through metropolises, nations, federations of nations, to civilizations, to humankind, to the earth, to a galaxy, and to the universe. Inferences and generalizations about all of these conceptions of apparently real massive and extensive organized wholes have bases in personal experience and tend to have their apparent reality accepted. When a person reads about a dynasty with unfamiliar cultural traditions, one already has some ideas about family and cultural systems at the same time one is aware that there is much more to such dynasties than appears in one's awareness.

Most inferences of civilized adults are intermediate inferences. Not only does the food that a farmer's wife prepares appear to be as real as it appears, but she also knows that the food is a product of many causes and conditions of the earth's agricultural system which she does not understand. Not only is a national dictator familiar with the personnel and fortifications he depends upon, but he also knows that multiplicities of conditions, such as jealousy, willingness to endure submission, weather, enemies, competing loyalties, etc., are too many and too complex to rule with complete assurance. Although a chemist has much demonstrated reliable understanding of many chemicals, the complexities of combinations and the uncertainties about the nature of energy organized in subatomic particles keep him uncertain about their nature.

Most experienced adults apprehend the organic unities of the complex objects in their environment both somewhat as naively realistic and somewhat with uncertain wonder about the mysteries of their existence and nature. But the naive familiarity and critical uncertainty become organically unified, with amazing variations. The nature of time remains very much a mystery. And self-conceptions include familiarity with one's awareness, interests, attitudes, body, and ways of functioning. But also persons often wonder why they exist, of what they really consist, and what makes them function in the ways they do. Most self-conceptions involve intermediate inferences and generalizations. "What is knowledge?" Almost any answer will involve intermediate inference.



## SECTION E

### GENERALIZING MEDIATE INFERENCES

"Mediate" or "mediated" inferences, as these terms are used here, refer to inferences that what appears as real also involves something both more than and different from what appears as real. Each kind of apparent more than and different from what appears as real involves as additional kind of mediate inference. Each kind of mediate inference may generate a generalization about such more than and different from what appears as real (and possibly about how that more than and different from what appears as real is related to what appears as real).

A fundamental difficulty in discussing mediate inference is that, no matter how much more than or different from the inferred being is from what appears in immediate inferences and intermediate inferences, it cannot be completely more or different, because it functions as a projection intended to apprehend a real object and thus is like all other projected intentions in being a projected intention. In every subject-object polarity something of the subject is immanent in the object. So even in mediate inferences to objects most unlike other objects, something of the nature and intention of the inferring subject remains implicit or immanent in the object.

But a mediately inferred object is significant because of its mysteriousness when compared with objects in ordinary experience. Although the uncertainty inherent in inferring the existence and nature of what appears as more than and different from, hence other than, what normally appears, tends to remain inherent in the inference, when people have repeated making the inference so that it becomes habitual, and a culturally established habit, its uncertainty tends to diminish and to become part of a creed of "believers."

Mediate inference may be exemplified in primitive thinking. Anthropologists report a plethora of generalizations about invisible powers. For their scientific purposes, anthropologists have generalized about many such primitive generalizations by adopting the polynesian term "mana" to name a general invisible power common to all of them. [See my *The World's Living Religions*, Ch. II.] Faith to the practical generalization that a thing is what a thing does and that when something is done there is something that does it, is common to human nature and human (and other animal) ways of knowing. Generalizations about visible causation naturally lead to generalizations about causation by invisible causes when actual effects are observed and no evident cause is observed. When something appears to be



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caused but no cause appears, then a person naturally infers, and generalizes, that an invisible cause is present. Primitive and traditional cultures are replete with examples of accepted explanations of both unique and recurrent examples of causation by invisible powers. Analogies are called up to depict the invisible power as a deity of some kind, having form like some animal (as in totems) or giant or wizard. A history of developments in Hindu theology well exemplify this process. [See *ibid.*, Ch. 3.] They lead eventually to Nirguna Brahman, which is conceived as the being of blissful awareness purified of all else. It is mediately inferred to be completely freed from all distinctness, form, time, desire, life (and thus completely other than ordinary experience), and yet as a negation of all negations, it is a product of human interest in negation, and in perfection of purity. Why any being should be is a complete mystery. Why Brahman is also both completely powerless to cause and yet is the causal source of all else, emanated or incarnated as *maya* or *suchness*, remains an ultimate mystery.

Contemporary physics is replete with mysteries and physicists complete with each other for professional advancement and Nobel Prizes by mediately inferring, and supposedly demonstrating, the existence of some particular kind or form of physical structure or power. Energy is a central concept in physical science. Everything in the universe embodies energy. What is energy? On the one hand, nobody knows. It is a complete mystery. Why energy exists, and why all existents embody energy, continues to be a complete mystery. On the other hand, the nature of energy should be obvious to everyone, because, if energy is what energy does, and if energy does everything that is done, so to speak, then we cannot fail to observe its nature in the way existing things function. Although energy is thus believed to be present through its effects in what appears in presence, and in immediately and intermediately inferred things and processes, there remains something about it that is inexplicable, and to this extent involves mediate inference.

In addition to the mysteries remaining after continuing study of chemistry and astronomy, and now biotechnology, the mystery constituting the mind-body problem, e.g., of how mental energy and brain energy can seem to be so different in nature and yet interact dialectically in multi-complicated ways, continues. In spite of all the published volumes of scientific findings, in libraries and data banks, and commonly accepted "scientific laws" revealing something about the nature of energy, the remaining ignorance, and uncertainties, about its nature requires retaining a large amount of inferential mediacy in our knowledge,



*Time.* Generalizing mediate inferences may extend in any of our four directions (past-future, self-objects) as well as including all of them and extending beyond them. Although existing as temporal beings and intuitively accepting their temporal nature, persons have little understanding of the nature of time. Although conceptually accommodating days and months and years, even centuries and millennia, and hours, minutes, seconds and even milliseconds, and times for eating and excreting, sleeping and waking, and rhythms of lungs and heart, and feeling influences of sunrise and sunset, and energy from periods of rest and fatigue from periods of work, the nature of time as a universal characteristic and condition of existing remains unclear. So theories about the nature of time are invented, some simple and obvious, some having partial plausibility, and some deepening its mystery.

One view, holding a mathematical view of time as consisting of instants just as a line consists of points, claims that, since what is past no longer exists and what is future does not yet exist, and what is present is a durationless instant, the apparent duration in any presence is specious. William James called it "the specious present". Equally unenlightening is the mediate inference that "time is the moving image of eternity". Both are ways of inferring that time as normally appearing in awareness does not exist.

Is there such being as eternity (timelessness)? If so, how is it related to time? Some claim that God, who is eternal (timeless), created the world and thus created time as a period within which the world will exist. [How souls can remain eternally in Heaven after the end of the earth remains unclear. If God is eternal, God is both before and after the earth which he created. Thus God is everlasting in the sense of lasting as long as the earth and its time. But after the earth, and time, ceases, the being of God may be eternal, but how can souls be eternal and still alive (temporal)?].

Are there many times, and lapses of time, as with the Hindu "Days and Nights of Brahman manifests the world for an aeon (a "Day") and then does not manifest the world for an aeon. Ananda, unendingness, is an unendingness not of each aeon but of the series of "Days and Nights." But the view of Advaita Vedanta is that all time is illusory (*maya*) and hence unreal except as an illusory manifestation of an eternal being. This view, like the above, has both immediate and intermediate ingredients, but at first acquaintance, belief sees to call for stretching imagination into accepting an unbelievable mystery. Of course, when a person, or a society or civilization, accepts a belief in a mystery as true, and becomes accustomed to its



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belief, the mediate characteristic of the inference recedes from obviousness and tends to be accepted as a familiar immediate inference.

Is time continuous or discontinuous? Some holding a mathematical view of time as consisting of instants just as a line consists of points externally related to each other, claim that, since what is past no longer exists and what is future does not yet exist, and what is present is a duration-less instant, the apparent duration of any presence is a specious illusion. William James called it "the specious present." Bertrand Russell proposed that existence exists for an instant and then does not exist for an instant and that all being consists in instantaneous sections of a universe proceeding temporally instant by instant. "The whole process of nature may, so far as present evidence goes, be conceived as discontinuous." [Bertrand Russell, *The Analysis of Matter*, p. 402. Harcourt, Brace and Co., N.Y., 1927.] Minds satiated with mathematical measurements may find Russell's proposal as immediate or intermediate inferences, but they remain mediate for me.

If existence is essentially temporal so that nothing can exist without time, is time essentially existential so that there can be no time apart from existence? Is there a single time, or are there many times, and many as there are existing processes? Does time flow smoothly, or does it sometimes flow faster and sometimes slower? Does it have different speeds in different kinds of existence, different areas of the universe, at different periods in history? Does time have "width" and "thickness," like space, not just a line (of instants) and a plane, but also a cube, and thus have "volume"? If so, does its volume vary? Regularly or in erratic waves? Does it sometimes stop, and then start again? Is time dialectical? If existing proceeds dialectically, must not time proceed dialectically?

Turning to the past in our past-future polarity, does the past exist? After-images and memories presuppose a yes answer. But if what is past is not present, has it not ceased to exist? (After-images and memories are present in awareness, and have not yet passed from presence.) Can what becomes past remain past everlastingly? Or may what is past be "reborn" in another present?

My view, that existence occurs in organic unities, having hierarchical levels of unities, each of which has its own duration and present, unit of time, so that we have present minutes, present hours, present days, present months, present years, present centuries, etc., or present heart-beats, present breaths, present waking, present menstrual period, etc., such that time is multi-leveled in its being ingredient in



the multi-leveled processes of existence. No present is a mere instant, no matter how short comparatively, and no present is everlasting. The multi-variant lengths of times involves the multivariant pasts and futures of each present. Many pasts and futures are contemporaneous with each present. So what becomes past does not become so completely, but, just as "old soldiers, never die, but just fade away", what becomes past becomes past gradually. Persons becoming acquainted with my theory regard it as requiring mediate inference. But, given my familiarity with it, my inferences seem primarily intermediate. But some mediacy remains in my inferences, because I continue to regard existence itself, and thus the existence of anything, as an ultimate mystery. [See my *Metaphysics : An Introduction*, Chap. II].

Inferences and generalizations about the future are as various as those about the past. Immediacy is present when anticipating the taste of a spoonful of soup just entering your mouth. Intermediacy characterizes inferences about plans for marriage, political election, moving to a new location, and retirement. Mediacy is added when we generalize about an afterlife, the future evolution of galaxies, and potentialities for generating several species of superraces.

*Self.* By "self" we here refer to the subject-object polarity present in awareness of appearances: Self is more than subject. Although its presence as subject in awareness, functioning as that which is aware, is intuited, and is conceived in terms of the ways it functions as subject, generalization that each persons makes about it normally involve also immediate, intermediate and sometimes mediate inferences. A self as subject normally immediately infers that it continues within and controls its body. A self as subject normally immediately infers generalizations about its interactions with its environment, its past experiences, its learning abilities, its intended actions. Although whenever a self may wonder about what it is, how it came to be, how its future may develop, mediate inferences speculating about its nature tend to develop.

Suggestions available in culturally inherited doctrines include inferring that a self is an eternal soul separable from its body, is an illusory and ignorant manifestation of Nirguna Brahman, is a temporary collection of atoms, is a mechanistic epiphenomenon, is destined to become a Mormon deity, is predestined for a future in Heaven or Hell, is all good because God (as conceived by Christian Scientists) is omnibenevolent and has the power to prevent any evil. When a person dreams or imagines self in any of a variety of fantastic ways, mediate inference may be involved. But most mediate inferences about self seem to retain more intermediate ingredients than inferences about objects.



## Generalization

*Objects*, as our two-directional subject-object polarity implies, are objects for subjects. Some (perhaps most) objects appearing in awareness appear as if real. Immediate inference generalizes about each object and each kind of object as being as real in just the way that it appears. Intermediate inference generalizes about objects in many different ways, depending not only on the kind of object but also on the kinds of errors or inadequacies appearing as a result of immediate inferences. Culturally-inherited explanations about the nature of apparently real things as objects contribute to intermediate inferences, exemplified by learning from textbooks, reading directions from manufacturers, and listening to lectures in training sessions.

Dissatisfaction with intermediately inferred generalizations has produced enormous varieties of mediate inferences. The histories of the sciences, religions, and literature are replete with examples of fantastic ideas at first unbelievable because so different from ordinary and culturally-established beliefs. Persons seeking to induce other to accept the fantastic generalizations must be very persuasive, and must appeal to some consistency with accepted immediate and intermediate beliefs. Evidence of inadequacy of accepted beliefs is normally invoked. Current concepts about anti-matter and chaos and black holes tend to be resisted by those unfamiliar with the inadequacies in recent and contemporary physics calling for more mediate kinds of speculation.

The unenviable state of much thinking in contemporary physics can be illustrated by citing titles from current publications. "Millisecond pulsars deepen a cosmic mystery". [*Science News*, July 20, 1991, p. 39.] "Quantum Chaos: Enigma Wrapped in a Mystery", [*Science*, February, 17, 1989, p. 893]. "Space Inversion. Time Reversal and Particle-Anti-Particle Conjugation". [*Physics Today*, March, 1966, p. 437.] "Strange Matter". [*Discover*, November, 1989, p. 63.] The author of this article quotes MIT physicist Robert Jaffe as saying, "a theoretical physicist does not sit back and make up his mind to think great thoughts... What we do is—invent some crazy theory and then try to prove it wrong." Isaac Asimov [*The History of Physics*, p. 737. Walker and Company, New York, 1920, 1984.] remarks that "the present frontier of physics... has become a jungle of strange and mystifying events". Each new proposed discovery seeming to solve some problem remaining in accepted theory typically generates a whole new set of unsolved problems, leaving the hope for "a new, subtle, and intensely bright illumination of the physical universe" [Ibid.] suffused with mystery, if not more hopeless than before.

Turning to generalizations about larger, more comprehensive wholes, i.e., generalizations inclusive of our four directions (past,



future, self and objects), do we observe any additional characteristics of the nature of generalization? The more complications, including multiplicities of remaining mysteries, in each of the various sciences and other speculative ventures in literature, etc., that call for synthesis, or organis, into an adequate world view provide additional problems with inherent characteristics. Concern for assurance or certainty about our inferences becomes more complicated as we seek more comprehensive kinds of knowledge.

Each of the sciences involves pressing inquiries into uncertain frontiers, each tending to adopt its own acceptable conclusions as pre-suppositions for further investigation. When these involve mediate generalizations with continuing mysteries and uncertainties, the problems of interdisciplinary understanding becomes fraught with complicated uncertainties. Philosophy, as a comprehensive science, is continually confronted with problems of trying to achieve some acceptable integration of multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary conclusions reducing the uncertainties as much as possible. Metaphysicians have always sought some pervasive integrating principle that will seem to provide assurance that existence is intelligible. This problem becomes increasingly difficult as each discipline discovers or invents new mediate generalizations, especially when evident contradictions continue to remain unresolved. But human nature seems inherently curious and provides continuing quest for understanding no matter how much absurd mediate speculations are proposed for exploration. The human predicament will continue to be plagued with many more complicated mediate speculations.

My own suggestions regarding some generalization about intellectual integration center about whole-part dialectical interactions involving both mutual immanence of polar opposites, holons and hierarchy, caused novelty, and omnipresence of both sameness and difference, audition and negation, initiation and termination, of whatever exists. In spite of my familiarity with my "Organicism," which I regard as primarily intermediate generalizations, I must confess that ultimate mysteries remain and mediacy continues to infect my perspective. But others seem to find my organicists quite mediate, partly, I suspect, because people in each of the world's three major civilizations have typical preconceptions preferring more pluralistic (Western) or more monistic (Indian) or more explicitly harmonistic (Chinese) assumptions to serve as foundations for assurance.

I believe that most people will continue to remain Naive Realists most of the time, trusting immediate inferences naturalistically. Increased acquaintance with the established doctrines in traditional cultures promotes acceptance of intermediate inferences. But persons having intellectual curiosity and committed to pursuing inquiry into the nature of existence will engage in inferring mediate generalizations more and more.



## *Man as Envisaged by Dostoyevsky*

*S. Sreekala Devi & V. C. Narayana Das*

"The proper study of mankind in man"<sup>1</sup> sang Alexander Pope. In one way or the other, man has always been the focal theme for discussions among philosophers all over the world. A lot has been written about the need to establish and defend the dignity, integrity, nobility, goodness, responsibility and the superior mental and spiritual nature of humanity. A lot has been said and written on values such as compassion, mercy and pity. There is no dearth of philosophic interpretation of concepts like freedom and democracy. Of course, there is no uniformity among philosophers with regard to their approach to man. Nor do they agree in their views on the exact nature of his mission and purpose in life. The present paper results from an attempt to extricate Dostoyevsky's philosophy of man from his literary works and to throw light upon certain valuable contribution he has made to the cause of humanism in the modern age.

Fyodor Mihalovich Dostoyevsky (1821-1881) was one of the greatest novelist philosophers of Russia before the historic revolution. His whole concern was centred around the nature and destiny of man. His philosophical reflections on man seems to be quite pertinent to the modern age. The complexity and profundity of his ideas on the nature and destiny of man have opened up vistas for a number of interpretations and commentaries, though these ideas were never drawn up systematically into a separate philosophical treatise. They remain scattered throughout his novels, letters, notes and essays.

Throughout his life Dostoyevsky was forced to cope up with opposition and to live constantly in the face of suppression and torture. His contemporaries failed to recognise his greatness. In fact his philosophy of life was the expression of the sum total of his agonies, as-

<sup>1</sup> Alexander pope. *Selected Poetry and Prose*. Edited by Robin Sowerby. Rout Ledge. London, New York, 1988, p. 153.



pirations and anguish. The real source of all his energy and inspiration was perhaps his experiences in the tragic conditions which he was forced to undergo from his childhood and culminating during the period of his penal servitudes. They led him to an intense awareness of the value of human life, as it is clearly evident in his novel, *The Idiot*. His firm conviction about the basic urge of man for life and survival was at the back of all his protests against every ideology which tried to impose any kind of restrictions on man by man. It was his vast and varied experiences in life which resulted in the production of the extremely complex and variegated range of characters, ideas and situations that we find in his writings.

Though Dostoyevsky's philosophic creativity encompasses a number of topics, his major concern is man. According to him,

Man is a mystery that must be solved, and if you should spend your entire life in solving it do not say that you have wasted your time.<sup>2</sup>

Dostoyevsky's whole aspiration was for the dawn of a new civilization in which man's free and comprehensive development would be possible. It means the realisation of a genuine humanism which can replace the old hypocritical, utopian and bourgeois forms of humanism. He longed for a world free of wars and oppression, one in which social justice and freedom would exist for the sake of man's development and flowering of his manifold abilities and gifts.

Dostoyevsky was an explorer of the secrets of life. For him nothing was precious or important than man, although nothing, perhaps, was more dreadful. He looks upon man as "an enigma, woven of contradictions, but at the same time in the person of even the most insignificant human being—an absolute value."<sup>3</sup>

Dostoyevsky recognised the profundity of the reality of man, his fatal and criminal tendencies, as well as his luminous impulses towards good. He was intensely conscious about the dark side of man with his power of destruction, limitless egoism and the fearful amorality that remains hidden in the depth of his soul. Hence he exhibits in his works the sin, corruption, egoism, and in general, the demonic element in man with unprecedented force. With great voracity he also describes man's innate impulses towards justice and good, which according to him are the angelic principles inherent in human soul.

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- 2 Ivan Forlov, *Man, Science and Humanism—A New Synthesis* Progress Publishing Co., Moscow, 1986, p. 269.
- 3 Edward, Paul (Ed.). *The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*. McMillan Publishing Company Inc. New York, Vol. 1, 1967.



## Man as Envisaged by Dostoyevsky

As a philosopher and an artist, Dostoyevsky was constantly engaged in the pursuit of portraying what appealed to him as "really human in human being". But at the same time, he never lost sight of the different problems of human existence: His perception of human suffering was a source of unmitigated anguish to Dostoyevsky throughout his life.

Dostoyevsky's studies on the psychology of man led him to realise how sufferings are inextricably interwoven with the very reality of man's being. Ortega Y. Gaasset told us in the present century that we are made conscious of our existence through pain. In the same manner Dostoyevsky tells us that

Suffering may be doubt, negation destruction and chaos.  
But it is at the sametime the sole root of consciousness.<sup>4</sup>

Suffering may evoke two diametrically opposite reactions. It reduces some people to a dull submissiveness, a passive acceptance of their fate, which amounts to a pitiable admission of their non-entity. But in others it awakens a strong sense of individuality combined with a protest against trampling of human dignity underfoot. Sufferings, for them, furnishes a real challenge for a vigorous affirmation of their existence through a life active of self-realisation. Thus suffering is important in building up of one's personality. It makes him either meek or rebellious, timid or courageous. The nature of Nastasia Philippovna as an outspoken rebel in Dostoyevsky's novel *The Idiot* is almost entirely defined by her suffering, while prince Myshkin in the same novel is typically a meek person.

Dostoyevsky loved life for its own sake. He protested against corporal punishment, violence and all form of humiliations. Dostoyevsky's vehement criticism of capital punishment is clear from the following passage :

When there is torture, there is pain and wounds, physical agony, and all this distracts the mind from mental suffering. But the most terrible agony may not be in the wounds themselves but in knowing for certain that within an hour, then within ten minutes, then within half a minute, now at this very instant your soul will leave your body and you will no longer be a person, and that this is certain, the worst thing is that it is certain,<sup>5</sup>

Dostoyevsky felt that the thirst for existence in man was so deep that even in the midst of adverse conditions he aspired for the longiv-

4 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, *Notes from Underground*. Trans. by Misra Ginsburg. Bantam Books New York, London, 1974, p. 39.

5 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, *The Idiot* A New Translation by Henry and Olga Cailisle. The New American Library, 1969, p. 43.



ity of life. In this respect, he was anticipating the Nietzschean attitude of 'yes' and 'amen' to existence even when it would be an eternal recurrence of a miserable and tragic life. Owing to this inherent longing, Dostoyevsky realises that,

Man is a creature that can get accustomed to anything and I think that is the best definition of him.<sup>6</sup>

The urge and thirst of man for life and his existence are fully and systematically expressed by Dostoyevsky through his different characters in his works. However, for him the secret of human existence does not consist in his mere survival. He must discover why he should live. It is this philosophical aspect, which is exclusively human, that distinguishes him from all other beings which constantly struggle for the prolongation of their lives.

On the one hand Dostoyevsky, like any other naturalist or the evolutionist of the biological tradition, looks upon man as a part of the order of nature. But on the other hand, with wonderful clarity and proof he declares man's real independence. He is uncompromising in his faith in the true essence of man as consisting in his freedom. The whole human enterprise in the *Notes for Underground* can be seen as man's constant effort to assure himself that he is a free individual endowed with the power to determine his own self. This self-affirmation is man's assertion of his unique existence as a being totally different from all other beings in nature. The whole dignity of human reality consist in this affirmation.

The most important thing for man, therefore is his own free choice (even though sometimes it may be absurd) and the desire to live according to his own will. Birendra Prasad Misra rightly points out that according to Dostoyevsky,

the nucleus of man is his genuine essence which is given in his freedom, his thirst for individual self assertion—that is to live according to his own stupid will. Man's ontology is defined by this thirst for freedom, the thirst to be 'oneself'.<sup>7</sup>

Dostoyevsky sees man's hidden essence in his freedom and the whole complex problems arising out of this freedom. Consequently, he reminds us that, though freedom is the most precious possession comprising his ultimate essence, it is also at the same time a burden

6 Donald Fanger, *Introduction : Notes from Underground by Fyodor Dostoyevsky*. Bantham Book, New York, London, 1974, pp. xiii, xiv.

7 Misra B.P. "Dostoyevsky : An Existentialist Philosopher." *Darshana International*, Vol, XXI : 3, 1981, p. 81.



which is too heavy to bear. "We are", as Sartre tells us, "condemned to be free".

In his novel *'The Devil'* he tells us that full freedom will come only when it makes no difference whether to live or not to live. Thus his character Kirilov finally commits suicide not because of his despair due to sufferings but as the supreme expression of his absolute freedom.

According to Dostoyevsky, limitations are imposed on man by society, economic conditions, laws, history, church and above all by God as he is traditionally conceived. Consequently, he is classified, defined and determined in terms of a hundred institutions and thousand conditions. But, man, as Dostoyevsky sees him, does not want to be defined and limited, since his essence consists in his freedom. Hence by the very nature of his reality, man is a being who seeks for the fullest realisation of freedom. If we find the question of freedom at the centre of all Dostoyevsky's writings, it is due to this identification of man's essence with his freedom.

Though freedom contains the seed of death, and self-destruction, it is the power that lifts man to the highest transformation of his being. It gives ample scope for the demonic elements in man, but it can also exalt the angelic principles in him. For, the impulses of freedom comprise a dialectic of good and evil. Thus, the idea of freedom made explicit by the existentialist thinkers during the present century was very much implicit in the works of Dostoyevsky. It is one of the reasons why Dostoyevsky is considered as one of the forerunners of modern existentialism.

Dostoyevsky laid great emphasis upon the significance of the individual. According to him the full development of a society is impossible when the significance and value of the individual is denied or ignored. However, it is primarily the concern of the individual himself to be a man in the genuine sense of the term. The genuine man for Dostoyevsky is precisely the individual who has recognised himself as free from all traditions, customs and conventions. Where there is a slightest denial of freedom, the fullest expression of one's own self becomes impossible, and consequently, it would be led to chaos and criminal impulses. For example, in *Crime and Punishment* the main character Raskolnikov after rationally analysing all the percepts of traditional morality is led to the tempting delusion that everything is permissible and proceeds to commit an act of crime.

Dostoyevsky unmasked the ugliness of contemporary social reality and its inhumanity and considered social evil as a consequence of the bourgeoisie which is nothing but a system governed by the bound-



less rules based upon economic considerations. It was extremely painful for him to realise that the so called equality of all men before the law would not really permit everyone to exercise equal freedom to do anything and everything within the law. For in actual practice one can do anything and everything only when he has enough money. Hence he points out that a "man without a million is not one who can do anything and everything but to whom anything and everything can be done."<sup>8</sup> In a society where morals are controlled by money, the individual becomes primitivised. In such a situation self-analysis becomes a hindrance in the struggle, and victory goes to those who are strong with capital and rank. Dostoyevsky depicts his Underground Man as a poor victim of this kind of bourgeois relations. His amoral paradoxes spring from a poor man's impotent striving to assert his sensitive individuality in a world in which it is the custom to worship nothing but success, rank and capital.

Dostoyevsky rejected the materialistic theory which absolutised the social environment. He regarded this theory as socially dangerous, since it could be easily used for justifying any crime. It will also lead to a depersonalisation of man. For, if human behaviour is determined by the social environment alone, it makes no sense to speak of individual personality at all.

Dostoyevsky was convinced that if the existing social system should be changed it could be done only through a transformation of the individual lives on the basis of certain lofty moral principle. He developed such an ideal which would enable mind to replace the present social system with a genuine humanistic order. His character Prince Myshkin in *The Idiot* exemplifies this moral principle. In one of his letters Dostoyevsky says that "Voluntary absolutely conscious and uncompelled total self-sacrifice for the benefit of all is a sign of the supreme development of individual, his highest power, his highest self expression and the greatest freedom of his will."<sup>9</sup>

Dostoyevsky believed that human happiness could be brought about by overcoming the alienation created by the dual personality which gives rise to a contradiction between personal interest and common benefit. His conviction was that in order to fashion a new world, man should turn his mind towards a new direction. For, brotherhood would not be materialised until one really become a brother to all other men. Thus universal happiness could be brought about only through the inner workings of man's spirit whereby he is enabled to realize the truth of humanity within himself as well as in his fellow-beings.

8 Kaster J. *The Aesthetic of Dostoyevsky*, Raduga Publishers, Moscow, 1987, p. 49.

9 Ibid., p. 60.



## 3

# Social Causation and Gnosocracy

Panos D. Bardis

"Power and knowledge admit to Perfection".  
Leibniz, *Discourses on Metaphysics*, I

## I. Introduction

I have always accepted Sir Francis Bacon's '*scientia potestas est*', as long as knowledge is employed creatively, philanthropically, altruistically.

I have always adopted Auguste Comte's description of sociology as a "*scientia scientiarum*", since its subject matter is practically boundless, and since it can affect the destiny of *Homo sapiens* immeasurably. Of course, many obstacles remain and one hopes that near utopia will be achieved in some distant and misty future !

It is such limitations that have inspired me to coin *gnosocracy* and develop a theory that suggests *rule by knowledge*.

## II. The Nature of Knowledge

But what is knowledge ?

First of all, knowledge is too complex, too labyrinthine. To convince myself of this, I have often consulted famous volumes such as these : Leonard Hobhouse, *The Theory of Knowledge*, 1896; Ernest Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisprobleme*, 1906, in three volumes (!); William Montague, *The Ways of Knowing*, 1923; Walter Stace, *The Theory of Knowledge and Existence*, 1932; and so forth and so on !

More frustrating and infuriating is the boundlessness of knowledge. Since I publish many papers on the philosophy and history of science, I purchase and own numerous books in this area. On the infinitesimal neutrino alone, I have : Isaac Asimov, *The Neutrino*,

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Presented at the North Central Sociological Association Conference, Dearborn, Michigan, April 27, 1991.



237 pages (1966); H. Klapdor and B. Povh, editors, *Neutrino Physics*, 343 pages (1988); O. Fackler and J. Van, editors, *Fifth Force: Neutrino Physics*, 665 pages (1988); Boris Kayser, *The Physics of Massive Neutrinos*, 127 pages (1989); John Bahcall, *Neutrino Astrophysics*, 450 pages (1989); and so forth and so on !

As for the nature of knowledge itself, the greatest philosophers manage to frustrate us further. Of course, the word knowledge is related to the Greek *gignoskein*, to know.

Epistemology itself studies *episteme*, or knowledge. Below are only a few of the countless major theories :

1. The Greek philosophers referred to knowledge as *episteme*, and to opinion as *doxa*. The highest form of knowledge is *sophia*, or wisdom (a philosopher is a lover of wisdom), which Plato defines as knowledge of the whole, and Aristotle as knowledge of the first causes.

2. John Locke's empiricism bases knowledge on sensation, thus giving us three types of knowledge : intuitive, demonstrative, and sensitive.

3. Immanuel Kant relates knowledge to *Verstand*.

4. Auguste Comte emphasizes the order of development in knowledge from the abstract to the concrete, or from mathematics to sociology.

5. Bertrand Russell distinguishes between "knowledge by description" and "knowledge by acquaintance".

Of course, Comte's dream has not come true. Part of the explanation is found in *Science* (February 24, 1989, p. 992), where Jerome Barkow, in his "Broad Training for Social Scientists", asserts that sociology and related fields rightly attempt to become "scientific" by emulating measurement in the natural sciences, but they have failed to adopt the theoretical continuity of the latter. This, Barkow adds, explains why psychology tends to be more rigorous than sociology is.

### III. The Nature of Causation

Causation may sound like a rudimentary concept, but its nature and types are as complex as those of knowledge. Indeed, I have found at least five relevant phrases among great philosophers :

1. "*Causa cognoscendi*" is the cause of our knowledge of an event.

2. "*Causa essendi*" refers to the cause of an event itself.



3. "*Causa immanens*" represents the cause in an entity produced by its own activity. Baruch Spinoza also conceived of it as "*causa sui*", or a cause of itself, which means God.

4. "*Causa transiens*" means that a cause is an entity produced by another.

5. "*Verae causae*" are true causes invented by Sir Isaac Newton. These exist in nature, are true, and suffice to explain things.

Causes being correlative to effects, Aristotle gave us their typology, which remains complete-cause, of course, is a poor and strange translation of his *aitia*, which has many different meanings. These causes, which explain something in its entirety, are four (the parenthetical examples are mine and refer to a chair): material (wood), formal (shape), efficient (the carpenter's thought), and final (function, namely, sitting). The is universal teleology.

The completeness of this typology explains why countless later philosophers adopted the Aristotelean classification, with various degrees of emphasis on each. Here are a few examples: William of Ockham, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, John Stuart Mill, Alfred North Whitehead, and so on.

Nowadays, when we say cause, we usually mean the "sufficient and necessary conditions."

#### IV. Causes in Society

As a student, I found sociology most fascinating. At the same time, I found its methodology most frustrating. Accordingly, I began to collect literally thousands of data—a process in which I am still sedulously engaged—which illustrate the discipline's inconsistencies, contradictions, and other problems. (A somewhat similar subject is discussed by Israel's Haim Marantz in his "Is a Science of Political Practice Possible?"—*International Social Science Review*, Spring 1991, pp. 51-58.) Then, in 1975, I read *The Current State of Sociological Theory* (New York; McKay), a brilliant book by Leon Warshay (he and Diana Warshay are completing another similar book). Lee may know it, but, as I have always thought, he is a laconic synecdochist. Indeed, he analyzes, synthesizes, and evaluates numerous social systems in only a few pages. That book alone inspired me to collect mountains of new data for one and a half more decades, which *Deo volente*, may be synthesized into several volumes. Here, of course, I can only present a few randomly selected sociological inconsistencies, contradictions, and so forth.



1. In every issue of the *American Sociological Review*, the *American Sociologist*; the *American Sociological Association Footnotes*, and the like, basic theories and concepts are questioned or attacked, as if one mathematician asserted that  $\pi=3$ . 14159265, while another seriously quoted I Kings 7:23 to "prove" that  $\pi=3$ .

2. Undoubtedly, the most explosive debates and vesuvian diatribes are found throughout every single issue of *Contemporary Sociology*. Indeed, here we encounter intelligent experts advocating diametrical opposites most conflictually. One of the myriads of examples deals with culture, education race, and crime (November 1990, pp. 773-777).

3. Diane Ravitch and Chester Finn have tested high school students (*What Do Our 17-year-olds Know?*). Richard Tomasson gave a similar, but much simpler, test to sociology students in college, who were 2-3 years older than the high school subjects. Still, the more select group (they were in college) did not do better.

4. Wendell Bell complains that theoretical progress is impossible, since, for instance, paradigm does not mean the same thing to all sociologists, students, other academicians, policy makers, and so forth ("What Do We Mean by 'Paradigm'?" *American Sociological Association Footnotes*, November 1990, p. 17). Another debate involved a group of scholars who composed several polemics on a similar issue (see, for example, Kazimierz Slomczynski and Tadeusz Krauze, "A Paradigmatic Crisis," *American Sociological Review*. October 1988, pp. 742-748).

5. In theory, countless outbursts illustrate my point. According to *Contemporary Sociology* itself, "sociology simply does not produce laws" (May 1987, p. 27). Much worse, "the nearly universal criticism of the semantic debates that currently pass for sociological theory" is justified (*ibid.*, March 1987, p. 144).

6. In social psychology, a social situation is defined as the total configuration of social factors influencing an individual's behavior etc. Some authors, however, include both external and internal stimuli, while some others exclude internal ones. (James Bossard, *The Socio- of Child Development*, 1954; etc.)

7. In family sociology, there are numerous theoretical approaches. Exchange theory alone presents almost countless minute or major variations, but I will mention only the following few: Willard Waller, "The Rating and Dating Complex" *American Sociological Review*, 1937, pp. 727-734; Kingsley Davis, "Intermarriage in Caste Societies", *American Anthropologist* (1941, pp. 382-390); William Goode, "Illegitimacy in the Caribbean" (*American Sociological Review*, 1960, pp. 21-



30; George Homans, "Social Behavior as Exchange" (*American Journal of Sociology*, 1958, pp. 597-606); Peter Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (1964); Alvin Gouldner, "The Norm of Reciprocity" (*American Sociological Review* (1961, pp. 161-168); Bernard Murstein, *Who Will Marry Whom?* (1976); and so forth and so on.

8. Comparative and political sociology is replete with myriads of intellectual sins.

a. Even William D'Antonio, a national officer of the American Sociological Association, is selectively ecstatic about our shrinking planet. "Positive News in sociology," he erupts dithyrambically. He thus urges US sociology departments to exchange scholars with the USSR: "If you have students whom you feel may be qualified" etc., he advises. But, first, with affirmative action being rampant, I hope he will refrain from suggesting that we feel our students in a Freudian fashion; second, his accusative case (*whom*) seems to indicate both that sociology has many deficiencies and that grammar ain't the forte of today's intellectuals; and third, prejudicially and fanatically, the *American Sociological Association Footnotes* is unjustifiably always for communism and justifiably always against the evil of apartheid. (November 1989, p. 2).

b. In her "Sociology Today" (*ibid*, p. 3), Louise Shelley sings rapturously: US sociology is a slave, Soviet sociology is the king!

c. Harvey Molotch, an American sociologist who visited the USSR, was entertained at Lucullan banquets and enjoyed "spices for the delicious dinners" prepared in his "honor." Accordingly, he sang the blessings of communism and attacked "the evils of capitalist society." A brilliant lady scholar in essence exclaimed - you, uninformed idiot, I wish we had some capitalism here ("Lecturing in the USSR," *ibid*.)

d. In his "The Face, and Pace, of Change in the Soviet Union" (*ibid*, p. 6), Michael Swafford informs us that he was equally ecstatic. Indeed, a minor, selected, isolated datum made him exclaim: "I was dazzled by the freshly daring and sophisticated television programming." I wish he would go and talk to the tragic Balts. I wish he would go and talk to the tragic Balts. I wish he would listen to the Soviet coal miners of Minsk and the Siberian Kuzbass. I wish he would ask Michail Gorbachev to define *glasnost* and *perestroika*. I wish he would conduct a seance and listen to the mournful and melancholy ghosts of Tiananmen Square. I wish he would learn something about North Korea, Cuba, and Ethiopia. Moreover, he should know that, in 1988, China's per capita income was only \$320, while South Africa's, in 1987, was as high as \$2,360. Besides, although apartheid is a



*monstrous evil* (unlike China, however, South Africa is now making progress), South African blacks own more automobiles than all the private cars in the entire USSR, and there are many more professionals among black women in South Africa than among all women in the rest of Africa! Must I add something concerning blacks and Hispanics in the USA?

e. I view of the above, I was amused to read Jeffrey Broadbent's "A Question of Academic Freedom in Japan" (*ibid.*, April 1991, p. 5). When he heard that Hiroshima Shudo University penalized five sociology professors because they spent research funds improperly, used university time for political activities, and the like, he seriously and vitriolically concluded that there is no academic freedom in Japan! I have two comments:

First, Raymond Gastil's *Freedom in the World* for 1987 gives political rights and civil liberties scores for all countries, I being the most democratic value. China is described as "not free" and her two scores are 6. The USSR is "not free" and receives two 7's. Both the USA and Japan are "free", and receive 1's!

Second, some of the most undemocratic activities occur in US academia. As editor-in-chief, book review editor, or associate editor of more than 40 international journals, I have been able to collect some of the most pathetic documents. These are desperate and lachrymose letters from professors who are anxious to be published and then promoted, despite the most vicious, immoral, and Machiavellian politics in their departments!

9. The miserable state of the sociology of peace and war is partly indicated by the activities of the American Sociological Association's section on the Sociology of Peace and War. Among other things, the august group asserted that "it is scientifically incorrect to say" that "humans have an inherited tendency to make war". In a brilliant statement, Robert Marsh hastened to demolish such medieval platitudes. ("A Critique of the Seville Statement on Violence", *American Sociological Association Footnotes*, April 1991, p. 7; the Seville Statement is found in *ibid.*, January 1991, p. 14.)

10. In industrial sociology, Aage Sorensen, sociology chairman at Harvard University, complains: "Throwing the Sociologists Out?" (*American Sociological Review*, December 1990, pp. 842-845). This and other sociologists of labor markets, whom James Baron and William Bielby described as "new structuralists" in 1980, considered their opponents too irreverent. But Michael Smith, sociology chairman at McGill University, merely dismissed Sorensen *et al.* as hopelessly incapable of understanding the labor market. Sorensen then disagreed



with him on at least 10 basic points, and then lamented that smith will impede sociological progress, since he misrepresents both sociology and economics !

I could go on and on, but I must close this section, since, as I have already indicated, I have collected thousands of such data. Let me only mention a formidable survey by Thomas Scheff *et al.* "Self-esteem, Crime, and Violence", which appeared in A. Mecca *et al.* editors, *The Social Importance of Self-esteem* (University of California Press, 1989). I say formidable because it summarizes more than 10,000 related studies which, however, have promoted neither our knowledge of self-esteem nor any benefit to the public—mainly due to the prevailing chaos regarding research techniques. The American Sociological Association, therefore, should redirect our methodological philosophy, Scheff suggests. (Thomas Scheff, "Is There Bias in ASR Article Selection?" *American Sociological Association Footnotes*, February 1991, p. 5).

## V. The Theory of Gnosocracy

I have already discussed many problems and theories concerning the nature of knowledge. My own theory has appeared in various journals—in the United States, in Italy, in South Africa, etc. ("The Theory of Gnosocracy", *The Dialogist*, Summer 1970, pp. 20-32, *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, August 1971, pp. 3-16; "Gnosocracy: A Quantitative Theory of Knowledge and Education", *South African Journal of Sociology*, November 1970, pp. 52-56; etc.) Here, I can only present a brief synopsis of gnosocracy after first defining it as "rule by knowledge", since, in Greek, *gnosis* is knowledge and *cratos* is power.

1. When we explore the material (both inorganic and organic), psychological (here emphasis is placed on the individual), and social (this includes all types of interaction between or among individuals) universes, we must do so in time and seek the smallest possible unit, if we are to achieve genuine understanding, prediction, planning, and the like. It is obvious, for instance, that our society would be vastly different if, like John Dalton, we still accepted the atom etymologically, instead of working with electrons, kaons, lambdas, muons, neutrinos, nectrons, photons, pions, protons, sigmas, and so forth. Similarly, when studying the effects of the mother's gainful employment on the family institution, treating the "working mother" as an indivisible or homogeneous unit is much less fruitful than scrutinizing component variables, such as number of children, ages of children,



financial needs, type of work, place of work, time of work, wife's and husband's attitudes toward the former's employment, and so on.

2. When such smaller units have been identified, we must attempt to describe their nature as accurately as possible. More importantly, our ideal goal should be quantification, namely, counting or measuring amount, degree, duration, extent, intensity, and the like. Without an accurate description of units, or constellations of units, as well as of other relevant phenomena, scientific research is inadequate. It is significant that some entomologists have been complaining that their colleagues have not always identified exactly the subjects of their research dealing with the *Gryllus domesticus*, which Charles Dickens made immortal in his Christmas story, *The Cricket on the Hearth*. Of course, it is true that, at least at the present time, quantification often seems difficult or impossible, especially in the psychological or social spheres. But it is also true that, even in these areas, considerable quantification has actually been achieved, and that, in the history of science in general, quantification has facilitated the advancement of knowledge. It is further revealing that even the enemies of quantification constantly employ this approach when, for example, they assert that A is "more" influential than B. Their type of quantification, however, is impressionistic and anything but rigorous.

3. The researcher should attempt to discover the relationships or principles which govern various units or constellations of units. Ideally, these principles should be expressed etiologically: A causes B. Unfortunately, scientists often seek to formulate spectacular general theories without first exploring, minutely and systematically, limited individual phenomena. First of all, without such data, it is impossible to formulate sound universal theories. To a certain extent, this is illustrated by some emphasis among biologists on research at the molecular level at the expense of limited investigations. Despite this trend, Karl von Frisch has stressed "limited" work which has resulted in an invaluable classic, *Tanzsprache und Orientierung der Bienen*. More significantly, although his students and their own students, from Lindauer to Maschwitz, have made numerous impressive contributions in this area, the subject of the dance language and orientation of bees is still inexhaustible. Accordingly, Von Frisch has observed: "The life of bees is like a magic well. The more you draw from it, the more there is to draw" (cf. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle in physics).

4. When such principles have been discovered, they should be applied, whenever possible and necessary, for the sake of solving problems of various types.



5. Finally, all this should be based on scientific terms (words) each of which represents one, and only one, specific, exact, precise, and clear concept (meaning or idea). Not infrequently, chaos has prevailed, since we tend to attribute several, even many, different meanings to one and the same term, in one and the same field or sub-field. When necessary, therefore, the scientist must carefully coin a new term or borrow one from another discipline, from a dead or living foreign tongue, or from her or his own language. Needless to say, although jargon should be avoided, it is not always imperative that the layman be able to understand the scientist's work—is the Fitzgerald contraction regarding a body's motion and the speed of light, which Einstein used in his special theory of relativity, unscientific merely because the typical layman finds this postulate difficult to comprehend? Moreover, since science deals with the general, and not with the unique, comparability is indispensable; but this is possible only when scientific terms and concepts are rendered uniform through some form of standardization and codification. Of course, whenever new knowledge demands it, terms and concepts should be revised.

## VI. Conclusion

In brief, emphasis on gnosocracy (in teaching, research, and related areas) appears to be more creative than other approaches. Since I have already discussed possible objections to gnosocracy in several publications, let me close as follows :

A few of the hypotheses I have tested successfully are :

1. Our emphasis on gnosocracy for a given relationship is inversely proportional to the chronological distance between cause A and its readily observable effect B. (This partly explains why, for instance, we tend to be more gnosocratic regarding biological phenomena than we are concerning virtually all educational methods).
2. The prevalence of gnosocracy is directly proportional to the concreteness, observability, or perceptibility of a given effect.
3. Gnosocracy is directly proportional to modernization, and vice versa.
4. The advancement of a given discipline is directly proportional to its emphasis on quantification. (Cf. geography, Alexander von Humboldt, and the isotherms and the like in his great *Kosmos*).

As for gnosocratic education, let me present only four of the numerous ideas I have already published:



1. We certainly have the right to criticize various systems even if we are unable to suggest satisfactory alternatives. But we do not have the right to criticize what we do not know or understand. (When Bishop Nicole Oresme, in 1377, attacked Aristotle in his *Le Livre du Ciel et du Monde*, he certainly displayed admirable knowledge of the great philosopher's *De Caelo*.)

2. Freedom to speculate and theorize is valuable, since it often leads to minor or major gnosiocratic achievements. (Cf. William Harvey and the mystical doctrine of circles in Aristotle and the Neoplatonists.)

3. We need both basic and applied research. (Cf. some of the Problems involving Bohr, Dirac, Einstein, Oppenheimer, Von Neumann, and others at Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study.)

4. Finally, in his *Il Principe*, Machiavelli wrote that *fortuna* controls half of man's actions, the other half being ruled by *virtu*. But, if we function more gnosiocratically, instead of following our whims, impulses, and passions, then both academe and the rest of society will be less governed by blind and cruel chance. I thus wish to modify, not without infinite humility and reverence, Descartes' celebrated Augustinian principle, "*Cogito, ergo sum*" ("*Je pense, donc je suis*," "I think, therefore I am"), thus; "*Scio, ergo sum*," "*Je sais donc je suis*," or "I know (gnosiocratically!), therefore I am." In other words, "*Magna est veritas gnosiocratica et praevalerebit!*"



## 4

## Productive Philosophy (Re-integrating Philosophy with Life)

*R. J. Cooper*

This talk is just thinking aloud: Meant to stimulate discussion than crystalise conclusions. For the essence of philosophy is best distilled through keen, sharp, precise discussion. But mere discussion is not enough, it must as Carlyle insisted lead to action. Hence if our philosophy is to be Productive it must meet the demands of the day in a strong, pragmatic way, It must be deep-rooted, down-to-earth, Problem-oriented.

This is a broad outline. A view: a way of thinking. It does not mean it is the only way. If anything philosophy means breadth, comprehension, sympathy, understanding the other's point of view. Voltaire revealed the true philosophic spirit when he told a volatile woman bubbling with arguments: 'Madam' I do not agree with a word of what you say, but I will defend to the end your right to say it'.

Philosophy as a bare, bald pursuit of an academic type has no attraction; the social aspects of philosophy are more important. What philosophy can do: what it has done: what Use it has for us to-day in the present juncture of our national life. Philosophy as a warm human subject, not a cold computer: or a deep dry well without any water so draw. This too is a matter of taste and temperament, heredity and training. I prefer a businesslike philosophy, a philosophy that can transact, tackle, solve. A competitive philosophy, not too high but just about even to meet the daily demands of our daily life. Values are here and now: born of the texture of experience, out of our daily doings, not something far, distant, sacrosanct.

Knowledge is primarily for use. Verbal realism was the measure of knowledge in the early sixteenth century but in the seventeenth century Francis Bacon introduced an organised system of inductive



philosophy and made rational understanding, direct observation and experiment the key to knowledge, We of the twentieth century apply our knowledge, be it science or the humanities for the betterment of mankind. Philosophy harnessed for service. In the words of Rt. Hon. Lord Snell: 'It is our responsibility to Use those acquired powers with a greater wisdom and a higher sense of responsibility' for practical ends. Others may think differently, good that it is so, this makes thought flow in different directions and explains the multiplicity of philosophies. We have reached the moon, perhaps the greatest phenomena of the century, not to dance by the light of the moon, but to probe its secrets and use its powers. Although in a letter published in the London Times under the caption: 'The Moon From Poona', I have expressed a different view, not what the scientists are doing to the moon but what the moon does to us, as it did to Khayam centuries ago—Ah, moon of may delight.....different moments produce different reactions. Philosophy too is a probe, a thrust, an experiment, a use: something productive, fruitful, yielding results, the right crop at the right season. This introduction is a pointer to the direction we are moving: needless to say that philosophy is not a finished product, stamped, sealed and delivered, rather it is to be understood as something growing, developing, being formed; chiselled, fashioned, shaped in the stream of the world, in the rough of experience; to change the metaphor it would be truer to say that philosophy is like a flowing stream, gathering bits of wisdom and streaks of light as it wends its way through the centuries. Thoreau drew a fine line of distinction when he said the true philosopher is not one who can discuss very subtly, but one who loves wisdom so much that he cannot but live wisely. Of course what is wisdom and how to live wisely are matters over which philosophers have written volumes.

From another angle it is important to note that unless philosophy percolates and reaches our emotions it would not be productive in our sense of the term. As a matter of fact we may go further and say the whole of our educational and social outlook must be 'reoriented away from dry intellection and towards sensibility'. We must as Sir Herbert Read insists: 'overthrow the tyranny of the cold concept'.<sup>1</sup>

### Putting Philosophy to Work :

This is no age of easy transition, it is a jet age demanding a jet philosophy—quick, precise, serviceable. This philosophy can do, in conjunction with other sister disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, social history to mention a few closely related sciences that

<sup>1</sup> The Politics of the Unpolitical.



## Productive Philosophy

merge into one another at various points. Our philosophy if it is to be fruitful must be a sort of workable philosophy and solve the important problems affecting our national life. Today at least our philosophy must not be far from the madding crowd but a part and parcel of the main current rejuvenating and refreshing it from time to time. Not cloistered and fugitive but up and doing, warm and activating. 'The supreme stillness is achieved in the open; says Charles Morgan, in the buzz and fuzz of life, in the daily grind of our daily doings.

Socrates is perhaps the best exponent of this type of philosophy—a 'market philosophy' acquired through keen, sharp, precise discussion: the great figure of Greek thought founded no school of philosophy but there is a Socratic way of life and that is more important than a mere doctrine. He never committed his opinions to writing. It was his habit to go every day to the market place in Athens and there direct his conversation to all and sundry by the question and answer method—sharp, keen, precise, directed to fruitful channels, practical ends. Socrates always made theory subservient to practice. His ethical teaching—the concept of virtue is only in order to practise virtue in life. He was out to make our beliefs rational, pragmatic, directed to life. And for the courage of his moral convictions this indomitable figure of Greek history dared his very life. *Egocentrism of the Artist*

To hark back to Sir Herbert again: if our philosophy as said before is to be warm and workable it must avoid the egocentrism of the artist which brings with it indifferentism (the artist sets himself above the melee, believes himself entitled to an olympian attitude) and this isolates the artist from the warm current of life and his work becomes a show piece. Similarly a philosophy that does not embrace the masses but floats like an iceberg in cold isolation away from the warm glow of life becomes bleak and barren. To repeat we must use our philosophy to direct ends with a purpose and goal in view. So if our philosophy is to be fruitful, productive—we must 'Put Philosophy to Work'.

### Concrete Example

To come to brass tacks, let us take a few concrete examples to clarify our position further, to see how a philosophy can serve practical ends. Take the problem of 'Student Unrest, its cause and cure'. This problem invading all the campuses of India so aggressively that education is fast becoming a mockery and degenerate a farce. Upon the education of our young depends the vitality of our nation. And that surely is a question very pertinent to philosophy. We cannot let education drift. It would be dangerous leading to chaos and confusion. No philosophy worth the name can allow schools, college and univer-



sities to be ruled by unruly elements. We cannot be apathetic to education. We must surely apply philosophy here, understand the problem from all angles and work out a proper solution. This would be more worth while than reading an abstract, abtruse paper, a breezy sail of pure academic interest.<sup>2</sup> When so many vital problems endanger our national life and press for solutions, we cannot afford the luxury to bypass these without contributing something substantial and valuable. We are pleading for philosophy as a human concern—warm, humane, broad-based, realistic. No more no less. Quintessentially the function of philosophy is to show how to live rightly. No easy task that. To live is an art which each must learn his own way. There is no easy way to truth.

Closely allied to this question of Student Unrest are others of a similar nature 'Student-Teacher Relationship' (A New Angle): Or 'Perspectives in College campus', which would deal with college ethos, mores and the impact of foreign students on Indian Universities from a broad philosophical angle, Tagore the most illustrious teacher of the 1930s who founded this Congress was out to make philosophy a human concern and founded Shanti Niketan as a symbol of philosophy in action. He believed that music and the fine arts, poetry and the arts are among the highest means of national self expression without which the people remain inarticulate.<sup>3</sup> Again numerous papers could be read on the variety of cultures prevalent in tribal India from a broad practical angle: whilst preserving and maintaining the pristine unioness of folk art, dances, songs and cultures. India is a rich kaleidoscope for research of this type. Culture cannot be imposed from without. Each culture grows out of local needs. One has only to look at a big country like India to understand the diversity of culture prevailing in rural, urban and tribal India and also from state to state and region to region. This diverssty is partly due to origin and partly developmental features. Indian culture is a composite of many strands. All these questions call for philosophical thought in union with political philosophy, sociology and social history, either within the same person or by team work. Another problem of fascinating interest would be the problem of 'culture-minglings'. India is specially rich in pertinent examples of the meeting, mingling or otherwise of divers cultures—Aryan and Dravidian, Hindu and Muslim, early Indian Buddhist art and Hellenistic art and so on. Also the contact of India and the West is an extremely interesting problem to investigate and can yield fruitful results

<sup>2</sup> The first is theoretical, the other presents problems firmly rooted.

<sup>3</sup> Centre of Indian Culture.



## Productive Philosophy

The young of the 1970s are a charming lot well informed and more challenging than the young of the 1940s. What then has gone wrong and why do they not click to discipline, order and co-operation, without which no nation can prosper? The 1970s are a link with what Dewey calls the 'Continuous Human Community' that has gone before us and will come after us and we owe a responsibility to posterity to use our philosophy toward the right orientation of youth.

Other problems of vital importance to our national life pertinent to philosophy in a broad sense are, to mention just a few, the preservation of democratic ideals in present day India or the same question in a slightly modified form—'Proposed constitutional amendment on Indian democracy' though primarily a political issue is of such wide ramifications affecting the very texture of our life that no philosophy congress can afford to brush aside. It calls for deep philosophical thought and action. In the words of Russell the everyday world presses in upon the philosopher and his ivory tower begins to crumble.<sup>4</sup> This vital question of the preservation of democratic ideals in India is very important and needs a deep philosophical analysis of the Rule of Law, the preservation of democracy, the meaning of justice, a free judiciary and an insight into the spirit of our Constitution. Only through such an analysis can we make our democracy strong and meaningful. As the modern world goes on its way and the modern state takes to itself increasing powers, it is vital that the rule of law shall continue to be observed and maintained.

Needless to say that the possession of a free, fearless and independent judiciary<sup>5</sup> is the surest safeguard for the attainment of a state based on justice to all sorts and conditions of men.<sup>6</sup> The Constitution, says our outstanding constitutional lawyer Mr. N. A. Palkhiwalla, 'was primarily shaped and moulded for the common man and to put the basic human rights above the reach of the State and of Politicians in power...' The real danger which the country faced today was from those who thirst and hunger for power. Further he reminds: 'the pith and substance of the Constitution was that it provided stability without stagnation and change without destruction of human values'. In the last analysis all philosophy is at bottom, a question of Values—What value you give to honour, to truth, to love, to discipline, to morality, to the rule of law, to the individual and to the State. In the beautiful words of John Laird, Regius Prof. of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen, two decades ago, said, 'we put our trust in patterns that gradually emerge from the loom of experience; but we belong to the loom and are a thought or two ahead of the pattern we are engaged in weaving'.<sup>7</sup> Let us weave with vision and vigour a strong and substantial democracy that will stand the test of time—freedom through discipline, peace through continuous adjustment, justice through the rule of law, contentment through work and harmony through religion.

<sup>4</sup> Portraits from Memory.

<sup>5</sup> How India has devalued the status of the Judiciary: Times of India, 25th June 66—by Mr. N. A. Palkhiwalla.

<sup>6</sup> The Law and the State by Lord Justice Birkett.

<sup>7</sup> The Temper of British Ideals: A fascinating booklet of high philosophical importance with a practical tang.



## 5

*Some Aspects of Buddhist Ethics**A. T. Hopkinson*

## PART II

## THERAVAADA

We now move on to the Theravada school beginning with a few quotations.

By the faithful observance of this noble body of precepts of right conduct he enjoys cloudless happiness within. (MN I 64).

At the time, when one has rejected (killing stealing etc.) does one feel at such a time perfectly well, or well and ill?—Well and ill, O lord". What do you think, Udayi? if one has trodden the path which brings with it weal and woe, can one then attain perfect welfare. The excellent one has cut off the conversation Mere virtue can never lead beyond the transient world. (MN II 65) Mean ye monks and of subordinate importance : nothing but moral purity, is what the average man means, when speaking approvingly of the Perfected One.

Cannot remain content merely with morality. It is merely the first absolutely necessary step. (It is interesting to note a passage in the Mahajjima Nikaya where it states that the holy life lived under the guidance of the Buddha is not just for the sake of purity of conduct but rather purity of conduct leads to purity of mind; which leads to purity of understanding; which leads to purity of knowledge; which leads to purity of certitude. (MN I 409) So moral purity is an important initial step in purification but it is not the final step.) Without it there can be no real concentration and thus no perception of anatta.

But concentrated meditation of the constituents of our personality is only possible when cognition is no longer disturbed by passionate upheavals of any kind.



The noble disciple thinks of the principles of morality, that are unbroken, comprehensive, always abiding the same, unspotted, liberating, praised by those of understanding, uninfluenced, recommended by the wise, not dictated by personal interests, directed towards concentration. In thinking of morality his mind brightens, joy arises, and whatever exists of spots ? on the mind, disappears, even as a dirty looking glass is cleansed by correct procedure. (A I 208)<sup>1</sup>.

The teaching, with its four Noble Truths and Noble Eightfold Path, was an exacting moral and psychological self discipline. It could be fully carried out only by those who renounced the world and entered the monastic community<sup>2</sup>.

R C Amore argues that the early Buddhists redirected the traditional piety of the people, They reinterpreted the traditional practices of sacrificing, granting hospitality, making offerings and venerating holy persons in accordance with Buddhist values and goals. Thus the sangha became worthy of sacrifice, hospitality, offerings and veneration being the unsurpassed merit field of all the world. The notion was maintained that one gains happiness in this world and a heavenly rebirth by doing merit (advice to laymen)—a brahmanic concept. The layman's support in thought word and deed of those possessed of admirable spiritual characteristics generated merit for himself and also helped to transform the whole society's orientation from harming to peace and generosity.<sup>3</sup>

Merit theory in early Buddhism was used to establish the superiority of the religion vis a vis its contemporaries. Thus the tathagata and his followers are said to be superior to other wanderers and brahmins and the bhikkhu is worthy of honour, not because of birth, wealth or knowledge of the vedas but because of his achieved mental characteristics. By comparison, the Sonandanda sutra defines a true Brahmin as one perfect in morality having reduced all the list of what makes a true Brahmin, including birth religious knowledge etc, provided by Sonandanda to basically morality. Morality, not the varna is what counts.

Furthermore, because the sangha is the unsurpassed merit field, those who support it will become the most meritorious.

- 1 G.Grimm, The Doctrine of the Buddha, Akademie Verlag 1958 p. 421f.
- 2 C. H. Hamilton, Buddhism—A Religion of Infinite Compassion, Liberal Arts, 1952, pxxvii.
- 3 R. C. Amore, The Concept and Practice of Doing Merit in Early Theravada Buddhism, Columbia University, Ph.D., 1970 p. 1.



Later punna stories were used pedagogically. Thus the jatakas encourage the layman in meritorious practise by relating those of the Buddha or other worthy individuals,<sup>4</sup>

### Five Cardinal Virtues

#### Faith<sup>5</sup>

Intellectually this is an assent to a doctrine which is not substantiated by immediately available direct factual evidence. Volitionally faith implies a resolute and courageous act of will. Emotionally it requires an attitude of severity and lucidity. Vexations are explained as inevitable retribution.

Socially it is trust and confidence in the Buddha and the Sangha<sup>6</sup>. David Bastow writes that the thirty marks and fabulous birth seem to imply for the Buddha a unique and a supreme status as settled from birth and before which is hardly compatible with his following disciples and practising austerities as a genuine seeker after truth-is that he achieved something by his own efforts.<sup>7</sup>

However, the Theravada view combines the belief that truths about the Way are justified by reference to methods of investigation open to any man and that truths are known and can only be known by reference to some transcendent otherworldly reality so that the proper attitude is faith.<sup>8</sup>

The Buddha speaks of the Dhamma as a come and see thing and the bhikhu need take on trust only what he has not achieved himself. With what he has achieved he can see for himself that the Buddha's teaching is correct in what he himself has achieved. Faith makes serene; it's arising arrests the five hindrances and clears the mind of defilements as a miraculous gem clears muddy water.<sup>9</sup>

#### Vigour

On vigour we note that excess is deprecated even in the virtues. All five regarded as one whole. (Aristotle, as is well known, formulated the doctrine of the Mean in his Ethics).<sup>10</sup>

4 R. C. Amore, op. cit., p. 151.

5 See also Pure Land Buddhism, p. 32.

6 E. Conze, The Way of Wisdom, Buddhist Publication Society, 1964, p. 1-3.

7 David Bastow, Continuity and Diversity in Early Buddhism in M. Pye and R. Morgan. The Cardinal Meaning, Mouton, 1973 p. 113.

8 Bastow, op. cit., p. 111.

9 E. Conze Buddhist Scriptures Pen 1959, p. 152.

10 See Ethics Book 2 and appendix two to this work.



## Some Aspects of Buddhist Ethics

So this is not an unconditional commitment. There is too much in common between the strivings of the Bodhisat and the bhikkhu. The Theravadins reconciled their picture of the Buddha as fully human with their refusal to think of any pronouncements as debatable by thinking of him as moral and spiritual expert and themselves as learners.<sup>11</sup>

### Mindfulness

This is the constant mindfulness with regard to the body, feelings, thoughts and mind objects which tends to eradicate misconceptions with regard to desirability (subha), happiness (sukha) permanence (nicca) and the self (atta) respectively.

### Concentration

One must first suppress the five hindrances.<sup>12</sup> (See section on the hindrances p2/) The concentrated mind acts as a powerful aid to see things as they really are by penetrative insight.

### Wisdom

Visuddhimagga XIV 7 says wisdom penetrates into the dhammas as they are in themselves. It despises the darkness of delusion which covers up the own being of the dhammas.

The eradication of the ashavas and the uprooting of tanha leads to liberation. The chain of existence is fueled by cravings and cankers "If a man's thinking is wrong, then not only cankers arise which had not arisen before, but also those which had already arisen grow apace" Further Dialogues I 4

### Middle Way

The Buddha emphasised the concept of the 'Middle Way' between the extremes of self mortification and sensuality. (Aristotle used the concept of the mean in his ethics).<sup>13</sup>

Sense pleasures are a noose (pasa) that binds to things mundane (Majjhima I 173) and yet mortification is useless as a means of enlightenment and internal purity (Dhammapada 141-2).<sup>14</sup>

Avoidance of extremes in thought is also stressed. There is famous amphiboly list of questions which should not be considered as they delay the path to nirvana. They include the extremes of:

11 Bastow op. cit., p. 114.

12 Lonze, p. 20.

13 See pages 2 of this work.

14 M. Barua, Studies in Buddhism, Saraswat Library, 1974, p. 72-9.



all exists—nothing exists

all has a cause—all emerges without a cause

### Arhat Faith

We now turn to the arhat path. We will also be looking at bhikkhus to some extent. (We will only be looking at the moral aspects, though, of course perfection in wisdom and meditation is also necessary).

A bhikkhu is expected to observe four higher morality:

Patimokkha Sila—The 227 rules of monastic life

Ajivaparisuddhi Sila—Morality pertaining to purity of livelihood

Paccayasannissta Sila—Morality pertaining to the uses of the necessities of life

Indriyasamvara Sila—Morality pertaining to sense restraint.

### Fetters and Hindrances

There are ten fetters (samyojanas) which chain man to the lower life (These are latent bonds as a neonate is not conscious of them).

The first three are eliminated by the stream winner

1 view on personality,

2 doubt,

3 attachment to observance

The Once Returner eliminates the next two

4 lusts of the flesh

5 malevolence.

The Never Returner eliminates the remaining five

6 attachment to the realm of forms

7 attachment to the formless realm

8 pride

9 restlessness

10 ignorance

The first relates to belief in the existence of the self. The second to doubts about the Buddha, the Dharma, the Sangha, the disciplinary rules, the past, the future, both the past and the future and dependent origination. The third relates to the belief that of ascetics and brahmins that purification is obtained by rules of moral conduct or by rites or by both.

### Path to riddance of the bonds

On attaining the first ecstasy there is a state of inward aloofness but not abandoning of observation and reflection, all is seen as transitory and ill... purges his mind of all such mental phenomena and applies it, so purged, to the state which is deathless, confident that



what is really good and really excellent is the stilling of all factors of being, riddance from all ties, destruction of cravings, passionless peace, nirvana. He attains to extirpation of the cankers, or at very least by his very passion for righteousness he destroys the five bonds which chain him to the lower life

The Uttapathakas held that the extirpation of the klesas had to be done for all three periods of time as if the klesas had a reality such as the sarvastivadins conceived.<sup>15</sup>

The word of the Buddha on the bliss of Nibbana caused the Andhakas to believe that through Nibbana as a blessing the fetters are cut off; for one who discerns the happy prospect of nibbana the fetters are put off.

Buddhagosa pointed out that when it is clearly discerned that the world is full of peril and nibbana is a blessing the fetters are put off. It doesn't work with just the latter half of the equation.<sup>16</sup>

### Hindrances

There are five kinds of hindrances (Nivarana)

- 1 Sensual desires (kammachanda)
- 2 Ill will (vyapada)
- 3 Sloth and torpor (thina-middha)
- 4 Restlessness and Worry (uddhacca kukkuccha)
- 5 Doubts (vicikiccha)

The first means attached to sense desire or sense pleasures and this leads to grasping and clinging to samsara in dependent origination. It is inhibited by the jhana characteristic of one pointedness (ekagata) and attenuated at attainment sakadagami and eradicated at anagami. However attached to the realms of form and formlessness are only eradicated at arhatship.

six factors lead to the eradication of sense desires :

- 1 Perceiving the loathsomeness of the object
- 2 Constant meditation on loathsomeness
- 3 Sense restraint
- 4 Moderation in food
- 5 Good friendship
- 6 Profitable talk

The second is due to the fact that an undesirable object leads to aversion. It is inhibited by the jhana characteristic of piti (joy); attenuated at sakadagami and eradicated at anagami.

15 S. N. Dube, Cross Currents in Early Buddhism, Manohar, 1980.  
16 S. N. Dube, Cross Currents in Early Buddhism, Manohar, 1980, p. 327.



Six factors lead to its eradication

- 1 Perceiving an object with thoughts of good will
- 2 Constant meditation on loving kindness
- 3 Thinking that karma is ones own
- 4 Adherence to that view
- 5-6 as for sense desires

The third is mental torpor. It is inhibited by the jhana factor of vitakka (initial application) and is eradicated at arhatship. Six conditions lead to its eradication

- 1 Reflection on the object of moderation in food
- 2 Changing bodily postures
- 3 Contemplation on light
- 4 Living in the open
- 5-6 As before

With regard to the fourth, uddhacca is mental restlessness associated with immoral consciousness and kukkuccha is worry or repentance. Both are inhibited by the jhana factor of sukkha (happiness). The first is inhibited on attaining arhatship and the second at anagami.

Six factors tend to its eradication

- 1 Learning
- 2 Questioning or discussion
- 3 understanding the vinaya
- 4 Association with senior monks
- 5-6 As before

The fifth is doubt, an unsteadiness with regard to one particular thing that is being done. It is inhibited by the jhana factor of vicara sustained application and eradicated on attaining sotapanni.

Six conditions lead to its eradication

- 1 Knowledge of Dharma and vinaya
- 2 Discussion or questioning
- 3 Understanding the vinaya
- 4 Excessive confidence
- 5-6 As above

As well as the hindrances there are also the fetters (samojanas) which are eradicated at various stages.

At the stream winner stage three fetters are eradicated :

Belief in the self

Doubts (vicikiccha) about the Buddha, the Dharma, the sangha, the past, the future, both the past and the future, and dependent origination.



## Some Aspects of Buddhist Ethics

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Adherence to wrongful rights and ceremonies (silabbataparamasa)  
The once returner eradicates the fetters of sense desires (kamaraga)  
and ill will (patigha).

The never returner eradicates destroys the five remaining fetters  
of :

- attachment to realms of form (ruparaga)
- attachment to formless realms (aruparaga)
- pride (mana)
- restlessness (uddhacca)
- ignorance (avijja).

Elimination of the fetters and hindrances is vital to the progress  
to nirvana. The arhat is perfect in wisdom and morality, though the  
schism which lead to the formation of the mahasamgikas and sthavi-  
ras came about through claims that arhats could doubt and fall from  
the path among other things.

**Dependent origination (Paticca Samuppada)**

This is the cycle that binds one to the realm of samsara. Its  
formulation is that in the past life ignorance has led to the committ-  
ing of karma and this has caused rebirth in this life so that conscious-  
ness arises. Dependent on conscious is mind and matter. Dependent  
on mind and matter are the six sense fields :

The human being can be catagorised as the 12 ayatanas and 18  
datus :

<i>Receptive faculty</i>	<i>Object</i>	<i>Consciousness</i>
Vision	Colour, form	Visual
Hearing	Sound	Auditory
Smell	Smell	Olfactory
Taste	Taste	Gustatory
Touch	Contact, Tangibles	Tactile
Intellect	Nonsensuous	Nonsensuous

Dependent on each sense arises contact. Dependent on contact  
arises feeling. Dependent on feeling arises craving. Dependent on  
craving arises grasping. Dependent on grasping arises becoming.  
Dependent on becoming arises birth and dependent on birth arises  
old age and death. The heart of this is that what causes one to  
remain in samsara is desire (tanha thirst)

The thirst for sense pleasures ' (kammatanha)

The thirst for life (bhavatanha)

The thirst for non existence (vibhavatanha)



### A note on the interrelated duties of monks and laymen

Wealth is seen as something to be used to care for kin, pay tithes, give alms to religious wanderers and brahmins which will lead one to heaven. (An III 45-6.) The traditional cause of suffering as laid down by the third noble truth of Buddhism is thirst (*tanha*) and in particular thirst for sense pleasures thirst to be and thirst for non existence (*kamma, bhava and vibhava tanha*)

Thrift and diligence are emphasized for laymen. A necessary precondition of being a donor (*dayaka*). Dn III 188 says that half ones wealth should be used for business, one quarter consumed and one quarter reinvested for emergencies.<sup>17</sup> Aristotle points out the difference between the magnanimous and the pusillanimous man. The latter is one who, though deserving, deprives himself of the advantages that he deserves, and through not claiming his deserts conveys the impression of having some defect and not knowing his own quality. (Aristotle p 158). The former does not take petty risks, nor does he court danger, because there are few things that he values highly; but he takes great risks, and when he faces danger he is unsparing of his life, because to him there are some circumstances in which it is not worth living. He is disposed to confer benefits, but is ashamed to accept them, because the one is the act of a superior and the other that of an inferior. (Aristotle p 156) The Ashokavadana tells of the desire of Ashoka to denote 100 kotis of gold to Kukktu-arama sangha.

Ashoka states that all prosperity ends in adversity. And "on account of the fruit of this gift which accrued to me who am in great devotion, I shall acquire lordship over my mind, which is valued by the Aryas and which never attains change or reverse<sup>18</sup>. Or as Gombrich puts it: the true duty of a Buddhist is to progress spiritually towards enlightenment. Monks and laymen have reciprocal duties. The laity are to materially support the monks and in harmony with this; they are to practise thrift and the monks must preserve the doctrine and preach to the laity.<sup>19</sup> Here we see moral acts leading to control of the mind Presumably through getting rid of wealth which leads to the eradication of desire. Though the practical benefit to

17 R. F. Gombrich, *The Duty of a Buddhist According to the Pali Scriptures* in W.D.O. Flaherty and J.D.M. Devett (eds), *The Concept of Duty in South Asia*, Vikas 1978.

18 R. Basak, *Buddha and Buddhism*, Sambodhi p. 100.

19 R.F. Gombrich, *The Duty of a Buddhist According to the Pali Scriptures*, in O'Flaherty and Derret, *The Concept of Duty in South Asia*, Vikas 1978 p. 117.



the sangha of persuading people to donate and therefore receive spiritual benefits should not be over looked.

The duty of monks towards laymen is to preach the Dharma. There is a triple division of duties of king, laity and sangha towards each other. Thus the king patronises the sangha and is advised by it; the laity supports the sangha and is instructed by it; the people owe their loyalty to the king and he has the duty to rule and protect them. The king may also intervene in disputes of the sangha. Thus King Bodawpaya of Burma intervened to settle the one and two shoulder robe argument.<sup>20</sup>

### MAHAYANA

The Hinayana schools were felt by the Mahayanists to be less advanced and selfish because they did not have the Bodhisattvas willingness to continue to return to the world to save beings, For did they seek Buddhahood but only the lesser level of arhatship.<sup>21</sup> (The Lotus sutra has parables which state that the Hinayana arahat path was taught as a skill in means by the Buddha as suited to beings at a particular level of development as indeed all teachings of him are heard and understood by beings at their particular level).

#### Bodhisattva

An essential characteristic of the Bodhisattva is the development of the correct mental attitude-bodhicitta.

#### Bodhicitta

Out of deep compassion for others comes the development of the authentic Mahayana motivation, the Mind of Enlightenment or Bodhicitta for compassion is the ethical absolute for Mahayana Buddhism and it is developed from a sustained and specific series of meditations and not merely from a pious wish to help others.<sup>22</sup>

Now we will look at the Bodhisattva paramitas.

#### Bodhisattva paramitas

These are the ten transcendental virtues which every Bodhisattva practices to gain supreme enlightenment.

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- 20 E. M. Mendelson, *Sangha and State in Burma*, Cornell University Press, p. 59.
- 21 However, it is worth noting that the Buddha told monks who to regard other's salvation as highly as their own. S. Tachibana *The Ethics of Buddhism* OUP 1926 Chapter 5.
- 22 Paul Williams, *Mahayana Buddhism*, Routledge, 1989 p. 19.



**Dana (generosity)**

The purpose of generosity is to eliminate craving and the Bodhisattva is not concerned with whether the recipient is truly in need or not. But he will not give if the gift is to be misused. He seldom if ever stoops himself to ask a favour.

“Who beg, Pancala Lord, to weep are fain

They who refuse are apt to weep again” (Jataka 323).

The Bodhisattva is willing to sacrifice even his life for others. (There is the famous story of the Buddha in a previous incarnation, before his enlightenment sacrificing his life so that a hungry tiger could feed her cubs, (Suvarnaprabhasa 206-224).

In giving food he intends to endow the recipient with long life, beauty, happiness, strength, wisdom and the highest fruit, Nibbana; drink with the object of quenching the thirst of passion; garments to acquire moral shame and dread; conveyances to cultivate psychic powers; odours for the scent of morality; garlands and unguents to gain the glory pertaining to the Buddha's virtues; seats to win the seat of enlightenment; lodging with the hope of serving as a refuge to the world; lights to obtain the five kinds of eyes—physical, wisdom, divine, Buddha, omniscience; forms to possess the Buddha aura, sounds to cultivate a voice as sweet as Brahma, tastes so that he may be pleasing to all; contacts to gain the delicate organism of a Buddha; medicine for the sake of nibbana. (In Tibet Bhaishajyaguru is the medicine Buddha representing the incarnation of healing in all its aspects from the curing of a cold through mental illness to the enlightenment itself—a healing of the human condition.) He emancipates slaves to deliver men from the thralldom of passion; renounces children to develop the paternal feeling towards all; renounces wives to become the master of the world; renounce kingship to inherit the kingdom of righteousness.

**Sila (Morality)**

This consists of the duties one should perform (carita) and the abstinences one should practise (varitta). He refrains from killing, stealing—thus developing honesty, trustworthiness and uprightness. He tries to be pure and chaste and does not indulge in harsh slanderous or frivolous talk.

**Nekkhamma (Renunciation)**

He realises the fleeting vanity of the world and voluntarily leaves it in order to lead the holy life. He practises the higher morality to such an extent that nothing can induce him to break it. As a rule



renunciation is, however, not practised by the Bodhisattva. For, his purpose is to help, not abandon beings.

### **Panna (Wisdom or knowledge)**

This is the understanding of the nature of the world as transitory and sorrowful and empty. Though the Bodhisattva does not fully abandon the world to the extent of achieving nirvana. Asange states that the Bodhisattva, because he has a firm conviction of voidness understands the true nature of samsara. He does not weary himself of the world for if he did he would quickly enter nirvana and thus not remain to help beings. Nor does he delight in the world else he would not progress so as to help beings. He does not fear nor does he strive for nirvana. If he feared it for if he did he would not progress. If he strives only for nirvana with no thought of other beings he will not remain in the world to help them.<sup>23</sup> He would be like a solitary realiser (Pratyekabuddha)

The Bodhisattva also strives to acquire complete knowledge in worldly things in order to use this knowledge to help beings.

### **Virya (energy)**

This the persistent energy to work for the welfare of others in thought and deed

### **Khanti (patience)**

The patient enduring of the wrongs inflicted on one by others and the tolerance of other's wrongs. Such endurance being to the extent of suffering torture and death (compare Jataka 313 where the Bodhisattva endure being cut to pieces and blessed his torturer)

### **Sacca (truthfulness)**

This is truthfulness which precept is never abandoned. Nor is the Bodhisattva's promise ever broken.

### **Ashitthana (determination)**

This is resolute determination. Without this the other vows cannot be fulfilled.

### **Metta (loving kindness)**

This is loving kindness to all beings equally including oneself It is the first of the four sublime states. The others are : Karuna (Compassion) to remove the sufferings of all<sup>24</sup>

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23 J. D. Wills, On Knowing Reality, Columbia University, 1979 p. 153f.

24 Compare Medicine Buddha on page 26.



Mudita (Sympathetic or appreciative joy) which destroys jealousy Upekkha (equanimity) The viewing of things without attachment or aversion<sup>25</sup>. Also one of the paramitas as is seen next.

### Upekka (equanimity)

The Bodhisattva remains adamant in the face of all slights and insults, praise and blame, loss and gain and, in short, through all the vicissitudes of life.

The Prajnaparamita sutra lists

Dana

Sila

Kshanti

Virya

Dhyana (contemplation)

Prajna (transcendental insight)

Later texts such as the Dhashabumika added

Upaya (skill in means)

Pranidhana (Resolution)

Bala (strength)

Jhana (trance)

It is interesting to note that the perfection of dana precedes that of sila.

The Bodhisattva also passes through ten (originally seven) stages (bhumi). From the Dasabhumika sutra :

1 Pramudita (joyful) rejoicing in bodhi and the fact that he will succour all beings he perfects dana.

2 Vimata (pure) He perfects sila and is free from all impurities.

3 Prabhakari (light giving) he brings the light of his insight into the world and perfects patience.

4 Arcismati (radiant) perfects effort and 37 principles conducive to enlightenment and burns away ignorance

5 Sudurjaya (difficult to conquer) He endeavours to perfect himself in dhyana and the practise of the four noble truths and is not easily conquered by the forces of Mara.

6 Abhimukhi (face to face) He perfects himself in prajna and insight into Dependent origination and stands face to face to with nirvana.

7 Duramagama (far going) He comprehends reality just as it is and perfects himself in upaya necessary to bring beings to salvation.

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25 See also on tanha p. 23.



8 Acala (immovable Unmoved by thoughts of emptiness<sup>26</sup> he is able to manifest him self at will in all levels of existence.<sup>27</sup>

9 Sadhumati stage of good beings Here he perfects himself in bala strength

10 Dharmamegha cloud of dharma As space is dotted with clouds so this stage is dominated by various trances and concentrations.

The Bodhisattva acquires a radiant body befitted with gems and works for the aid of beings. Perfecting himself in jnana he obtains the deliverance of the Bodhisattva.

In eighth century Tibet, debates were held between the monk Mahayana and Kamalisila. The former declared that enlightenment has nothing to do with morality, but was positively hindered by good and bad deeds which led to heaven and hell and bind one in samsara, Enlightenment lay in cutting all thought and must be instantaneous. Kamalisila replied that liberating wisdom was the result of analysing to find out if an entity had inherent wisdom. Sudden enlightenment was seen as destroying scriptures, morality and compassion.

### SKILL IN MEANS

The doctrine of upaya kausalya (skill in means) is a teaching aid whereby tricks are used to bring people to the truth. A problem exists in the radical difference between the Hinayana idea of the arahant path and the more human nature of the Buddha and the Mahayana idea of the triple body supermundane nature of the Buddha teach the Hinayana path and not just the Mahayana. The answer is that he teaches according to the capacity of his audience. A number of famous parables in the lotus sutta show this idea. It will be sufficient for us to look at just three in brief.

#### (1) The Burning House

The parable concerns an old man of great power and incredible wealth and his many sons. It tells how the sons were trapped in a burning house while playing. The children are ignorant of the danger and the father saves the children by the skillful means of announcing that he has three splendid carriages awaiting them.

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26 Note how Buddhagosa said that the doctrine of no self could terrify beings.

27 Compare the idea of the nirmanakaya—the illusion body of the Buddha which manifests itself in the world and pretends to die in order to help beings to enlightenment. An example of upaya.

28 P. Williams Mahayana Buddhism Routledge 1989 p. 193f.



But because he loved his sons equally they each received not small inferior carriages but one great carriage.

The parable requires little interpretation. The father is the Buddha. The burning house is the house of samsara, within which living beings, absorbed in their playthings are trapped. The Buddha offers inducements (vehicles), according to the desires of living beings, but when they respond and leave the house, he gives them the very best reward, namely, the gift of Buddhahood (the one vehicle). The question is asked, whether the father, or the Buddha had lied to his children? He did not. The children's lives had been saved and that was the greatest gift of all as Truth is linked to effective means and depends, not on some absolute standard, but on context.

## (2) The Prodigal Son

A young man ran away from home to another country, and over a period of years was reduced to dire poverty. In his wanderine ght young man accidentally headed towards his native country. Meanwhile the father prospered and became a very rich man. He earnestly wanted to see his son again but could not find him. One day the poor son chanced to reach his father's house. While the son no longer recognises his father or his new house, the father instantly recognises his son and sends a servant to fetch him. The son however is terrified and helpless with agony.

The father accordingly realizes that he must introduce him in gradual stages to the truth that he is the son of the father and heir to all this wealth. The father offers his son very menial and dirty work (sweeping away dung).

Because the son is such a good character and works well the father promotes him. At long last the father, about to die, announces to all that this man is really his son and heir. "You and I", he says to his, "Are now to be no different."

Hearing his father's words the son rejoiced greatly. Then he thought that formerly he had no thought of seeking or expecting anything, and now (this great wealth) came to him of itself.

The meaning of the parable is clear : with faith and understanding the assembly joyfully accepts the new Doctrine. They understand that the Buddha had come down to their level to preach the lesser

29 This is not an original use of the metaphore, See Vinaya Pitika I 34: "Our perceptions are all on fire".

30 The parable has a second meaning. The Buddha is said to: "create the old and rotten burning house of the three worlds (samsara) and, in order to save beings... he teaches and converts them, enabling them to attain Buddhahood" (61).



doctrines and offer the lesser reward, but now reveals himself in full power and majesty. Consequently they all have confidence in their inheritance.

### (3) The Good Physician

There is a good physician, who intelligently refines medical herbs and skilfully heals many sicknesses. The man has many sons. He has to leave them for a far country. Left behind, his sons drink poison, and roll about in agonized pain and confusion. On his return the father sees the agony of his children and offers them a cure for their sickness. But, having lost their sanity, the children refuse to take it. So the father tells them that he is about to die, and leaves them again. Later a messenger arrives and tells the children that their father is dead. Grief stricken, they take their father's medicine and are cured. Hearing of their cure the father returns.)

This parable explains that the Buddha's forthcoming demise is only a trick. It is an expedient device whereby beings, insane with the poison of wrong views, are moved to take the Buddha's antidote. For, in reality, the Buddha is not, deceased.

In each case the question is asked as whether or not it was morally wrong for a trick to have been played in each case. Each time the answer is no as people have benefitted through the trick by having their lives saved.

Vimalakirti is another example of skill in means. He pretends to be sick so that other Bodhisattvas will visit him so that he may preach to them. His house is the entrance to a Pure Land. He frequents low places to preach to people. He performs miracles such as filling his house with giant thrones. But nonetheless he lived at home but remained aloof from the realm of desire.<sup>31</sup>

Like the Buddha he sees the necessity to preach to beings according to their capacity.<sup>32</sup>

His sickness is a parable of the state of the world. He says that it comes from ignorance and the thirst for existence and it will last as long as so the sickness of all living beings-for the Bodhisattva the world consists only of living beings and sickness is inherent in living in the world, so the Bodhisattva suffers as parents do when a child is sick.<sup>33</sup>

31 R. A. Thurman, *The Holy Teaching of Vimalakirti*, Penn State UP 1976, p. 2.

32 Thurman, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

33 Thurman, *op. cit.*, p. 46.



The Bodhisattva will even break the moral law for the sake of beings. Indeed, he should according to the Shikshasamuccaya and will delight in his resultant rebirth in hell. Attachment is not necessarily a fault for him; for it is good for him to be attached to persons if it means that he will be thus concerned to aid them. Aristotle we note in passing, also speaks of the necessity not to have a too rigid moral attitude but to act in equity.<sup>34</sup>

Finally in this section, it is interesting to note that the Bodhisattva seems able to even break the law of karma for the sake of beings according to Vasutara writing of the Mahasamgikas and some of their schools where he says that Bodhisattvas, for the sake of beings, are born into bad states at will and can be born into any of them as they like. Normally the type of rebirth depends on one's karma solely.

### PURE LAND

Pure land Buddhism is the belief that certain Buddhas have created certain realms where those who, through faith are born in it have an eternal life from which they will never fall until they have achieved enlightenment. In some schools of the Amitabha cult simply to call, with faith upon his name at death is sufficient to achieve rebirth in his realm where even the birds sing the praise of the Dharma. The Pure lands seem to provoke a paradox in Buddhist ethics. On the one hand there is the compassion of the creators the land who are concerned to save beings but, on the other hand, the idea that one can be reborn in a Pure Land through faith does seem to have some counter attack on the idea of karma.<sup>35</sup>

### CONCLUSION

We have seen the practice of morality is essential to the progress to nirvana in Theravada Buddhism. Also how the mental attitude<sup>36</sup> and volition (cetana) is a prerequisite of the karmic effect as was stated by Buddhagosa. As the Dhammapada begins: Preceded by mind [are] the dharmas, based on mind [and] mind made;

If one speaks or acts with a corrupt mind,

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34 J. A. K. Thomson, op. cit., p. 21.

35 Two forms were founded in Japan. 1 Jodoshu founded by Honen (1133-1212) where salvation is due to calling upon the name of Amitabha (nembutsu) and leaving everything else to him. 2 True Pure Land (Jodo Shinshu) founded by Shinren (1173-1216) which relied on faith not nembutsu and which is open to all true believers.

36 Is there anything as fluctuating as mind ?



Then suffering follows him as the wheel [follows] the hoof [of an ox].<sup>37</sup>

We have also looked at the importance of Dharma/dharma and karma. In addition we looked at the Mahayanists with their emphasis on compassion and skill in means.

In the matter of ethics one might either discuss the philosophical meaning of the term or give moral rules, such as the silas, with or without reasons for the rules. Buddhist ethics seem to come under the latter. Moral rules are given and the benefits of obeying such as a good rebirth or progress to nirvana are stated.

Superficial similarities to certain ideas of western philosophy also exist. We have noted the superficial similarity of the Aristotelian concept of the mean and the Buddhist Middle Way. And the idea of Aristotle on the seeking of happiness and the Mahayana statement that all beings seek happiness. Hume does not really contribute anything. Hume felt that moral rules were a feeling in the mind. We find no connection between this and Buddhism. Kant saw morality as proof of the existence of a deity, which separates him from Buddhism, he also saw it as proof of life after death as such was necessary to fit with his idea that the universe was rational and there moral acts had to be rewarded properly even if they had not been in life. A very superficial connection with the idea of rebirth as a result of moral acts.<sup>38</sup> Finally, the idea of Hegel is of evolution to an ultimate point of history. But this is a society evolution seen in the evolution of Geist rather than the evolution of the individual of Buddhism. Theravada Buddhism has an absolutist attitude to morality, as did Kant, whereas the Mahayanists, with their skill in means are more liberal in attitude. An attitude which we found bears some similarity to certain ideas of Aristotle,

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37 Translated in A Piatigorsky, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Thought*, Curzon 1984, p. 53.

38 A closer similarity in western thought is seen in Origen's idea of cycles of existence as laid down in *De Principiis*. II. 8. 3. He states that beings who sinned and thus fell were, in proportion to their sins clothed in bodies as punishment. And repeatedly so for punishment. For it is possible that different worlds have existed and will exist. See J. Stevenson, *A New Eusebius*, SPCK 1977, p. 216f.



## APPENDIX ONE

## ARISTOTELIEN CATAGORIES

NAME	EXAMPLE
Substance	a species such as horse, man
Quality	White cold
Quantity	three feet
Relation	bigger than
Time	noon, spring
Place	Athens
Temporary position/ disposition	sitting, pleased
Permanent Place	educated, crippled
Activity	cutting
Passivity	being cut

## APPENDIX TWO

## ARISTOTLE TABLE OF VIRTUES AND VICES

Sphere of action or feeling	Excess	Mean	Difficiency
Fear Confidence	Rashness	Courage	Cowardice
Pleasure Pain	Licentiousness	Temperance	Insensibility
Getting/ Spending/ (minor)	Prodigality	Liberalilty	Illiberality
Getting/ Spending/ (major)	Vulgarity	Magnificence	Pettiness
Honour/ Dishonour (major)	Vanity	Magnamity	Pusillanimty
Honour/ Dishonour/ (minor)	Ambition	Proper ambition	Unambitious
Anger	Irascibility	Patience	Cack of Spirit
Self Expression	Boastiffulness	Truthfulness	Understatement
Conversation—	Buffoonery	Wittiness	Boorishness
Social Conduct	Obsequiousness	Friendliness	Cantakerousness
Shame	Shyness	Modesty	Shamelessness
Indignaiion	Envy	Righteous indignation	Malicious enjoyment



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## 6

*Can Moral Reasoning Be Purely Deductive?**Gautam Kumar Sinha*

## I

The topic strikes at a problem which has been very controversial in contemporary ethical thought. The Aristotelian model of deduction, has to its credit, wide acceptability and applicability. There is a widespread belief that if any reasoning is rigorously logical, it has to be deductive. But such a reasoning demands the fulfilment of certain necessary and basic conditions. Our problem at present is to see whether moral reasoning is capable of meeting those demands.

In order to do this the paper intends to proceed in and through the following stages. First, it would try to outline, in a very general way, the basic features of a really Deductive reasoning. That would provide the basic tool for making our final assessment. Then, the paper would consider the question as to why such a problem has come to demand consideration. We shall notice that there have been explicit examples of some moral reasoning advanced by some prominent Ethicists, who expressly put moral reasoning in the form of Deductive reasoning. We shall consider Moore's model as a paradigm. After that, basing ourselves on the considerations of the above mentioned two factors, we shall be in a position to make a comparative assessment of the two reasonings and would come to highlight the essential points of difference between the two. And then, finally, we shall demonstrate that in spite of differences, there is a sense in which Moral reasonings also come to show up such features that are the hall marks of Deductive reasoning.

## II

According to Aristotle, moral reasoning is syllogistic in its character. Aristotle opines that moral reasoning involves deliberations about the things to be done by the agent himself. In his scheme, deli-



beration is required in order to determine how a certain end can be achieved. Deliberation consists of a series of steps—each of which can be explicated in the syllogistic form. Aristotle maintains that starting point in this series is the determination of a certain end, while the conclusion is an action to be done by an agent so as to realise the given end. The other premise provides a connecting link between the specified ends and the actions to be done. He also calls his syllogistic form of reasoning 'the deductive form of reasoning'. The special feature of a deductive reasoning is that the relation between premises and conclusion is that of entailment, that is to say, the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. To accept the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false involves one into a self-contradiction. Thus, the relation between premises and conclusion depends on rigorous rules of inference. The premises and the conclusion are so related that once we accept the former to be true, we have to accept the latter to be true as well; and this is done not by way of our own choice but by the command of the rules of inference. There is no room for any personal decision or choice in such a case. Whether what is stated in the premises is materially true or not has no bearing to the validity or invalidity of the reasoning. The above reasoning is valid just because it is done in accordance with the rules of logic.

A deductive argument can be either valid or invalid. In a valid argument when the premises are true then the conclusion has also to be true. The conclusion of the valid deductive argument is contained in its premises. The peculiar nature of a deductive argument is that it can be valid even when its premises are not actually true. For example :

All angels are mortal.

Plato is an angel.

Therefore, Plato is mortal.

In the above example although the premises are not materially true yet the argument turns out to be valid. A deductive argument is invalid only if it is shown that it is possible for some argument with the same form to have true premises and a false conclusion. For instance :

All men are mortal.

Plato is mortal.

Therefore, Plato is a man.

Thus, a deductive reasoning becomes invalid only when its central rule namely that it cannot be that premises are true and the conclusion is false is violated.



## III

Some contemporary ethicists such as, A.C. Ewing, W.D. Ross, G. E. Moore have developed a fascination towards the deductive reasoning for its use in settling moral disputes. However, for the sake of brevity, we shall be taking up only Moore's view of moral reasoning for our discussion. Moore classifies moral judgements into judgement concerning intrinsic value and judgements concerning value as a means. Judgements of the former kind are not amenable to proof. They are self-evident and are known as intuitions. But the judgements of the latter kind are amenable to proof or disproof. Hence, the reasoning is needed only for the second kind of judgements and not for the first kind.

Moore does not give a systematic account of moral reasoning, but what we gather from the preface of his *Principia Ethics*, it appears that he opts for the deductive kind of reasoning. He attempts to determine the general nature of moral reasoning and then to explicate the role which a moral reasoning has to play in a moral talk, conversation and sermon. This becomes clear from his observations given as under ;

I have endeavoured to discover what are the fundamental principles of ethical reasoning; and the establishment of these principles, rather than of any conclusions which may be attained by their use, may be regarded as my main object.<sup>1</sup>

In order to drive home the point he is making, Moore starts by posing a question :

...what is the nature of evidence, by which alone any ethical proposition can be proved or disproved, confirmed or rendered doubtful.<sup>2</sup>

And in order to meet this question, he details the steps of his reasoning. He says that moral reasoning consists of a set of statements of both kinds; a statement regarding a basic self-evident intuition, and a statement of a causal relation. Its major premise is self-evident truth known as intuition and its minor premise is such which states a causal relation. In other words, the minor premise provides a causal link between the premise and the conclusion. To prove the statement 'X is good', Moore argues thus :

Y is intrinsically good.

X causes Y.

Therefore, X is good.

The first premise of the above argument is a statement of intrinsic values and the second statement is causal in its nature. These two statements are set of premises which entail the conclusion, the



statement 'X is good'. Thus, Moore seems to maintain the view that there is a logical relation between premises and conclusion and the whole process of reasoning is strictly governed by rigorous rules of inference. Like a strict logician Moore too maintains that to accept the premises to be true and not to accept the conclusion to be true involves us into self-contradiction. This gives us sufficient grounds to maintain that for Moore reasoning applicable to moral pursuits is purely deductive in nature.

#### IV

Thus, we have outlined in a general way, the basic feature of Deductive reasoning and then we have also given an example of an Ethicist's thinking that moral reasoning can be deductive. But the problem for us is to examine whether Moore's model, or for that matter, moral reasoning in general is able to stand to test demanded by a deductive reasoning. In order to see this we shall have to analyse deeply the basic features of a genuinely moral reasoning.

It might appear that the passage involved in the case of a moral reasoning in between the premises and the conclusion is somehow not as rigid as it is in the case of usual deductive reasoning. One significant point in moral reasoning is the presupposition of a moral commitment. The acceptability of a moral judgement, say 'g' becomes expedient only when it is given under the reference of a system of commitment. When x tries to convince g to accept 'g', he intends to show that when Y accepts a system of commitment, he is also committed to accept 'g' provided 'g' is a judgement belonging to that system. That is to say, to accept a system of commitment to be true and not to accept the judgement belonging to that system is to become inconsistent. The relation between these two is logical, but it is not as rigorous as that of the relation of entailment. To be committed to certain moral system under one framework and not to accept a moral statement which is given in the same framework is logically weak but not self-contradictory.

Moral commitments are generally expressed in the form of generalisations. These are called maxims or principles. A maxim is more general than a singular judgement in the sense that the latter can be subsumed under the former, whereas a principle cannot be subsumed under any singular judgement. This cannot be an instance of any moral judgement whatsoever. On the other hand, in order to justify a singular moral judgement, one has to show that it is an instance of a moral principle which the opponent is committed to accept. Thus, a moral reasoning has as its constituents, some maxim, some singular statement and a statement as their consequence. For example, sup-



pose X gives this judgement to Y. 'The extremist ought to be condemned for what they have done in Punjab'. Now X may proceed to justify it by arguing thus.

- (i) their actions are against national integrity and solidarity.
- (ii) All actions which are against national integrity and solidarity ought to be condemned.

In the above reasoning '(i)' states some facts about the extremist actions and '(ii)' expresses a maxim which is relevant to moral evaluation of such actions. The judgement in question is justified on the ground that if one accepts; (i)' and '(ii)', then he is committed to accept the judgement in question and if he refuses to accept it, then his position apparently turns out to be inconsistent. This shows that the justification of a singular judgement necessarily involves a reference to the maxim or a principle. It is important to note that this reference is not always explicitly made. Most of the time the maxim is left unmentioned. This is a special feature of a moral reasoning that it is generally enthymematic in character.

However, one specific character of a moral principle is that it is not as strict as the general propositions of formal logic. Axioms and principles of formal logic do not admit of any exception, whereas the axioms and principles of ethics do allow such exceptions. For instance, 'stealing is wrong' is a moral principle and it does have some exception because in some specific situation an act of stealing may not be wrong. Hence, it is not logically inconsistent if in place of saying 'stealing is wrong' we say in most cases 'stealing is wrong'.

One more peculiar feature of moral reasoning is that the actual case stated in one of the premises to which a moral maxim is applicable, is often not very precise. For instance, in case of 'stealing' sometimes it becomes difficult to ascertain whether a given act is or is not a case of stealing. Here one has to decide as to whether the act in question is really a case of stealing or whether it is an exception of a general rule: 'stealing is wrong'. Thus, the element of decision seems to play a very significant role in moral reasoning, whereas in deductive reasoning there is no room for decision-making. For example, the statement 'fire generates heat' to which a scientific law 'heat causes expansion' is applicable, is so precise that hardly it requires anybody to take a decision whether it is a case of heat or not. The notion of the heat used in the above example is more precise than the case of theft referred in the moral law. This is the reason why a disagreement in moral discourse is not easily resolvable. Now, since decision is an essential factor of moral reasoning the relation



between premise and conclusion in it cannot be that of entailment in its strict sense of the term. This line of thinking suggests yet another relevant point making out a difference between 'moral reasoning' and 'a strictly deductive reasoning'. For a deductive reasoning concrete examples are not at all relevant, the validity or the invalidity of the argument nowhere involves a reference to concrete facts; it is valid or invalid by dint of the very form of it. But contrary to this in moral reasoning, instances are invariably important and they have a role to play in determining the validity-invalidity of the reasoning.

Nevertheless, in spite of these differences, moral reasoning may be presented in a syllogistic form, although it has to be remembered that the relation between the premises and the conclusion is not as rigorous as in the case of deductive reasoning. Some ethicists developed an appreciation towards the relation of entailment. Hence, they attempt to introduce entailment relation in moral reasoning. They feel that by doing so they would succeed in making moral reasoning scientific and thereby retaining a sort of a logical rigour in it. But this is a mistaken attempt based on an improper understanding of the peculiar nature of moral reasoning. It seems that they are not able to appreciate fully the important and distinctive role that 'decision' has to play in moral reasoning.

Thus, in moral reasoning the relation between premises and conclusion is not as rigorous as it is in deductive reasoning. In a deductive reasoning the inference is so strict and rigorous that it is not possible to accept the premises to be true and deny the truthfulness of the conclusion. On the other hand, in case of moral reasoning, it would not be a contradiction to accept a moral rule 'every one ought to keep one's promises' and a factual statement 'A promised to do Y' but not to accept the judgement 'A ought to do Y'. Such situations are not rare in one's moral life. This shows that the specific character of moral reasoning is not exactly similar to that of a deductive reasoning. Hence, any attempt to introduce deductive reasoning in moral disputes is not proper. The discussion made above gives us sufficient ground to conclude that the reasoning acceptable in morality cannot be purely deductive.

## V

But, at this point, one important clarification has to be made. The distinction between moral reasoning and purely deductive reasoning must not lead us to ascribe to the subjective factor said to be present in moral reasoning. Indeed moral reasoning leans almost essentially on the factor of indecision; it does not make it subjective. Had the subjective element been so obvious in moral reasoning, then



the very question regarding its being deductive would not have arisen. Such a question is relevant only because moral reasoning does exhibit certain features that look like those of deductive reasoning. Let us clarify this point still further. The decision-element of moral reasoning does not distort its objectivity. A moral judgement is justified by its reference to a maxim or principle, that gives to moral reasoning a sort of an objectivity and universality. Such a reasoning works among those who are committed to give credence to and to accept that particular law of morality or maxim. Now, everybody who accepts that law or the maxim cannot afford, without being inconsistent not to accept the judgement subsumed under it. The maxims referred express some moral commitments which are acceptable not only to one individual alone but also acceptable to all those who are the members of that society to which such commitments belong. Hence, moral reasoning becomes public and objective. Moral maxims are also authoritative on the ground that they are not creation of an individual but an outcome of their use during the long period of time. They are, in fact, handed down to us as a part of our social and cultural heritage.

Thus we can conclude that although moral reasoning is not exactly similar to a rigid deductive reasoning in a special sense, limiting the sphere of its comprehension, it does exhibit characters similar to those exhibited in Deductive reasoning.

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## Human Essence and the Discipline of Physics

Hristo Stefanov Manev

The universal character of the discipline of physics concerns the basis of cognition, where human essence is unavoidably reflected. And human essence can be revealed only by analyzing, from a contemporary point of view, the world of which we are a natural product. The analysis shows that three kinds of directed changes concern, in one way or another, all the Universe and because of that they form three mutually connected cosmic tendencies. On the one hand, the evolution of material nature totally increases chaos. This unique changing of our Universe we will call *sympoevolution* (from-universe). On the other hand, *bioevolution* locally increases organization by means of cyclic processes in plants and animals, which we will in general call *zonses* (from-a living being). Because of its locality and trend the secondary zonsic tendency opposes to the primary material tendency, and thus gives the phenomenon of Life a cosmical character. And last but not least is *pneuevolution* (from-spirit), where the locally existing consciousness returns to the limitless Universe, supporting on itself in its march towards achieving the world. Thanks to this self-opposing the ideal substance consciousness converts its holder into a Spirit, which is the third cosmic phenomenon—see the most general scheme of the world.

### THE MOST GENERAL SCHEME OF THE WORLD

<i>phenomenon</i>	<i>substance</i>	<i>tendency</i>
Universe	matter	towards total increasing of chaos
Life	zonses	towards local increasing of organization
Spirit	consciousness	towards achieving the world



## Human Essence and the Discipline of Physics

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By itself matter is only an immediately existing actuality. But still in the act of the most elementary self-reproduction of a zonse it increases its organization and thus faces the self-dispersing structurality of matter. To this opposition, the immediately existing actuality divides into a subjective reality of the zonse and an objective reality of its surroundings. However, the zonse may accomplish its opposition to the surroundings only if it cognizes this surroundings. In this way cognition mediates the existence of the zonse and that is why the zonse becomes a mediately existing actuality.

Cognition arises as a means for carrying out of the zonsic tendency and in general consists in mediating of actuality. In the case of the simplest zonses, without a nervous system, mediating is exhausted by perceiving the immediate relation between the zonse and its surroundings, which is the first basic form of cognition. Due to the image so perceived in the zonse its reaction becomes an adequate reaction, or *action*. A plant is an example of a perceptive zonse (from the word *perception*), remaining within the frames of the primary perceptions, which, when appropriate conditions are available, only develops the zonsotype set in the germ of the organism (The word *zonsotype* means both the genotypical and the remaining inherited factors in the zonsic germ<sup>1</sup>). And the zonse with a nervous system (a specialized organ of cognition—*gnoseorgan*) is a conceptive zonse (from the word *conception*) usually called an animal. The *gnoseorgan* perceives the images far more perfectly than the remaining part of the organism and at the same time transforms them into independently existing concepts. Transforming perception into conception is the second basic form of cognition. Whereas by perception the zonse can reflect only transitory relation, conception enables it to become estranged from the impressions of moment. Then the zonse has a possibility to conceive also the course of evolution, and so this cognition converts its action into *activity*. The unity of perceptions and conceptions in an animal's *gnoseorgan* represents in general its soul, where the body of the animal is reflected as well. At this stage of bioevolution cognition is delimited from the zonsic tendency without opposing to it, because their interrelation does not lead further than to increasing chaos through organization. But the development of the opposition between the zonsic and the material tendencies stimulates the conceptive zonse to be reflective also of the images in its soul. In this self-mediating the soul faces itself by being conscious of itself. From the point of view of this self-opposing actuality is divided into an ideal reality of consciousness and non-ideal reality of the rest of the world. In general, reality is a correlatively given actuality, and self-opposing in consciousness is thinking, which is the third basic form of cogni-



tion. The notive zones (from the word *notion*) mediates the images in its consciousness, thus mediating also every reality until the symbol is created, which signifies the essence of the phenomenon grasped in a notion. Fertilized by this way of the thought, the activity of the notive zonse becomes *labour* and the subject rises to a personality.

If cognition, in general, is mediating of actuality, then logic, generally, is the way of mediating, and we call human knowledge the result of thinking. Because thinking reflects the unown objective and subjective realities, as well as its own ideal reality, it creates generality of knowledge, which represents truth in general. Science is that cognitive human activity, in which, the very knowledge is mediated. Here cognition goes deeply into knowledge by abstracting itself from the covered stages, as a result of which a new and more effective knowledge than the initial one is received. When cognition, in such a manner, makes itself its own subject, it attains knowledge, by which it finds itself in its own generality. That is why this own cognition, or Cognition, represents a becoming of cognition into the own itself. Then the own science, or Science, forms the factual side of Cognition, where in its own logic, or Logic, becoming has as a subject matter itself. It is interesting to note that the basic notions of the so outlined human essence are connected in a scheme, which corresponds to the scheme of five elements (earth, water, air, fire, ether) used by the ancient Greeks for explaining the world-see the most general scheme of human essence.


Man is a triune knot of the material, the live and the realizing nature in our three-ways determined world. That is why human essence finds its actual dimensions not so much in the objective manifestations and not so completely in the subjective expression but only in the bosom of spirit, where a measure of the greatness is the degree of the own overcoming. This overcoming is the supreme human freedom. Because of that the freedom of every man is carried out on three mutually irreducible levels : a) factual freedom-determined by the benefits at his disposal; b) formal freedom-measured by his rights in society; c) full freedom-he achieves by overcoming his spiritual narrowness. In its turn his factual freedom has three mutually complementing sides : a) his personal qualities-bodily, souly and spiritually, of which he disposes by using himself; b) his recognized property-material, live and ideal things, of which he legally can dispose; c) his social status-of which he inalienably disposes<sup>2</sup>.

That is why human activity forms a system, whose utmost general structure is found by combining the three basic forms of cognition with the three mutually irreducible realities. Thus, depending on its



grounds, human activity initially is divided into perceptive, conceptive, and notive spheres. And its purposefulness to the objective, to the subjective or to the ideal realities leads to a next triunity in its subdividing: For generality of knowledge, however, the so obtained nine main kinds of unown human activity are united in Science. Thereby the triunity is laid also at the very becoming of human cognition, which reaches its utmost unity only when it passes through the entire road to its own reality, and removes in Logic the differences among its forms as a knowledge for the way of its own becoming. In this way Cognition is set apart as an own human activity, which encompasses all kinds of human activity in a triadic universal decimal classification (TUDC) of the entire human activity—see the most general scheme of human activity<sup>3</sup>.

### THE MOST GENERAL SCHEME OF HUMAN ESSENCE



MAN IS SPIRIT,  
SPIRIT IS TRIUNITY,  
WE ARE MORTAL GOOD !



## THE MOST GENERAL SCHEME OF HUMAN ACTIVITY

- |                 |  |
|-----------------|--|
| 0. Cognition    | -based on itself                           |
| 1. physics      |  |
| 2. technique    | —based on perception                       |
| 3. arts         |  |
| 4. formalics    | —in more narrow sense called “mathematics” |
| 5. language     | —based on conception                       |
| 6. beliefs      |  |
| 7. philosophy   |  |
| 8. government   | —based on notion                           |
| 9. descriptions |  |

Every man is a local trinity. On that account we comprehend actuality in the guise of finite images, which are objectively determined in the perceptive sphere, subjectively determined in the conceptive sphere and ideally determined in the notive sphere. To these three kinds of images correspond objects, topics and ideas respectively, jointly called things. If as a classifying feature of the most general kinds of human activity now we use its purposefulness to the objective, to the subjective or to the ideal realities it is divided into :

1. objective labour—incarnatings of the spirit :
  1. making objects—technique
  2. forming topics—language
  3. applying ideas—government
2. subjective labour—experiences of the spirit :
  1. Objective creation—arts
  2. subjective creation—beliefs
  3. ideal creation—descriptions
3. ideal labour—realizings of the spirit:
  1. in the objective reality—physics
  2. in the subjective reality—formalics
  3. in the ideal reality—philosophy
  4. in its own reality—Cognition

The quintessence Cognition immediately comes from physics, formalics and philosophy, which are the human activities nearest to it. Because of that in cognition generally there are three utmost fundamental scientific disciplines :

- (a) Physics—directed to the empirical, the external, the primary—seeking for factual truth
- (b) formalics—directed to the regular, the internal, the secondary—seeking for formal truth
- (c) philosophy—directed to the entire, the unitary, the synthesis—seeking for full truth.

To the three utmost fundamental scientific disciplines correspond three principally different ways of thinking in:



- (a) penetrating in the objective reality-factual logic,  
where the thought finds itself as a primary actuality of element
- (b) extracting the subjective reality—formal logic  
where the thought finds itself as a secondary actuality or law
- (c) grasping the ideal reality—full logic,  
where the thought finds itself as a synthesis actuality or symbol;

Considered in this way, physics is a universal discipline, encompassing all human knowledge from its objective side, whereas the universal discipline formalics encompasses all human knowledge from its subjective side, and the universal discipline philosophy encompasses the same knowledge from its ideal side—see Fig. 1. The more concrete field of every one of the remaining possibly most fundamental scientific disciplines is determined by the kind of relevant unown human activity, which each of them has for its subject. That is why after the universal disciplines physics, formalics and philosophy, as possibly most general the disciplines technics, linguistics, politics, the study of beliefs and descriptics are lined up. At that technics, linguistics and politics form a group of the most general objective disciplines, called also, “exact sciences”, to which irrelevantly are added the universal ideal disciplines physics and formalics as well. And the study of arts, the study of beliefs and descriptics form a group of the most general subjective disciplines, called also “humanities” or “arts”, to which irrelevantly is added the universal ideal discipline philosophy as well. From this utmost general system of human cognition, the primitiveness of the division of all disciplines only in “exact” and in “humanitarian” disciplines is seen.




Fig. 1



In its turn the universal discipline of physics is divided most generally into one synthesis direction measurement and nine more specialized directions, which are grouped in this way:

# 1. Physics

## 0. measurement

- |                          |                           |
|--------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1. corpuscular mechanics | —corpuscular approach     |
| 2. fields mechanics      | —fields approach          |
| 3. systems mechanics     | —systems approach         |
| 4. microworld            | —downward from the atoms  |
| 5. mesoworld             | —of the human sizes       |
| 6. megaworld             | —upward from the galaxies |
| 7. sympology             | —for the material nature  |
| 8. biology               | —for the live nature      |
| 9. pneuology             | —for the realizing nature |

Here the notion measurement means correlating in the objective reality, directed to our penetrating in it, which undoubtedly lies in the basis of the entire physics. The specialized directions of physics in the first triad are formed by our different approaches to actuality, the directions in the second triad are determined by our place in the material nature, and the directions in the third triad are set apart by the kinds of mutually irreducible actualities.

The contents of now learned discipline of physics in the school, college and university education is only a part of the contents of the so determinated discipline of sympology, which encompasses all disciplines for material nature such as chemistry and astronomy for example. In other words, the discipline of sympology represents an initial exposition of the universal discipline physics, that has for a subject only material nature. This exposition will be natural when it is in compliance with the principle for a gradual transiting from the immediate and the simple to the more and more mediate and complicated when the utmost wide scope of physics is outlined. For that purpose sympology starts with the study of mesoworld (form medial, central), where the three main approaches in physics are consecutively developed on the objective analysis of the sensitive facts. On this basis, a united picture of mesoworld is built, further to be used for a smooth entering into the nearer to us microworld and in the furtherer of us megaworld.

With a view to these ideas, and to the present circumstances under which the basic course in physics in the colleges and universities is found, this course should be built according to the next



## Human Essence and the Discipline of Physics

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## EXEMPLARY SYLLABUS

0. Introduction
1. Mechanics of Bodies
  1. Mechanics of Corpuscle
  2. Mechanics of Solid Body
  3. Mechanics of System of Bodies
2. Restoring Processes
  1. Elastic Oscillations
  2. Electromagnetic Oscillations
  3. Elastic Waves
  4. Electromagnetic Waves
3. Spontaneous Processes
  1. Thermodynamical Consideration
  2. Statistical Consideration
  3. Structure and Properties of the Substance
4. Mesomechanics
  1. Principles of Mesomechanics
  2. Mechanics of Uninterrupted Media
  3. Limitive Mechanics
5. Gravitational Interaction
  1. Gravitational Forces
  2. Gravitational Field
  3. Gravitation and Cosmos
6. Electromagnetic Interaction
  1. Electric Forces
  2. Electric Field
  3. Flux of Electric Charges
  4. Magnetic Field
  5. Electromagnetism
  6. Electromagnetic Radiation
7. Micromechanics
  1. Microobjects
  2. Atom
  3. Atomic Nucleus
  4. Quanta of Matter
  5. Condensed Media
  6. Information Systems
8. Megamechanics
  1. Cosmic Bodies and Systems
  2. Contemporary Theory of Gravitation
  3. Metagalaxy
9. Conclusion

In the introduction of the course, the position of the universal discipline of physics in the system of human knowledge is outlined and the program for its initial presentation as symphony is laid down. The study of mesoworld starts with its most simple idealization in the



division Mechanics of Bodies, where the corpuscular approach is developed. The division ends by introducing the notion of material system and by discussing stability of its equilibrium and of its motion. In the second division, the restoring processes are considered as the simplest changes of the material system, in which the system returns in its stable state. Depending on interrelation between the continuance for spreading of the local changes into the system and the continuance for the changing of the system as a whole, the restoring Processes themselves are divided into oscillations and waves. The generality of this fields description is straight away underlined with the united studying of elastic and electromagnetic oscillations, as well as of elastic and electromagnetic waves in the frames of wave equation. In the third division the material system is considered in itself in its own inner determination. And the commensurable with us material systems reveal their inner determination when they are studied as parts of a whole, which we do in the thermodynamic consideration, as well as when they are studied as a unity of elementary components, which we do in the statistic consideration. Thus in these three mutually complementing and more and more abstract studies of the mesoworld consecutively are mastered the corpuscular, the fields and the systems approaches in physics. Only in the fourth division the mesomechanics is built as a completed picture of mesoworld with the theme Limitive Mechanics, know under the name "Special Theory of Relativity". Here the existing of a limitive speed  $c$  of spreading of the local changes is obtained as a natural consequence from the combining of the principle for the full equivalence of the inertial frames of reference with the principle for the consecutive spreading of the local changes and with the implicit principle for the finite determination of the objects in mesoworld. Mesomechanics is a limitive logical system also due to the fact that every micromechanics and respectively megamechanics built by us in limit must turn into it.

The division Gravitational Interactional leads from the idealizations of mesomechanics to the studying of megaworld, and the division Electromagnetic Interaction leads to the studying of microworld. The consecutive presentation of the two divisions taking out from mesoworld enables us to emphasize the analogy and the differences between gravitational and electromagnetic interactions. Along with this such a presentation also shows an unsoundness of mesomechanics to describe megaworld and microworld, which is of different kind. The adequate describing of microworld is considered in the division Micromechanics, starting with an analysis of the nature of microobjects. In the analysis, laws specific for microworld are revealed, used further for studying of the structure of the atom,



of the atomic nucleus and of the smallest individually existing quanta of matter. This knowledge is used for more thorough and exact describing of the material systems in the theme Condensed Media. As the highest synthesis of the micromechanics and the mesomechanics the theme Information Systems outlines the information level in the development of material nature, which leads to rising of life, and after that, of realizing nature.

Most generally, the megaworld is studied by exposing the basis of the corpuscular, the fields and the systems megamechanics. In the corpuscular megamechanics, where cosmogony enters, space distribution and evolution of cosmic bodies and of their systems are considered. Fields megamechanics includes the contemporary views on gravitation, and in systems megamechanics, where cosmology enters all mechanics are united. The concluding theme is devoted to synthesis direction *measurement*, which inevitably relies on our understanding of physics as a whole and, in its turn, contributes to the formation of this understanding.

The exemplary syllabus so exposed has been published in <sup>5</sup>under the title The Natural Structure of the Discipline of Physics. Its ideas have been applied in writing of the laboratory guide in physics<sup>6</sup>. In my last publication on this theme. Laboratory Practicum in Physics in the Higher Technical Institutes<sup>7</sup>, the elaboration of the basic course in physics in the institutions of higher education has received its next development.

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## Krishnamurti and Sankaracharya : A Close Perspective of their Views on Freedom

A. P. Sharma

### Introductory :

If we try to examine J. Krishnamurti's and Sankaracharya's philosophical views we find that there is some commonness and uncommonness in their approach towards human freedom. As philosophers both presented unparalleled views in that respect. Both lived like ascetics and devoted themselves for the good of the humanity.

Though Krishnamurti stayed in posh colonies and bungalows in England and in other European countries, he had no attachment to those things in life. The best example of this kind can be witnessed from his life when at the Omen Camp on the 22nd August in 1929 he dissolved the Order of the Star. He announced :

I maintain that the Truth is a pathless land, and you cannot approach it by any path whatsoever, by any religion, by any sect. That is my point of view, and I adhere to that absolutely and unconditionally.<sup>1</sup>

Thus after dissolving the order, he never became a member of any sect in his remaining years of life. He did not believe in any gurus nor in any kind of organization, religious or other.

Sankaracharya was born in 788 AD and lived till 820 AD. He lived a renounced life almost from the very beginning and devoted his whole life for The good of the people of this country. He began by being worshipper of the Goddess Sakti but later on became a vaisnava and then after some time renounced the world to become a 'sanyasin'.<sup>2</sup>

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- 1 Lutyens, Mary., *Krishnamurti : The Years of Awakening*, Straus and Giroux, New York, 1975, p. 272.
  - 2 Sharma, R. N., *Indian Philosophy*, Orient Longman Ltd., New Delhi, 1972, p. 281.



**Krishnamurti's Views on Freedom :**

Before discussing matters relating to freedom, Krishnamurti describes various kinds of plight and bondage, which are the main cause of non-freedom. Without wasting any time in reading any scriptures or religious books, he projected his unique philosophical views on the issues which hinder human freedom. In this respect he highlights various limitations and impediments such as fear, conditioning, word and thought etc., which do not allow man to see things clearly and as a result he cannot reach the realm of freedom. He states :

You are all depending for spirituality on someone else, for your happiness on some one else, for your enlightenment, for glory, for the purification, and for the incorruptibility of the self, not one of you is willing to do it.<sup>3</sup>

In Krishnamurti's views 'awareness' is one of the important aspects of human freedom. In his definition of the term 'awareness' one can hear the echo of Sankara's definition of self-realization. Krishnamurti reckons that awareness is a kind of process through which the self is to understand its own activities, the 'I' in its relationship with the people, with ideas and with things. That awareness is from moment to moment and therefore, it cannot be practised. Krishnamurti does not approve of any kind of practice for practising leads to habit formation. Awareness is a sort of observation in which there is a complete communion, the observer and the observed are completely in communion. Awareness is a state of mind through which truth can be perceived.....the truth of 'what is', the simple truth of daily existence that man can go far. As the *near* is understood the distance between the *near* and the *far* is not there.

At another place, while describing the meaning of realization, Krishnamurti states that truth, God or what one will, is not something to be experienced, because the experiencer is the result of time, the result of memory, of the past and so long as there is the experiencer there cannot be reality. He thinks that there is reality only when the mind is completely free from the analyzer, from the experiencer and the experienced. Then the mind itself will find the answer, and will see that the change comes without its asking.....without any invitation. Only in that state is there a possibility of renewal, newness, revolution.<sup>4</sup>

Freedom comes only when man's mind is not influenced by the past. The past is what man is now and is made up of the things which he puts together through desire and its activities. In fact 'the possibility of being free of the past is very light. The man is the result of the past, it is put together by time, by circumstances, by incidents and experience based on the past.'<sup>5</sup>

3 Lutyens, *Years of Awakening*, p. 274.

4 Krishnamurti, *The First and Last Freedom*, Victor Gollancz, London, 1954.

5 Krishnamurti, *Commentaries on Living* (Third Series), Victor Gollancz, London, 1961, p. 280.



Thus, man's attachment with the past leads to 'conditioning' which always limits man's mind from the moment he is born to the moment he dies. Krishnamurti reflects :

For centuries we have been conditioned by nationality, caste, class, tradition, religion, language, education, literature, art, custom, convention, propaganda of all kinds, economic pressure, the food we eat, the climate we live in, our family, our friends, or experience, .....<sup>6</sup>

Thus the age old taboos, belief in tradition and in determinism, which ultimately lead to conditioning, are obviously the barriers to human freedom. Therefore, until we are free from them we are not free.

### Sankara's Concept of Freedom :

In Advaita philosophical discussions similar views on 'freedom', 'mukti' or 'moksa' have been projected. While discussing freedom, the Advaitas try to establish that self-realization is the highest goal of human beings. They conceive self (atman) as eternal (nitya), non-dual (advaita) and unqualified (nirguna) and believe that it remains in bondage so long as it is not aware of itself due to ignorance, which can be dispelled through self-knowledge. Hence self-realization in the case of the Advaita and self-awareness in the case of Krishnamurti, are similar to the state of '*atmanubhuti*' which is said to have been possible by means of enlightenment (*suddhajana*) alone and for this there is no necessity of either taking recourse to different rituals prescribed in tradition (*karma*) or appealing for devotion (*bhakti*) to any supernatural Lord (*Isvara*).<sup>7</sup>

In fact the non-dualistic trend of the Upanishads found its chief defender in Sankara, who made Advaita the main metaphysical school in India. According to Sankara, the world of our experience has only a relative value as such it would not help in self-realization. The opposite between the Real and the Unreal is found in our conscious experience itself and in the area of the 'I' and 'Thou', the subject and the object every thing is split up. Therefore, out of the two, man has to choose one as real and reject the other as unreal. Unless the self knows what is non-real (ignorance), it can never reach the realm of the Real.

The state of non-awareness of duality of the self which Sankara refers to, is almost the same as is pointed out by Krishnamurti. Krishnamurti believes that the consciousness is the realm of the known is always self centered. It cannot exist without the 'I' or the 'me' as its centre. All its actions emanate from the centre called the 'self'. Hence they are separative, self-inclusive, incomplete and inadequate. The known can never have the experience which is holistic, as it is limited and bound by the centre which is 'self'. Since the known is self-centered, all its actions and experiences are of the

6 Krishnamurti, *Freedom From the Known*, Victor Gollancz, London, 1969, p. 25.

7 Kar, Bijayananda Pati, "Is Advaita Mukti Non-Analytical?", *Darshana International*, July 1986, p. 64.



nature of division which implies contradiction. Therefore, the very structure of consciousness in the realm of the known is a contradiction between the opposites.....'what is' and 'what should be', the subject and the object, the thought and the thinker, the observer and the observed, the experiencer and the experienced, the past and the future, the mine and the thine, and the knower and the known. It is this contradiction which brings about conflict which is the source of unhappiness. Hence, all its actions and experiences are sorrow. The self is the centre of all the known; hence all the activities of the self simply brings sorrow.<sup>8</sup>

The Advaitins believe that the self being deceived by illusion created by 'maya' always sees something other than Brahman (Truth). Thus Krishnamurti's contention that the 'self' is the centre from which all its actions emanate' or consciousness is always self-centered is quite parallel to that of Sankara's who also presumes that man's delusions in this world are caused due to 'maya' or ignorance.

#### Commonness And Uncommonness in the Views :

Though both try to reach the problem of freedom through different ways, both believe that the self needs to attain the state of self-awareness or self-realization through which it (self) can perceive the whole truth. Both Sankara and Krishnamurti believe that there is falsity or ignorance in this world which creates bondage and that falsity or ignorance is created due to either 'maya' or deep rooted conditioning. Both Sankara and Krishnamurti believe that the 'self' is able to keep itself free from the dogmas of illogical things and can transcend itself by abandoning the traditional path by seeing the things as they are. Both believe that 'mukti' or freedom can be attained either through a prescribed procedure (Sankara) or without practising any procedure (Krishnamurti).

But in spite of their apparent parallelism there is a deep difference in their approaches towards attainment of freedom. Sankara seems to be more religious in his outlook as he preconceives that there is a Creator of the word—the Brahman, who is also the creator of Maya. Krishnamurti has an untraditional approach. He conceives that the self being conditioned by different things around him, which include tradition, culture, caste, prejudice, fear, past experience, thought, memory etc., is never able to see the Truth as it is. The self is incomplete as it is limited by its previous experiences. Therefore, it builds a centre around itself. As such it starts looking at in a self-centered manner, which ultimately results in contradictions.

Unlike Sankara who is traditional in his outlook and seeks divine shelter to redeem man from ignorance, Krishnamurti is totally anti-traditional and unritualistic and does not prescribe any course for man's redemption. He seeks freedom through "intelligent choiceless awareness", which is not a postulate of any religious dogmas.

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8 Krishnamurti, *Commentaries on Living*, (Second Series), Victor Gollancz, London, 1959, p 244.



## Book-Review

Aaron Antonovsky, editor, *The Sociology of Health and Health Care in Israel*, New Brunswick, N.J. Transaction Publishers, 1990, pp. xxi 278, \$18.95.

Under the sponsorship of the Israeli Sociological Society a series of studies on Israeli society have been published. Edited by Aaron Antonovsky of Ben-Gurion University, the fifth volume in the series consists of twenty five papers organized into three sections : (1) Structural and Cultural Factors in Health and Illness, (2) Role Behavior in Coping with Health and illness, and (3) The Health Services and Professional Socialization.

All twenty five papers have been previously published in journals or in collections of papers. As such, the articles are reproduced as photocopies of the originals, and the type face varies from paper to paper. The editor restricted the selections to papers that had been published in English since 1980. Although the book has sociology in the title, some selections are by anthropologists. Finally, only one individual "is represented more than once as first author" of a paper.

*Social Science and Medicine* is the source of nine of the papers-the others coming from diverse other journals or edited volumes. The topics vary from concerns with health in general to cancer, mental disorder, breast feeding and drug use. The people who were studied varied from medical students, nurses and physicians to a variety of citizen groups, (e.g., immigrants, adolescents, retirees), to patients of one sort or another, (e.g.; psychiatric patients, dialysis patients, and cancer patients). But, as Shuval and Antonovsky indicate, there has been a 'blindness' in studies of health and health problems of the Arab population of Israel; this gap is evident in this volume.

It is impossible to review each of these papers, so I will discuss a few that caught my attention-in order to give readers of this review a sense of the book.

Zuckerman-Boreli investigated the effects of terrorist attacks on the behavior and psychic well-being of members of three kibbutzim (communal settlements) and three moshavim (non-communal settlements). A sample of 200 individuals-100 from each type of settlement-was selected. Nearly all were interviewed; the data were subjected to path analysis, with not totally persuasive results. For example, she found that the severity of border incidents had an effect on social disturbance (people in settlements which have experienced frequent incidents restrain their activities more than those where incidents have been infrequent) but had no effect on emotional well



being. One confounding variable that compromised her conclusions, however, was country of origin. Those in kibbutzim tended to be immigrants from Europe and English speaking countries who came to Israel before its establishment in 1948, whereas those in moshavim were from Arab speaking countries who had arrived after statehood. Thus, the effects of type of settlement were seemingly combined with the effects of ethnicity and the effects of time of arrival; one is unable to discern how the effects of terrorist attacks on psychic well-being were attenuated or exacerbated by any of these other three-variables.

Baider and Abramovitch tell the story of a woman who had immigrated from Kurdistan with her family. At the age of 18 she was married against her will to a first cousin. Because of infertility problems of her husband she was unable to become pregnant (which was seen as her fault and resulted in great stigma); she developed cancer of the breast and consequently had a radical mastectomy. Shon therhaster, a dybbuk 'appeared' in her life. She held discussions with the dybbuk about her future plans. She felt that out of the death from cancer she would produce a child; this would 'solve' her problem of disrepute that had descended on her because of her alleged infertility and because cancer, a disgraceful disease in the eyes of her community, had been visited on her by God as a punishment. The dybbuk might be seen, then, as a cultural manifestaion of mental disorder-but one that served an important function, at least according to the authors. Although I found the author's interpretation unconvincing, her account, despite being that of only one case, was quite informative.

In an interesting paper, Basker also examined the presumed clash between indigenous cultures and the medical-scientific culture: From a study of 102 married Jewish women who sought abortions. Basker discussed one case, which illustrated this clash. A 39 year old Algerian wife, mother of five children, sought an abortion, which would be her second-the first occurring between her third and fourth child. Her fourth child had been delivered by a caesarean section, which the woman explained as being necessary because of the earlier abortion. The last four of her children were unplanned; with each succeeding child she became more ambivalent about having an additional child. She and her husband resisted the use of contraceptives because they felt them unnatural; in their minds any pregnancy was the will of God and shouldn't be interfered with. Instead, they tried to be 'careful', using coitus interruptus, which was not effective. After her fifth child, she experienced headaches and vomiting which was ultimately diagnosed as a gall bladder problem add resulted in the



removal of her gall bladder; before this diagnosis was made, two different gynecologists had seen her and attributed her problems to anxiety over getting pregnant-a misdiagnosis. Baxter saw in this case a clash of native culture with medical culture. The Algerian couple wanted to control their family size, but was unwilling to do so by use of medically prescribed techniques. The conflict, then, was between their traditional values and modern values reflected in contraceptive practices.

Izraeli and Notzer Studied gender differences in the persistence of individuals to become physicians after applications to medical school had been rejected. In 1979 they interviewed 179 males and 34 females who had been rejected 1970 by a Tel Aviv medical school. They found that man reapplied on average 2.8 times in contrast to who reapplied 2.2 times. Ultimately, however, about the same proportion (slightly over half) of the men and women became doctors, though a larger proportion of the woman entered other careers in the health field. They concluded that men were more persistent than woman, though their results are not totally convincing.

These, then, are four of the papers in this volume. Although it is tantalizing in the pictures given, sometimes elliptically, of health and health care in Israel, I can't conclude that it is successful in its attempt at making a unified contribution to medical social science. On the other hand, this book is relevant for a concern with peace, because ultimately peace depends on the attitudes and behavior of individuals. Their inclinations to support actions for peace depends on their interactions with each other the outcomes of those interactions will affect those inclinations. one important type of interaction occurs in individuals' encounters with the medical enterprise. Medical sociology is concerned *inter alia* with the nature and effects of those encounters-a concern well reflected in this book.

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
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